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Foreword  |  7
The social market economy – with an increasingly ecological orientation – has 
proven a successful model for economic development in Germany. It has been 
the basis for reforms to increase competitiveness and growth, allowing Germany 
to become world champion exporter while meeting the challenges of strong 
immigration, reunification, and increased globalization with little social unrest. 
It reflects a basic set of values, shared by most Germans, which combines free 
market with social and ecological principles. 
In 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development issued Social and Ecological Market Economy Principles in German 
Development Policy, which details how this successful German and European 
tradition of economic, social, and ecological policy design can be used to orient 
German development cooperation.
The GTZ Sector Network Sustainable Economic Development Asia 
immediately took up the issue, and at their 2007 meeting, GTZ advisors in the 
field of economic policy and private sector development debated the significance 
of the model of the social and ecological market economy for various Asian 
countries. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
GmbH is the technical cooperation implementing organization of German 
development cooperation and is active in most Asian countries. The sector 
network offers a forum for GTZ advisors and others in the field of sustainable 
economic development to exchange experiences and discuss international good 
practices as well as lessons learnt from practical implementation.
It was at this point that the editors decided to assemble this reader in order 
to further explore the question which its title poses: “The Social and Ecological 
Market Economy – A Model for Asian Development?” We feel that the model 
of the social and ecological market economy can provide a perspective from 
which to approach the many unresolved questions in the region, and, after many 
discussions with our partners in government agencies and the private sector, 
we have come to believe that Asian perceptions of the state, the economy, and 
social values potentially match the concepts of the social and ecological market 
economy in many areas. 
At the core of the reader are articles by GTZ practitioners, primarily members 
of the above-mentioned sector network, who provide examples of how elements 
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of the social and ecological market economy are reflected in the portfolio 
of German development cooperation in the region and also reflect on what 
needs to be done to develop this further. These articles are complemented by 
the perspective of German researchers and policy advisors, who reflect on the 
current reform debate in Germany, and the perspective of Asian partner country 
representatives, who outline their own understanding of why the German model 
may be of relevance to sustainable development in their countries – using the 
model not as a blueprint, but as a starting point for dialogue. An introductory 
section sets the framework by outlining the different elements of the social and 
ecological market economy and by reflecting on GTZ’s corporate philosophy in 
relation to the model.
This book could not have been completed without the contributions of the 
authors; we want to thank them for their readiness to participate in this project. 
Furthermore, we are very grateful to Katja Röckel, who played an essential role in 
coordinating the logistics of preparing this reader and contributed substantially 
to its content. We also would like to thank, in particular, Dr. Marianne Scholte 
for her tireless and outstanding editorial work. Without these two, this reader 
would not have materialized.
Corinna Küsel
Ulrike Maenner
Ricarda Meissner
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Introduction  –  From Political to Economic Competition
The social market economy is one in which social concerns are accorded the same 
importance as economic concerns. Faced with contemporary environmental challenges, 
the social market economy must of necessity become an ecologically oriented economy.1 
But the ecological orientation should not dilute the traditional social market economy 
“brand”. The ecological ingredients of the social and ecological market economy 
(SEME) are as important as its market elements and social characteristics. However, 
if the market does not work and if economic policy is not combined with preventive 
and compensatory social policy, the ecological dimension cannot be effectively 
incorporated into a social market economy. So, the terms market, social, and ecological 
should chime with each other as equally essential elements in a melodious triad.
Until the 1980s, the world was divided into competing political and ideological 
systems. The main question was: Is society better off and more just if the economy is 
centrally planned – as in the former Soviet Union or in China until 1979 – than is the 
case in a capitalist market economy? Or could there be a third way2 in which the state 
1Market here means as much competition as possible and suitable for society. Social means caring 
for the weaker members of society and keeping in mind the interests of society. Ecological means 
caring for the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, recycling, alternative energies, 
traditional energy savings, etc. in the respective country and worldwide. 
2The “third way” was launched as a programmatic approach by the British Labor Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in 2000. In English-speaking countries, the question is often raised as to the difference 
between the social market economy and the third way. The term third way could mean anything 
between communism and capitalism, between centrally planned and free market economies. The 
term social market economy, however, contains the clear message that the market elements are 
at the same level as social care. In terms of content, the third way model, which was above all a 
political concept for the reform process in Great Britain, is close to the neo-liberal approach (see 
Fig. 1), because the state increasingly relinquishes the production of public goods like transport, 
infrastructure, health care, education, and other services, privatizing them. Social subsidies to the 
weaker members of society are reduced, in an attempt to give them more incentives to care for 
themselves and release the state from high social costs. Alfred Schueller discusses several third 
ways to show how ambiguous this concept is. See Alfred Schueller, “Soziale Marktwirtschaft und 
Dritte Wege”  (Social market economy and third ways), ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Band 51 (2000):169-202.
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is as important an economic player as the market?  Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the market-oriented model has asserted itself, albeit with different political 
shades from country to country: greater or less state interference, more or less influence 
of civil society organizations. The main question today is: which type of market 
economy is most effective in terms of economic success, social justice, and ecological 
sustainability?3 Thus, the debate has moved on from the political to the economic. 
Globalization has opened up and accelerated worldwide communication 
processes. Information about what is going on in different countries has 
increased enormously.  This enables competitors to adapt or imitate successful 
techniques and products much more quickly than before. Before the 1990s, 
it was relatively easy to insulate a country from outside influences, to exclude 
the majority of the population from access to relevant information, and to 
protect national enterprises from foreign competitors through custom barriers 
and other means of discrimination. There was scarcely any public discussion 
at that time about the damaging ecological effects of some types of economic 
activity.4  
Today, democratic governments, which by definition are committed to plurality 
of opinion and freedom of information, neither wish nor would be able to cut 
the population off from foreign influences. Even authoritarian and totalitarian 
governments can impede global information flow into their country only by 
means of strong repression. The internet and international trade agreements, 
especially the World Trade Organization, and various regional groupings have 
strengthened international interaction.
In this world of free information, economic competition between countries 
has become tougher. This has brought about a more intense search for the 
most effective economic system. For about a decade, this competition has been 
dominated by three issues:
1)  How can the wealth and educational level of the population be increased 
and, if achieved, how can it be sustained?  
2)  How can economic growth and improved knowledge be distributed in a 
way that allows as many people as possible to participate?  
3In economic terms, the world is far from the thesis of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History 
and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Its validity is doubtful even in political terms, 
given the Chinese approach or that of the “neo-socialist” Venezuelan  President Chávez and his 
followers Morales (Bolivia),  Correa (Ecuador), and Ortega (Nicaragua).
4The statement of a former Brazilian minister of economy – “The darker the clouds, the better 
for our economic growth” – expresses the viewpoint of many developing countries and some 
industrialized countries, too.
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In this contest for the most effective social market economy model, ecological 
sustainability has gained more and more ground. Possibly – and in my view, 
ideally – the environmental dimension will come to be recognized worldwide as 
the third criterion for measuring the effectiveness of any economic system.
Figure 1: Range of Economic Systems and Influence of the Economic Actors
So, current discussion no longer gravitates between the extreme positions 
of a centrally planned economy linked to authoritarian government and a free 
market economy associated with liberal government. In most countries today, 
the discussion revolves around a more neo-liberal or neo-conservative model and 
a more socialist or social-democratic market economy (see Figure 1). Between 
those two alternatives lies the social and ecological market economy (SEME), an 
open and flexible system that may be adjusted according to the time and situation 
in different countries. That is why SEME is not a fixed point on the scale of 
economic systems, but rather a range which may move to the left or to the right 
according to particular needs and circumstances (see Figure 1).5
5For example, if unemployment increases, the state or its employment agency must become more 
active (the model moves to the left) than would be the case in times of full employment (the 
model is situated more to the right). The fluctuation of the SEME model showing the necessary 
adjustments can be illustrated through many  more examples: the effects of a more or less severe 
economic crisis; higher or lower inflation; needs for greater environmental protection; problems 
of energy supply; insufficient health care; demographic changes; adjustments of the foreign 
exchange rate and foreign trade; etc.  
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In the European Union (EU), which has expanded from an economic 
community of six founding countries in 19586 to 27 countries7 with about 500 
million people, the member states have opted for a market economy molded 
by more or less important social and ecological elements. In search of the 
most effective system, one which offers economic efficiency, social justice, and 
ecological protection, the EU distinguishes four models8:
•  the Mediterranean model (MM), as found in Greece, Southern Italy, and 
Portugal;
•  the Continental model (CM), as found in France, Germany, 
Northern Italy, and Austria;
• the Nordic model (NM), as found in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark; 
• the Anglo-Irish model (AIM), as found in Great Britain and Ireland.
These models show variations in relation to state influence, tax systems, 
flexibility of labor markets, pension systems, redistribution instruments, open 
market competition, environmental protection, etc. The ten states which joined 
the EU in 2004, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007, are still 
experimenting with different elements of the four models. As Figure 1 shows, the 
SEME model differs from the socialist and the free market economy models by 
virtue of such factors as the relative influence of government (G), the role of civil 
society (CS), and individual responsibility (IR) in society and in the economy. 
Aims of the Social and Ecological Market Economy
“Welfare for all” as Economic Target
The call for “welfare to all”, which provided the title to the book by Ludwig Erhard,9 
the pragmatic pioneer of the social market economy and the first minister of economy 
6Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
7The six countries named above plus Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,  Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
8The economic and social situations of the EU member states were analyzed in the Sapir Report. 
See André Sapir et al., An Agenda for a Growing Europe – Making the EU Economic System 
Deliver (Brussels: the EU Commission, July 2003).
9Ludwig Erhard, Wohlstand für Alle (Welfare for all) (Düsseldorf:  Econ-Verlag, 1957). Erhard 
became the first minister of economy of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. His approach 
was, at that time, vigorously opposed by the Social Democratic Party, which was in favor of 
more state planning. Only after the model proved successful did the different democratic parties 
generally accept it, while frequently debating its different elements.
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in Germany after World War II, does not suggest that all citizens are at the same level of 
welfare. Every country naturally has more and less well-off people, and their condition 
is not always related to individual effort or merit. However, the social market economy 
should enable the vast majority of people to participate in the wealth of the nation, 
either through their own endeavors or with the help of society, thus allowing for a 
significant level of individual dignity.  It should deliver a decent standard of living and 
open access to education and professional training. Nobody should live in poverty.
Several factors combine to achieve this aim of welfare for all. The creation of 
wealth, normally measured by economic growth, depends greatly on investment. 
This presupposes an adequate savings rate, possibly promoted or supported by the 
state. Savings, however, make sense only if there is price stability. Inflation is poison 
to the enterprise of creating welfare for all. Certainly, investments can be financed 
temporarily through credit; however, credit must be repaid one day. Individuals 
normally respect this obligation, while governments often go into debt at the 
expense of their citizens, sometimes even at the expense of future generations.10 
Therefore a balanced government budget is equally essential to the creation of welfare 
for all.  Ideally, all current expenses of the state should be covered by tax revenues.
Economic growth can also be driven by foreign investment. This implies a 
higher risk of volatility because of speculative capital transfers or withdrawal 
of profits and/or capital. Thus, solid economic growth leading to welfare for all 
requires a sound internal savings rate.
Innovation is also decisive for economic growth. No country achieves real growth of 
5% or more through increased production of traditional goods and services alone. There 
must also be a qualitative approach. This is apparent from the experience of Germany 
and Japan after World War II, later on from that of some Asian countries like 
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and more recently from India and Chile. 
Other fast growing countries like China, Vietnam, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, having started with the quantitative approach, are now being forced 
to pay more attention to innovation if they are to continue playing an important 
role in the global economy. In Europe, Ireland and Finland have opted very 
successfully in the last decade for the qualitative approach to economic growth, 
and Germany, a bit too comfortable in the 1980s and 1990s, now seems to 
have left its sleeping-beauty period. New products and new technologies are 
vital to the opening of new markets. This in turn allows for a reduction of costs and 
10Public debt crises of the last 30 years, like those of Latin America, Asia, and Russia, show how 
quickly countries can be thrown back. In Germany, the constitution limits the debt that the state 
can incur. It states that the government should borrow only for investment purposes, not to cover 
current administrative costs.  The EU has established that member states should not contract 
debts higher than 3% of their GDP.
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a concomitant increase in competitiveness.11 The more productively employed the 
population, the greater the chance to achieve welfare for all. Full employment12 in the 
strict sense of the word can hardly be achieved in a dynamic economy, because of the 
fluctuations within the different economic sectors. This phenomenon is reinforced by 
globalization.13 Therefore, workers and managers need to be highly flexible and mobile. 
The effort to create welfare for all is not confined to the national economy alone. Foreign 
markets must be considered as well, in terms of both exports and imports, if countries are 
to benefit from their comparative advantages. The economic development of China 
after 1980 shows this clearly. Opening its market to foreign investments and goods, 
China learned from foreign experience. It imported the raw materials and technology 
necessary for industrial modernization and became increasingly able to export, to the 
extent that it is expected to overtake Germany as world export leader in 2008. 
Exports increase welfare by creating more employment. Imports increase welfare by 
bringing new, better, or cheaper products into a country, as well as putting competitive 
pressure on internal prices and thus raising real income. However, large export or import 
surpluses that are not accompanied by high capital imports or exports, respectively, 
disturb the macroeconomic balance and could endanger general welfare. Foreign trade 
equilibrium is therefore another important factor which facilitates welfare for all.
The art of politics is called upon to give effect to the above-mentioned aims 
and to enable countries to react quickly in the case of imbalance. The achievement 
of an acceptable level of welfare for all does not justify sitting back or resting on 
one’s laurels. Internal or external influences can disrupt this dynamic equilibrium 
very easily, if attention is focused mainly on creating wealth and insufficiently on 
its distribution. Sooner or later, the concentration of wealth in certain echelons 
of society or in certain regions will engender social conflicts. The social market 
economy model obliges the state to pay attention to fair income redistribution14 
11Some countries try to innovate through attracting foreign investment, offering tax advantages, 
low labor costs, less regulations, and lower environment protection standards. But growth created 
in this way is rather artificial and brings only transitional benefits, especially if the process is not 
based on well-trained workers, a high level of engineering and managerial skills, the ability to 
innovate, and the protection of intellectual property rights.  
12Generally, when the unemployment rate is less than 4%, a country may be said to have full 
employment.
13For example, the textile industry, once an important production sector in industrial countries, 
has been reduced as Asian countries have taken up production of everyday textiles. So workers 
from this sector have had to look for jobs in other areas.
14In many countries which benefited from globalization, a stronger concentration of wealth on 
fewer persons can be observed. Therefore, a political debate arises as to whether the state should 
redistribute not only income but wealth, too, for example, by taxation of inheritance. 
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and balanced regional policy. If economic growth is concentrated on a certain 
region, a “backwash effect”15 may be expected.  This can be observed in China, as 
dynamic people migrate from backward regions into more prosperous ones, thus 
hobbling any chance of improvement in the backward regions.
Social Justice as Political and Economic Aim 
Social has a double meaning. On the one hand, the term relates to society and 
on the other, to the concept of welfare services as in social security. Social justice 
is achieved through social security measures, like health services, pension systems, 
etc. and the redistribution of income in favor of those who cannot help themselves. 
This is not the place to discuss the philosophy of justice. In economic terms, social 
justice means equal opportunities, facilitated by a sufficiently open educational 
system. It means as well that those who make a greater effort should obtain more 
benefits. However, the satisfaction of basic needs like food, housing, and healthcare 
may be taken as a minimum standard. Social justice, in economic terms, cannot be 
measured exactly.16 In the end, it has to be judged politically by the majority of the 
population through the process of democratic elections. The notion of social justice 
for all is somewhat idealistic because, while human beings are of course all equal 
under the law, they are unequal in terms of potential, ambition, and expectations.17
In spite of this fact, a stable and successful society can be achieved only if it is 
organized as justly as possible. The best way to realize this aim is through open access 
to education. Also in this field not everybody has the same ability or willingness to 
learn and one cannot force people to engage with a lifelong learning process. But it 
is highly important that the door to education and professional training is open to 
everybody and not restricted by economic or social background.18
15This effect has been analyzed by Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions 
(London: Duckworth, 1957), contradicting Albert O. Hirschman’s plea in The Strategy of 
Economic Development (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1958) for creating development 
poles and expecting a “trickle-down effect” from these. See Dieter. W. Benecke, Kooperation und 
Wachstum in Entwicklungsländern (Cooperation and economic growth in developing countries) 
(Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1972), 33. 
16In 2007, the 17th Congress of China’s Communist Party, obviously aware of the current 
concentration of wealth, set a harmonious society as a central goal. Such an aim cannot be 
achieved without social justice, but might be a step towards the SEME.
17The British writer George Orwell, known for his critical view of the almighty state (1984, “Big Brother 
is watching you”) satirizes former communist ideology in his novel Animal Farm. While starting the 
“revolution” of the animals against their farmer with the slogan “All animals are equal”, after a short while 
the pigs in power complement the slogan with the addendum that “some are more equal than others”.
18The Pisa Study, which regularly analyzes the knowledge level in different countries, shows that the 
efficiency of the educational system corresponds with the economic and social performance of a country.
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Environmental Compatibility of Economic Policy as Ecological Aim
Since the 1970s, the economic and social aims of the social market economy model 
have been complemented by ecological goals. Although efficient waste disposal or 
recycling was important even before, the discussion about energy shortages, the 
expansion of the ozone hole, and climate change have increased ecological awareness 
of the population and has pushed the state to include environmental elements in 
the social market economy. Thus, states have passed laws and regulations which 
limit emissions, require the installation of filters, and enforce recycling and have 
established tax incentives or subsidies for alternative energies, energy saving, and 
the development of new environmentally friendly technologies.
In the beginning, industry and households took a defensive approach to 
ecological needs. This cost factor, however, soon turned into profitable activity, 
with the production of filter systems and waste recycling and incineration plants, 
the development of alternative energy sources like solar cells, geo-thermal warming, 
wind farms, and biofuels,19 and the promotion of energy-saving techniques. In this 
way, a huge new market was created with enormous potential for growth.
International pressure has driven the ecological agenda in some countries. 
The Kyoto Conference20 in 1997 and subsequent agreements have played an 
important role in this. In Europe, politicians have recognized that the Kyoto 
target is insufficient to reduce global warming. At the initiative of the German 
government, EU member states agreed in 2007 to reduce carbon dioxide and 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% and to increase the production of renewable 
19Meanwhile, biofuel has become a contested international issue. Brazil and the USA have brought 
their common interest in biofuel production almost in line. Venezuela’s President Chávez, together 
with former Cuban President Fidel Castro and the Movement of Landless People in Brazil (MST), 
started a campaign against biofuel, arguing that the production of biofuel raw material prevents 
small farmers from producing food. In the EU currently, the policy of bonuses for agricultural land 
not used for the production of food has changed. In recent years, farmers used their land, at least 
partially, for the production of biofuel raw material. Now, as prices for milk products, meat, and 
flour have increased sharply (in part because of the great demand in China), European farmers once 
again get bonuses for using their land for food production.     
20In this conference, the 55 countries which produced over half the worldwide emissions of 
carbon dioxide agreed a protocol to reduce the 1990 level of emissions by 5.2% by 2012. By 2007, 
169 countries had signed this protocol but the USA, the greatest offender, has not yet done so, 
and China, the second greatest offender, is reluctant to fix quantitative goals for emissions. The 
Bali Conference on Climate Change in 2007 again demonstrated the confrontation between 
more progressive countries, for example the EU states, and more reluctant states like the USA, 
China, India, Russia, and several developing countries. The latter argue – and this is correct – that 
the industrialized countries have caused a large part of the current ecological damage and that 
their priority is to reduce poverty and pursue more dynamic development.
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energy by 20% by 2020 (“20-20-20”). At the Bali Conference on Climate Change 
in 2007, the 190 participant states also recognized that the Kyoto aims were 
insufficient, but could not commit themselves to quantitative aims. However, 
they agreed to draw up a new international protocol by 2009, which will commit 
the industrialized country to greater reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, but 
will also demand more pollution control from the developing countries.
Great political skill and intense dialogue between the state, enterprises, trade unions, 
and consumer organizations are required to harmonize economic, social, and ecological 
aims. Once more, it should be emphasized that ecological aims can only be achieved 
effectively in a dynamic economy that places importance on the future of society. In 
spite of a certain resistance by some governments, awareness of the need for greater 
environmental protection has increased.21  The development of a system allowing firms 
or countries to buy and sell so-called pollution rights or carbon credits is also welcome.
Sources of the Social Market Economy
As the SEME was developed on the basis of the social market economy, 
the latter must be explained first. A social market economy is an economic 
order based on clear principles and therefore offering a reliable orientation for 
economic actors. Such an economic and social order does not fall from heaven. 
It is rather the result of scientific research and reflection on ethical principles 
and the outcome of entrepreneurial and political activities. In addition to its 
theoretical framework and philosophical underpinnings, positive and negative 
experiences and trial-and-error processes have helped build up this system.
The social market economy, named as such in Germany from 1949 onwards,22 
is based on a long tradition of socio-economic debate. “Manchester Capitalism,” 
the nineteenth century process of industrialization in England and Germany, 
generated enormous technical innovations and wealth for some entrepreneurs, 
but also caused significant worker pauperization. This pushed economists and 
politicians to think about alternative designs for the economy and society.
21Here we can cite the popularity of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore and his film An 
Inconvenient Truth.  It is notable as well that at the Chinese People’s Congress in 2006 and the 
17th Congress of China’s Communist Party in 2007, different motions proposed more attention to 
environmental aspects than in the past. 
22The term is attributed to Erhard’s State Minister Alfred Mueller-Armack, Wirtschaftslenkung 
und Marktwirtschaft (Steering of the economy and market economy)(Duesseldorf: Verlag für 
Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1947). In many later publications, different aspects of the social 
market economy were analyzed, for example. Dieter Cassel (ed.), 50 Jahre Soziale Marktwirtschaft 
(50 Years of social market economy) (Bonn: Lucius und Lucius, 1998).
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Karl Marx correctly described these social problems, but his call for the “expropriation 
of the expropriators” was not a viable option.23 Conservative politicians, obviously 
afraid of a revolution, tried to take the wind out of socialist sails by introducing social 
relief schemes. The then German Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck pushed very 
progressive social legislation through parliament in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, creating an insurance system for workers that provided health protection, 
pensions, and unemployment payments.  The Catholic and Protestant churches 
introduced charity activities, but also developed alternative economic concepts: the 
Catholic Social Doctrine24 and the Protestant work ethic,25 respectively.
These political and church activities were important in a pragmatic sense. 
However, the conclusive model of the social market economy was developed in 
academic circles, by people who were aware of the positive aspects of a liberal 
economy, but at the same time conscious of its social downsides. The challenge was 
to find a system that assured technical progress and dynamic entrepreneurship, 
while avoiding concentration of wealth and hegemony by few rich persons. 
Based on the analysis of the economists of the Vienna School (notably Boehm-
Bawerk and Schumpeter), the social scientists of the Freiburg School (von Hayek, 
Roepke, Eucken) developed Ordoliberalism: a regime that combined individual 
freedom of economic activity (“liberal”) with an economic “order” acceptable to 
society. So, this theoretical approach advocated:  
•  for open markets and free competition, individual property rights, and 
contractual liberty; 
•  against economic concentration, excessive individual liberty, and 
uncontrolled business cycles.
This ordoliberal concept does not argue in favor of equality for all citizens, 
but rather for equal opportunity. Everybody should have access to resources 
which permit a decent standard of living; markets should not be monopolized 
23Karl Marx recognized the positive role of capitalism, too. Asked by Russian and Indian 
socialists how to establish socialism in their countries, he stated that capital accumulation and 
industrialization are preconditions of socialism, because in agricultural societies like Russia and 
India at that time, there was neither a proletariat ready to fight for the revolution nor sufficient 
wealth to be redistributed and spent on social services.
24See for example Anton Rauscher,” Katholische Soziallehre und liberale Wirtschaftsauffassung” 
(Catholic Social Doctrine and Liberal Economic Concepts), in Selbstinteresse und Gemeinwohl. 
Beiträge zur Ordnung der Wirtschaftsgesellschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1985), 
279-318. 
25See for example Helmut Thielicke, Theologische Ethik (Theological Ethics) (Tuebingen: Mohr/
Siebeck, 1958).
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nor interfered with by the state and should be open for newcomers to allow for 
effective competition. These requirements which involve government decisions, 
at least in part, and the scientific, ethical, and political roots demonstrate that 
the social market economy is not an economic order alone. It is at the same time 
a political system, the success of which must be verified periodically. Majority 
decisions are required to establish if citizens feel that their society is properly 
organized. This is manifest in the right of the population to re-elect or to change 
the government that is responsible for shaping the general framework of the 
economy and society.
The concept of a social market economy was put into practice by Ludwig 
Erhard. He had learned from the worldwide economic crisis of the 1920s, the 
experiences of the German war economy (between 1939 and 1945), and the 
theoretical approaches of the Vienna and Freiburg Schools. Obviously, nothing 
is more convincing than success, evident in Germany between 1952 and 1990, 
when the country experienced unprecedented prosperity and social justice. 
Several countries bear witness to similar economic success.26 Although their 
jump forward deserves great acknowledgement, the real challenge is to improve 
the standard continuously.27 One of the great advantages of the social market 
economy model is that it provides a roadmap for sustained wealth creation. Its 
application makes it possible to overcome economic underdevelopment and 
to stabilize a level of wealth, combined with a satisfactory component of social 
justice. This model is not unique to Germany; it may operate in countries with 
different characteristics. Indeed mere imitation of the German experience cannot 
promise the same success, given the structural differences. The instruments of 
the social market economy might be roughly the same, but their application will 
differ according to the situation in which the country in question finds itself.
Definition of the Social Market Economy
The social market economy, although based on strict principles, constitutes 
at the same time a very flexible system. This presents a great challenge in terms of 
entrepreneurial dynamics, consumer vigilance, and attentive governmental policy. 
The successful application of the model demands rather prompt reactions to internal 
26Examples worth studying are Ireland, Finland, Estonia, and Slovenia in Europe; Chile in Latin 
America; South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and, more recently, India, China, and Vietnam in Asia.
27Many Latin American countries, for example, have experienced a quick boom based mostly on 
the export of raw materials, but they have also suffered deep crises, because they did not succeed 
in facilitating the participation of the broader population in the newly created wealth.
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societal changes as well as to external influences. The fundamental institutional 
requirements are the rule of law and a democratic order in which the interests of the 
different social groups are respected. Social partnership between trade unions and 
entrepreneurial associations is an essential component of labor market design, to allow 
for entrepreneurial dynamics, investment, high employment rates, and social justice. 
Through this system of countervailing powers, a dynamic equilibrium is created. 
Implementation of the social market economy is based on three general principles:
•   Individual spirit of achievement and self-responsibility of citizens. 
Obviously the range of individual performances varies: it depends on 
financial, educational, and physical capacity. Therefore, while everybody 
does not share the same spirit of achievement and sense of responsibility, 
people must – to a degree that corresponds with their ability and capability 
– make the same effort to obtain a good education and adequate welfare 
and to provide for their pension and their health insurance. A great spirit of 
achievement is likely only if citizens can acquire private property and if they 
can compete with one another.
•   Solidarity within society. This means that the more capable and wealthier 
members of society have to contribute more to improve the opportunities 
and quality of life for people who cannot manage to achieve a proper 
standard of living. Solidarity is shown for example in the tax system, where 
people with higher incomes are charged more, or in the social insurance 
system, where those with higher incomes pay higher contributions, enabling 
the weaker to avail of a decent level of security. Solidarity expresses itself also 
in the freedom to form trade unions, associations, cooperatives, and other 
civil society organizations, which assist those who by individual effort alone 
cannot participate actively in the economy and society.
•   Subsidiarity28 of the state. This comes into play in the case of natural 
catastrophes, but also in times of economic depression with high rates of 
unemployment and business collapse. Government subsidiary support may 
be necessary too if the contributions of tax payers are insufficient to maintain 
the system of social security, in the case of an aging society, for instance. 
Government subsidiary support however is not just a defensive measure.  It 
can also stimulate innovation. In general, ecological protection needed state 
intervention at the outset. High-tech areas may also sometimes require state 
subsidies. It is important to clarify that subsidiary activities should always be 
28Subsidiarity means in general that the higher level entity only becomes active when the lower 
level entity cannot solve a problem. In the social market economy, it means that the state only 
gets involved if individual efforts and community solidarity cannot solve an individual or social 
problem.
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considered transitional and concentrated on public goods: they should not 
be designed for individual advantage.
It is self-evident that the social market economy is an open system which 
requires a high degree of in-built flexibility. Otherwise, citizens, social groups, 
entrepreneurs, and government will not succeed in achieving an optimal 
combination of the three principles. If there are too many subsidiary activities, 
solidarity and self-responsibility will be reduced or even suffocated. If solidarity is 
too generous, this may be exploited by persons who do not exert effort according 
to their capability (“social parasites”). If citizens cannot count on solidarity or 
subsidiary activities, society will be divided into a dominant coterie of the very 
rich few and a poor and dependent majority.29  
This can be shown by a recent example of world-wide relevance: the opening of the 
Chinese economy in 1979. By giving more flexibility and freedom to entrepreneurs, 
amazing economic growth has been achieved in the last decade.30 However, the 
government neglected to dedicate high priority to the social solidarity that is needed 
in such times of drastic change in the economic structure. Now, special social policy is 
urgently required to compensate for the loss of social security caused by the demolition 
of the technologically and economically inefficient big industrial conglomerates, which 
in former times took care of all the social needs of the workers and their families.31 
Summing up these remarks, the social market economy can be defined as an 
economic order based on open market competition with in-built social security 
factors. This model cannot ever be perfect. But, as it is a flexible system, open 
to new ideas and developments, it aspires to improve continually by checking 
its effectiveness and its outcomes through international comparison and citizen 
satisfaction. Politicians must be ever vigilant as to the balance of the three general 
principles, and analysis, carried out by independent experts, should advise the 
29A sad example of a bad mix of the three principles may be observed in many Latin American 
countries, where 10% of the population have 50 to 60% of the wealth at their disposal, and half 
the population has only 10% of the wealth. In China, too, this problem of wealth distribution has 
become a considerable problem, not only in regional terms but also in interpersonal terms. The 
poverty of small farmers and migrant workers may lead to greater social conflict if more attention 
is not paid to redistribution issues. 
30The Chinese government, at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party, recognized that this 
growth had been achieved, at least partly, at the expense of ecological needs, which must be taken 
into account if the declared goal of quadrupling the level of wealth by 2020 is to be reached.
31Clearly, part of the economic inefficiency of those conglomerates was caused by the high costs 
of their social functions: organizing health services and childcare, educational facilities, and the 
pension system for their workers.
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government how to react to changes and how to improve the system, especially 
since politicians habitually are inclined to maintain a more or less satisfactory 
system, often eschewing timely adaptations.
The social market economy, established in 1949 and further developed since 
then in Germany and other countries, has been challenged by two important 
phenomena in the last 20 years: globalization and the issue of environmental 
protection, both inseparable from the energy crisis and climate change. An 
adequate response to these challenges demands a shift in individual and 
social behavior as well a new thrust towards lifelong learning. It also entails a 
readjustment of the instruments of solidarity and subsidiary measures.
Conditions for Success of the Social and  
Ecological Market Economy 
The SEME has been able to deliver good results in every country. Obviously, 
as in all economic models, the educational level and the population’s access to 
and willingness to engage in lifelong learning are of decisive importance. Rich 
natural resources can help but are not a necessary condition for success, as can 
be seen by the examples of Switzerland or Singapore. In addition, the following 
four functional requirements are fundamental to achieving welfare for all, social 
security, and better environmental protection.
Reliable Framework Conditions
Adequate laws and an independent judicial system, respect for individual and 
social human rights, the possibility of participating in the political decision-making 
process, and a certain continuity of government policy or at least of the public 
service, are all indispensable to offering long-term orientation to the different 
economic actors. If rules are not clearly established and socially accepted, some will 
try to gain advantages at the expense of others or at the expense of society. Without 
a clear and reliable framework, the economic actors will strive to maximize short-
run profits, placing their savings abroad rather than investing them in the country 
in which they were generated. If the framework conditions change very quickly, 
citizens’ willingness to participate responsibly in the design of society can hardly be 
expected. The maintenance of stable framework conditions, however, does not 
mean eternal devotion to the status quo.32 The potential for flexibility and change 
must also be an in-built feature of the framework. Part of the art of politics is to 
32In the extreme case, this happens in dictatorially governed countries where the wrong 
framework is maintained to the disadvantage of welfare for all, human rights, and social justice.
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combine stability and flexibility, continuity and innovation. Tardy reactions to 
internal or external change – as has been the case in different countries’ response to 
globalization – have led to deficits in competitiveness or lack of social security.  
This may be observed in Germany, where between 1990 and 2002 economic 
policy and the social security system were not adjusted to take account of higher 
unemployment, an aging society, and the problems encountered in incorporating 
the eastern German population into the western social security system. The 
measures to reform the system, which began in 2003, caused considerable 
political difficulties. In this case, the framework conditions of the social market 
economy were still in place, but politicians did not exercise the flexibility of the 
model. In fairness to the democratic process, adjustments are more difficult in a 
multi-party democracy than in an authoritarian system, because interest groups 
defend their positions and thus render dialogue more time-consuming. However, 
such dialogue offers greater stability for the future. A strongly structured and 
institutionalized economy33 is like a big tanker, changing course much more 
slowly than a sailing boat.
The specific ecological framework conditions are defined through scientific 
research and political movements. It has taken some time to recognize them as 
such and to introduce them in a legally binding way. Nowadays, in Germany and 
many other countries, environmental protection and energy savings are accorded 
the same importance as economic and social aims. 
State Behavior
The government must clearly espouse the SEME model, expressing its 
commitment to prosperity, social justice, and ecological protection, while 
recognizing its own intervention limits. The state’s active economic role refers, 
above all, to the production of public goods like health service, education, public 
transport, infrastructure. The state can privatize these sectors, but then has the 
obligation to monitor the performance and to regulate the service conditions.34 As 
the citizens must behave in accordance with the system, the state, too, in the form of 
government organizations and the public service at the national and regional levels, 
must respect the SEME rules established and sanctioned by majority decision. 
State-owned firms have to be competitive; the public service has to work effectively. 
33This inflexibility of different highly institutionalized countries has been analyzed by Mancur 
Olson Jr. in The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
34Examples include the railway system or the energy sector, where the state can intervene if 
the tariffs exceed a rational limit and where the state can maintain the property of the physical 
infrastructure.
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The state must protect structural plurality and foster the take-off potential of 
enterprises and individuals. It should offer incentives rather than intervene in the 
economic process. A preventive social security policy – for example a professional 
training system – should take priority over subsidies. Indirect transfer measures 
(taxes, interest rates, etc.) should be favored over direct redistribution. The state 
should be willing to bolster the self-responsibility of citizens and, as far as possible, 
to delegate control and decision-making to autonomous organizations.
Typical features of positive state behavior according to the SEME model 
include: central bank independence; the autonomy of trade unions and 
employers’ organizations to arrange labor market conditions; transfer of control 
and professional career design to chambers of commerce and industry; delegation 
of control functions in the banking and insurance sector to autonomous bodies; 
delegation of the control of economic concentration to an antitrust organization. 
All these institutions, financed partly or entirely by the state, should perform 
their public functions independent of state intervention. 
The state has a special function in the area of environment. Communication 
campaigns inform citizens about their obligations and advise them how they 
can adjust their behavior to meet ecological requirements. In the past people 
regarded their behavior as rather irrelevant to the world climate. Therefore, 
to convert the social market economy into a social and ecological market 
economy, the state has had to issue new laws and regulations and determine 
and implement duties and behavior codes, incentives, and punishments for 
producers and consumers.
As environmentally oriented activities constitute a relatively new element 
of the model, the temporary subsidy of activities which are ecologically more 
effective is compatible with the SEME model. Traditional energy resources like 
coal, gas, or petrol are still less expensive than energy produced by wind farms, 
bio-material, thermal heating, and solar cells. The more alternative and renewable 
energies gain credibility, the closer they get to the break-even point and so become 
competitive. For the present, environmental protection is of higher priority in 
the SEME than free competition in the energy sector. However, state support 
will apply only until companies reach their break-even point.
Independent and Responsible Media
The SEME is a multi-faceted model. It is hard for the average citizen 
to fully grasp the economic, social, and ecological processes. Therefore, 
effective information and communication is imperative. In the SEME, this 
is made possible for consumers by consumer protection associations and state 
regulations obliging producers to indicate clearly the content of products. Just 
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as for consumers, adequate information is essential for firms. Producers affiliate 
themselves with chambers of commerce and industry, branch associations, and 
lobbying institutions in order to get access to relevant, timely information. In 
this process of communication, independent and pluralist media – newspapers, 
radio and television programs, and the internet – play a vital role in monitoring and 
motivating people. Additionally, independent expert committees must find weak 
points and failures in the system and inform institutions that are affected by these.
An effective communication process also depends on the educational level 
of the population and their interest in being well informed. If the schooling 
structure is inadequate or if possibilities for ongoing professional training and 
adult education35 are lacking, people can hardly be expected to understand or 
interpret media messages. According to the SEME model, not only must the 
state facilitate, but it must actively support freedom of information in its own 
interest. Independent reporting and journalism can assist the government to 
recognize and respond faster to system deficits.
Relative Independence and Willingness of the Participants to Compromise
The economic and social actors, meaning the state, entrepreneurs, trade 
unions, autonomous public institutions, and interest groups of civil society are, in 
principle, independent in their decision making, while being mutually dependent 
(Figure 2). No single actor can fully achieve its interests without impacting in 
some way on the interests of the others. Sometimes there are conflicts of interest, 
producing winners and losers. The SEME requires, however, that the actors do 
not regard others as their enemies, but recognize (albeit at times only silently) 
that the interests of the other actors are equally legitimate. In the end, this obliges 
the SEME actors to compromise.
The most frequent example of this struggle for advantages is played out in the 
controversy between employers’ associations and trade unions. While recognizing 
their mutual legitimacy, both institutions may employ instruments of threat in 
the form of a lockout or strike. Both sides know that such measures have high 
costs. Even in the case of widely differing opening positions, a strike would not 
usually go so far as to destroy the enterprise, since that would not only fail to 
improve working conditions or salaries, but would destroy the employment itself. 
35In addition to public and private education in Germany, there is a dual professional education 
system: apprentices learn the practical requirements of the firm while attending professional 
schools, where they are given the theoretical background of their activity. Polytechnic schools 
(Fachhochschulen) offer students a more practical third level education. Adult education schools 
(Volkshochschulen) offer a great variety of courses for adults, while political foundations, 
financed mainly by the state, offer courses on political, economic, and ecological matters.
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Similarly, in the case of lockout, the firm stands to lose its experienced workers, 
possibly entailing much more serious costs than a higher salary agreement. Social 
partnership is an important feature of the SEME model. This does not always 
imply peaceful understanding and harmony between the actors, but rather the 
willingness to compromise if negotiation possibilities are exhausted.36 When 
both sides have reached a compromise, a truce arrangement applies, meaning 
that while the negotiated agreement is still in operation, strikes or lockouts are 
legally forbidden.
Government must also be willing to compromise. Before introducing laws 
which affect economic, social, or ecological interests, hearings and consultations 
take place that may lead to modifications of the original plan. 
Figure 2: Interest Conflicts, Cooperation, and Compromises
  
Autonomous institutions like the central bank, the antitrust office, the 
chambers of commerce and industry, the institutions that regulate banks 
and insurance companies, the office for environment protection, the central 
employment agency, the national pension office, etc. are essential elements of the 
SEME. The state delegates sovereign functions to those institutions, which in 
turn are bound to show willingness to compromise. So, in its effort to combat 
inflation, the central bank cannot raise the interest rate to the extent that the cost 
of credit inhibits investment. The antitrust office has to compromise in terms 
of concentration issues, given the bigger market in the EU and globalization. 
36In Germany, an independent expert is often called in as mediator in the case of a very difficult 
conflict. In other countries, the government intervenes.
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But that does not mean that it abandons its general skepticism vis-à-vis the 
concentration of economic power.
There are many more examples to show how the freedom to build associations 
and the management of their diverging interests can complicate the process 
of negotiating and reaching agreements. But this is all part of the dynamic of 
the SEME model. If the economic, social, and ecological actors demonstrate 
flexibility and open-minded behavior, if they know that compromise is necessary, 
then the dynamic and innovative process of the SEME is guaranteed as is the 
continuity of an effective, partnership-oriented decision-making process.
 
Shaping the Social and Ecological Market Economy
It is the art of politics to take the right measures at the right time and to the right 
extent. The same challenge applies to shaping the SEME. In this context, local 
and national governments have the leading role, since the election process gives 
them the responsibility for the welfare of society.  However, these government 
institutions can be successful only if they are in dialogue with the other above-
mentioned economic actors, such as employers’ federations, trade unions, and 
autonomous institutions. Civil society associations like conservation groups, 
nuclear power or other protestors can play an important role in this dialogue as 
well, especially at the local level.  Intensive dialogue is also necessary within the 
political parties to involve the members in the decision-making process. In the 
case of far-reaching decisions, governments may also benefit from dialogue with 
the opposition.37
The SEME principles are relevant for almost all areas of the economy and 
society, but there are seven policy fields, where SEME principles particularly 
influence decision making. Each of these policy fields, which must be carefully 
analyzed, can be illustrated here only very briefly.38  
37This political dialogue will not always bring about the intended consensus. However, decisions 
must be taken. Those groups who feel disadvantaged by a decision have the possibility to seek 
affirmation or redress through the courts. In Germany, one can also take proceedings against the 
state to administrative courts (Verwaltungsgerichte).
38Several of the following articles in this book will deal with these areas in detail.
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Planning and Coordination
The macroeconomic and macro-social framework is at issue here. Planning and 
coordination of economic, social, and ecological activities refers to the legislative 
competence of the government on the local, national, and international levels. 
The state has to clarify what constitutes a public good and consequently set its 
priorities for action or participation. 
In order to establish a reliable reference system, the state also has to declare 
which of its sovereign control functions are delegated, for example, to the central 
bank or the antitrust office. It guarantees the freedom to create associations 
which represent members’ interests in the planning and coordination process. It 
gives autonomy to trade unions and employers’ associations in their negotiations 
on labor market conditions, and to chambers of commerce and industry, but 
obliges all firms to associate themselves with one of the chambers. Banks and 
insurance companies are free to regulate their own operations, but have to 
affiliate themselves with the respective regulatory institutions and solidarity 
funds. Subsidy priorities are fixed and made public, for example, for firms 
engaged in environmentally friendly activities and for research and development. 
Transparency is the necessary condition for clear orientation of the economic, 
social, and ecological actors. 
Property Regime
Private property is one of the pillars of the SEME and is protected in Germany 
by the constitution. Property rights, both material and intellectual, constitute the 
basis for planning private activity. In general, private property can be used freely, 
except where it affects the interests of society or could damage other persons. In 
the SEME, limitations on the free use of property have to be established very 
clearly. This can be controversial where there is a social interest. Private owners 
can go to court if they feel that the social interests are less important than their 
right to private property. 
In the SEME, state property is possible as well. In general, it must serve the 
public interest, as in the case of land for infrastructure or educational purposes. 
The workers’ right to codetermination in big firms, allowing representatives of 
the employees to participate in the board of directors, is a special feature of private 
property in the SEME. Although they are not the owners, workers participate in 
entrepreneurial decision making. In medium-sized firms and public institutions, 
freely elected workers’ committees must be informed about the activity of the 
firm and participate in key decisions, such as, for example, the employment or 
dismissal of staff. The higher-level aim of social peace and welfare demands this 
limitation of private property and its free use.
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Monetary Order
In general, the state decides on the type of national currency and its convertibility, 
while the value of the currency is determined in international markets. In the SEME, 
monetary decisions, originally regarded as proper to the government, have been 
delegated to the central bank.39 The central bank’s fundamental task is to procure 
the stability of the currency by using the generally acknowledged money market 
instruments (interest rates, rediscount rates, deposits of the private banks, etc.). 
The capital market, which also serves as a source for government borrowing, 
is self-regulated. Because of the recent problems created by hedge funds, 
government circles are considering more state regulation so as to reduce the – 
often merely speculative – purchase of firms by hedge funds.
A new national and international “capital market” could arise with the trade of 
carbon certificates between those enterprises or countries whose greenhouse gas 
emissions are below the nationally or internationally fixed limits and those who 
have to buy certificates because their production is not yet within the limits. Here a 
new facet of the ecological enrichment of the social market economy is emerging. 
It is important for the SEME shaping of the monetary order that there are 
alternative bank types. Germany’s bank system is based on three pillars; the 
commercial banks, owned by families or shareholders; the savings banks, backed 
by a municipal liquidity guarantee; and credit cooperatives, in operation since 
the nineteenth century when they started to attract small savings and to borrow 
low cost credits. In order to prevent bank crashes, a bank regulatory institution 
monitors bank activities. Banks themselves have created a guarantee fund, 
through which they help member banks which find themselves in difficulties, in 
order to maintain the credibility of the banking system as a whole.
Enterprise Order
The plurality of approaches in the SEME is also expressed by the diversity of 
legal forms of enterprises, including shareholder companies, individually owned 
firms, state enterprises, and cooperatives. For each of these, the legal regulations 
in terms of minimal capital contribution, liability, publication duties, workers 
committees, tax burden, etc. are clearly defined. 
The treatment and at times the support of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), mostly family-owned, constitute a special case in the SEME. These firms 
play an important role in the area of innovation as they reach the break-even point 
quicker than big companies and therefore can pass innovations more quickly to 
39Since the introduction of the common European currency, the euro, in 1999, decisions formerly 
taken by the national central banks, are now taken by the European Central Bank. 
44  |  Part 1  Overall Perspectives
the market.40 In psychological terms, SMEs offer the advantage that workers 
can identify with the firm more easily than with big companies. This is because 
production is often more labor oriented than capital intensive and workers can 
see, for the most part, the final result of their work. Such identification has proved 
to be a stabilizing factor in times of recession. So, in general, SMEs are more 
flexible and often more dynamic than big companies. This societal advantage, 
according to the SEME model, justifies state support of these enterprises through 
tax reduction, technological and managerial consulting and credit facilities.
Competitive Order
The intensity of competition is the result of market processes, but the rules of 
the competitive system are established by government. State interventions can be 
used in special situations like concentration of market power, patent protection, 
or public interest. In general, however, competition should be as free as possible to 
strengthen the spirit of achievement and as regulated as necessary in order to avoid 
social and ecological problems. This combination of freedom and regulation leads 
to a functional competition in SEME terms: resources should be allocated in an 
optimal way, but not at the expense of society or the environment. Such a situation 
can be achieved only if markets are open to newcomers and if an official entity – 
in Germany, the Federal Antitrust Office – monitors the markets. In addition, the 
media, along with producer and consumer organizations, should strive to ensure 
transparency. Attempts to agree on market conditions and to control or to fix prices 
are banned and can attract heavy fines. Market power41 can be achieved by higher 
efficiency and lower costs for a certain time, but this will be reduced if the market is 
open to newcomers. This open market policy is also valid for foreign investors and 
their products.42 Imports, however, are subject to the same hygienic, ethical,43 and 
other regulations as national products. Although free competition is a priority, it 
40While SMEs always played an important role in the field of technological progress in Germany, in the 
last 20 years they have also often become pioneers in the production of ecology-linked goods and services.
41The question of whether a firm may be allowed to control a market and the circumstances 
and length of time in and for which this may apply requires intensive discussion. Market power 
achieved by buying out one’s competitors is clearly banned if one already has a considerable 
share of the market. In that case, there must be good reasons to allow a merger. Obviously, the 
dimensions of markets have changed with regional integration, as in the case of the EU market, 
and with globalization, which have widened many markets and forced some firms to merge.
42The WTO strives for maximum freedom of international commerce. In the case of agricultural 
products and textiles, it has been particularly difficult to overcome national egoism.
43In the SEME, obviously exploitation of workers, child labor, lack of work accident insurance, etc. 
are banned.
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is not a contradiction of SEME principles to subsidize certain products for a 
time and in exceptional cases. This “promotional subsidy” can be observed in 
innovative areas such as technology or environment protection. In particular, 
the latter needs subsidy, since the production of renewable energy and climate 
protection measures still entails higher costs than traditional production. Here, 
the interest of society justifies interference in the competition process, which is 
usually self-regulated.
The cooperation of firms on a lower level enabling them to compete on a higher 
level is also compatible with the SEME oriented competition order. This is typically 
the case of cooperatives, where, for example, smaller dairy farmers eliminate their 
potential competition by establishing a commonly owned dairy, which allows them to 
compete with bigger farmers. Another case of cooperation that eliminates competition 
is the existence of the trade unions where workers, actually competing with their 
own labor force, collaborate to form a countervailing power against employers, thus 
achieving better work conditions. These and other cases of cooperation have a social 
justification which prevails, too, over the objective of competition.
Increasingly, the national competition system is influenced by international rules. 
The UN Conference on Trade and Development and, even more, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) try to establish rules that facilitate the world-wide commerce 
of goods and services and reduce the disadvantages of developing countries.44 The 
International Labor Organization has influenced social standards for workers and 
therefore the costs of competitors. International competition is also affected by 
multinational initiatives like the EU, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); international groupings like 
the Cairns-Group, oriented to agriculture; the Group of 20, which was formed to 
reach better conditions in the WTO Conference in Cancun; and the politically more 
influential Group of Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa). These and other 
groupings show that globalization not only widens the possibilities for international 
competition, but also provokes countervailing trends. The same may be said about free 
trade agreements which the USA and EU have concluded with several countries. 
In spite of these international agreements, there are plenty of opportunities 
for functional competition on the national level where, according to SEME 
principles, the individual spirit of achievement, solidarity, and subsidiary 
activities must be brought together in a harmonious balance.
44Numerous multinational agreements have been presented and partly approved: the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, the Convention on Biological Diversity, Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. 
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Fiscal Order
Fiscal policy is important in procuring for the state the necessary financial 
means to produce public goods and pay for public administration.45 In times 
of globalization and environmental protection, fiscal policy has an additional 
international dimension. Corporation and profit tax, as well as the ecological 
regime in different countries, have influenced, at least in part, the decision of firms 
about where to locate. That can be seen in the new EU member states, in India, 
China, Vietnam, and other countries, as they attract investors from Europe and the 
USA. In Western Europe, Ireland presents a relatively recent example of this.46  
The state fixes the type and rate of tax for firms and individuals. The distinction 
between direct taxation like income tax or profit tax and indirect taxation such as value 
added tax (VAT) is very important to the SEME discussion. On the one hand, direct 
taxes are politically more problematic because the tax payer feels directly affected and 
is therefore more likely to sanction those politicians responsible for this tax burden. 
And indeed, politicians must be careful not to seek too high direct taxation, for fear 
of suffocating the spirit of achievement and consequently the dynamics of economic 
development. On the other hand, direct taxes furnish the government with an 
instrument of redistribution, allowing it to charge the wealthy more than the less well 
off and thus to subsidize services for the whole society. Therefore the rate of direct 
taxation is indicative of government willingness to finance social justice.47 
In the case of indirect taxation, the tax payer can reduce his/her burden by 
spending less money on the taxed service, as for example in the case of VAT, by 
buying less. The social problem caused by high VAT is that the less well off are 
more affected because their consumption quota – the percentage of income 
spent on consumption – is higher than that of the wealthier population. Indirect 
taxation can become an instrument of social policy if luxury articles attract higher 
taxes than basic goods. The same is true for ecological policy: pollution-causing, 
high-energy-consuming goods (like big cars) could be taxed at a higher rate than 
more environmentally friendly products.   
45In some countries, the central bank is still one of the finance sources of government, not so in 
the SEME. Here only (part of the) profits of the central bank is transferred to the state budget.
46Since 1973, Ireland, one of the poorest countries in the EU, has attracted investors from the 
USA and the European continent, thanks to lower tax rates, well-trained workers, and less 
regulation, converting it into the second richest EU country today.
47Discussions about flat rate, progressive, or linear tariffs are never ending, as well as the discussion 
about the top marginal rate and the level of tax-free income. An income tax of 75% (applied 
previously in Scandinavian countries) seems indicative of a highly socially-oriented approach. 
However, it also provokes tax avoidance and capital flight. This can mean that the overall tax 
revenue collected by the state may be lower than if a maximum rate of 42% were applied. 
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The distribution of tax revenue between the central government and regional or 
local authorities is also problematic. In Germany, a federal republic, the VAT, which 
generates the highest single tax revenue, is divided half and half between the federal 
government and the regional state governments, leaving just 2.2.% for the municipal 
level. In the case of income tax, 15% of the revenue remains at the municipal level and 
85% is divided equally between the national and the regional levels. In order to fulfill 
the constitutional requirement to establish a more or less equal level of development 
in the entire republic, a redistribution of tax revenues is undertaken: the richer federal 
states of Germany have to pass part of their revenue to the poorer states.48  
Therefore, the design and application of tax policy is a highly sensitive political 
issue and requires intensive dialogue between economic and social actors. The 
ultimate decision about tariffs and tax rates resides with the government, which 
has to consider the revenue aspect, macroeconomic consequences, and social and 
ecological implications.
Social Order
In the SEME, appropriate behavior of the economic actors should diminish 
the incidence of social problems. The state fixes the rates and the quota to be paid 
by employers and employees for pensions, health insurance, and unemployment 
insurance. Contributions to the social security system are shared by employers 
and workers according to salary level. These payments, often supplemented by 
private insurance, contribute to preventive social policy. Curative social policy 
constitutes the other element of the social order.  By this is meant the pensions, 
health and unemployment benefits, and contributions to those who cannot 
maintain a decent standard of living on their income alone.  
The social order demonstrates the interlinking of the three general SEME 
principles: responsibility of citizens to care for their own welfare; solidarity 
through the higher contributions of those who have higher incomes; and 
subsidiary activities by employers and the state.  
Here education and professional training deserve special mention. Every 
citizen should do his/ her utmost to be sufficiently well prepared for professional 
life and for adequate opportunities in the labor market.49 As education is an 
48This redistribution process is a very political topic. Of course, the general rule that the richer 
must help the poorer is accepted. The question, however, is the amount that should be transferred 
to less developed regions. And the richer states question why the poorer ones are not able to 
better organize their development.
49In times of crisis, usually those who have invested less in their professional qualification are the first to 
lose their employment. The same can be observed in industrialized countries whose firms loose market 
share in the less sophisticated production areas taken over by developing countries at lower costs.  
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expensive commodity, the state must guarantee access to educational institutions. 
Investment in scientific research, in the different levels of education, and in lifelong 
learning, whether by the state, private institutions, or citizens themselves, enables 
countries to respond more effectively to globalization and an aging society. 
In a broader sense, the ecological aspects of society are also part of the social 
order, being indispensable to the living conditions of present and, even more, of 
future generations.
Current Challenges for the Social and  
Ecological Market Economy 
At present, the design of the SEME at the national level encounters three 
major challenges, globalization, environmental requirements, and changes in the 
social structure. 
Globalization is not a new phenomenon,50 but nowadays it presents an even 
more important challenge for politicians in designing the national economic, 
social, and ecological policy in dialogue with the different groups of the society. 
While globalization offers wider opportunities for commerce and investment, it 
also reduces the scope of national politicians to shape proper SEME conditions. 
However, this does not mean that the economic actors, and above all the state, 
are relieved of their responsibility to cooperate in the design and tailoring of the 
economic, social, and ecological order. 
The second great challenge lies in the domain of the environment and climate 
change. Germany has taken a leading role in this field. It had introduced and 
continues to introduce new laws and regulations,51 partly because of EU obligations. 
Germany’s ecological orientation has led to high-tech innovations in the production 
of filters, solar cells, and geo-thermal heating and insulation systems. Far exceeding 
the already mentioned Kyoto aim of 5.2% reduction of emission between 2008 and 
2012, Germany, according to the Ministry of Environment, has already reduced 
emissions by 19% in comparison with 1990 level. This challenge will remain 
important for the next 10 years as well.52 Demographic change constitutes the third 
big challenge for the future design of the SEME:
50In a certain way, although in a “smaller world”, former empires had also created a globalization 
effect, enriching minorities while impoverishing majority segments of the populations.
51Some of the regulations, for example, the separation of litter or deposits for cans, once caused 
smiles in other countries, but were later introduced there as well. 
52During her term as President of the EU, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel decreed the 
mentioned “2020” goals.
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•   People are now living longer, a factor that has implications for social security 
and health systems: either older people must get smaller pensions and 
reduced services or younger people will have to contribute higher amounts 
to the social system, or the state must fill the gap.
•   Women are as well-educated and professionally prepared as men; therefore, 
in their wish to exercise their profession, many postpone pregnancy. That 
means that fewer children will be born unless the government makes 
provision for stronger support for young families.
•   The increased migration from poorer countries makes greater demands 
on social services and calls for more cultural integration efforts with 
corresponding additional social costs.53 Aid to developing countries could 
reduce migration, especially from Africa to Europe, if it is invested in 
productive activities that create more employment. This international 
solidarity is another cost factor which may reduce the ability of national 
governments to tackle social problems at home.
Such challenges, to which some of the EU countries and certainly Germany are 
exposed, can be managed within an adjusted SEME system, which is, as already 
pointed out, a flexible and open model, not bound to a rigid ideology. International 
competition might accelerate adjustments, but even the “tiger” states like China, 
Vietnam, South Korea, and others will reach a certain saturation point and experience 
higher costs for employment, social services, and ecological protection.54
53Migration problems exist in several countries on the national level as well. In quantitative 
terms, the inner migration in China, from the hinterland to the more prosperous coastal areas, 
is probably the most problematic. Migrant workers are often employed in very poor conditions 
and we have already cited the backwash effect.  India presents another case of considerable 
inner migration by better educated persons towards the new centers of high-tech industry like 
Bangalore. Similarly in Germany, after unification in 1990, there was a notable migration of 
young people from east to west. 
54David Ricardo’s principle of comparative cost advantages is also valid in a globalized world, 
although it is no longer as simple as Ricardo’s account of the exchange of wine and textiles 
between Portugal and England in the nineteenth century. 
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Conclusion
The interaction of the state, entrepreneurial federations, trade unions, and civil 
society associations is the cement that holds together the different blocks of the 
SEME edifice. The state influences the other economic, social, and ecological actors 
as they influence the state. Both the state and the social partners challenge social 
scientists to analyze their activity and to enable them to look into the mirror that 
reflects the level of welfare of the society. As the different actors are autonomous 
and play their role according to their own interests, the shifting balance of their 
actions can lead on occasion to frictions. Sometimes, considerable conflicts arise 
between the different interests, and the adjustment may be slow, but the solutions 
will be found in dialogue between the actors within the framework of the SEME 
model. To summarize the functions of the SEME actors:
The State and the Public Institutions
•  establish SEME-relevant laws and the framework conditions as well as a 
monitoring system that ensures that the actors obey the rules;
• fix the priorities of the different economic, social, and ecological action fields; 
• protect and promote functional competition;
•  are vigilant with respect to the social balance in order to avoid or ease social 
problems;
• offer incentives and support innovations;
• produce public goods;
• set rules for environmentally friendly behavior;
• control and sanction the rules which define the SEME system;
•  promote and support educational activities, professional training, and research;
•  intervene in a subsidiary way when private initiatives or solidarity cannot 
solve problems.
The Entrepreneurs and their Institutions
• focus on productivity and competitiveness;
•  search for and undertake profitable activities and reinvest – at least 
part of –  the profits; 
• monitor national and international markets and search for innovations; 
• observe ecological requirements in their production;
• ensure socially acceptable conditions for their workers;
• promote and support professional training of workers;
•  facilitate workers codetermination by channeling transparent flows of 
information;
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•  participate in social partnership, negotiating labor market conditions with 
the trade unions; 
• invest in research-and-development activities;
•  establish federations and pressure groups to present their interests and 
exchange information.
Trade Unions 
• strive for socially acceptable conditions in the labor market;
•  negotiate salaries through social partnership with employers’ associations,  
respecting market conditions and the profit interests of firms;
• engage in professional training of their members;
• support worker committees in the firms in the codetermination process;
•  seek international contacts as a countervailing power to multinational 
companies.
The Organizations of Civil Society
•  engage politically to influence – at least indirectly – the other SEME 
actors;
• search for information in order to increase transparency in society;
• demand and support consumer protection;
• promote environmentally friendly behavior;
• support incentives for lifelong learning;
•  act on the local level to improve the economic, social, and ecological welfare 
of individuals.
Social Science Institutions
•  analyze the effectiveness of different economic models in general and check 
the operational efficiency of the SEME in terms of its economic dynamism, 
social justice, and ecological protection;
•  monitor developments inside and outside the country and their influence 
on the SEME (globalization, demographic changes, environment, cultural 
changes, psychological factors of economic and social behavior, business 
cycles);
•  analyze the different instruments of the SEME in terms of their effectiveness 
and dimension;
• offer consulting services55 to the economic, social, and ecological actors.
55 In Germany, a group of economists prepares an annual report for the government. In its public 
presentation, the government representative does not always look very pleased. Additionally, 
different scientific institutes regularly publish their short- and long-term outlooks.
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In synthesis: the SEME, as seen in the experiences of different countries, 
especially Germany, has proven to be the best of all imperfect economic, social, 
and ecological systems. It creates prosperity, thanks to entrepreneurial freedom; 
it allows for interventions to redistribute this wealth and achieve social justice; 
it has effective in-built instruments of environmental protection. The SEME 
instruments have to be applied in a manner that corresponds to the conditions 
of the country in question, incorporating the exigencies of international 
development. Though aiming at optimal results, the SEME will never be 
perfect. However, it is flexible enough to allow continuous improvements and 
to offer solutions to economic, social, and ecological problems which come up 
unavoidably from time to time.
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Introduction
The social and ecological market economy, the economic model that has shaped 
the economic and societal development of the Federal Republic of Germany, has 
resulted in comparatively stable economic performance, a reasonably equitable 
distribution of wealth (compared to other countries), and economic convergence 
between the eastern and western parts of the country. Clearly, the model, which 
consciously combines economic, social, and ecological goals, has been a success in 
Germany. In 2007 the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) defined a framework of principles based on the German 
model of the social and ecological market economy as the basis for economic 
development cooperation. 
As a German-Government-owned enterprise working in international 
cooperation, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH supports the German Government in achieving its development 
cooperation objectives. Therefore, the principles of the social and ecological 
market are of utmost significance for our work. We believe this model is highly 
relevant to our work and to future perspectives on development in our partner 
countries. GTZ accompanies development and transition processes in more than 
120 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. In Asia, GTZ 
is active in 15 countries.1
This article will describe how the model and the framework defined by the 
BMZ are embedded in our corporate philosophy, why we think the model is 
relevant for Asia, and how we translate its principles into our work. Examples of 
our work will be presented in this reader, focusing on private sector development, 
1Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, the Pacific 
countries, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
Contributing to Asian Development – German 
Technical Cooperation and the Relevance of 
the Social and Ecological Market Economy
Cornelia Richter
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economic and social policies, financial systems development, and vocational 
training and labor market policies. In Asia, the total volume of projects in these 
areas in 2007 was €208 million.
The Model of the Social and Ecological Market Economy 
and GTZ Corporate Philosophy
With the adoption of the principles of the social and ecological market 
economy, the BMZ created a coherent, value-oriented framework for German 
development cooperation’s commitment to sustainable development,2 which 
constitutes the foundation of GTZ’s mission and mandate.3 The social and 
ecological market economy is built on the principle that sustainable development 
is only possible when economic, social, and ecological concerns are taken into 
account. Thus, the objectives of the social and ecological market economy are 
welfare for all, social justice, and environmental protection.4 
The specific relationship among these three dimensions needs to be defined 
in a process of dialogue and negotiation between the state, civil society, and the 
private sector. Implementation of the model thus implies (1) a holistic approach 
that involves support at different levels and cooperation with various stakeholders 
(multi-level approach: national, regional, local); (2) process-orientation, for 
example, facilitating processes of negotiation among different stakeholders 
(public, private); and (3) value-orientation, on the basis of the principles of a 
social and ecological market economy. 
While the original model of the social market economy emerged in the 1950s as 
an attempt to link the principle of market freedom with social equity, the model 
has now been expanded to integrate the element of environmental sustainability, 
which is a key requirement for long-term sustainable development. The model is 
thus clearly flexible enough to change and develop in response to experience and 
new challenges. 
The social and ecological market economy is by no means a purely economic 
model. It was developed in the specific social and cultural context of Germany 
and Europe and similarly must take into account the societal, cultural, political, 
and institutional factors that shape the patterns and orientations of development 
in other economies. We are very much aware that simply transferring the formal 
institutions of the market economy, without making the necessary adjustments, 
2See http://www.bmz.de/en/principles/aims/objectives/index.html
3GTZ, Concept for Sustainable Development (Eschborn: GTZ, 2005).
4See Benecke in this reader.
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can lead to a loss of credibility and even political instability. The model is thus 
by no means intended to constitute a blueprint or a straightjacket. Rather, it is a 
value-based orientation that offers a range of policy options for the very specific 
economic, political, and societal conditions in each country. 
The model of the social and ecological market economy thus takes due account 
of the diversity of partner countries in Asia. In newly industrializing countries, 
which have specific priorities and concerns as a result of their integration into global 
structures and markets, it will take quite a different shape than in the poorer partner 
countries of German development cooperation. In countries such as India and 
China, world market integration, reduction of social inequality, and the development 
of ecologically sound production processes dominate the policy agenda. These 
countries are thus increasingly requesting GTZ advice in the fields of social security, 
introduction of ecological and social standards, and the use of renewable energies. 
In the least developed countries and in fragile states, on the other hand, issues 
such as facilitating economic and social participation are the most pressing. 
Supporting inclusive and pro-poor growth and equality of opportunities in these 
countries means facilitating productive and equitable integration of marginalized 
groups into economic growth processes. Innovative concepts are required in these 
countries, for example, insurance mechanisms that also protect poor people in the 
informal sector from essential risks (which may be the result of climate change).
The model of the social and ecological market economy also provides 
orientation in an increasingly globalized environment. Globalization and its 
effects on global structural policies, international trade, regional integration, 
and environmental and climate problems constitute new challenges for technical 
cooperation. A new global approach is required to regulate competition in 
globalized markets, ensure free trade, and address the challenges of climate 
change. Advisory services on questions of global structural policies, for example, 
related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Global Environment 
Facility, must build on clear positions and values, and a clear idea of how to 
address the global environmental challenges in our partner countries. The model 
aims to find the best possible match between global challenges, and the specific 
national and local requirements.
For GTZ, all this implies that the principles of the social and ecological 
market economy translate into very different forms in our practical work. Their 
operationalization depends on the specific patterns and stage of development of 
each country, that country’s position in the global economy, but equally its cultural 
background, traditions, and its own vision for development. For us, successful 
advisory services, therefore, are value oriented and build on recognition of and 
respect for the value system and the principles and priorities of each society.
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Value orientation, a holistic concept of development, a process- and dialogue-
oriented approach to change, and an emphasis on the importance of institutions 
are also essential underpinnings of GTZ’s concept of capacity development. A 
market economy is built on capable and efficient institutions that ensure the 
functioning of markets as well as social cohesion.  Strengthening the capabilities 
of our partner countries to build the required institutions is one of the basic 
objectives of GTZ’s capacity development support. 
Successfully Implementing Reforms: Values and Institutions
GTZ’s long experience in technical cooperation has shown that two 
aspects matter most in achieving development cooperation goals and required 
reforms: (1) societal values and (2) the quality of institutions (their potential to 
develop and adjust to new circumstances). This view, which has accompanied 
our capacity development work for many years, has also been confirmed in 
economic research, most notably in “institutional economics”,5 which examines 
the values and institutions of societies that may foster or prevent developmental 
processes.
According to the institutional economists North and Denzau, not only is formal 
institutional development important for the development of societies, but also the 
“shared mental models” within a society.6 According to them, these mental models 
tend to change less quickly than the formal institutions (institutions meaning both 
the regulatory framework and organizations). However, if the reforms and the socio-
economic reality created by rapid development processes become incompatible 
with the mental models, there are losses in welfare and political stability is at stake.7 
Thus, institutional economists claim that development processes are path dependent, 
because cultural traditions and values determine the development path of a society. 
Not only do institutions matter, but history matters as well.8  
This fact tends to be neglected in the world of development projects and programs, 
which usually have a comparatively short time horizon of two to six years. Changes 
in the formal institutional setting can be achieved quickly as we have seen in the 
5International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (Washington DC: IMF, April 
2003), 104.
6See Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North, “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions”, 
Kyklos 47, no. 1 (February 1994): 3-31.
7See Joachim Zweynert, “Wirtschaftskultur und Transformation” (Economic culture and trans-
formation), Wirtschaftsdienst 86, no.12 (2006): 803.
8Ibid.
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Eastern European transition process, while changes in the mental models often take 
more time. We also know this from our own experience in Germany, as recent reforms 
emphasizing the responsibility of the individual and reducing the responsibility of 
the state in social policies have not been easily accepted by Germans.9 
Values
In our work, we believe it is necessary to be transparent about the values that 
we stand for and to enter into a long-term dialogue on principles underlying 
the institutional reform processes. This dialogue with our partners in Asian 
countries about mental models – which includes the articles in this reader – 
brings cultural and historical dimensions to the surface and contributes to better 
mutual understanding. Thus, such dialogue has a value in itself for development 
cooperation, but also contributes to the sustainability of our assistance. 
The values underlying the model of the social and ecological market economy 
– our mental models – are best reflected in the principles of: 
• solidarity, 
• subsidiarity, 
• individual spirit of achievement, and 
• self-responsibility. 10 
Although this may sound very much like conventional wisdom for any 
professional working in development cooperation, the relevance of each principle 
for individual partner countries depends on the respective cultural context in 
that country. A number of Asian countries are in fact multi-ethnic and multi-
religious and therefore have a multi-facetted set of values. 
The mental models of Asian culture usually include a much stronger focus 
on the community and harmony than Western culture. This is rooted in, among 
other things, Asian religions and ideologies such as Confucianism and Buddhism, 
which emphasize loyalty towards the family, corporation, and nation and which 
sacrifice personal freedom for the sake of the society‘s stability and prosperity. 
Although Asia has a wide range of cultures, values, and religions, a certain 
level of generalization is possible. The following values are typically considered 
characteristic for Asia:
• predisposition towards strong and stable leadership; 
•  respect for social harmony and an inclination towards consensus as opposed 
to a tendency towards dissent or confrontation; 
9See Welzel and Vehrkamp in this reader.
10See Benecke in this reader.
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•  acceptance of broad and penetrating state and bureaucratic intervention in 
social and economic affairs; and
•  preference for the welfare and collective well-being of the community over 
individual rights.
Willingness to compromise is a precondition for the functioning of the social 
and ecological market economy11 and has resulted in many consensus-building 
mechanisms in Germany, which also reflect the division of responsibility 
between the state, the private sector, and civil society in the model. This has led 
some to label the German society a “consensus society.” The Asian preference 
for social harmony and non-confrontative solutions creates a common ground 
and an interest on the part of our partners for further exchange on the many 
mechanisms of dialogue and consensus building the German model has to offer. 
High-Quality Formal Institutions
Clearly, for a development path to succeed, the mental models of a society 
must be in line or gradually brought into line with the desired reforms. However, 
high-quality formal institutions (meaning both the regulatory framework and 
the organizations responsible for designing and implementing that framework) 
are equally important, as the authors in this reader underline time and again. 
Least developed countries, but also, to a certain extent, transition countries, need 
to build up their institutions for economic, social, and environmental policy and 
regulations. Benecke, in the previous chapter of this reader, outlines seven policy 
fields that require a regulatory framework and corresponding organizations 
to define the structure and course of action in the economy: (1) planning and 
coordination; (2) property regime; (3) monetary order; (4) enterprise order; 
(5) competitive order; (6) fiscal order; and (7) social order. 
One of the most essential institutions in any development process is the 
state. The government or parliament will usually define a nation’s development 
objectives, and the executive will be active in the implementation of measures to 
achieve those objectives. We are, of course, aware that there is no agreement in 
the international discussion on the role of the state – on the areas in which the 
state should be active or which measures it should employ. In contrast with the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the social and ecological market economy promotes an 
active and proactive state12 that provides public services, shapes the regulatory 
environment, and undertakes to reconcile various interests through its interaction 
with the private sector and civil society. 
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
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The belief in an active state is shared by Asian countries – this adding yet 
another layer to our conviction that the social and ecological market economy is 
potentially a very interesting model for Asian governments to consider. However, 
there are also important differences between the Asian understanding of the role 
of the state and that of the social and ecological market economy: the social 
and ecological market economy stipulates that state monopolies in areas not 
characterized by public goods produce inefficiencies and contradict the principle 
of subsidiarity, while these monopolies can be found in many Asian countries. 
Subsidiarity,13 one of the key values underlying the social and ecological market 
economy, is particularly relevant to transition countries, because it means that the 
state should not engage in activities that are more efficiently provided by the private 
sector. Subsidiarity limits the economic role of the state to providing public goods 
and setting the regulatory and – to some extent – the incentives framework for 
the private sector and for civil society. It stipulates that the state should not engage 
in activities that are more efficiently provided by the private sector. This principle 
constitutes an important fundamental value underlying our advisory work in 
countries working to establish a market economy (for example, in the areas of 
economic policy, financial sector development, and private sector development). 
The state in Germany is most active in the areas of social policy, promotion 
of small and medium enterprises, regional policies, and the promotion of new 
technologies, particularly environmentally friendly technologies. Approaches 
in these areas are mainly developed on the provincial level in Germany and are 
met by a keen interest on the part of our Asian partners, as they seek to find 
approaches to the challenges that face them today.
Development in Asia – Sharing the Benefits of Growth
Asia-Pacific is a region of contrasts. It has some of the fastest-growing 
economies in the world and, at the same time, a number of least developed 
countries (LDCs)14 that continue to face persistent challenges. As a whole, the 
region has made significant progress in poverty reduction, already achieving some 
of the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). China 
and India, which together account for nearly 40% of the world’s population and 
rank among the fastest-growing countries in the world, contribute most of this 
progress, along with the “tiger” economies of East and Southeast Asia.
13In general, subsidiarity means that the higher level entity only becomes active when the lower 
level entity cannot solve a problem. See Benecke in this reader, footnote 28. 
14Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Timor-
Leste.
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However, also for those countries that have been successful in reducing their 
overall poverty levels, poverty remains a problem. Certain groups, mainly in the 
rural and more remote areas but increasingly also in urban locations, are not 
benefitting from the growth process: 
•  Almost one-third of the world’s poor live in India, so that MDG 1 of halving 
poverty becomes very much an Indian challenge.15 The Indian economy has 
grown steadily over the last two decades, resulting in a decrease of poverty 
from 54.88% in the 1970s to 25.7% in 2004/2005 – but this quarter of the 
population still continues to subsist on $0.40/day. Growth has been uneven 
with respect to different social and economic groups, geographic regions, 
and rural and urban areas. The Gini coefficient is at 0.368 (2004/2005).16
•  High levels of inequality are found especially in China (with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.469 in 200417), where the eastern coastal areas have witnessed 
successful, export-driven growth processes, while the other regions of the 
country increasingly lag behind.18  
•  Even though in Vietnam the Gini coefficient of 0.344 (2004) is not excessively 
high, distribution of wealth has a clear regional and ethnic dimension. Poverty is 
increasingly concentrated among the ethnic minorities, where 52.3% remain poor, 
compared to 10.3% among the Kinh and Chinese majority. Most of the poor 
continue to live in rural areas (20.4% in rural areas vs. 3.9% in urban areas).19
Such rising income inequality is frequently accompanied by tensions. The 
situation is aggravated even further when ethnic and religious issues also play 
a role. In many countries in Asia, highly conflictive relationships exist between 
ethnic minorities and the government, for example, in the case of the Hmong 
in the Vietnamese Highlands, the Chakma of Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill 
Tracts, or the Muslims in southern Thailand. While the main objectives of these 
movements appear from the outside to be political and cultural/religious, the 
underlying causes are often poverty, discrimination, marginalization, lack of 
15Calculated for the 1990s, using the poverty line of US$1 in purchasing power parity. See 
Hadnes and Klump in this reader.
16Indian Planning Commission, http://www.planningcommission.gov.in/news/prmar07.pdf. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2007/2008 
(New York: UNDP, 2007), 283. Compare with Germany’s Gini coefficient of 0.283 (2000).
17Ibid., 282.
18See Mang and Bonschab in this reader.
19World Bank, Vietnam Development Report 2008 (Hanoi: World Bank, 2007), 3-4. Data is based 
on preliminary and unofficial information from the Vietnamese General Statistics Office.
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access to public goods like education, infrastructure, health, etc., exploitation of 
the local and regional resources without fair allocation of government budgets, 
and lack of access to political representation. The governments frequently resort 
to force in order to handle the situation. 
In many developing countries in Asia, a by-product of the impressive (but unequal) 
growth and job creation is the rise of labor conflicts. So-called wild strikes, motivated 
by violations of labor laws and workers’ rights by the employers,20 are becoming an 
increasing problem, also in the export and industrial processing zones. Often, there 
are institutional deficiencies, including weak or non-existent regulation and a general 
lack of dialogue mechanisms or social partnership arrangements. Thus, wild strikes 
are often the only way for workers to express their grievances and to make themselves 
heard. “Real” strikes are also on the rise as workers push for salary increases.21
The strong overall growth performance of Asia tends to hide the fact that the 
development of the Asian LDCs is lagging behind, especially those in South Asia.22 
Asian LDCs account for almost one-third of the global population in all LDCs. 
They vary widely. Bangladesh is the largest, with a population of more than 130 
million, while Bhutan is quite small with around 750,000 inhabitants. As a result 
of these differences, the experiences of these countries vary widely. Like the other 
countries in the region, the Asian LDCs are developing, but from a lower level. 
Some of these countries are successfully participating in the region’s growth (for 
example, Cambodia with a 5.5% annual growth rate in per capita gross domestic 
product from 1990 to 2005 and Bangladesh, which is considered one the lead 
performers among LDCs); others, such as conflict-ridden Nepal, have not been 
able to stimulate economic growth and thus foster human development.23 For the 
region, the extremely dynamic development in some Asian countries represents 
both a challenge and an opportunity. It may result in increasing inequality leading 
to regional tensions or it might generate additional resources and opportunities 
stimulating development in the Asian LDCs.
Challenges for Asia – Ensuring future growth
Those countries in Asia that have already achieved high growth rates now face 
the challenge of ensuring the continuation of that growth, while also making sure 
that the benefits of growth are increasingly shared among their citizens. And 
20Wild strikes are spontaneous work stoppages, implemented without any formal procedures.
21See Ho Sy Hung and Meissner in this reader.
22UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, 247.
23Ibid., 279.
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those countries that are still LDCs should reflect on the lessons learned from the 
more developed countries,24 as they design their development strategies. Issues of 
competitiveness, financial stability, and the environment are taking center stage 
for both groups.
The competitiveness of Asian products and services has improved immensely. 
Globalization and falling trade barriers, however, present a threat to many 
developing Asian countries (and especially their small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and poorer parts of their population). 
•  First, industries that until recently were able to survive in markets protected 
by high tariff barriers will be wiped out if they cannot increase their 
competitiveness quickly and efficiently or if they cannot move to more 
prosperous market segments. 
•  Second, in particular smaller firms may not have access to the know-how, 
technology, and finance they need to improve their performance. 
•  Third, competitiveness is often exclusively based on low labor costs, 
resulting in dependency on external know-how and inputs and often in an 
unsustainable “race to the bottom”, where profit margins are so low that 
exploitation of workers and resources are unavoidable.
If governments do not react and develop strategies to support certain sectors 
or regions with effective structural instruments, whole sectors or industries may 
be wiped out, leading to further unemployment, increasing regional inequality, 
and migration to urban areas – all of this in countries without functioning social 
security systems. In these countries, firms need better access to information, 
know-how, new technology, and innovations,25 and governments need to develop 
a clear structural policy26 to strengthen and sustain the competitiveness of their 
24For example, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Philippines.
25In developed countries of Asia, governments, universities, research institutions, associations, and 
large and small firms in the private sector work hand in hand in order to make their economic 
sectors more powerful and more competitive. In addition, there is a range of instruments and 
programs and huge networks of commercially transferred services that can help a company or an 
entire sector to improve technology or marketing. 
26Please note that I am using the term structural policy in the sense of the German term 
strukturpolitik, which is a collective term to describe all economic policy measures that aim to 
shape the structure of an economy. Structural policy may target either the sectoral or regional 
economic structure with the objective of preventing crises, for example, due to globalization. The 
English term structural policy has a different meaning, implying a policy that addresses permanent 
market conditions; examples include tax incentives or labor market conditions (http://www.fin.
gc.ca/gloss/gloss-s_e.html). 
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industries (beyond low labor costs), support structural change in accordance 
with WTO regulations, and transfer the workforce from non-competitive to 
competitive sectors.
In the financial sector, managing financial risks has become more important 
than ever, given the large volume of financial funds flowing to emerging markets 
in Asia. This phenomenon, which reflects the success of these economies, also 
represents major challenges for the monetary authorities who manage monetary 
and exchange rate policies in these countries. Institutional development, in terms 
of setting up an effective regulatory and organizational framework for financial 
market supervision, has not kept pace with these challenges in a number of 
Asian countries. This institutional deficiency now represents a major risk for the 
stability of the financial sector and the economy of various countries as a whole. 
The problem of climate change must be dealt with on a global scale by all 
governments, but also at the national level by authorities in each country. South 
Asia, in particular, will probably be one of the most affected areas worldwide. 
The coastal population in South and Southeast Asia is already facing the problem 
of serious flooding due to rising sea levels caused by climate change. Even under 
conservative assumptions, the sea level could rise to 40 cm higher than the present 
level by the end of the twenty-first century and submerge a huge area of the South 
and Southeast Asian coastal belt. Over 70 million people living along the coastal 
belt may be forced to relocate. In South Asia, the rapid melting of glaciers in 
the Himalayas is initially expected to cause excessive water flow and flooding in 
the region. Eventually, the full loss of glaciers would have a severe affect on the 
availability of fresh water in the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra Rivers, which 
are the life-line for an estimated 500 million people in India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, many of them poor. The associated loss of farm production, water 
for human needs, fisheries, river transport, and livelihood will be devastating and 
may completely wipe out the progress in poverty reduction achieved so far. 
The Social and Ecological Market Economy as a Model for Asia
The extent to which the social and ecological market economy appears attractive 
to our partner countries in Asia – and thus is considered a potential model with 
which to address their own challenges – depends on whether or not Germany 
has been able to implement social, ecological and, of course, economic objectives. 
Asia, as far as we can see, views Germany with a certain respect due to the fact that 
Germany is world champion exporter, but also recognizes that there are certain 
weaknesses in the German model and that there is still room for improvement. 
However, Asian observers are aware that, during the last two decades, the social 
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and ecological market economy has provided conceptual space in Germany for 
necessary ongoing reforms – to meet the challenges of reunification between East 
and West Germany, globalization, and immigration27 without social unrest. 
Furthermore, even though this reader only touches upon the ecological aspects 
of the social and ecological market economy, it is important to highlight the fact 
that Germany has been more successful than most other countries in integrating 
ecological aspects into its regulatory framework. For example, the recent 
“climate package” of laws (December 2007) aims to increase the percentage of 
renewable energy used in electricity production, housing, and fuel to 18% by 
2020.28 Industrial policy has been successfully employed in Germany to support 
the development of environmental technologies, providing the business sector 
with new markets and new business opportunities. The German example shows 
that adjustment to the challenges of climate change creates opportunities and 
does not necessarily harm competitiveness.
The institutions that had been developed on the basis of the model in West 
Germany, most importantly mechanisms to reconcile and unite different 
interests, have made these adjustment processes possible. The social and ecological 
market economy brings together economic, social, and ecological objectives, 
but the responsibility is shared – for example, the private sector also has a social 
responsibility, which is embedded in the German constitution.29 Thus, a system of 
social partnership unites employers and employees at the enterprise level, where they 
work together to further the company’s welfare – for example, the co-determination 
system gives employees one-third of the seats in the supervisory board of a firm, 
which allows them to participate in decision making and at the same time to exercise 
an important control mechanism over the management board. 
Social objectives are not only achieved through social security measures, like 
health services, pension systems, and the like, but most importantly by providing 
equal opportunities to all citizens. The German constitution calls for an equal 
standard of living for German citizens, no matter in which area of the country 
they live and work. This equality is pursued through the education system (most 
prominently, the dual system for technical and vocational training, where the 
27According to the 2005 Micro-census, 18.6% of the residents in Germany are migrants 
or children of migrants. See www-ec.destatis.de, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2, Bevoelkerung und 
Erwerbstaetigkeit, Wiesbaden 2007. 
28http://www.bmu.de/pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilungen/pm/40896.php 
(29.02.2008).
29The German constitution states that “property entails obligations” (Eigentum verpflichtet). See 
Benecke on the consequences for the private sector.
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state and the private sector take on a shared responsibility for educating the 
country’s youth30), regional development mechanisms (with the reunification 
between East and West Germany as the best example), and other instruments. 
The specific structure of the German economy, with its multitude of small and 
medium enterprises (the so-called Mittelstand), is another way that the model 
attempts to provide welfare for all, one that has greatly interested many of our 
partners. There is a set of policies in Germany that specifically targets SMEs. 
The model of the social and ecological market economy has clearly been 
successful in Germany, and it is also popular among Germans precisely because 
it aims to provide welfare for all. However, there is also clearly need for further 
reform. A recent study on social justice that compared Germany to other groups 
of countries with a different welfare system shows a mixed picture: Germany is 
ranked a little higher than the average of the continental European welfare states, 
much higher than the Anglophone countries, but lower than the Scandinavian 
countries. The main problem according to the study is the inflexibility in the 
labor market, which creates high entry barriers for certain segments of the labor 
force. The debate in Germany focuses on the necessity for further reforms in 
social policies.31  
There is a wide range of opinions: Hein and Truger,32 on the one hand, argue 
that social achievements (including labor market regulation) do not harm 
the competitiveness of the German economy, and that unsatisfactory growth 
performance is mainly the result of strict monetary policies and failure to 
stimulate economic demand. Welzel and Vehrkamp,33 on the other hand, point 
out deficiencies that still need to be addressed to enhance competitiveness, 
particularly in the area of labor laws and education.  
Furthermore, the effects of globalization have led to a widening of the income 
gap in Germany, refueling the debate on social justice and leading to calls for new 
instruments to achieve it. Certainly, there is need for further reform, particularly 
with respect to achieving a new balance between the economic and social goals of the 
German model. The debate on how to achieve more social justice while maintaining 
30See Baur and Pfeiffer in this reader.
31See Wolfgang Merkel, “Soziale Gerechtigkeit im OECD-Vergleich” (Social justice compared 
in OECD countries) in Soziale Gerechtigkeit – eine Bestandsaufnahme (Social justice – taking 
stock), eds. Stefan Empter and Robert B. Vehrkamp (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 
233-257. Whether or not this level can be viewed as satisfactory is hotly debated in Germany at 
present. See Benecke in this reader.
32See Hein and Truger in this reader.
33See Welzel and Vehrkamp in this reader.
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competitiveness is ongoing in Germany; however, all agree that for Germany the 
social and ecological market economy has provided a flexible framework for change. 
This debate and also the reforms implemented in the last years provide a wealth of 
ideas and experience that we can share with our partners in Asia.
It is important to underline that the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s new Regional Strategy for Asia explicitly reflects 
the principles of the social and ecological market economy and specifies them 
further for the diverse and dynamic Asian context. Socially balanced economic 
development, ecologically sustainable development, and democratization and 
human rights, good governance, and conflict reduction are the strategy’s three 
core objectives. In order to promote sustainable economic development in Asia, 
the German contribution is structured around three modules: (i) strengthening 
economic competitiveness, especially in smaller and medium-sized enterprises; 
(ii) developing and upgrading social security and service systems; and (iii) 
mobilizing the informal sector.
Outlook
The objective of this article has been to reflect on the relevance of the model of 
the social and ecological market economy for Asia. It has given initial indications 
of how the model can respond to the challenges of globalization and increasing 
inequality in Asia, and how values such as equal opportunity, social justice, fair 
competition, and ecological sustainability can contribute to fair and sustainable 
development. It has also provided examples of how this orientation is translated 
into practical approaches to technical cooperation in different country contexts. 
The articles in this reader delve into these issues in much greater depth. They 
endeavor to shed light on the relevance of the model for Asia from the three 
different perspectives that this article could just briefly touch upon: 
1) From the perspective of academia: The reader contains contributions from 
German researchers who reflect on the further development of the social market 
economy in Germany and the ways in which Germany is dealing with some of 
the challenges it is facing at present; they also review how key principles and 
elements of the German experience translate into practical concepts of possible 
relevance for Asia.
2) From the perspective of Asian economists: Another set of articles examines 
the significance of the model from an Asian viewpoint in the context of different 
Asian countries. They assess how elements of the model can provide policy options 
under different circumstances, and how relevant aspects may already be reflected 
in ongoing debates on societal values in some of their countries (for example, 
Cornelia Richter  |  67
market economy with a socialist orientation in Vietnam, the harmonious society 
in China). 
(3) From the perspective of development cooperation practitioners: Finally, 
several articles review how the elements and principles of the social and ecological 
market economy have translated into practical concepts and policy options for 
implementation of technical cooperation at the country level. These practical 
lessons from experience have frequently been elaborated in a joint effort between 
the GTZ advisors and their counterparts. At the same time, these articles reflect 
the range of relevant GTZ services and the areas which should be developed 
further in the light of the principles of the German model.
In a nutshell, the overall objective of this reader is to create a platform for 
dialogue and exchange between different perspectives, visions, and experiences. 
The concept underlying this reader thus immediately reflects a fundamental 
principle of the social and ecological market economy and equally of GTZ’s 
approach: the importance of stimulating processes of dialogue and exchange, and 
creating forums for a sustainable and effective discussion between the state, the 
private sector, and civil society. 
In GTZ’s understanding, technical cooperation can only be effective and lead 
to sustainable results if it is based on a cooperative and dialogue-oriented approach 
between all partners involved.  While official agreements on development 
cooperation are generally concluded between the German and the partner 
governments, effective implementation must involve and ensure ownership by all 
relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society. Furthermore, 
cooperation with Asia increasingly builds on a two-way dialogue, in which 
Europe has as much to learn and benefit from Asian experience as vice versa.
To innovate further and hone its approaches, GTZ engages in an extensive 
exchange with academia and applied researchers, both nationally and 
internationally. We believe that only through close exchange with the research 
community can we develop our work in line with the best international thinking 
and research – and also critically reflect upon our approaches. For this purpose, 
GTZ has joined hands with leading development economists to create the 
Poverty Reduction, Equity, and Growth Network (PEGNet). The PEGNet 
brings together researchers with an interest in issues revolving around the 
poverty-inequality-growth nexus in developing countries, and links them to the 
German development policy bodies. 
Furthermore, we are also deeply engaged in international forums and 
networks with other development agencies and donors, for example, the Donor 
Committee for Enterprise Development, where GTZ plays an active role on 
behalf of the BMZ. These allow us to learn from each other and harmonize key 
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principles and approaches, but they also constitute a platform for bringing crucial 
concerns into the international discussion, for example, the issue of whether or 
not there is a proactive role for the state to play in creating the preconditions for 
competitiveness in globalized and knowledge-intensive markets and in ensuring 
a pro-poor orientation of growth.  
While this reader presents a range of cases where the principles of the social and 
ecological market economy have effectively helped to address key challenges and 
requirements of our partner countries and have been translated into sustainable 
policy options, I would also like to highlight a few areas which, in my opinion, 
deserve more attention in our work.
This article has already referred to the importance of specific cultural and historical 
patterns, in other words, the shared mental models, within each society. We need 
to pay even more attention to this field, and deepen our understanding of these 
models. A systemic and value-oriented approach to capacity development must 
systematically consider the respective societal values and institutions and integrate 
the specific cultural, societal, and historic values and development patterns. 
We have seen the importance of dialogue and cooperation mechanisms for 
ensuring ownership and inclusion. So far, the emphasis has been on dialogue 
between the public and the private sector and, to a lesser degree, on ways to 
involve civil society. The experience of the social and ecological market economy 
teaches us the importance of involving representatives of the workers and trade 
unions; mechanisms of co-determination constitute an essential building block 
of the success of the German social market economy. Capacity development 
in shaping social partnerships as well as approaches for corporate governance, 
which include elements of co-determination, for example, should therefore be 
integrated in private sector development. 
Given the environmental challenges Asia is facing, supporting ecological 
sustainability is a clear priority. The lack of contributions to this reader on the 
environmental dimension indicates that economic development approaches 
need to consider environmental sustainability in a more integrated and 
systematic manner. For example, more thought should be given to ways to 
address ecological aspects within the framework of economic policy, perhaps by 
supporting partner countries in designing ecological tax reforms on the basis of 
the German experience and establishing a regulatory environment compatible 
with ecological sustainability. 
To conclude, I would like to underline that I am convinced – and this reader 
fully supports my conviction – that for GTZ, the model of the social and ecological 
market economy constitutes a solid framework for our advisory services and for 
cooperation with our partner countries. For our partners, it hopefully presents 
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a model that can help them reconcile the objectives of growth and welfare with 
their respective culture and value system. 
We look forward to further developing this approach in close dialogue with 
our partner organizations as well as our international partners, both in the 
academic and the donor communities. In particular, we hope to continue the 
dialogue which has been initiated through this reader in an Asia-wide conference 
on the social and ecological market economy scheduled to take place at the end 
of 2008. 
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Ever since the mid-1990s, the German economy has performed far worse 
than the economy of the euro zone as a whole.1 However, public awareness only 
really focused on this lag after the 2000/2001 downturn. From 2001 to 2005, real 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates were low, at times even negative. 
The economic stagnation led to a significant radicalization of the economic-
policy debate. The overwhelming majority of German economists, journalists, 
and business representatives maintained that Germany was undergoing a deep 
“structural crisis” as a result of over-regulated labor markets and employment-
adverse social security systems. Radical “structural” reforms therefore appeared 
to be the only way out of the crisis. By the second legislative period of the Social 
Democrat-Green government, proponents of radical reform managed to also 
push through corresponding economic policies, the AGENDA 2010 and the 
Hartz Laws. The grand coalition in power since the end of 2005 has not deviated 
from these policies to any significant degree.  
In 2006 Germany experienced an unexpectedly strong expansion. In 
international comparison, German’s economy grew at the same rate as the 
economy of the entire euro area.  Nevertheless, warnings still persist that the 
reform efforts must not be relaxed, so as not to endanger the results of past 
efforts and cutbacks. This point of view is astonishing and – if it has economic 
policy consequences – dangerous. It is astonishing because it does not ask why 
the German economy stagnated for more or less five years, while most of the 
euro zone economies and also those of very different countries like Great Britain, 
Sweden, and the USA recovered quickly after the 2000/2001 downturn and had 
significantly higher growth and lower unemployment rates than Germany.2 And 
such a standpoint is dangerous, because a continuation of “structural reform” 
policies threatens to further burden economic developments in Germany. 
1See Eckhard Hein and Achim Truger, “What ever happened to Germany? Is the Decline of the 
Former European Key Currency Country caused by Structural Sclerosis or by Macroeconomic 
Mismanagement?” International Review of Applied Economics 19 (2005): 3-28.
2For a comparison of Germany with Great Britain and Sweden, see Eckhard Hein, Jan-Oliver 
Menz, and Achim Truger, “Warum bleibt Deutschland hinter Schweden und dem Vereinigten 
Königreich zurück? Makroökonomische Politik erklärt den Unterschied,” IMK Report Nr. 15 
(2006), Düsseldorf.
German Economic Policy at a Crossroads 
Eckhard Hein and Achim Truger
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In this article, we call into question the diagnosis of “structural sclerosis” of the 
German economy and the resulting strategy of “structural reforms.” In our opinion, 
the German stagnation from 2001 to 2005 cannot be explained by the failure to 
implement structural reforms of the labor market and the social security systems or 
delays in implementation of such reforms, but by macroeconomic mismanagement, 
in other words, by misguided monetary, wage, and fiscal policies, imposed, in part, 
at the European level (European Central Bank – ECB, Stability and Growth Pact 
– SGP) and promoted, in part, by the mistaken German reform zeal.  
Germany’s Stagnation from 2000 to 2005
Compared to the euro zone average and to the USA, Germany was particularly 
hard hit by the downturn of 2000/2001 (Table 1). While average annual real GDP 
growth of the euro area (including Germany) was 1.4% and thus significantly less 
than that of the USA in the period from 2001 to 2005, Germany’s average annual 
growth in that period was 0.7%, just half of the euro area’s growth rate.
In contrast to the euro zone as a whole, the weak German growth was carried 
exclusively by the export surplus. Domestic demand, on average, had a negative 
impact on growth from 2001 to 2005. Overall, the German economy was 
characterized by a high degree of international competitiveness, on the one hand, 
and considerable weakness of domestic demand, on the other hand. Because of 
the weak growth, employment declined in Germany from 2001 to 2005, whereas 
it increased in the euro area and in the USA. The German unemployment rate, 
which had always been below the euro area average before 2002, rose above it. 
German inflation, on the other hand, was well below the euro area average, as it 
had been since the mid-1990s. 
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Reform Deadlock?
For most German economists, the explanation for the growth and employment 
problems at home is clear and simple: rigid and over-regulated labor markets, as 
well as employment-adverse social security systems are held responsible for the 
German crisis. This viewpoint is based on a simple neo-classical model, according 
to which (long-term) unemployment can only be caused by disruptions to the 
labor market that prevent a market-clearing real wage from emerging.3 Collective 
wage bargaining (for example, sector-wide wage agreements), labor-market 
3See, for example, Horst Siebert, “Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in 
Europe”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1997): 37-54.
Germany Euro zone USA
Real GDP, annual growth rate 0.7 1.4 2.6
Growth contribution of domestic demand 
including change in stocks
-0.2 1.3 3.0
     Growth contribution of private 
consumption
0.2 0.8 2.2
     Growth contribution of public 
consumption
0.0 0.3 0.5
     Growth contribution of fixed capital 
formation
-0.4 0.2 0.5
    Growth contribution of balance of goods 
and services 
0.9 0.1 -0.5
Employment, annual growth -0.2 0.8 0.7
Unemployment rate 8.7 8.5 5.4
Inflation rate1 1.6 2.2 2.5
Table 1: Real GDP Growth, Growth Contribution of Demand Aggregates, Un-
employment Rate, and Inflation Rate in Germany, the Euro Zone, and the USA
average value for 2001-2005 (in percent)
Notes: 1Germany and euro zone: Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI), USA: national 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Source: European Commission, annual macro-economic database (AMECO), 2006, http://europa.
eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm 
(February 8, 2007). OECD (2006), Economic Outlook, 2006, http://www.oecd.org/document/61
/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2483901_1_1_1_1,00.html (February 8, 2007). Authors’ calculations.
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regulations (for example, employment protection, minimum wages), and the 
social security systems (for example, unemployment benefits, tax wedge) have 
been identified as the cause for long-term unemployment and therefore also for 
weak growth. In this view, there is only one solution for the problems: reduction of 
labor-market rigidities through more flexibility and decentralization of collective 
wage negotiations (for example, through company-level pacts), deregulation 
of the labor market (for example, by dismantling employment protection), 
reduction of unemployment benefits (for example, Hartz IV), and lower 
non-wage labor costs.4
We have elsewhere explored at length the general theoretical and empirical 
deficiencies of such a viewpoint.5 However, far more important for the 
German discussion is the fact that even if the “institutional sclerosis” view were 
theoretically and, in general, empirically convincing, it would not be applicable 
to developments in German labor market institutions, social security systems, 
and unemployment. Looking at the indicators usually cited for the rigidity of the 
labor market and social security systems (employment protection, unemployment 
benefit replacement rate and duration, union density, bargaining coordination, 
tax wedge) in Germany, one finds that these have not worsened, either absolutely 
or relative to the European Union (EU), the euro area, or the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, since the slump 
in growth and employment during the mid-1990s. Table 2 demonstrates this by 
way of an aggregate indicator for institutional sclerosis and its development from 
the beginning of the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, which we calculated from 
the individual indicators. It shows that Germany reduced “institutional sclerosis” 
more clearly than all other countries or groups of countries, significantly reduced 
the gap vis-à-vis the OECD countries, completely overcame the gap vis-à-vis the 
EU average, and even did better than the euro area average. 
4See, for example, the majority view in German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report 
2005/2006, Seize the Chance – Boldly Advance the Reforms, Berlin, 2006, as well as the Joint 
Forecast of the Working Group of German Economic Research Institutes, “Die Lage der 
Weltwirtschaft und der deutschen Wirtschaft im Herbst 2005,” DIW Weekly Report 43/2005: 
605-655. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, “Ways Out of the Crisis”, Frankfurt, 2003; European 
Commission, “Germany’s Growth Performance in the 1990’s,” Economic Paper Nr. 170, Brussels, 
May 2002; and OECD, Economic Survey – Germany 2004, Paris, 2004.
5See Hein and Truger, “What ever happened to Germany?” (Footnote 1).
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The conclusion that structural reforms in Germany have proceeded at an 
above-average pace in international comparison – particularly in the last ten 
years – is also supported by two newer studies: first, a study by Deborah Mabbett 
und Waltraud Schelkle of reforms in employment protection legislation and 
unemployment benefits to the end of 2002 (Table 3)6 and secondly, the recent 
“OECD Jobs Strategy Reassessment.” The OECD, which has been one of the 
most prominent proponents of the need for structural reform, in general and 
particularly in Germany,7 certifies that Germany’s reform activity was well above 
the average from 1995 to 2005:8 according to its “reform intensity indicator,” 
Germany places fourth among the 30 countries studied and third within the euro 
zone, behind the Netherlands and Finland.
6See Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle, “Bringing Macroeconomics back into the 
Political Economy of Reform: the Lisbon Agenda and the ‘Fiscal Philosophy’ of EMU,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45, no.1 (2007): 81-103.
7OECD, The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations (Paris: OECD, 1994).
8OECD, OECD Employment Outlook: Boosting Jobs and Incomes – Policy Lessons from Reassessing 
the OECD Jobs Study (Paris: OECD, 2006).
Table 2: Aggregate Indicator for “Institutional Sclerosis”1 1980-84 and 1995-99
1Arithmetic mean of the indicators for employment protection legislation, unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, unemployment benefit duration, union density, bargaining coordination, and 
tax wedge, each scaled to the interval [0;100].
2Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, USA.
3without Greece and Luxemburg.
Source: Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn, David R. Howell, and John Schmitt, “Labor Market 
Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence”, in 
Fighting Unemployment. The Limits of the Free Market Orthodoxy, ed. David R. Howell (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Authors’ calculations.
1980-84 1995-99
Germany 57 52
OECD2 49 47
European Union3 53 52
Euro zone3 52 53
USA 20 18
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Given the background of this empirical evidence, it is very difficult to attribute 
the German growth and employment problems to overly rigid labor markets and 
a lack of structural reforms. The suspicion thus arises that the diagnosis behind 
the current economic policies was and is wrong.
Table 3: Reform Intensity1 in 14 EU Countries
Note: 1Sum of the two reform intensity values assigned by Mabbett and Schelkle, i.e. the sum of the 
reform intensity value of reform measures in the areas of employment protection and unemployment 
benefits for each country in the respective period on the basis of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti 
Social Reforms database. Positive values signal “increasing flexibility” (i.e. less labor protection and lower 
benefits). Negative values indicate “decreasing flexibility” (i.e. more labor protection and higher benefits). 
Mabbett and Schelkle measure the reform intensity of a reform package by assigning a value of 1 to 
reforms the databank classifies as “marginal,” and 2 to those classified as “structural”. Reform packages 
with more than one measure receive an intensity value of 2 if they contain two or more marginal 
measures and an additional 2 for including a structural measure (thus 4 is the maximum value for any one 
reform package, while 2 is the maximum value for packages that contain only marginal measures).
Source: Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle, “Bringing Macroeconomics back into the 
political economy of reform: the Lisbon Agenda and the ‘fiscal philosophy’ of EMU”, 2005, 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000259/01/BringingMacroeconomicsBackIn.pdf (February 
8, 2007). The Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti Social Reforms Database, http://www.frdb.org/
documentazione/centro_doc.php (February 8, 2007). Authors’ calculations.
1987-1994 1995-2002 1987-2002
Belgium 5 7 12
Denmark 4 10 14
Germany -2 17 15
Finland 4 16 20
France -3 -12 -15
Greece 0 9 9
Great Britain 5 5 10
Ireland 5 3 8
Italy 1 13 14
The Netherlands 2 24 26
Austria -1 13 12
Portugal 0 -3 -3
Spain 5 0 5
Sweden 4 15 19
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Germany Euro zone USA
Monetary policy
Short-term real interest rate, percent 1.2 0.6 -0.2
Long-term real interest rate, percent 2.6 2.1 1.9
Short-term real interest rate minus real 
GDP growth, percentage points
0.5 -0.7 -2.8
Long-term real interest rate minus real 
GDP growth, percentage points
1.9 0.7 -0.7
Fiscal policy
Government budget balance, percentage of 
GDP 
-3.5 -2.5 -3.5
Structural budget balance as a percentage 
of potential GDP, annual change, 
percentage points
-0.1 0.0 -1.0
Output gap as a percentage of potential 
GDP, annual change, percentage points
-0.8 -0.6 -0.3
Number of years with pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy during an economic slowdown
3 
(2003-5)
3 
(2003-5)
0
Negative fiscal stimulus in an economic 
slowdown, cumulative, percent of potential 
GDP
1.7 1.1 --
Wage policy
Compensation per employee, annual 
change, percent
1.8 2.5 3.9
Nominal unit labor costs, annual change, 
percent
0.2 1.7 1.7
Labor income share,1 percent 64.9 65.3 67.2
Change in labor income share to previous 
year, percentage points 
-0.6 -0.3 -0.4
Table 4: Indicators for Monetary, Fiscal, and Wage Policies in Germany,  
the Euro Zone, and the USA
average 2001-2005
Notes: 1Compensation per employee divided by GDP at factor costs per worker.
Source: European Commission (Table 1). OECD (Table 1). Authors’ calculations.
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Macroeconomic Mismanagement
A macroeconomic explanation for the weakness in German employment and 
growth can be based on both Post-Keynesian and New Keynesian theory. The 
latter now comprises the new international mainstream in macroeconomics.9 
According to these theories, an inadequate or uncoordinated use of 
macroeconomic instruments, that is, monetary, wage, and fiscal policies, can 
easily be the explanation for low growth and high unemployment over a longer 
period.  
Monetary Policy
With the start of the European Monetary Union in 1999, Germany lost the 
status of a regional key currency country in the European Monetary System 
(EMS) and the related interest-rate advantages. Because nominal interest rates 
have converged since 1999 while the inflation rate in Germany is below the euro 
zone average, Germany now has significantly higher real interest rates than the 
rest of the euro area. On average for the years 2001-2005, the policies of the ECB 
resulted in a short-term real interest rate of 1.2% for Germany, although it was 
only 0.6% for the euro zone as a whole (Table 4). And while the short-term real 
interest rate in the euro zone was positive throughout the 2001-2005 period, the 
Federal Reserve pushed through a negative short-term real interest rate of -0.2% 
in the USA. This expansive monetary policy contributed to the rapid recovery of 
the US economy after the 2000/2001 slump. The difference between short-term 
real interest rates and real GDP growth, as an indicator for the growth friendliness 
of monetary policy, was on average clearly negative for the years 2001-2005 in 
the USA. The ECB reacted much more hesitantly and less expansively to the 
growth downturn and thus contributed to the weak growth in the euro zone and 
particularly in Germany since 2001. While the difference between short-term 
real interest rates and real GDP growth was slightly negative on average in the 
euro area between 2001 and 2005, it remained positive in Germany.
The German economy thus not only suffered from the loss of the interest rate 
advantage as a result of the currency union, but was also especially affected by the 
growth-unfriendly policies of the ECB after 1999. However, Germany’s poor 
performance from 2001 to 2005 can be attributed only in part to these factors, given 
that monetary policy in a currency union can take into account only average inflation 
and GDP developments, and not the special situation of an individual country. 
9Eckhard Hein, Arne Heise, and Achim Truger (eds.), Neu-Keynesianismus – der neue 
wirtschaftspolitische Mainstream? (Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 2005).
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Fiscal Policy
Given that the ECB was neither willing nor able to stabilize the German 
economy after 2000, German fiscal policy should have worked to counteract 
the macroeconomic shock. However, it did exactly the opposite: it attempted to 
consolidate the budget pro-cyclically and thus worsened the crisis. One reason 
for this was the pressure from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as Germany’s 
budget deficit continually exceeded the 3% limit from 2002 to 2005. On the other 
hand, however, it was also the result of the economic policy recommendations of 
the German economics mainstream, which pushed for expenditure consolidation 
of the government budget, regardless of the cyclical situation.10 The attempt was 
obviously unsuccessful (Table 4).
The actual budget balance is not an appropriate indicator with which to 
evaluate the cyclical orientation of fiscal policy, because it cannot be controlled 
by economic policy, but is the result of the overall macroeconomic process. 
We therefore use instead the structural budget balance, in other words, the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance in relation to potential GDP, and compare its 
development with movements in the output gap, in other words, the difference 
between actual and potential output.11 If there is a positive change in the output 
gap, the economy is in an upturn; a negative change indicates a downturn. The 
change in the structural budget balance indicates the direction of fiscal policy: 
if there is a positive change, structural deficits fall or surpluses increase and fiscal 
policy has a restrictive impact. If there is a negative change, structural deficits rise 
or surpluses are reduced and fiscal policy is expansionary. 
Measured in this way, German fiscal policy from 2001 to 2005 was pro-cyclically 
restrictive in three of these years and thus intensified the downturn (Table 4). 
The cumulative negative fiscal impact amounted to 1.7% of potential GDP over 
the entire period. Fiscal policy in the euro zone was also pro-cyclically restrictive 
in three of the years, although the cumulative negative fiscal impact was only 1.1% 
10See, for example, the majority view in German Council of Economic Experts and the Working 
Group of German Economic Research Institutes (Footnote 4).
11The cyclically adjusted budget balance is the budget balance that would have resulted if actual 
GDP were exactly equal to potential GDP (output gap = 0). If capacity is outstripped (output gap 
> 0), i.e. a cyclical upturn, actual tax receipts are greater than potential tax receipts, and because 
of low unemployment, actual public expenditures are less than potential public expenditures. If 
capacity is not fully utilized (output gap < 0), the reverse is true. Through this cyclical adjustment, 
the cyclical elements of the budget balance are calculated out. The resulting cyclically adjusted 
balance can be interpreted as a measure of the true influence of fiscal policy on the economy, while 
policy and cyclical factors are mixed in the actual budget balance. Of course, short-term cyclical 
and long-term structural influences cannot be statistically separated with absolute certainty. 
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of potential GDP. Thus, although the cyclical downturn was much stronger in 
Germany than in the entire euro area – the output gap declined annually by 0.8 
percentage points in Germany versus 0.6 percentage points per year in the euro 
zone – German fiscal policy was considerably more restrictive. The fiscal-policy 
response in the USA, in contrast, was strongly anti-cyclical between 2001 and 
2005: the structural budget balance was reduced by one percentage point per 
year on average. In the euro area and in Germany, this balance was maintained or 
reduced by only 0.1 percentage point a year, although both experienced a much 
steeper decline in the output gap.
The restrictive and destabilizing orientation of German fiscal policy becomes 
even clearer, when the development of individual expenditure categories is 
examined (Table 5). Real total government expenditures fell by 0.2% per year 
from 2001 to 2005, while they increased by 1.4% a year in the euro area and, even 
more sharply, by 3.6% per year in the USA. Real public consumption in Germany 
declined by 0.3% a year; real public investment fell dramatically by 4.0% a year. 
The ratio of public investment to GDP was therefore only 1.5% in the 2001-2005 
period and thus a good percentage point below the values for the euro zone and 
the USA. This development is particularly alarming, given that public investment 
is not only an essential component of effective demand in the short term, but 
also a key prerequisite for private investment and economic growth, through the 
related provision of public infrastructure.
Germany Euro zone USA
Real total government 
expenditure1
-0.2 1.4 3.6
   Real government consumption1 -0.3 2.0 4.3
    Real government fixed capital 
formation2
-4.0 1.5 3.2
Real government revenue1 -1.3 0.8 0.3
Government gross fixed capital 
formation (percent of GDP)
1.5 2.5 2.7
Table 5: Annual Growth Rates of Selected Fiscal Policy Aggregates in Germany, 
the Euro Zone, and the USA
average 2001-2005 (in percent)
Notes: 1deflated using the HCPI; 2deflated using the deflator of gross fixed capital formation.
Source: European Commission (Table 1). Authors’ calculations.
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Wage Policy
The development of wages, measured as compensation per employee – 
compared with the rest of the euro zone or the USA – was also particularly 
restrictive in Germany from 2001 to 2005, as it had been already since the 
mid-1990s (Table 4). Growth in German unit labor costs was therefore well 
below the euro area average, which was the main reason for the below-average 
inflation. In 2004 and 2005, unit-labor-cost growth was even negative, so that 
wage developments represented a significant risk of deflation, in other words, the 
risk of falling output prices and rising real debt, particularly of businesses, with 
the corresponding negative effects on investment. Falling output prices did not 
materialize because the prices for imported energy as well as government fees and 
taxes rose, and firms could also increase their profit margins. 
Although German below-average wage developments, compared to the rest 
of Europe, were dominant for long phases even before the currency union, at 
that time they were the basis for the German position as key currency country 
in the EMS, which allowed the German Bundesbank to set lower nominal 
and real interest rates than prevailed in the other countries.12 In contrast, after 
the monetary union, German wage restraint, as the basis of the below-average 
inflation rate, was penalized by above-average real interest rates. The moderate 
wage movements in Germany also contributed to a greater fall of the labor 
income share. Together with the general uncertainty caused by the structural 
reform policies, the massive redistribution to the detriment of workers was the 
main reason for the everywhere bemoaned weakness of consumption and internal 
demand. The trend of falling labor income share continued also in the entire euro 
zone in the 1990s, although with a slower speed than in Germany since 2001. 
In the USA, in contrast, it proved possible to the arrest the tendency towards 
falling labor income shares in the 1990s, so that this share now lies around two 
percentage points above that in the euro zone or Germany. 
Wage restraint in Germany certainly increased the international price 
competitiveness of German firms, so that export surpluses almost quadrupled 
between 2001 and 2005. Nevertheless, this export success was not enough to 
compensate for the weakness in domestic demand. Because over 40% of German 
exports go to the euro zone, the growing German export and current account 
surpluses are accompanied by increasing current account deficits or declining 
surpluses in the partner countries within the monetary union. Since the other 
countries can no longer use a nominal devaluation to defend themselves, they are 
under growing pressure to also pursue wage moderation and demand-dampening 
12See Hein and Truger, “What ever happened to Germany?” (Footnote 1).
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policies in order to improve their competitive position. The deflationary risks 
emanating from wage developments in Germany therefore increasingly threaten 
to radiate into the euro area. German wage movements have thus become a 
dangerous powder keg for the currency union.
Final Remarks and Conclusion
The essential causes of German stagnation from 2001 to 2005 are not found 
in over-regulated labor markets and employment-adverse social security systems. 
On the contrary, unmistakable macroeconomic mismanagement, in part at the 
European level (ECB, SGP) and in part homegrown, was responsible for weak 
growth and high unemployment. The fact that there was an upturn in 2006 and 
that the five-year stagnation did not continue is the result of the reform pause 
and the less dampening position of the public budget in that year, which made it 
possible for the foreign trade stimulus to spring over to internal demand, especially 
to investment. However, the recovery has nothing to do with the reform policies 
of previous years; these explain only why the recovery in Germany was so long 
in coming.
The continuation of structural reform policies and attempts to consolidate 
the government budget by means of expenditure cuts would again destabilize 
the economy. What is required instead is macroeconomic policy reorientation, 
in other words, more expansive monetary and fiscal policy and stabilizing wage 
developments, which again make use of the room to maneuver between the target 
inflation rate of the ECB and long-term national productivity growth.
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Introduction
The social market economy is considered one of the central pillars of Germany’s 
political and economic post-war architecture. The formula for success of the 
subsequent world champion exporter can be summed up as “prosperity for all” 
(Erhard 1957) based on a market economy and the maintenance of a social – and later 
also ecological – balance. Almost 60 years after its inception, however, the concept 
of the social market economy is facing a double challenge arising primarily from 
changed economic and social conditions in an era of economic globalization.
Despite – or perhaps precisely because of – these challenges, now, after 60 
years, the social market economy still appears a reasonable means of achieving a 
balance within society that is capable of tempering the ecological and social 
burdens of increased international competition. In particular, Asian countries with 
rapidly growing and increasingly liberalized economies and totalitarian pasts are 
considered likely candidates for the introduction of social market economy 
principles. That would enable the social market economy to remain a leading 
export – at the very time when its future viability in Germany is the subject of 
highly critical and controversial debate.
One side of this domestic German debate focuses on a crisis of the social market 
economy and the need for a new social market economy in Germany. Warnings 
that the concept of the social market economy needs to be revised and updated 
are expressed above all because social security systems are under great pressure 
as a result of demographic change and globalization. The social1 component of 
the social market economy is seen as an obstacle and a competitive disadvantage 
and condemned as a domestic policy burden on a government overstretched by 
redistributive duties (Papier 2007, 3).
1The German term sozial is translated as social throughout the text. The authors are aware of 
discussions regarding an adequate translation into English, which according to many experts 
would lie somewhere between “social” and “welfare.”
Social Market Economy 2.0 –  
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On the other hand, a majority of the population increasingly doubt 
whether Germany’s social market economy still merits the designation social 
at all and whether its social aspirations have not fallen victim to the supposed 
challenges and constraints of global “predatory capitalism.” The latest Bertelsmann 
Stiftung surveys show that only 15% of Germans consider economic relations in 
Germany fair, whereas a clear majority of the population (56%) believe them to 
be unfair (Vehrkamp and Kleinsteuber 2007a, 6-7). The social security reforms 
implemented during the years of the SPD2-Green coalition are mainly criticized 
as threats to the social component of the social market economy and are rejected 
as socially inequitable, not only by broad sections of the population but also by 
many politicians (Vehrkamp and Kleinsteuber 2007b, 299-300).
Against this background, the following essay will primarily examine the 
social market economy’s need and capacity for reform in Germany, whereby the 
possibility of transferring the concept to the Asian region should be understood 
as the underlying question behind the text. In any event, we shall be focusing 
on the current state of the social market economy in Germany and the extent 
to which it provides adequate answers to the pressures of global competition. 
After all, the social market economy will only be considered a potential model for 
Asia if it proves sustainable in Germany and sufficiently flexible, adaptable, and 
reformable to meet the challenges of demographic change and globalization.
We shall therefore begin with an analysis of the current situation: What is the 
situation in the areas that influence the social market economy in Germany? 
Where do the greatest weaknesses lie, and where are reforms most needed? 
In examining these questions, we shall be focusing particularly on the areas of 
employment, taxation, social security systems, and education. Additionally, 
attention will be directed towards the development of German “social capital.” 
According to Putnam and Goss, a society’s social capital is a crucial factor in its 
coherence, creativity, and competitiveness (Putnam and Goss 2001, 15 ff.). We 
wish to include this new field in our analysis because social capital appears to us to 
be an essential quality of societies that are renewable and flexible and nonetheless 
demonstrate fundamental agreement on certain identifying characteristics.
In the second part of this essay, we shall be taking a closer look at selected reforms 
of two legislative periods with regard to whether or not they are able to contribute 
to modernizing the concept of the social market economy in Germany.
The essay then concludes with a short outline of the reformability and future 
viability of the social market economy in Germany against the background of the 
challenges of globalization.
2SPD = Social Democratic Party of Germany
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An Outline of the Current Situation in Germany
A comparison of Germany’s position in the most important international 
economic rankings provides an initial appraisal of the German economy’s 
international competitiveness. At first glance, the results present a rather mixed 
picture. Although the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Index puts 
Germany among the world’s top ten, in 8th place out of a total of 125 countries 
surveyed, the same study ranks Germany only 14th in its Growth Competitiveness 
Index, which means it is in the lower middle range within the smaller group of 
comparable OECD3 countries (Lopez-Claros 2006, xvii). This assessment is also 
confirmed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung International Business Site Ranking, which 
puts Germany in 15th place out of a total of 21 OECD countries in its Activity Index 
and last in its Success Index4 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007, 14 ff.). An examination 
of other international comparative studies, even considering the sometimes great 
difference in methods, questions, and results involved, still presents a rather 
consistent and clear picture: Germany only manages a lower middle ranking among 
a comparable group of highly developed OECD countries.
This picture is also confirmed by international growth comparisons, in which 
Germany demonstrates only below-average performance. Germany was long 
able to live from the high productivity increases of the phase of reconstruction 
during the 1950s and 1960s, but since the first oil crisis in the early 1970s, the 
German economy has only been growing at a below-average rate compared with 
its international competitors. Thus, for example, the average annual growth in 
Germany’s real gross domestic product amounted to only 1.6% in the 1990-2000 
decade; that is just half as much as the USA and significantly lower than the 
average growth rate in the 15 core countries of the old European Union, which 
was at least 2.0%.
Still, Germany is world champion exporter and has a highly competitive 
export business sector. But since Germany’s macroeconomic performance has 
remained below average, we would like to formulate four hypotheses which will 
be reflected throughout this essay (Empter and Vehrkamp 2006, 14):
3Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
4The Success Index provides information about the country’s current situation in terms of its 
employment situation and economic growth. The Activity Index addresses the most important 
factors behind these two dimensions. It measures and evaluates the specific steps the country has 
taken to influence the target dimensions. Both indices are complemented by detailed comments 
on the latest developments in economic, financial, collective bargaining, and labor market policy, 
allowing the International Business Site Ranking to identify successful strategies and tools for 
greater employment and economic growth.
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•  The initial concept of the social market economy was a factor behind Germany’s 
political stability and the resulting economic growth after World War II.
•  Although Germany is the world’s leading exporting nation and has powerful and 
globally competitive export companies, it now suffers from considerable competi-
tive weaknesses and disadvantages compared to its international competitors.
•  The concept of social market economy was not adapted to the changing busi-
ness environment in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany’s current weaknesses as 
a business location are primarily due to elements of the economic and social 
policy framework of the social market economy that are no longer condu-
cive to international economic competitiveness.
•  The problems cannot be met by simple “too much social policy” or “not enough 
social policy” solutions, but require a differentiated look at the set of institutions 
and organizations in Germany. The example of the successful reconfiguration of 
the Scandinavian welfare economies is proof that it is possible to be internation-
ally competitive while preserving important national standards.
Employment
In international comparisons, the German labor market presents a few 
strengths, such as a low level of youth unemployment and the relatively 
rapid increase in women’s employment. Its marked weaknesses are far more 
numerous. In addition to generally high unemployment and a comparatively 
low employment rate, these weaknesses become most obvious in that it has 
the OECD’s highest levels of unemployment among older employees and 
low-skilled workers as well as a proportion of long-term unemployed of more 
than 50%. Moreover, numerous indicators show that the German labor market 
has become institutionally ossified and is characterized by a high level of 
inflexibility (Thode 2006, 250-251):
•  With regard to working times, Germany has a comparatively low number 
of average annual working hours per employee. According to OECD 
calculations, the average actual working time in Germany in 2004 was 1443 
hours. That means employees in Germany worked some 200 hours less than 
their counterparts in Great Britain and Finland, for example, and almost 
400 hours less than their colleagues in the USA.
•  In the case of the average length of company employment among permanent 
employees, Germany remains one of the countries with comparatively long 
periods of employment. In 2000, the average duration of employment with an 
employer was 10.5 years. That represented only a marginal decrease compared 
with 1990, but was significantly higher than the values for less regulated labor 
markets, such as those in Denmark, Great Britain, and the USA.
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•  The level of regulation of the German labor market continues to be high 
in comparison with other OECD countries. Although a number of 
deregulatory measures have been implemented in recent years – not only in 
protection against unfair dismissal, but also in the regulation of temporary 
employment and temporary staffing – the level of German labor market 
regulation nevertheless remains practically unchanged.
Taxation and Social Insurance Systems
Compared with other countries, the tax and social insurance systems also 
present competitive disadvantages that partially explain Germany’s below-
average growth performance:
When you evaluate the quality of a taxation system on the basis of its 
effectiveness, efficiency, and simplicity, then the German taxation system fares 
badly (Fuest and Becker 2006, 335 ff.). It is not very effective, as demonstrated 
above all by the fact that backward-looking tax load measurements put the actual 
tax burden on companies active in Germany at the middle of the international 
ranking, while forward-looking calculations put German at the head of the 
international tax burden list. Furthermore, the German taxation system is 
considered bureaucratic and opaque. To sum up, as a result of relatively low tax 
revenues, significant tax behavior distortions, and the high bureaucratic cost, it 
can be said that the German taxation system is very inefficient, complicated, and 
only moderately effective.
Financing social insurance systems through non-wage labor costs also leads 
to lower domestic demand, despite rising unit labor costs as a result of the 
growing tax wedge between gross and net income. One traditionally important 
component of Germany’s social market economy – the pay- and performance-
based financing of social insurance systems – is therefore increasingly proving to 
be an international competitive disadvantage. As a result, many experts have long 
been calling for a shift in the funding of social insurance systems away from non-
wage labor costs towards stronger and allocation-neutral tax-based financing 
(Blum and Ludwig 2006, 274-275).
Education
Another crucial factor for success in a globalized world is a competitive and 
powerful education system. Here, too, the OECD’s comparative educational 
indicators reveal significant deficiencies at all levels of the German education 
system:
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PISA comparisons5 since 2000 have revealed a number of things about the 
German school system. Compared with other OECD countries, the performance 
of 15-year-old students in Germany is at most middling in a number of important 
areas. Furthermore, performance differences between individual schools in 
Germany are greater than in any other OECD country. Especially disconcerting, 
however, is the fact that individual educational opportunity in Germany is still 
relatively strongly determined by the social background of a child’s parents. The 
factors contributing to this include the early and inflexible performance-based 
selection process for different school types after the fourth year of compulsory 
education and the lack of personalized learning support for students (Schleicher 
2006, 433 ff.).
In the higher education sector, Germany is conspicuous for its comparatively 
low level of participation and its very low proportion of graduates, above all 
in the natural sciences. Thus, for example, the number of students successfully 
completing a higher education program in Germany in 2004 was just under 
200,000, which corresponds to a graduate ratio of only roughly 20% of the 
respective age group. The average proportion of higher education graduates 
within the OECD came to 32%. Globalization and technological progress are 
generating strong growth in the demand for graduate employees. On the German 
labor market, however, they are in far too short supply for demographic reasons 
and as a result of excessively low participation in tertiary education.
The position of German universities in international rankings also seems to 
suggest that they are not among the world’s best institutions of higher education 
(Müller-Böling 2006, 457 ff.). 
Moreover, the German higher education system is also underfunded. In 2002, 
the overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) invested in public and private 
education in Germany was 5.3%, which was significantly less than the OECD 
average of 5.8%. The list of education spenders is led by Iceland (7.4%) and 
the USA (7.2%), followed by Denmark and Korea (7.1% each). Germany fares 
even worse in a comparison of public spending on education. While countries 
like Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Belgium invest more than 6% of 
GDP in their education systems from public funds, Germany’s share of public 
education spending amounts to only 4.4% of GDP. As a result, Germany only 
reaches 20th place in the ranking of all OECD countries. This is an indication 
not only of underfunding, but also of an imbalance in the funding of the German 
education system overall. While the proportion of private education spending is 
lowest where the private benefits of education are highest, namely in the higher 
5Program for International Student Assessment, carried out every three years by the OECD.
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education sector, preschool education in Germany is predominantly privately 
financed: until now, tuition fees in Germany have primarily been charged for 
kindergarten rather than university.
Social Capital and Cooperative Partnerships
Social capital and economic performance are mutually interdependent. On one 
hand, strong economic performance can be a prerequisite for a well-developed 
civil society, because financial security gives members of society time to engage 
in activities not solely oriented to economic gain. On the other hand, however, 
a strong civil society can become the starting point for economic prosperity, 
because people collaborate and form networks to compensate for economic 
deficiencies (Offe andFuchs 2001, 492-493).
Quantifying social capital is rather difficult since it does not involve an 
immediately and easily recognizable “hard currency.” Membership in clubs, 
political parties, and associations can provide an initial indicator here, but the 
situation is much more complicated in the case of networks, neighborhood 
groups, or participation in public events.
In Germany, following the end of the Second World War and the country’s 
moral and economic collapse, people initially showed a great aversion to joining 
associations. The economic upturn, however, brought a heyday of associations, 
which were mainly thematic and leisure related. Membership in clubs and 
associations and the number of people engaged in voluntary work have remained 
surprisingly constant since the 1980s, and some surveys have even registered a 
slight increase, mainly in the voluntary sector. According to a poll by the Germany 
Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth, 36% 
of over 14 year olds in Germany are actively involved in an association, which 
represents a 4% increase compared with 1999 (Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior 
Citizens, Women, and Youth 2004). The number of associations in Germany is 
also steadily increasing in absolute terms, with the establishment of new sport 
associations continuing to dominate.
A boom is also emerging in the foundation sector. More foundations were 
established in the years between 2000 and 2005 than during the entire decade 
before. The 2000 and 2002 reforms of the laws governing foundations may have 
been partially responsible for this development, but it is certainly also a result of 
social changes, global influences, and, not least, the large inheritances being left 
to the current generation.
Lastly, in connection with social capital, we should not forget voluntary 
business contributions to a functioning society. For some years now, companies 
in Germany have been increasing their social activities under the heading of 
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corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship. In the process, they are 
often able to build on a solid foundation of good neighbor relations and orient 
their social and ecological activities in an increasingly strategic way. According to 
a 2006 Bertelsmann Stiftung survey of 500 entrepreneurs and decision makers, 
some 60% of businesses are making an active commitment in one or more areas.
All these figures are encouraging. However, several important factors for social 
capital’s impact on society should not be overlooked. Obstacles to cooperation 
between different players within German society remain. Above all, improvements 
could be made in multipolar cooperation between politics, business, and civil 
society on urgent contemporary issues. The second area in which Germany 
needs to catch up with other countries is the informal and formal recognition 
of civil society as an equal player and its corresponding integration into political 
processes (Maecenata Institut 2006).
A Policy of Reform: Modernizing the Social Market Economy
Following this outline of the policy areas that are important for the concept of 
the social market economy, we shall now take a look at current developments and 
trends. Germany in the years between 1998 and 2007 was a country very much 
characterized by political reform. Systemic structural reforms largely failed to 
materialize in the 1990s following German reunification. Thus, for several years 
now, there has been a tangible and significantly increased need for reform – which 
is also recognized by the population and political decision makers in Germany – 
due to the pressures of demographic change and economic globalization. A number 
of far-reaching reforms, primarily of social security systems, have had a significant 
impact on the social market system. Following an initial mood of renewal, however, 
in recent years the dominant impression among Germany’s general public has been 
one of increasing unfairness in economic and social relations, which is also reflected 
in the recent strong showing of the Left Party. In the following section, we shall 
attempt to describe selected areas of the recent reform policy and examine their 
contribution to a renewal of the social market economy.
A debate on a renewal of the social market economy, like the one that has been 
conducted in Germany over recent years, frequently overlooks one important aspect: 
the fact that the social market economy does not actually exist as a homogeneous 
entity. Instead, this term entails a flexible concept that seeks to combine its two 
elements – social and market economy – and in the past, during the time of Erhard 
and Müller-Armack, largely involved a regulatory policy framework for market-
economy-based competition. Essentially, it attempts to reconcile the concept of the 
welfare state and the performance principle of the market economy.
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Accordingly, the goals and instruments pursued by the two aspects of the 
social market economy are variable and the balance between the two elements 
social and market economy also depends on a country’s political traditions, 
societal preferences, and central goals. Thus, the understanding of the social 
market economy by Ludwig Erhard, an ordoliberal economist, is rather different 
from that of later politicians who attempted to establish a welfare state under 
the same label (Dietzelbinger 1998, 235ff.). In a nutshell, it could be said that the 
fixed element of this dual concept is the market economy as the substantive system 
designation, while the flexible social element is influenced by the current situation, 
by the financial and social possibilities, and by the greatest challenges facing the 
respective country. Therefore, to varying degrees, the properties of competition, 
solidarity, subsidiarity, and individual responsibility are constitutive attributes of 
the social market economy.
To what extent and in which areas governments exert influence through 
substitution, allocation, or supplementary policies is not predetermined. Ralf 
Dahrendorf thus very pertinently characterized the fundamental regulatory 
policy question of the social market economy in terms of its adaptability to 
different contexts as follows: “How much social good can a competitive market 
economy tolerate?” (Dahrendorf 2004, 10).
Viewed against this background, Germany’s reform policy of recent years presents 
itself in a different light. By no means did it represent the end of the social market 
economy, but a flexible adjustment and modernization of the principle. A major 
factor behind this development was the global triumph of the market economy and 
capitalism – in its most diverse forms – during the 1990s. The others catalysts are to 
be found more in the domestic policy domain. The German welfare state is under 
substantial financial pressure and does not appear to have appropriate instruments 
available for dealing with a number of current problems. The attempt to improve 
competitiveness through the reform of central systems can also be viewed as an effort 
to preserve the tradition of the social market economy, while also adapting it to face 
new challenges in a flexible way and thereby making it viable for the future.
Because the response to the changed conditions resulting from globalization 
largely involved a redefinition of the social component, a readjustment is required 
in the balance between social and market economy. We need safety mechanisms 
on the margins of society to ensure that social coherence is not threatened by the 
impoverishment of large sections of the population. Overall, however, individual 
initiative, responsibility, and motivation should be strengthened rather than 
weakened. An examination of the individual areas of reform below should 
demonstrate whether and how far this adjustment process has been successful 
in recent years.
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Employment
It is a fundamental tenet of the social market economy that gainful employment 
which enables a decent living should always receive precedence over subsidized 
unemployment. However, disagreement exists on how to achieve the fullest 
possible employment even among advocates of the social market economy. As 
a result, the reforms of the SPD-Green government in this area found both 
supporters and opponents in all political camps.
Hartz I-IV
The labor market reforms of 2003 to 2005 are generally known as the Hartz 
reforms, taking the name of one of their main authors, Peter Hartz, the chairman 
of the expert commission established by the Schröder government and former 
Human Resources Director of the Volkswagen Group. The designation Hartz I 
to IV encompasses a raft of measures, restructuring proposals, and ideas primarily 
aimed at reducing unemployment. The Hartz Commission developed a three-
pronged strategy that combined deregulation of the labor market, reduction of 
non-wage labor costs, and increased mobilization of jobseekers themselves, as 
well as more dynamic job placement. Central elements of the reform package 
included the introduction of new employment relationships, a reorganization 
of job placement, and the amalgamation of sozialhilfe (social welfare benefits) 
and arbeitslosenhilfe (unemployment assistance). The introduction of the Hartz 
reforms was greeted by surprisingly large popular protests – by German standards 
– involving many different groups within society. The reforms were and still 
are often equated with the renunciation of welfare state principles. The most 
frequently raised criticisms have been impoverishment as a result of excessively 
low benefits, pressure to take badly paid or inappropriate work, social hardship 
as a result of the demand for mobility, and, finally, the decline of normal 
employment relationships subject to compulsory social insurance contributions.
On the other hand, the backers of these reforms – for example, the group 
associated with former Bundesbank head Hans Tietmeyer and the Initiative 
Neue soziale Marktwirtschaft, the campaign he is supporting for a new social 
market economy – stress that these changes strengthen individual initiative, 
flexibility, and competition in the labor market and are thus precisely what is 
needed to preserve the social component of the social market economy in the 
twenty-first century. As proof, they cite one of Ludwig Erhard’s fundamental 
ideas on employment: “The ideal I have in mind is based upon the strength that 
allows an individual to say: I want to prove myself by my own efforts, I want 
to cope with the risks of my life myself and want to be responsible for my own 
destiny” (Tietmeyer 2001).
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This aspiration makes it impossible to confuse the social component of the 
social market economy with a nanny welfare state; instead, very much in tune with 
the recent labor market reforms, the social market economy combines a safety net 
for the weakest members of society with an activating framework for everyone 
who is able to work. According to this view, the earlier “glut” of government 
redistribution measures has paralyzed the market and its participants and 
reduced individual enterprise.
Today, researchers are still arguing about whether there is a real link between 
these reforms and the decrease in unemployment in Germany since 2007 or 
whether macroeconomic developments such as monetary policy are the actual 
driving force behind the improved situation on the German labor market 
(Bontrup 2007, 25 and Jacobi and Kluve 2006, 3), An accurate evaluation is 
made difficult by the fact that individual, highly controversial aspects of the 
Hartz reforms have meanwhile been modified, watered down, or abolished and 
that the next generation of welfare state reforms, for example, in the shape of 
government-subsidized minimum wages, are already being discussed. Here, too, 
opinions do not necessarily divide along party lines. A debate is currently taking 
place on whether minimum wages represent dangerous ballast that will hamper 
the labor market, whether they should be established as part of a social security 
package, or whether they will make many other benefits obsolete as a form of 
basic social provision (Dahrendorf 2004, 11).
Minimum Wages
From the perspective of the social market economy, labor market reform must 
not restrict the freedom of movement and individual initiative of employees and 
entrepreneurs. What is more, any reform must be oriented towards the goal of 
creating income through employment. That is why the primary concern of labor 
market reform is achieving a balance between individual elements. A possible 
statutory minimum wage, for example, does not in itself represent a danger. In 
order to prevent job losses in the low-pay sector, however, a minimum wage must 
be low enough to make it acceptable to businesses on a broad front. Furthermore, 
it ought to be so much higher than government welfare payments that accepting 
work remains attractive (the precept that there must be a gap between wages 
and social welfare benefits). Such a minimum wage would then, however, not 
meet the social policy demand for a living wage. One solution to this dilemma 
could entail an appropriate combination of a minimum wage with government 
wage subsidies for low-pay sectors in which productivity is beneath the level 
of a living wage. This kind of combination wage would secure and also create 
employment in the low-pay sector and simultaneously guarantee the level of 
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living wage sought by social policy. The introduction of such a coordinated model 
of minimum and combination wages is one of the greatest challenges of German 
labor market policy in the next few years.
Social Security and Taxation
Retirement Pension Reform
When it comes to pension reform, significant advances have been made in 
recent years that have contributed to the long-term stabilization of the 
German retirement pension system, which is now much more resilient to 
demographic change than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. This has mainly been 
accomplished by three reform measures:
•  the introduction of a supplementary private, funded pension insurance 
scheme (Riester-Rente);
•  the introduction of a “sustainability factor” in the calculation of pensions to 
guarantee that if the number of contributors decreases, pension levels will be 
adjusted to ensure contributions remain stable on a long-term basis; and
• an increase in the retirement age to 67.
Health Care Reform
While labor market reforms were the trademark of the SPD-Green government, 
the health care reform of 2006 can be considered a central project of the CDU6-
SPD grand coalition. After the last substantial changes in this area were undertaken 
at the beginning of the 1990s, the 2006 reform represents an attempt to adapt 
the German health care system to cope with demographic changes and medical 
progress in order to avert eventual system overload. Studies by the OECD and 
the German Advisory Council for Concerted Action in Health Care increased 
the pressure for reform because they showed that, compared with other systems, 
the German health care system is too expensive for the quality offered and therefore 
not internationally competitive (Greß 2006, 39).
The health care reform represents a compromise between the two contrary 
positions of the SPD and CDU, and – perhaps precisely for that reason – it has 
been criticized by all political camps and numerous experts as incoherent and an 
inadequate solution to this problem. There are plans to establish a health care 
fund into which payments will flow from employees and employers and from 
which statutory health insurance plans will receive their funding. This has been 
criticized from all sides as bureaucratic and anticompetitive – in other words, 
detrimental to the idea of the social market economy.
6CDU = Christian Democratic Union, in other words, the Christian Democratic Party of Germany
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The extension of health insurance to all citizens is certainly compatible with 
a reinterpretation of the social market economy. When understood as the basic 
provision of essential health care, such a move is not only financeable, but also 
socially desirable. What is problematic, however, is the fact that the range of 
benefits provided by health insurance funds was also extended and contribution 
rates will presumably have to be increased. That would lead to a further rise 
in non-wage labor costs in Germany, tend to make labor more expensive, and 
threaten international competitiveness. Stronger tax financing for health insurance 
is also being discussed as a means of avoiding the negative impact of social insurance 
contributions on the labor market and employment.
Tax Reform 2000
From the viewpoint of the social market economy, taxes are an important 
means of financing basic public duties, but they must be related to economic 
performance and not threaten it. Additionally, taxes have also become an 
important means of influencing the international competition between 
business locations. Direct and indirect taxes give governments some scope for 
influence here, but this is a very delicate area that requires great sensitivity and 
dialogue.7 The intellectual fathers of the social market economy were not generally 
concerned about high or low taxation, but considered it important that taxes 
take the appropriate form for the relevant situation. Alfred Müller-Armack, 
one of the inventors of the social market economy, summed up the situation as 
follows, “...if the right form of taxation is selected, high taxes for the benefit of 
welfare and government consumption can be an entirely neutral matter with regard 
to the market economy, because although it may have a major effect on demand, 
its satisfaction does not infringe market economy rules.” Recent reforms of the 
German tax system have attempted to lower the direct taxation burden on 
citizens and companies, and they have also succeeded in achieving considerable 
relief in that area. The reduction of the entry and highest tax rates in 2000 were 
appropriate and did not contribute to the delayed upturn in Germany. This was 
much more a result of the economic stagnation of previous years. Domestic 
demand only rose when the labor market figures gave grounds for greater 
optimism, and it was also not – as widely feared – completely neutralized by the 
recent increase in value-added tax.
7See Benecke in this reader.
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Business Tax Reform 2007
In addition to the income tax reform, the reduction of corporation tax to 15% 
has pushed the overall corporate taxation burden to below 30% and is expected 
to particularly alleviate the situation for the medium-sized private business 
sector, a traditional target group of the social market economy. However, there 
has been criticism of counter-financing measures – for example, stricter write-off 
regulations increase the administrative burden on businesses (Institut der 
deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2008).
Overall, these taxation reforms show that tax reductions on a meaningful 
scale and at the right time can create new scope for investment and employment 
– both important factors for the success of a social market economy, which 
should not be endangered by excessively high taxes and surcharges.
Education
In a globalized world, however, perhaps the most important subject for the 
present social market economy is not the tax burden or labor market reform, but 
the strength of the education system. This is because the pressures of demographic 
change and economic globalization necessitate a redefinition of the welfare state 
and demand that individuals assume more responsibility for their own financial 
security. That, in turn, is only possible if they have acquired a solid foundation of 
education and training that empowers them to independently shape their own 
lives. Furthermore, a well-trained workforce is becoming increasingly important 
in the international competition for the best minds and talents.
Many aspects, developments, and debates in the German education system are 
not easy to communicate because the individual German Länder (federal states) 
have a great deal of scope to shape the education landscape. Nonetheless, we shall 
examine three examples of educational reform to ascertain their contribution to 
a renewal of the social market economy: the Bologna reform of German higher 
education, the regional introduction of higher education tuition fees, and the 
nationwide parental allowance.
Bologna Process
Major impetus for improvement in the international competitiveness of 
German higher education is now coming from the European level. The so-called 
Bologna Process has initiated the most far-reaching structural reform in German 
higher education for more than three decades (Petzina 2005). The greatest 
challenges exist in the following areas (Vehrkamp 2006):
• the internationalization of German universities is inadequate;
•  the level of participation in higher education is too low when compared with 
other countries; and
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•  the higher education sector is underfunded and also suffers from a structural 
imbalance in funding when compared with other countries.
Measured against these challenges, the Bologna Process8 is better than its 
reputation. Its implementation can contribute to restoring German higher 
education’s international competitiveness. That applies especially to increasing 
the participation in tertiary education, where the introduction of the two- 
tier degree system of Bachelor studies followed by Master’s courses can make a 
major contribution. Additionally, the two-tier degree course structure facilitates 
a substantial shortening of the duration of study and makes the higher education 
system more pervious.
Tuition Fees
As a rule, a higher education offers the best possible opportunities for achieving 
a high personal income and individual financial security. Despite the high level 
of personal benefit accruing from a higher education, studying in Germany 
remained largely free of charge for the individual concerned. In other words, it 
was financed by the general public as a whole.
Since 2006/2007, tuition fees have been levied in seven German Länder. At 
the same time, at the national level, new models of student funding have been 
introduced – for example, study credits aimed to ensure that tuition fees 
do not become a social selection criteria. Students have to pay up to €500 a 
semester, which is still a below-average sum when compared to fees in other 
countries. Nevertheless, the level of protest, particularly on the part of students, has 
remained high.
In principle, however, German education experts mainly see advantages in 
the introduction of tuition fees – provided that they are levied and used in a 
meaningful way. It is stressed that universities should be granted the greatest 
possible autonomy in their organization and use, should embed the levying of 
fees in a meaningful overall strategy of quality assurance and development, and 
should waste as little money as possible on bureaucracy (Müller 2008).
Tuition fees should aim to again make degree courses at German universities 
internationally more competitive in qualitative terms, to simultaneously relieve 
the financial pressures on budgets, and to strengthen individual responsibility 
not only of universities but also of students. If socially acceptable models of 
8In 1999 the education ministers of 29 European countries signed a declaration to create the 
European Higher Education Area by making academic degree standards and quality assurance 
standards more comparable and compatible throughout  Europe. The process thus started and 
later opened to members of the Council of Europe. It was named the Bolgona Process after the 
place of signature.
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student funding can be found and the money is invested in better teaching, 
then tuition fees are also compatible with the principles of a social market 
economy.
Parental Allowance
Against the background of a recent steady decline in the number of births, 
the grand coalition government has taken up the challenge of reconciling having 
children and a career as a crucial area for increasing the birth rate in Germany. 
It is assumed that female graduates and other highly qualified women frequently 
decide not to have children because they result in financial losses and career 
disadvantages primarily for women. The new family policy under CDU Minister 
von der Leyen relies on improved child care for infants between the ages of one 
and three as well as comparatively high allowances for mother and fathers during 
the first year after birth. An initial assessment shows that this government policy 
seems to be bearing fruit (“Von der Leyen zieht positive Bilanz” 2007). For 
social market economy advocates who think in more ordoliberal terms, however, 
government intervention in this area represents an interference in individual 
freedom and autonomy. Nonetheless, Germany very obviously lacked incentive 
structures for young men and women to found a family and the resultant aging 
of society is already having dramatic consequences, for example, for the funding 
of social security systems.
Financial support during the first year of a child’s life and improved chances 
of finding child care services after that will at least partially cushion the personal 
risks of founding a family. Money, however, is not everything when it comes 
to government solidarity. These family policy reforms also demonstrate that 
a certain amount of imagination is required in applying instruments of social 
regulation in order to achieve modern interpretations of the social market 
economy model. The introduction of “fathers’ months,” which extend payments 
for two months if fathers also take parental leave and look after their children 
for this period, initially gave rise to extremely hefty debate. Yet, it is precisely 
this instrument that is contributing to the required change in attitudes, because 
it goes beyond a purely financial measure and has social implications. Far more 
fathers than expected took up this opportunity in its very first year, thereby 
exceeding the parental allowance budget initially allocated by the family affairs 
ministry. The more fathers avail themselves of this right, the sooner businesses 
and society as a whole will become accustomed to “parenting” fathers. This will 
reduce the pressure on highly qualified women to bear almost sole responsibility 
for the upbringing of their children and increase their willingness to raise a 
family.
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Social Capital and Cooperation
One important characteristic of the social market economy, alongside 
individual responsibility, competition, and the principle of subsidiarity, is social 
solidarity. It encompasses not only the independent actions of individuals, but 
also the community’s general solidarity with the individual. The activities of 
individual citizens within a state can make a significant contribution to reducing 
the transaction costs in industry and politics and thereby positively influence 
a country’s overall performance. The three decisive components of this are 
attention, trust, and commitment (Offe and Fuchs 2001, 417). The strength of 
these three qualities within a population determines the level of social capital 
and therefore a society’s capacity to develop solutions for current problems 
through cooperation, responsibility, and organization. The level of social capital 
is composed partially of the individual characteristics of citizens and partially of 
the collective and institutional characteristics of the society as a whole (Offe and 
Fuchs 2001, 499).
Social capital is important for a modern social market economy, because 
it shifts attention away from government activities towards an appropriate 
balance of individual responsibility and solidarity. The original idea of the social 
market economy actually envisaged that government would only intervene in a 
stimulative, distributive, or supportive way where the market and its mechanisms 
did not function adequately or fairly. The level of social capital is particularly 
important at a time when governments find it difficult to provide balanced 
financial support for all areas of activity and population groups. Yet civic activities 
should not be viewed as a kind of emergency fill-in in the event of government 
weakness. Strictly speaking, they represent an important and indispensable 
contribution to the stability and innovative ability of a country.
Although in essence these activities involve a contribution from the population, 
government also has a specific role to play here by creating “structures of 
opportunity” for civic activities (Braun 2001, 3). After all, the level of education 
and prosperity, the statutory framework, and other incentives provided by public 
policy contribute to social capital and actually make it possible in the first place. 
This is evidenced by the example of Great Britain, one of the few industrialized 
nations with an enduringly high level of social capital. Among other things, this is 
attributed to the fact that policymakers have been promoting social commitment 
and voluntary work since the welfare reforms of the early twentieth century and 
continue to do so today.
In conclusion, let us take a closer look at two areas that can contribute to social 
capital and, at least in part, have also been the subject of reforms in Germany: 
civic activities and corporate social responsibility (CSR).
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Civic Activities
In 1999, the German Federal Government gave the newly founded Study 
Commission on the Future of Civic Activities the task of designing “concrete 
political strategies and measures to encourage voluntary civic activities in Germany, 
which are for the common good and are not intended to produce material gain” 
(Enquete Kommission 2002, 2). The proposals made by the study commission in 
its final report included an institutional structure for promoting civic engagement 
at the federal level, improvement of fiscal regulations, and simplification of the 
law governing foundations. Political action has been taken on a number of points 
since then. For example, the law governing foundations has been simplified, 
volunteer agencies have been granted charitable status, and a law was passed and 
came into force on January 1, 2007 with the goal of encouraging voluntary civic 
activities (Müggenburg and Potocki, 2008). The Bundestag (German parliament) 
subcommittee on this subject founded in 2003 comes close to meeting the demand 
for an institutional structure for the promotion of civic engagement, but it has not 
yet been able to effect a fundamental change in public attitudes.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Political support is also an important factor in promoting corporate activities. 
Although this publication contains a separate contribution on the relationship 
between CSR and the social market economy,9 we should still examine the role of 
businesses in the social market economy from the perspective of social capital.
In addition to their central role in the market economy and their contribution 
to tax revenue and social insurance systems, businesses have often developed 
extensive activities in the social and ecological domain. Although the goal and 
scope of these activities are determined by the businesses themselves and are thus 
voluntary, here, too, the impetus for this increasingly important contribution to 
the common good originates from society and government (Roome 2005, 323).
Corporate social responsibility can be considered Germany’s great 
undiscovered reform area. Neither of the last two governments developed 
significant activities here. Conventional wisdom says this is an area in which 
businesses must act independently and without incentives or support from 
government – that argument certainly has some validity, but it falls short of the 
mark. Corporate commitment can be prompted by appropriate government 
backing. Even more importantly, political restraint in this area can waste 
significant synergies generated mainly by the cooperation of all sectors of society. 
Above all, cooperation between business, civil society, and government can give 
9See Finkel and Fleischer in this reader.
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rise to viable solutions to current problems (Welzel et al. 2007, 5). The creation of 
a framework for commitment and cooperation should be at the very top of the 
agenda of a policy seeking to modernize the social market economy.
Outlook – No “One-Size-Fits-All” Solutions
After many years of economic prosperity, Germany was rather late in 
recognizing the changing environment of global competition and new demands 
for skills and institutions. Of course, the tremendous task of unification and 
internal adaptation processes on every level kept Germany very busy throughout 
the 1990s. But the example of Scandinavian countries as well as recent success 
stories in some fields in Germany show that the right policy ideas combined with 
effective implementation can lead to economic prosperity and social justice. 
A look at the reform agenda and the list of reforms already implemented in 
Germany shows that important initial successes have been achieved in the past 10 
years mainly in stabilizing the pension system and increasing the flexibility of the 
labor market. The goal of again making the social market economy in Germany 
a successful model that can also serve as an example of effective economic and 
social policy for Asian countries has, however, not yet been fully reached. Major 
tasks still remain to be completed, above all, in the reform of other social security 
systems (health care, long-term care, and unemployment), the creation of a 
viable low-wage sector for the low-skilled and long-term unemployed, as well as 
a sustainable consolidation of public budgets and the reform of the regionally 
structured federal decision-making system. Education on all levels is perhaps the 
most important area that must be addressed; recent developments in Germany 
give reason for some optimism. 
Most important, however, is development that people can relate to. Shared 
visions and goals which can very well lie within the concept of a renewed, globally 
competitive social market economy should serve as a common foundation 
on which change can be built. In our view, the current creative challenge for 
politicians but also for other leaders in society lies in translating and transforming 
globally discussed success factors into locally successful structures.  
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1. Introduction 
For at least a decade, the relationship between economic growth and rising 
inequality has been discussed by development practitioners and researchers with 
reference to the concept of “pro-poor growth.” The simple but appealing goal behind 
pro-poor growth is to enable the poor to participate in the benefits of economic 
growth. While the general concept refers to both high growth rates and poverty 
reduction, an emerging consensus suggests that growth alone is a rather insufficient 
tool for poverty reduction. Even though the term pro-poor growth has been around 
since 19971 (and the previous idea of “shared growth” for even longer), there is still no 
consistent definition of it. There is not yet a meaningful theory available which explains 
how the same rate of aggregate growth can be achieved with different rates of poverty 
reduction (Klump and Miralles 2006). Furthermore, on the empirical side, differing 
definitions and measurement tools for poverty, inequality, and growth impede 
comparison of the abundant research on the impact of economic growth on poverty. 
Comparing empirical (cross-) country studies investigating the impact of growth on 
poverty reduction is extremely helpful for learning more about the mechanisms and 
causalities at work; however, one should also be aware that the conclusions drawn 
depend to a great extent on the concept of pro-poor growth employed.
This article gives an overview of the debate about the relation between economic 
growth and inequality, with a special focus on the developments in South, East, and 
Southeast Asia. It is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the debate 
about what constitutes pro-poor growth and how different understandings affect 
the measurement outcomes of the impact of economic growth on poverty. Section 
3 studies the links between economic growth and inequality. Section 4 provides 
examples of how some Asian countries translated economic growth into poverty 
reduction, considering their specific conditions and the implemented policy 
1The concept of shared growth was first denoted “pro-poor growth” in the UK White Paper 
on International Development 1997: “Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st 
Century.” 
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interventions. Section 5 derives effective policy recommendations from the lessons 
learnt in the country studies. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Measuring Pro-poor Growth – A Matter of Definition? 
The way the impact of economic growth on poverty is measured often dictates 
the chosen policy intervention. The measured degree of pro-poorness of growth 
depends to a large extent on the underlying concept. While the World Bank 
defines growth as pro-poor when the increase in gross domestic product reduces 
poverty (however small the reduction) (Ravallion 2004), the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) only regards growth as pro-poor if the poor 
benefit proportionally more than the non-poor (Pasha and Palanivel 2004). 
White and Anderson (2001) subsume the different meanings of pro-poor growth by 
comparing the variance of the poor’s share of income to (1) their previous share, (2) their 
share in the population, or (3) some international norm (for example, a pre-specified 
poverty threshold). The first definition is equivalent to that of the World Bank and is 
usually considered  the absolute definition of pro-poor growth. In that sense, growth 
must only fractionally reduce poverty to be called pro-poor even though the poor 
might benefit proportionally less from growth than the non-poor. Policy intervention 
concentrates on the macroeconomic level in order to directly influence gross domestic 
product (GDP). The second meaning of pro-poor growth is used by UNDP and 
includes an equality approach. It is usually considered the relative definition and aims 
to minimize the gap between the mean income of the poor and mean overall income. 
Hence, growth is pro-poor, relatively speaking, if it benefits the poor proportionately 
more than the non-poor (Zepeda 2004). This view generally favors microeconomic 
policies that reduce inequality rather than a concentration on overall economic growth. 
Consequently, the measured effects of policy interventions vary with the definition of 
pro-poor growth. Recent empirical studies show how a decrease in relative inequality 
is regularly accompanied by an increase in absolute inequality. 
In order to emphasize the dependence of outcomes on the definition of pro-
poor growth, McKay (2007) draws on the case of Vietnam. During the period from 
1992 to 2003, the drop in overall poverty is considered to be pro-poor according 
to the absolute definition. Using the relative definition, the same growth process 
cannot be deemed pro-poor, since high income groups benefited relatively more 
than low income groups. The reverse is true for the case of Indonesia during 
the period after the financial crisis (1996-2002). There, albeit negative, growth 
was pro-poor in a relative sense as inequality fell and, hence, the poor suffered 
relatively less than the non-poor. However, it was not pro-poor with regard to the 
absolute definition, since growth was negative and poverty increased.
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Clearly, different definitions of pro-poor growth lead to different assessments 
of growth processes. Furthermore, the definition affects its quantification 
directly by setting the explicit measurement tool. Recent studies employ different 
concepts and thus define varying tools to quantify the impact of growth on 
poverty. Among the concepts, the measurement tools of UNDP and the World 
Bank are considered the most advanced. They have also been the most influential 
for recent empirical research. 
While the growth elasticity of poverty (GEP)2 only relates changes in poverty 
with changes in per capita income, the poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR) 
and the rate of pro-poor growth (RPPG) include the dimension of the equality of 
growth.3 PEGR captures the change in poverty when inequality changes without 
affecting the real mean income. Thus, the estimated growth rate gives more weight 
to the incomes of the poor (the weight depending on the specified threshold). 
The RPPG is based on the concept of a “growth incidence curve” (GIC) and 
marks the area under the GIC up to the headcount ratio.4 If the RPPG exceeds 
the mean growth rate, growth is judged to be pro-poor in its relative meaning.  
Hence, the measured effects of a policy intervention not only vary with the 
definition of pro-poor growth but even more with the applied measurement 
tool: While the RPPG judges Thailand’s growth experience pro-poor for 
the period from 1990 to 1996, the PEGR only does so for the last four years. 
Hence, according to Zepeda (2004), RPPG overestimates Thai pro-poorness 
and therefore tends to falsely judge poverty reduction strategies successful. In 
contrast, Ravallion (2004a) highlights the case of Chinese growth that reduced 
absolute poverty5 notably in the period from 1980 to 2001. According to the 
PEGR, the Chinese experience is judged more anti-poor than pro-poor. Hence, 
PEGR tends to underestimate the Chinese pro-poorness and therefore tends to 
falsely spurn successful policy strategies.  
While development practitioners and researchers suggest multidimensional 
policy strategies to achieve pro-poor growth, only few academic attempts have been 
made to integrate the multidimensionality of poverty in its measurement. Grosse et 
al. (2005) recently identified the exclusiveness of income as an indicator for poverty 
as the crucial shortcoming of current pro-poor growth concepts. They define 
2GEP is defined as the percentage change in the incidence of poverty (measured by the headcount 
index) associated with a 1% increase in per capita income.
3While the PEGR was defined by UNDP (Kakwani and Son 2006), the RPPG was developed by 
the World Bank (Ravallion and Chen 2003).
4The headcount ratio commonly denotes the proportion of the population living under the poverty line.
5Measured as the population living below the poverty line of US$1 in purchasing power parity.
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poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon including social indicators and then 
suggest, following Ravallion and Chen (2003), a non-income growth incidence 
curve (NIGIC) that indicates the improvement of non-income indicators (health, 
education, nutrition, and mortality) between two periods for each percentile.
3. The Interdependence of Inequality and Growth
Can growth still be judged pro-poor if it simultaneously increases inequality? The 
analysis of the effect of growth on distribution thus leads to Kuznets and the hypothesis 
of the “Inverted U.” In his 1955 article, Kuznets argued that, in the process of development, 
economic growth modifies the personal distribution of income. In the early stages of 
industrialization, a developing country first suffers from increasing inequality. After this 
transition period, the return rates between the sectors adjust, and accrued inequality 
declines. The increase of inequality is attributed to the sectoral shift from agricultural to 
non-agricultural sectors and, hence, migration from rural to urban areas. 
The “Kuznets process” was for almost four decades one of the most cited and 
least disputed assumptions within the theory of income distribution (World Bank 
2005). Most work on the relationship between growth and income disparity still 
focuses predominantly on testing the Kuznets hypothesis (for example, Deininger 
and Squire 1996, for cross-country regressions). However, still today, the possible 
trade-off between growth and equality is not thoroughly understood.  
Although the Kuznets process promoted the analysis of distributional 
change considerably, Anand and Kanbur (1985) miss a plausible explanation 
for the population shift within the concept. An emergent consensus suggests 
that the underlying assumptions concerning migration processes and sectoral 
developments do not hold for the majority of the developing countries. Even 
Kuznets (1955) admits the meagerness of his data set on developing countries, 
which included only India, Ceylon (today: Sri Lanka), and Puerto Rico. As 
more and better data sets became available, it became apparent that the empirical 
relationship he found does not fit the subsequent evolution of research.6 
While Kuznets looked at the impact of growth on distribution (albeit 
somewhat neglecting country-specific conditions), Bourguignon (2004) suggests 
a two-way relationship between growth and distribution. He states that (1) 
growth impacts the distribution of income and wealth (as previously described 
by Kuznets) and (2) country-specific conditions, in terms of initial distribution 
of factors of production, affect prospective economic growth. 
6In line with that critique, Wan et al. (2006) and Wan (2004) reject the Kuznets hypothesis for 
China, after having found a U pattern during the period of strong economic growth.
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The most recent contributions focus on the second link more than on the first, 
namely how initial distribution shapes the growth process and its subsequent 
effects on poverty (Ravallion 2004, Kakwani and Son 2006). According to Datt 
and Ravallion (2002), distribution matters for poverty reduction. Decreasing 
inequality entails the participation of a higher share of the poor population 
in economic growth. Poverty, therefore, will be more responsive to growth 
the more equal the initial distribution is. Datt and Ravallion substantiate this 
proposition with a study comparing the impact of growth on the different 
regions of India. They show that higher initial inequality in Indian states 
hinders growth benefiting the poor. According to Qiao et al. (2008), the same 
is true for China, where they find a substantial trade-off between growth and 
regional equality.7 
Existing theories implicitly or explicitly relate inequality to economic 
growth through four major impediments of inequality on physical and human 
capital formation: (1) Imperfect capital markets limit prospective chances 
of growth. With high inequality of access to capital, poorer individuals face 
credit constraints restricting them in their investment decisions. (2) Unequal 
income distribution weakens domestic demand and slows down the economy 
(as observed in China since the late 1990s). (3) Increasing inequality is often 
accompanied by a destabilization of the socio-political environment, which is 
detrimental to investment and growth. (4) An unequal initial distribution of 
income and wealth leads, in the democratic context, to more redistribution 
and therefore less private capital accumulation. The significance of inequality 
reduction is highlighted by the World Bank (2005), stressing its twofold return: 
First, a reduction of inequality will most likely enhance a simultaneous decline 
in poverty. Second, the consequent lower level of inequality will lead to faster 
poverty reduction through the prospective economic growth.
Despite these arguments, the effect of inequality on economic development 
continues to be hotly debated. Forbes (2000) points to the confusion of 
causality within most of the empirical studies. Recent contributions show that 
low inequality countries tend, in the long term, to grow faster. However, these 
studies fail to explain how a change in a country’s level of inequality (for example, 
by government reforms) will affect its growth process. According to Forbes, the 
derived negative impact of inequality on growth is basically due to exogenous 
factors. By analyzing the effects of changes in distribution on growth in a given 
country, Forbes finds, in contrast to most empirical work, a strong positive effect 
of inequality on economic growth. 
7A closer look at these results will be taken in the following section.
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By accounting for initial inequality, Easterly (2007) derives contrary state-
ments. He distinguishes initial disparity with regard to its roots in (i) structural 
and (ii) market inequality. The first results from historical events as colonization 
or discrimination (in other words, from non-market mechanisms) brought 
forth an elite. In contrast, market inequality arises from the uneven distribution 
of success in free markets or from market failures. Previous studies had derived 
lower per capita income from initial inequality in terms of schooling and 
institutions. However, inequality also affects such non-monetary development 
outcomes. Thus, inequality is only a proxy for other exogenous factors like 
ethnic fractionalization, legal origin, and tropical location. Controlling for the 
exogenous factors, Easterly tests the inequality relationship and detects that 
higher structural inequality aggravates the reverse effects of growth on poverty 
(albeit with a slightly lower impact than previous regressions). Easterly points 
out that countries affected by structural inequality cannot be unconditionally 
pooled with countries suffering market inequality.8     
These results show once again that no universal pro-poor growth strategy 
can exist. However, one can learn from country studies to what extent initial 
conditions and explicit policy interventions have to work together in order to 
promote growth and poverty reduction simultaneously. In the following section 
we will therefore focus on results from panel data studies on specific Asian 
countries.  
4. Empirical Evidence from Country Case Studies in Asia
This section focuses on the impact of growth on poverty and inequality in several 
countries of South, East, and Southeast Asia. Most notably, East Asia experienced 
exceptionally high average per capita growth rates during the 1990s, so that the 
incidence of poverty declined sharply (for example, in China the rate of change 
in incidence of poverty declined from -0.8% per year in the 1970s to -9.8% in the 
1990s). In contrast, South Asia could not translate growth into poverty reduction 
to such a degree (for example, in India the rate of change in incidence of poverty 
declined only from -1.7% per year in the 1970s to -2.8% in the 1990s). 
However, the Indian and the Chinese economies are larger and much more 
diverse than most of the other countries in South, East, and Southeast Asia. 
Looking only at India or China as a whole will surely lead to premature or biased 
conclusions. Nevertheless, as provinces in China and states in India operate under 
8According to Easterly (2007), structural inequality is clearly bad for subsequent development, 
whereas market inequality might be good or bad.   
112  |  Part 2  Academic Perspectives
one central government, many of the unobserved factors can be controlled. The 
limits of an encompassing analysis and a general statement should nevertheless 
be kept in mind.
The following section will examine the experiences in five Asian countries. 
Bangladesh, China, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia were chosen, since they 
hold a focal position within the German development strategy. In addition, 
these countries were chosen as eminent Asian country cases in a recent research 
project on pro-poor growth undertaken by an international partnership of 
European development agencies, including the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, and Kf W Entwicklungsbank 
for Germany, together with the World Bank.9 
The Case of Bangladesh
Although Bangladesh has long been considered to be locked in a poverty trap, 
it today plays the role of the lead performer among the least developed countries. 
After independence in 1971 and a phase of recovery and reconstruction in the 
post-war period, Bangladesh entered a period of stable economic growth. Three 
decades ago, Bangladesh was still characterized by high population density and 
a scarcity of natural resources, as well as by an environment of weak institutions, 
socio-political instability, and economic mismanagement. Today, Bangladesh is 
an example of how a country can succeed despite extreme vulnerability to natural 
disasters and a bad initial position.
Until 1990, the pattern of Bangladesh’s Gini coefficient10  traces the Kuznets 
Inverted U. In the early 1970s, 74% of the population lived below the poverty line. 
The pace of poverty reduction increased in the 1980s and accelerated even further 
in the 1990s (per capita income growth rose from 2.2% a year in the 1980s to 3% 
in the 1990s and the rate of change in incidence of poverty decreased from -0.6% 
to -2.4% per year within the same period). During the 1990s, per capita income 
increased by 3% per annum. Nevertheless, the pace of rural poverty reduction 
9OPPG (Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth) is a research project initiated in 2003 by 
a partnership of French (AFD), German (BMZ, Kf W, and GTZ) and British (DFID) 
development agencies and the World Bank. The aim was to derive further insights into the 
concept of pro-poor growth and sound operationalization of pro-poor growth policies by 
analysing 14 countries in four continents.
10The Gini coefficient is given by the (household-size weighted) mean absolute deviation between 
all pairs of a suitable measure of living standards, typically per capita household real income or 
expenditure. The Gini coefficient lies between zero and one, where zero means that everyone in 
the economy has the same share and one means that one individual owns everything.  
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was lower than the pace of urban poverty reduction during the 1980s and 1990s 
alike. From 1991 to 2000, rural-urban inequality rose further, so that the ordinary 
growth rates in rural and urban areas differed by almost one percentage point 
(with a rate of 1.4% for rural and 2.3% for urban areas, respectively). The Gini 
coefficient rose in rural areas from 0.27 in the early 1990s to 0.35 in 2000, while, 
during the same time period, the urban Gini coefficient rose from 0.33 to 0.44. 
The analysis of the RPPG makes the rise in inequality even more apparent: 
Within the same period, the RPPG rose, by 0.8% in the rural but only by 0.37% 
per year in the urban regions of Bangladesh. However, the share of the population 
below the poverty line dropped from the initial 74% in 1971 to only 40% in 2000. 
Today, Bangladesh is approaching a stage of self-sufficiency in rice production.
At the beginning of the period of economic growth in the 1980s, the pace of 
poverty reduction was partly absorbed by economic instability. An unsustainable 
public deficit impeded the launch of crucial reforms, and natural disasters 
regularly destroyed agricultural output, all of which weighed down the process 
of overall economic growth during the 1980s. Since the 1990s, damage by natural 
disasters could be reduced significantly for the rural population. The decrease 
of exposure to natural disasters led to an acceleration in poverty reduction. Sen 
et al. (2007) emphasize the stabilizing economic environment as the engine for 
pro-poor growth, because it made possible important pro-poor expenditures. 
Within the framework of a stable macroeconomic environment during the 
1980s and 1990s (favored by the positive effects of the Green Revolution), 
Bangladesh was able to use the additional fiscal resources for public expenditures 
and pro-poor reforms. Sound family planning programs reduced population 
growth continuously so that the total fertility rate decreased from 7 in 1975 to 3.2 
in 2000. The simultaneous increase of productivity through the use of modern 
technologies led to significant per capita income growth. The period of economic 
growth notably favored the increase in poverty reduction during the 1980s and 
1990s (average annual economic growth increase from 3.7% in the 1980s to 4.8% 
in the 1990s). However, the urban-biased growth strategy, which favored the 
non-agricultural sector, absorbed further capacity for higher poverty-reducing 
effects at the national level.
Sen et al. (2007) highlight a policy mix that notably favored pro-poor growth 
for the last two decades: (1) Macroeconomic stability, including a policy of low 
inflation, a stable exchange rate, and low current account and fiscal deficits. The 
double-digit inflation rate characteristic of 1970s dropped to a single digit rate of 
5.6% in the 1990s. (2) Economic openness through the liberalization of external 
trade and foreign exchange regimes. The resulting export growth fostered 
substantial employment generation (export growth even increased from 10.4% 
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a year in the 1980s to 11.7% in the 1990s). (3) Public expenditures that focus on 
pro-poor benefits in: (i) rural infrastructure and (ii) human development. After 
a period of high budget deficits in the 1980s, Bangladesh was able to benefit from 
economic stabilization and invest in pro-poor expenditures. Rural infrastructure 
development and particularly road projects connected rural growth centers and 
helped increase farm as well as non-farm output. By employing predominantly the 
rural poor for the projects, unemployment was reduced and additional purchasing 
power was created. Furthermore, the roads increased the possibilities of trade 
between rural and urban areas, and new small-scale roadside shops sprouted up. 
Investment in basic education with a special focus on girls’ education was realized 
through an increase of public resources on the one hand, but especially through 
efficient public private partnerships, notably for secondary education programs, 
on the other hand.  (6) Primary and preventive health care. This investment policy 
led to significantly lower child mortality and greater access to drinking water and 
sanitation during the 1990s. In combination with an increase in education, the 
share of skilled labor rose, enhancing a rise in productivity.  
As a last resort for the poorest and most vulnerable of the society and in 
order to face the calamitous natural disasters, additional pro-poor reforms were 
carried out. Increased disaster preparedness and safety nets in terms of expanded 
transfer programs helped ensure food entitlements for the poorest. By increasing 
grain production during the dry seasons and diversifying income by further 
engagement in the non-farm sector, the poor were enabled to better deal with 
exogenous shocks. The development during the 1990s in which the poor were 
less likely to be hit disastrously by the regular floods marks one example of an 
efficient policy intervention on the level of safety nets in Bangladesh.  
The Case of China
Until the beginning of the period of major reforms in 1978, China was basically 
an egalitarian society, with the exception of the rural-urban disparity. The country 
was marked by central planning: strict government control of an important share 
of national industries and of all productive assets distorted prices and led to a 
misallocation of resources. The reforms introduced a free market economy by 
gradually removing price controls. The position of the Chinese economy today 
demonstrates the spectacular results of this strategy.
Since the start of the economic reforms in the late 1970s, China has experienced 
rapidly increasing economic growth (the rate of per capita growth increased from 
4.4% a year in the 1970s to 7.8% in the 1980s and even to 9% during the 1990s). 
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The years between 1979 and 1994 were marked by a continuous increase of the 
capital stock. While almost 80% of the Chinese worked in agriculture before the 
reforms in 1978, only 50% remained there in 1994. In line with economic theory, 
fast economic growth involved the largest increase in income inequality of all 
countries for which comparable data is available. In the period from 1981 to 1995, 
the Chinese Gini coefficient rose from 0.28 to 0.38. 
The major source of China’s economic boom lay in its opening towards 
competitive markets. The increase of competition led to a rise in workers’ efficiency 
that accelerated the growth process. The increasing productivity was in fact 
supported by the inflow of capital investments. The additional resources allowed 
the introduction of new machinery with better technology. Widespread reforms 
facilitated investments in infrastructure so that productivity further increased.
Within their reform project, Chinese policy makers made rapid growth their 
top priority, well aware of the trade-off between growth and inequality that had 
been experienced in most developing countries. As low national inequality was for 
a long time identified as a strain on economic growth, Deng Xiaoping summarized 
the national strategy with the famous words: “Let some get rich first.” 
One focus of the 1978 reforms that enhanced the economic boom was 
(fiscal) decentralization leading to a shift of tax revenues from the central to 
regional governments. Simultaneously fiscal decentralization was to some extent 
responsible for the increase of geographical disparity. Zhang (2006) explains 
increasing inequality with the fact that farmers and firms in poorer regions pay 
heavy taxes, while those in rich regions benefit from generous public expenditures 
and lower tax burdens. During the pre-reform period, all taxes collected by local 
governments were shared with the central government and then redistributed. 
Hence, local governments that aimed at promoting growth reduced taxes at the 
expense of the national economy. The reform allowed regional governments to 
keep their revenue and decide whether to follow (i) a strategy of low taxes in order 
to attract investment or (ii) a strategy of higher taxes to invest in public goods 
and services. According to Qiao et al. (2008), the less equal distribution of fiscal 
resources slowed economic growth in some disadvantaged regions. Nevertheless, 
regional governments, infused with new revenue, gained the opportunity to 
invest in local infrastructure and, thus, attracted non-state as well as state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).
Yang (1999) identifies urban-biased centrally planned policies as primarily 
responsible for the increase in rural-urban disparities. The preferential treatment 
of the urban sector within the reforms in terms of (i) labor mobility restrictions 
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(from rural to urban areas), (ii) welfare systems, and (iii) financial policies of 
inflation subsidies11 and investment credits caused the rising inequality between 
rural and urban China. In the post-reform period, heavy industrial development 
was favored which, hence, justified the drain on agricultural surplus in order to 
support urban capital accumulation and subsidies.   
On the other hand, the process of decentralization can burrow major roots 
of economic growth. Six aspects are identified that supported the favorable 
economic developments in China: (1) In general, decentralization improves 
allocative efficiency. Resource allocation fostered an increase in investment in 
efficient non-state firms and promoted a further increase in productivity. The 
actual productivity boom was also encouraged by decollectivization and the 
introduction of profit incentives to collective, private, and foreign enterprises 
and investors. State authorities were withdrawn from many enterprises. The 
withdrawal led to a major decrease in the output of state-owned enterprises. 
Simultaneously, the share of private enterprises and joint ventures rose from 2 to 
10% from 1978 to 1992. (2) Foreign trade and investment was liberalized so that 
the annual increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) rose from below 1% in the 
late 1970s to 18% in 1994. Especially coastal provinces decided to reduce taxes 
in order to attract foreign investors. Hence, the favored coastal areas grew faster 
so that inequality between the provinces increased. (3) State control over some 
prices was relaxed (especially for consumer goods and agricultural products), 
enhancing the opportunity for the increase of exports. With rising foreign trade, 
Chinese enterprises were able to earn hard currency and gain more flexibility 
on the world market. (4) Investments in industrial production further increased 
the Chinese position on the world market, but simultaneously increased regional 
disparity as investments in the industrial sector were made at the expense of the 
rural areas and the agricultural sector. (5) Through investment in the education 
of the Chinese workforce, the shift from agriculture to non-farm industry could 
be enhanced. 
The Case of India
Almost one-third of the world’s poor12 live in India, so that the goal of halving 
poverty becomes very much an Indian challenge. India achieved independence 
11The period of high inflation during the 1980s was caused mainly by the increase in government 
expenditures and investments disproportionately in favor of the urban sector. As the rural 
population accounted for over 75% of the national population and rural wages were, in contrast 
to urban wages, not subsidized by the state, consistently higher inflationary taxes were imposed 
on rural earnings, leading to a further increase of rural-urban disparities.  
12Calculated for the 1990s, using the poverty line of US$1 in purchasing power parity.
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and set up a federal democracy in 1947. Regarding economic reforms, India is 
rather a latecomer. An extensive reform program only followed India’s balance 
of payments crisis in 1991. Until then, India had adhered to a regime with strict 
government control over private sector participation and investment, foreign 
trade, and FDI. Starting in 1991, significant reforms led to an opening of the 
economy and transformed India into one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world. However, the period of fast economic growth was accompanied by rising 
inequality which is, still today, especially felt in the remote rural regions. Striking 
(cross-state) heterogeneity characterizes today’s Indian economy and population 
to a large extent. The heterogeneity also impedes drawing conclusions from all-
India aggregates.   
India’s success story is reflected by the significant decrease of the population 
remaining below the poverty line. While in the 1970s almost 56% were forced to 
survive with less than US$1 per day, in 2000 only 28.6% remained there. The rate of 
annual per capita income growth increased from 0.8% in the 1970s to 3.6% in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, average consumption per capita grew at an annual 
rate of 3% (a one-third increase in consumption per capita over the decade). The 
gradual decrease of the incidence of poverty (from 54.88% in the 1970s to 26.10% 
in 2000) suggests that India’s growth process had a positive impact on poverty 
reduction. Compared to the 1980s, poverty reduction even accelerated in the post-
reform period after 1991 (during the 1980s GEP was at -0.6 and the elasticity, with 
a value of 0.77, became more negative during the 1990s). 
Comparing sectoral patterns of growth shows that overall growth was 
particularly driven by the industrial and service sectors, that is, by non-agricultural 
factors (while aggregate GDP grew at a rate of 6.7% annually from 1993 to 
2000, agriculture grew at only 3.2%). Different growth patterns thus explain the 
substantial differences in growth rates among Indian states during the 1990s. Datt 
and Ravallion (2002) show that the most successful states in the 1990s (in terms 
of GDP per capita growth) used to be middle income states in the 1980s. The 
statement that a higher initial level of per capita GDP favors further economic 
growth holds for all states but the two richest. As higher or middle income states 
tend to have higher literacy rates, they are also more likely to be affected by non-
agricultural growth (that particularly relies on skilled labor). Two main reasons 
for regional differences in the dimension of poverty reduction appear to be: 
(1) the state’s initial level of inequality (for example, in terms of credit market 
imperfections, access to education, and inequality of assets like land) and (2) 
the sectoral and geographic composition of growth. As economic growth was 
particularly driven by the industrial and service sectors, it seems that the initial 
literacy rate is crucial for the explanation of pro-poor growth in India. Economic 
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reforms that started in 1991 had a major impact on the further expansion of the 
Indian growth process.   
Besley and Cord (2007) emphasize insights from previous studies and derive 
six policy propositions essential for relating poverty reduction to economic 
growth in India. (1) The circulation of regional newspapers must increase in 
order to give the poor a voice and enhance the responsiveness of the government. 
(2) The investment climate must be improved so that policies can impact the 
poor directly. Empirical evidence highlighted the uselessness of some labor 
regulations. Within the manufacturing sector, regulations that were meant to 
strengthen the workers left rural poverty untouched and even increased urban 
poverty. By improving the investment climate rather than putting forward useless 
reforms, the poor can be directly involved in the economy. (3) Access to capital 
must be improved. This encourages the creation of non-agricultural activities. The 
expansion of bank branches to remote areas was shown to have a strong positive 
impact, first, on rural poverty reduction and, second, on the wages of agricultural 
labor. (4) Education conditions, especially those empowering women, must be 
improved to enhance economic growth. The less basic education one receives, 
the greater the impediments to participation in economic growth. The levels of 
literacy vary widely throughout India, as education is the responsibility of the 
states. (5) Property rights must be improved and land reforms must be designed 
efficiently to substantially reduce rural poverty. Evidence shows that moderate 
reforms that improved the bargaining power of tenants had positive outcomes 
after independence, although direct distribution of land showed no effect. (6) 
Women must be empowered, since the costs of high gender inequality and low 
female participation turned out to be particularly high in India.
The engine for pro-poor growth in India was the right mix between human 
resource development and economy-wide policies favorable to the poor. Pro-
poor policies imply higher development spending and the implementation 
of policies that lead to higher output per capita as well as to a higher level of 
education. Datt and Ravallion summarize these findings by stating that non-
agricultural economic growth is more effective in reducing poverty in states with 
more developed initial conditions (in terms of, for example, share of the landless 
population, infant mortality, and literacy rate). 
The Case of Indonesia
Indonesia is one of the few countries where a strategy of pro-poor growth 
has been purposely designed and implemented over many years. Despite the 
weak economic starting conditions, the effort has translated into success. The 
two decades after independence in 1945 were marked by political and economic 
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instability with a serious decrease in income and hyperinflation. For most 
development economists, the situation in Indonesia seemed desperate. However, 
over the following three decades, Indonesia experienced sustained economic 
growth, which is considered today to be the major source of its poverty reduction. 
That growth period is held responsible for Indonesia’s transformation from a 
poor economy to a relatively prosperous middle-income country.  
Prior to the Asian financial crisis, the incidence of poverty dropped to an 
astonishing extent. Starting from a situation in 1966 in which almost 70% of 
the population was absolutely poor, the incidence of poverty decreased to 60% 
in the 1970s and further to 15.1% in the 1990s. The rate of pro-poor growth had 
an average value of 6.56 per year during the period from 1965 to 1990 (compared 
to 2.37 from 1950 to 1965). The remarkable economic development came to 
an abrupt end with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, dramatically exposing 
Indonesia’s vulnerability. The proportion of poor people rose from 17.7% in 1996 
to 24.2% in 1998. However, just as the economic crisis led to a sharp increase in 
the poverty rate, the rebound in 2000 led to a renewed drop in poverty to almost 
its pre-crisis level. These figures suggest that poverty responds to a major extent 
and relatively quickly to economic shocks.    
The Indonesian growth process mainly relied on changes in domestic policies 
and the gradual development of institutions, with the support of a favorable 
external environment (including the availability of new technologies). Since the 
late 1960s, almost 80% of the changes in Indonesian GEP is explained by changes 
in real rice prices. Hence, the adoption of new agricultural technologies counts as 
the major engine of Indonesia’s pro-poor growth. 
According to Osmani (2004), the favorable environment, namely, the 
Green Revolution and the windfall of oil wealth, encouraged the Indonesian 
government to embark upon a program to promote rice cultivation. The 
program was based on four pillars: (1) the introduction and diffusion of the 
new agricultural technology in order to make it available for everyone; (2) 
the subsidization of agricultural inputs (such as fertilizers); (3) investments in 
infrastructural development (irrigation and roads); and (4) regulation of the 
price scheme. Hence, especially small-scale rice farmers were enabled to increase 
their productivity to an important extent, so that millions of people could be 
raised above the poverty line in only a few years. 
A shift in the structure of the economy and thus of the pattern of growth 
occurred when Indonesia started a policy of market liberalization. The large 
inflow of foreign capital (especially from Japan) increased manufactured and 
labor-intensive exports and, consequently, generated employment on a large scale 
(the share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 16% in 1985 to 25% in 1996). 
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Correspondingly, the engine of Indonesia’s favorable pro-poor development 
included political, market-driven, and institutional processes. In combination 
with a favorable external environment and the conscious and gradual inclusion 
of the poor, the growth process became pro-poor. Timmer (2007) explains 
Indonesia’s success as the result of a “three-tiered strategy of pro-poor growth” 
which combined (i) efficient macroeconomic policies with (ii) market activities 
(translated through the reduction of transaction costs to facilitate operations in 
the factor and product markets) and (iii) household decisions (regarding labor 
supply, agricultural production, and investments in non-tradables) stimulating 
aggregate demand.  
The process of pro-poor growth was further promoted by (1) a twofold 
pro-poor policy intervention and (2) a rise in public expenditures in human 
development. The twofold strategy focused on investments in rural infrastructure 
such as roads. The work was carried out primarily by the rural poor who were 
employed on low wages. Thus, an important part of the abundant rural labor 
force was absorbed and further productivity gains were stimulated by raising 
employment. Consequently, the spending capacities of the rural poor were raised 
simultaneously with the improvement of infrastructure.13 In addition, the oil 
revenues were used to invest in education and rural public health in order to 
further increase productivity in the long-run. 
The period of booming economic growth ended with the contraction caused 
by the Asian economic crisis in 1997. This crisis was reinforced by the unprepared 
government, which was unable to cope with the situation. The depreciation of the 
rupiah caused major disruptions in the rice market and, hence, a sharp increase 
in poverty, resulting in riots. Fortunately, the rural economy played a major role 
as a safety cushion. The impact of the crisis could be mitigated as the agricultural 
sector absorbed much of the workforce.    
The Case of Vietnam
After years of war, Vietnam was reunited in 1975. The post-war communist 
period was marked by years of suppression and policies of collectivization of land 
and factories. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was hit by political and economic 
instability, poverty, and war. National poverty stood at over 75%. A political shift 
only came in 1986, when the government embarked on reforms implementing a 
free market with private ownership of farms and companies within the socialist 
regime. Since the introduction of doi moi – meaning renovation – Vietnam has 
13The financial resources for these pro-poor strategies came mainly from additional World Bank 
funding and oil revenues in the late 1970s.
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been undergoing a gradual economic transformation from a centrally planned to 
a market-oriented economy. 
Since the 1990s, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam emerged as a star performer 
among the Asian economies. At first glance, the growth period might resemble 
a miracle (Klump 2007), but, at a second glance, it will definitely serve as a 
showcase for pro-poor growth.14 Through an efficient policy mix within doi moi, 
Vietnam achieved a reduction of the poverty headcount from 58.1% in the early 
1990s to below 25% by the end of 2004.
Since the onset of Vietnam’s doi moi reforms, the country has experienced a 
period of remarkable success in economic growth and development. Kakwani 
and Son (2006) point to a PEGR consistently higher than the growth rate of per 
capita expenditure during the period from 1992 to 1997. The GEP and RPPG tools 
yield the same result for the late 1990s: the poor benefited proportionally more 
than the non-poor from the Vietnamese growth process during the 1990s (from 
1993 to 2002, GEP had a yearly average of -0.77 and RPPG an annual average 
of 4.1). Neither the Asian economic crises that hit most of the other East Asian 
countries nor the SARS epidemic in more recent times could stop Vietnam’s 
outstanding development, although the very high growth rates of the early 1990s 
could not be sustained. Between 1992 and 1997, per capita real expenditures still 
increased by approximately 1.4 times in real terms. 
The increase of per capita real expenditure levels is true for rural and urban 
areas. However, the pro-poorness of Vietnamese growth is tarnished by strong 
spatial disparities, as the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest regions 
widened between 1992 and 1997. While some urban areas managed to efficiently 
translate the periods of strong economic growth into poverty reduction, other, 
mainly remote rural areas that are to a great extent home to ethnic minorities still 
suffer from high poverty rates. 
Aggregate income inequality did not increase very much between 1993 and 
1998 (the Gini coefficient went from 0.34 to 0.35 and only climbed to a value of 
0.37 in 2002). Analyzing regional poverty measurements highlights the spatial 
disparities: average annual growth rates varied within the country between 1.64% 
(along the north-central coast) to 6.95% (in the northeast) in the period from 
1998 to 2002. In 1992, almost 88% of the poor in Vietnam lived in the rural area. 
While poverty declined by 66.67% in the urban areas between 1992 and 1997, it 
decreased by only 48% in the rural areas.   
14Klump (2007) referred to it as a miracle because of the highly beneficial external circumstances 
which helped Vietnam grow at the given rates. He highlighted the Vietnamese growth experience 
as a showcase mainly because of the particularly effective internal policy measures. 
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The pro-poorness of the growth process in Vietnam has been attributed 
primarily to doi moi. The government’s reform efforts focused mainly on 
decollectivization, the abolition of price controls and subsidies, streamlining of 
the public sector, and macroeconomic stabilization and opening. Bonschab and 
Klump (2007) identify unskilled labor as the most abundant factor of production. 
As there is a shortage of arable land, another strategy of poverty reduction than 
increasing employment of unskilled labor in the agricultural sector had to be 
found. In this context, Bonschab and Klump suggest the following policies as 
most beneficial for pro-poor growth: 
1)  Reduction of population growth in order to slow the increase of unskilled 
labor. The slowdown in fertility was mainly achieved through the economic 
reforms that raised the opportunity cost of having children, higher mobility 
of the population, and the introduction of a widespread family planning 
program (for example, introducing a two-child-policy in 1988). 
2)  Decollectivization of farm land by granting land-use rights to individual 
households in a most egalitarian way. The improvement of land-related property 
rights had strong pro-poor effects, since it contributed to greater diversification 
of rural incomes: farmers invested in a more long-term manner. Subsequently, 
productivity increased and farmers got further involved in non-farm activities. 
Of the people escaping poverty from 1993 to 1998, 63.4% had previously worked 
in the agricultural sector. Fourteen percent of those who worked in agriculture 
and escaped poverty in 1993 had changed occupation by 1998. 
3)  Pro-poor spending through investments in human capital and public health. 
By further investments in the main components of the human capital of the 
poor, the share of skilled labor in the Vietnamese economy can be improved 
and productivity increased.
4)  Facilitation of access to capital through availability of formal credits. In 
1993, 73% of all households relied on informal credits with high interest 
rates that absorbed the impact of private investments. In combination with 
the implementation of the Enterprise Law, which facilitated the process of 
licensing, the start up of new private enterprises was encouraged. This led to 
a shift in the employment structure, away from household enterprises and 
the agricultural sector, towards the manufacturing and service sectors.15 
5)  Opening the economy to foreign trade. The reform policy was marked by 
(i) a major shift in the rice policy and (ii) the creation of focal economic 
areas intended to improve external trade with direct neighbors. Reforms 
15In the period from 1995 to 1999, private firms created only 4-5% of jobs, whereas they created 
between 15-30% in the period from 1999 to 2000 (Bonschab and Klump 2007).
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in the rice policy relaxed restrictions on rice exports and removed internal 
barriers to trade, thus leading to an increase in the real price for rice. With 
the simultaneous abolishment of several constraints on the import of 
fertilizers and the resulting fall in prices for chemical fertilizers, the overall 
output of rice increased by more than 20%. In order to support the overall 
growth process, the Vietnamese government created focal economic areas. 
The areas were created in order to produce above-average economic growth 
leading to further industrialization and modernization. The design of high-
tech parks and investment in infrastructure facilitated the connection with 
direct neighbors and trading partners and attracted FDI. 
6)  Macroeconomic stability, in order to counteract the upward pressure on 
prices caused by market liberalization. The macroeconomic reform program 
included a devaluation of the currency, a reduction of subsidies to state-owned 
enterprises, tougher budget constraints, restructuring of the tax base and 
administration, and encouragement of the private sector. The strict reform 
program was successful, and inflation was significantly reduced.
5. Lessons Learnt: Is There a Recipe for Miraculous Pro-
Poor Growth? 
The five country case studies reinforce the conclusion drawn in the introductory 
section: There seems to be no unique recipe for successful pro-poor growth, 
but initial conditions, explicit policy interventions, and incidental external 
developments have influenced the aggregate pattern of growth and poverty 
reduction. Nevertheless, some particular policy interventions appear fruitful in 
general terms and thoroughly adaptive to differing environments. Therefore, the 
following section aims to derive some general lessons learnt from the case studies. 
In addition, the aim of this section is to overcome the “missing theory problem” 
by drafting a general conceptual framework in which results from the country 
analyses can be translated into pro-poor growth policies. 
In a general perspective, explicit pro-poor growth intervention can focus on 
(i) microeconomic policies designed to induce an equitable growth process, (ii) 
macroeconomic policies devised to create a stable economic framework for the 
increase of GDP, and (iii) the creation of a system of transfers and safety nets as a last 
resort for those people who are not able to actively participate in the growth process. 
Starting from a simple analysis of the process of production and income 
generation, Bonschab and Klump (2004) identify three major blocks of direct 
microeconomic policies that need to be stressed in order to make a policy strategy 
explicitly pro-poor, namely policies influencing (1) the factors of production, 
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(2) the economic sectors, and (3) the geographic areas of production. According 
to the country-specific conditions, the different blocks have to be approached 
differently, but with the same goal of combining growth with poverty reduction. 
Thus, the specific country context must be examined carefully beforehand. 
Therefore, these should be understood as a toolbox for decision makers at the 
micro-level. In addition, governments can influence pro-poor growth by using 
the set of existing institutions, through macro policies or by direct pro-poor 
spending. Public transfers can influence the wellbeing of the poor directly or by 
impacting the availability of productive assets indispensable for the poor to escape 
poverty (such as education and health) and the sector and area composition of 
production (for example, by investing in infrastructure or reforming ownership 
rights). In general, the economic process of production, income generation, and 
(re)distribution is affected by policy interventions in each block.
Figure 1: A General Conceptual Framework for Pro-poor Analysis
Source: Based on Bonschab and Klump (2004) and Klump and Miralles (2006)
Depending on the abundant factor of production, land, capital, or skilled or 
unskilled labor will be determined as the starting point for efficient factor-market-
policy interventions (for example, land reforms, education policies, or capital market 
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reforms). By increasing those factors of production which are complementary to 
the abundant factors, an efficient poverty-reducing strategy can be designed. Since 
unskilled labor is usually the abundant factor of production in developing countries, 
the strategy should aim at increasing skilled labor (by investment in human capital) and 
land (for example, by decollectivization, the increase of property rights, or investments 
in rural infrastructure). Such a strategy will not only increase labor productivity, but 
will simultaneously increase the productivity of the complementary factor, land. This 
will translate into higher agricultural employment and higher agricultural income. 
The effectiveness of such a strategy is highlighted by the success stories of Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam that have been enhanced by the Green Revolution and the 
resulting increase in productivity. All governments of the countries examined in this 
article showed that the combination of investment in human capital with land reforms 
and investment in rural infrastructure resulted in an acceleration of economic growth 
that benefited the poor at least proportionally.    
The elementary factors of production (such as land, (un)skilled labor, and 
capital) are used in different proportions in the production processes in the farm 
and non-farm sectors, the private and public sectors, and the formal and informal 
sectors. In line with the concept of Bonschab and Klump, Pasha and Palanivel 
(2004) suggest addressing the microeconomic reforms to the poor population 
by directing the resources straight at them. That is to say, sectoral policies should 
direct resources to sectors in which the poor work. If growth is concentrated in 
sectors in which most of the poor work, then employment generation will most 
probably have a positive impact on poverty reduction. 
The case studies reveal the significant impact of agriculture on economic growth 
and, most notably, on poverty reduction. It was shown that agricultural growth 
generally has a major effect on poverty reduction in combination with a reduction 
in inequality. Through the liberalization of agricultural exports and the import of 
fertilizers, especially Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Vietnam were able to encourage pro-
poor growth. Non-agricultural growth tends to benefit the economy in a faster way, 
but usually at the expense of the poor (as shown by the cases of Bangladesh, China, 
and India). 
An important segment of the rural poor is concentrated in the non-farm rural 
sector and produces non-tradable goods and services. As local demand is essential 
to the growth of this non-farm sector, rising agricultural income provides it 
with additional demand. Hence, the impact of agricultural growth on poverty 
reduction is indirect, since it is mainly through increased spending in the non-
farm rural sector. Through the creation of backward and forward linkages between 
the agricultural sector and the non-farm sector in rural areas, agricultural growth 
is further strengthened and a virtuous circle of growth and income develops. 
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The direct impact of agricultural growth is shown by the Green Revolution, 
which reduced poverty through a significant increase in productivity and, 
hence, the shift of poor farmers above the poverty line. However, country cases 
highlight that agricultural growth must be accompanied by constant attention 
to the profitability of labor-intensive activities (for example, investments in rural 
infrastructure like roads) in order to have a direct impact on poverty reduction. 
Otherwise, the rural poor stay poor despite agricultural growth.     
If the nature of growth is not to be agricultural, then, policy strategies must be 
designed differently, as the case of India shows most clearly. Countries and regions 
with lower literacy rates will face difficulties, as non-agricultural growth mainly 
benefits skilled labor – in contrast to agricultural growth, which affects unskilled 
labor. The country case studies show that employment growth remains one of 
the main channels through which economic growth and poverty reduction are 
linked. Since poverty can most efficiently be reduced through income generation 
and income is generated through employment, the key to sustainable poverty 
reduction lies in the expansion of employment opportunities. 
With a higher level of development, the industrial and service sectors become 
more relevant to the poor. Since the public sector generally lacks the flexibility to 
absorb the poor, the domestic private sector needs to expand and be strengthened. 
The examples of China and Vietnam show how policy reforms can create profit 
incentives in order to attract private investors and encourage the start up of new 
enterprises. Through the facilitation of access to private credits and licensing 
of private firms, investors can be supported in their investment plans. The 
cases of China and Vietnam show that an efficient resource allocation through 
decentralization and decollectivization further accelerates the development of 
the private sector. Sound reforms also prevent the workforce from rushing from 
the agricultural into the industrial sector only to become informal workers.  
Much evidence shows that the poor of a country can only benefit from 
microeconomic policies if they have the opportunity to operate in a well-
functioning macroeconomic framework. Only within a country that guarantees 
a certain economic stability will development strategies take. Within a stable 
economy, the likelihood of financial and socio-political crises can be minimized. 
However, the impact of the different macroeconomic variables on growth and 
poverty reduction is still strongly debated. Nevertheless, the country cases 
show that some macroeconomic policy interventions turn out to be especially 
efficient in supporting and enhancing the pro-poor growth process. The cases 
of Bangladesh and Vietnam reveal that low inflation and a low public deficit 
create a favorable environment for pro-poor growth. By increasing economic 
openness through liberalization policies and the devaluation of the currency, 
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foreign investors can be attracted and will fuel the national economy. The 
potential impact of trade liberalization on poverty reduction is one of the 
most prominent elements within the pro-poor growth discussion. The cases of 
Indonesia and Vietnam show its positive impact principally on rural economic 
growth. However, the rising rice prices for Vietnamese consumers should not 
be neglected. According to the World Trade Organization, a general consensus 
suggests that expansion of exports (through trade liberalization) contributes to 
faster economic growth. During the 1990s, the individuals who benefited from 
trade liberalization were either directly involved in export activities or operated 
in limited auxiliary service functions that developed around export activities. 
Hence, to ensure that trade liberalization benefits the poor, backward and 
forward linkages must be implemented. Through those linkages, larger-scale 
economic sectors can participate in export activities. 
The macroeconomic rationale for keeping budget deficits low is also highly 
controversial. On the one hand, governments are generally urged to keep deficits 
small in order to support macroeconomic stability. Large budget deficits increase 
the danger of a crisis which will affect the poor disproportionately (as was shown 
in the case of Bangladesh). However, government expenditure in the form of 
public investment in human development and infrastructure can particularly 
support the poor, as the country cases of Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India show. 
Expenditures are most efficient if they are financed through additional resources 
and not through the public deficit (as highlighted by Bangladesh and Indonesia). 
Within the country case studies, public investments in rural infrastructure 
display a positive impact on rural poverty reduction. However, the impact 
seems even more pro-poor if the road work is carried out by hired rural laborers 
(employment growth). 
The importance of public investment is highlighted by the evidence from 
China and Vietnam, where a crowding-in of private investment followed 
increasing public investment. However, this cannot be generalized. In cases of 
governance failure, corruption, and problems in the implementation of public 
sector projects, budget deficits can, in contrast, harm the economy to a significant 
extent. Only when GDP growth is significantly lower than the potential long-
run growth rate, is there a possibility of making use of expansive fiscal policy. 
However, it must be kept in mind that in the case of government expenditures 
targeting human resource development (such as, for example, education or family 
planning programs), the positive impacts on poverty might not be apparent 
in the short term. These investments impact the long-term poverty pattern. It 
is therefore possible that the actual impact of such investments only becomes 
apparent through the measurement of non-income factors. 
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All policy recommendations stress the importance of empowering the poor 
and making them a productive part of society. However, some individuals are 
more vulnerable and not able to actively participate. Because of illness, age, or 
discrimination, some individuals rely on further support. Others rely on temporary 
help because of natural disasters or unforeseen threats (for example, floods in 
Bangladesh). The resulting inequality can be addressed by complementary 
interventions, such as transfers, on the one hand, and the creation of safety nets, 
on the other. 
Transfers do not target the active inclusion of the poor, but rather their 
embedding in the growth process through redistribution. By direct (conditional) 
payments or subsidies to certain individuals, transfers can reallocate a share of 
the growth dividend. The group of temporarily disadvantaged can be helped 
through safety nets. Safety nets have two main functions: (1) redistributing 
income and resources to help the poor overcome short-term poverty, and (2) 
helping households to manage risks. The most efficient instruments for coping 
with risk are insurance systems that are available to and affordable for the poor. 
The country cases demonstrate the importance of such safety nets. Because 
Bangladesh benefited from an efficient policy to deal with risks, especially 
regarding natural disasters, efficient poverty reduction was possible despite poor 
initial conditions. In contrast, Indonesia suffered intensely and lost an important 
share of the growth dividend in the financial crisis because of the lack of formal 
safety nets.  
6. Concluding Remarks
The debate on growth with poverty reduction in general and the analysis of selected 
Asian country case studies has raised the question whether a unique recipe for pro-poor 
growth exists. Instead of providing a short and misleading answer to the question, this 
article aimed, first, to point out the important definition and measurement problems 
with pro-poor growth and, second, to build on country experiences to develop a 
consistent conceptual framework for the analysis of appropriate policy interventions 
given the heterogeneity of initial country conditions. 
Our lessons can be summarized as follows: 
1)  Before implementing a pro-poor growth strategy, policy makers must 
first define the goal to be achieved. Depending on the absolute or relative 
understanding of pro-poor growth, policy interventions differ, as was seen 
in the introductory part of this article. Hence, policy makers must decide 
whether they want to concentrate on economic growth or on including 
equality in the development process. 
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2)  In order to actively design growth policies, decision makers must pay 
attention first of all to a sound macroeconomic framework in order to 
implement appropriate microeconomic policy interventions. By analyzing 
the specific country conditions, the areas of intervention can be determined 
and then approached through policies targeting the relevant factor markets, 
sectors of production, or areas of production and income generation. 
3)  In order to ensure that no part of the population is left behind in the growth 
process, policy makers should implement an efficient system of transfers 
and safety nets to support the disadvantaged and help people cope with 
disasters when necessary. 
Making use of the available country resources to foster growth, while at the 
same time spreading the growth dividend among the whole population, is a 
concept which became popular in post-war Germany under the name of the 
“social market economy.” In the view of Ludwig Erhard, the first Federal Minister 
of Economics in the Federal Republic of Germany and its second Chancellor, 
the social market economy relies on free markets, a sound macroeconomic 
environment, and social safety nets, which provide the necessary social balance 
of growth. Given the remarkable conceptual proximity between the strategy 
of pro-poor growth and the model of  the social market economy, the German 
experience of achieving a sustainable and balanced economic miracle in the 1950 
and 1960s might provide a further interesting case study from which developing 
countries could learn today – not with the aim of copying a specific country 
model, but in order to discover how specific country conditions can be used most 
efficiently for a highly successful development path.   
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Introduction: Industrial Policy in the Social and Ecological 
Market Economy
Neoliberal models of economic development have not been able to achieve 
persistent economic growth. This became especially evident in Latin America 
and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, rapid and undifferentiated 
economic liberalization, in combination with a movement to downsize 
government programs, has increased the social imbalances between and 
within societies and made it more difficult to deal with the ecological threats 
to humanity. On the other hand, state-led development models that tried to 
replace market-based resource allocation with heavy-handed government 
planning and implementation often fared even worse. The social and ecological 
market economy (SEME) provides a promising, pragmatic alternative to the 
neoliberal and the state-led development models, as it aims to reconcile the 
propelling function of markets with the checks and balances provided and 
executed by the state as the entity responsible for safeguarding (social) equity 
and (ecological) sustainability. It is therefore gaining credibility, especially 
among developing countries of Asia that traditionally assign an important 
role to government intervention, but seek to avoid the errors of manifold non-
capitalist experiences in the region.  
The concept of SEME, however, is not very well defined, and those countries 
that claim to have developed some kind of SEME (Germany, the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands, New Zealand) have implemented different policy 
mixes to balance efficiency with social and ecological goals. Moreover, these 
strategies have changed over time, not least in response to the challenges of 
globalization. The common denominator of SEME is that the state, within a 
market-based and competitive economy, seeks to ensure equal opportunities for 
its citizens to participate in the economy. Social security systems also help ensure 
inclusion in societal life. Furthermore, environmental protection is pursued by 
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internalizing environmental costs in the market economy. State intervention 
is based on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby local authorities and non-
government organizations play an important role in providing public goods. 
Industrial policy played and plays an important role in forming and maintaining 
SEMEs. Successfully implementing industrial policies requires a careful balancing 
of market forces and state intervention to achieve optimal results in terms of 
economic efficiency, social equity, and environmental sustainability. 
This article presents lessons learnt from the successes and failures of industrial 
policy. Chapter 1 provides a definition of industrial policy and shows how it usually 
pursues various objectives. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings 
of industrial policy, in particular the concept of “market failure” that is used to 
justify government intervention in markets and its counterpart, “government 
failure,” which addresses the risks that are necessarily involved in any intervention. 
Chapter 3 then reviews the existing empirical evidence with particular emphasis 
on Asia. Finally, Chapter 4 distills lessons from theory and from Asian practice. 
It summarizes how industrial policies should be designed and implemented so as 
to preclude government failure and to achieve the intended outcomes effectively 
and efficiently, and it identifies principles that should guide “smart” industrial 
policy in line with the framework of the social and ecological market economy. 
1. Industrial Policy: Definition and Targets
Industrial policy comprises any deliberate state activity that stimulates specific 
economic sectors and activities and thereby promotes structural change (Rodrik 
2007, 3). Although traditionally its main aim was to spur the transition from agrarian 
to industrial, that is, manufacturing societies, the term industrial policy refers more 
broadly to any public support for structural change. In recent years, industrial policies 
more and more often aim to build competitive advantages in knowledge-intensive 
services. In other cases, especially in developing countries, industrial policies also 
support non-traditional primary activities, such as salmon farming or viniculture. 
Very diverse policy measures may directly or indirectly affect and alter the 
sectoral composition of the economy. Industrial policy therefore overlaps with 
manifold other policy areas including trade policy, financial policy, competition 
policy, infrastructure policy, education policy, and employment policy.1
1See, for example, Meyer-Stamer 1998, 2 ff.  Especially in development cooperation, the terms 
private sector policy or SME policy are commonly used. In practice, these concepts largely overlap 
with industrial policy. What characterizes the latter concept is its emphasis on structural change 
without ex ante privileging certain firms due to their ownership (private vs. public) or size (small 
vs. large) structure.  
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Industrial policies are mostly geared towards increasing economic efficiency 
and competitiveness. In practice, however – and particularly in a SEME – 
efficiency gains are not pursued exclusively, but social inclusion and cohesion 
and environmental sustainability are also taken into account.2 Four different 
objectives may be distinguished. The first three reflect traditional key objectives, 
whereas the fourth objective has gained in importance since the 1980s: 
1)  strengthening competitiveness of existing industries and stimulating the 
development of new ones to seize new economic opportunities, for example, 
through subsidies for research and development (R&D) or through support 
for start-ups in promising new activities; 
2)  cushioning the social effects of the decline of mature industries, for example, 
through specific policies for regions which depend on declining industrial 
activities, where unemployment rates are increasing to a disproportional degree;
3)  balancing regional inequalities, for example, through special incentives for 
investments in less developed regions; and
4)  counteracting negative externalities of economic activities on the natural 
environment, for example, by establishing tariffs above market equilibrium 
level for renewable energy fed into the power grid.
The logic of industrial policies may differ. Selective policies target specific 
sectors, such as coal and steel, electronics, or biotechnology. Horizontal 
policies support a specific range of activities that are considered important 
for competitiveness across sectors; examples include subsidies for R&D and 
industrial training or finance for innovation. Neoclassical economists in most 
cases reject selective policies, arguing that they distort competition and channel 
resources towards less efficient activities. Horizontal interventions, in contrast, 
are widely accepted, because the existence of market failures in R&D, for example, 
is generally recognized. In practice, however, the distinction is not as clear cut as 
it may seem. Governments often try to influence the broad direction of structural 
change without favoring specific industries, for example, by providing support 
for innovative activities (thus discriminating against well-established types of 
enterprises) or fostering the use of ICT (which is more relevant in some activities 
than in others). In other cases, local clusters of specialized firms are supported, in 
other words, incipient patterns of specialization are further strengthened.
2See, for example, the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy (European Union 2004, 6, 8, 16, 31). 
The strategy calls for “removing disincentives for female labor force participation,” “eradicating 
poverty,” and “addressing specific target groups’ issues.” Moreover, “it aims for growth to be 
environmentally sustainable.” Meyer-Stamer (1998, 13-14) calls for an “industrial policy for 
sustainability.” See also Aigingers’ concept of “dynamic competitiveness” (Aiginger 2007, 313).  
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In practice, industrial policy serves not only to achieve any of the above 
mentioned four objectives. Rather, politicians sometimes use industrial 
policy instruments to satisfy particular demands of their respective electoral 
constituencies.
2. Market and Government Failures –  
Theoretical Underpinnings of Industrial Policy
According to neoclassical economic theory, market forces should lead 
to the best possible allocation of available resources, thereby enhancing the 
specialization of countries according to their comparative advantages (Pareto 
efficiency) and inducing growth. There are mainly two reasons why markets may 
fail to deliver these outcomes predicted by the neoclassical framework (see, for 
example, Chang 1996, 7 ff. on market failures):
1)  The existence of economies of scale or collusive behavior may lead to imperfect 
competition (for example, monopolies or monopsonies where individual 
market agents may affect quantities and prices in the market). Governments 
may need to regulate markets under conditions of imperfect competition. 
2)  Decisions and action of individuals generate costs or benefits for other 
stakeholders (externalities). As a result, private cost-benefit structures deviate 
from the social cost-benefit structure. In such situations, governments may 
be well advised to provide (or create incentives for the provision of ) goods 
in the public interest.  
The assumptions underlying the neoclassical approach are restrictive. Even 
neoclassical economists themselves admit that their assumption that markets 
function on the basis of perfect competition among actors with full information 
about all relevant parameters and with completely rational preferences is an 
abstraction of the real world situation. This is especially the case with regard to 
most developing countries, where market-enabling institutions are deficient and 
basic public infrastructure as well as high-level technical training is lacking. 
This mismatch between simplified models and complex reality has led some 
authors to reject the concept of market failure as the rationale for industrial 
policy (for example, Cimoli et al. 2006). However, accepting the difference 
between model and real world, the concept of market failure can be an important 
analytical tool to analyze critical weaknesses in markets and to target policies 
accordingly. 
One essential field where market forces alone will lead to underperforming 
economies is innovation and technological learning (Rodrik 2004, 6 ff.). 
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Technology and innovation are key drivers of productivity growth. Productivity 
growth, in turn, is necessary to enable local producers to cope with increasing 
international competition, while allowing salaries and social welfare to rise. As 
evolutionary economics teaches, technological learning is a complex process. It 
involves the skillful recombination of knowledge that is partly bound to individuals 
and/or organizations and therefore requires a high degree of interaction, trust-
building, and coordination. Moreover, learning processes are cumulative, often with 
uncertain economic outcomes and multiple externalities (see, for example, Lundvall 
1992). The development of new technologically relevant knowledge suffers from 
problems of non-appropriability. While the actor investing in knowledge creation 
inevitably has to bear the sunk costs and the risks of innovation failure, in most 
cases he will only be able to appropriate part of the benefits in case of innovation 
success. This is all the more the case in societies where institutions for the protection 
of intellectual property and enforcement of contracts are weak. 
In sum, innovation and technological learning are highly prone to market 
failure, while bearing a huge development potential. Public support to R&D, 
human capital formation, and technology transfer is thus an essential element 
of industrial policy in practically all high performing economies. World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules explicitly exempt support to research activities, 
including those carried out by private firms, from the list of prohibited subsidies, 
provided that it does not exceed certain levels.3
Probably the most serious negative externalities of purely market-driven 
development are the degradation of natural resources and damage to the 
environment that affects all stakeholders in a given territory alike, independently 
of whether or not they benefit from the economic returns of an activity (as 
entrepreneurs, workers, or consumers). The reports by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change (Stern Report) have recently emphasized that external 
environmental effects go far beyond national boundaries and that the costs will 
largely be borne by segments of the global population that have not benefited 
from economic growth to any relevant degree. 
The need to incorporate environmental and, in particular, climate-related 
externalities is not yet fully reflected in industrial policymaking, neither in 
developed nor in developing countries. Fostering competitiveness, on the one hand, 
and environmental policy, on the other hand, are in most cases still being handled 
by separate and often competing political entities and stakeholder groups. 
3WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 8.2 (a),  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm#articleVIII ( January 4, 2008). 
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It should be noted that industrial policy is not always geared towards enhancing 
national competitiveness. Instead, governments in social and ecological market 
economies may also pursue industrial policies in order to maximize social and 
environmental spillovers from economic activities. They may, for example, link 
innovation policy with efforts to improve resource productivity and ecological 
performance. Public procurement may be employed to purchase ecological “best-
practice technologies,” and prizes may be offered for innovative technologies that 
secure particular environmental objectives (Gross and Foxon 2003, 125-128).
While the inclusion of the environmental dimension in industrial policy is 
quite recent, the social dimension has for quite some time been integrated in the 
discussion on industrial policy. Two examples are given below to illustrate how 
industrial policy can contribute to achieving socially desired outcomes: 
•  Policies to alleviate regional disparities. Market forces usually lead to increased 
power concentration and spatial polarization. Once regional disparities 
exceed acceptable limits, social cohesion is endangered, and political unrest 
(or radicalization) may be induced. In Germany, the constitution obliges the 
government to ensure equivalent living conditions in all parts of the national 
territory. Likewise, in most other industrialized countries, governments 
pursue programs to reduce spatial polarization, often including significant 
transfers of public financial resources.4
•  Policies to shape urban space. Market forces induce the concentration of 
retail services in large super- and hypermarkets, often greenfield investments 
outside of the urban core areas, where land prices are lower. In many 
countries across the developed and developing world, this has led to loss of 
infrastructure and decaying downtown areas. As a consequence, in many 
countries, among them the USA with its market-liberal tradition, urban 
revitalization programs were set up, including tax incentives and grants for 
companies wishing to invest in the inner cities.
Summing up, these observations on innovation and learning processes, environmental 
externalities, and regional disparities show that market failures are common and justify 
public intervention. On the other hand, critics of industrial polices point to the risks 
of government failure. Even if markets fail to provide the best possible solution for 
certain problems, government interventions may do more harm than the actual market 
failures. Five arguments are put forward by critics of industrial polices:
4As in the case of public support to research, the relevant WTO agreement (see footnote 3) 
exempts from prohibition “assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member 
given pursuant to a general framework of regional development.” 
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First, the state is composed of politicians and bureaucrats who, at least partly, 
pursue their own personal interests rather than working in the best interest of 
the public. Individuals enter the bureaucracy in order to achieve reputation and 
power, to enjoy the perquisites of the office and, most importantly, to draw a 
good salary. All of these variables are affected by the size of the total budget of 
the bureau. Bureaucrats thus benefit from the size of their institutions and the 
available resources. The bigger the budget, the higher are the salary and reputation 
as well as the opportunities to satisfy clientelist networks. Therefore, it is rational 
for bureaucrats to attempt to extend their responsibilities and to produce goods 
and services in more than a socially optimal quantity (Chang 1996, 22-23 and 
Fritsch, Wein, and Ewers 2007, 407). Even if an agency’s work is not successful, it 
may try to hide its inefficiency in order to ensure further allocation of funds. 
Second, bureaucrats, unlike private investors, do not bear the full risk of their 
decisions. Incentives for civil servants are determined by the civil service career 
law and informal patronage norms. Usually there are few provisions to reward 
good or penalize bad performance (Fritsch, Wein, and Ewers 2007, 406). This 
implies a considerable risk that less care is taken when public funds are invested.
Third, governments are not insulated from the specific interests of pressure 
groups. The state can be seen as “an arena, within which economic interest groups 
or normative social movements contended or allied with one another to shape the 
making of public decisions” about “the allocation of benefits among demanding 
groups” (Skocpol 1985, 4). Since the most powerful groups will be most effective 
in influencing relevant decisions, state policies and regulations reflect the interests 
of these powerful players. For example, private sector groups may seek privileged 
access to subsidies or protection from more efficient competitors. 
Fourth, the fact that governments allocate benefits to pressure groups creates 
an incentive for private agents to divert efforts away from productive purposes 
(for example, to enhance productivity and competitiveness) towards influencing 
state policies and capturing the rents emanating from these state interventions 
(Krueger 1974 and Chang 1996, 27-28).
Fifth, even if all state actors were benevolent and tried to improve the 
efficiency of the economy and overall welfare, they may lack the ability to achieve 
their well-intended objects. It is doubtful whether the state is better informed 
than markets, which would be a prerequisite for correcting markets. Of course, 
firms may also take wrong decisions, but this is part of a competitive dynamic 
of entry and exit that permanently drives innovation. In contrast, governments 
that channel resources towards certain industries and “pick winners” may distort 
market signals and thus make resource allocation inefficient (see Pack and Saggi 
2006, 281 ff.). In addition, collecting and processing the necessary information 
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is a cost-intensive exercise for the state. These costs may exceed the benefits of 
correcting market failures and result in a waste of resources needed for other 
policies (Chang 1996, 26).
3. Empirical Evidence: Lessons from the “Asian Miracle” 
Experiences 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are the countries whose development 
trajectories most seriously challenge conventional economic wisdom regarding 
the power of the “invisible hand” and the superiority of non-interventionist over 
interventionist policies. The three (formerly developing) countries managed to 
catch-up with the OECD5 world in terms of economic dynamics and social welfare 
within only a few decades. Catching up was a consequence of interventionist 
policies to help create comparative advantages. When looked at in more detail, 
the policies adopted by the three countries were quite different. While Korea used 
subsidized credit and rationed it in a highly selective manner to favor sectors and 
companies investing in strategic industries, the most important instruments in 
Taiwan were selective fiscal incentives (Etzkowitz and Brisolla 1999). Later, other 
Asian countries – Malaysia, Indonesia, China – tested different interventionist 
strategies, with some remarkable successes (for example, building up competitive 
advantages in different sub-sectors of the electronics industry in Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, China, and Singapore) and some costly failures (for example, the 
national car in Malaysia, aircrafts in Indonesia). In sum, however, the region, 
on the basis of relatively interventionist policies, fared much better in terms of 
industrialization and the creation of knowledge-based competitive advantages 
than any other region in the world.  
Since the early 1990s, many studies have tried to explain the factors behind 
the success of the Asian miracle countries, often comparing it to the failure of 
interventionist policies in Latin America (for example, World Bank 1993; Nelson 
and Pack 1999; Lall 2006). While the debate around some issues is still going on, 
there are several elements of Asian industrial policies that are mentioned rather 
undisputedly as critical success factors (see, for example, Westphal 2000 and 
Wade 1990):
•  Macroeconomic stability, reflected in relatively low inflation rates, positive 
real interest rates, fiscal balance, and properly valued real exchange rates, 
allowed for rapid and effective responses to disruptive shocks.
• Factor inputs rose quickly, physical and human capital were rapidly expanded.
5Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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•  Even if the strategic goal was industrialization, the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector was paralleled by successful agricultural development.
•  Competent bureaucracies were able to orchestrate the development process, 
without succumbing to lobbying or pressures by strategic interest groups. 
•  Incentives for new industries were tied to performance, for example, special 
concessions were handed out on the condition that export targets be met. 
•  Compared, for example, with Latin America, these Asian economies were quite 
open, both with regard to trade and to ideas. The emerging manufacturing 
sectors were export oriented from the very beginning, and exports grew much 
more rapidly than gross domestic product (GDP) over long periods of time. 
•  In all Asian miracle countries, governments fostered the transition towards 
knowledge- and technology-driven economies by emphasizing primary and 
secondary education as well as technical training on vocational and tertiary levels. 
•  Government spending on R&D was also a strategic asset of Asian industrial 
policy, enabled by the high export revenues. South Korea, in particular, is 
today among the world’s leaders in R&D spending as a percentage of GDP. 
•  Openness, however, was by far not complete: on the import side, Korea 
and Taiwan imposed differential tariffs and sometimes even quantitative 
restrictions on trade.
Apart from these commonalities, each successful catching-up process was 
based on a unique development trajectory, and industrial structures as well as 
policy mixes varied quite strongly. For example, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong adopted very different strategies for dealing with foreign direct 
investments. More recently, the success stories of industrial development in 
China and India again build on specific strategies (Altenburg, Schmitz, and 
Stamm 2008). Also, each successful country and sector benefited from certain 
windows of opportunity. Hence there is no “one-size-fits-all” concept for 
successful industrial policy.  
Nevertheless, three general lessons may be drawn from this brief sketch of the 
Asian miracles, specifically compared to less successful or failed policies in other 
developing regions:
First, selective industrial policy can be successful if carried out by competent 
governments. Bureaucracies need to be sufficiently independent from interest groups 
that may distort the process in their favor. While state intervention can be assessed as 
greatly successful, government failure always was a problem. Quite often, consumers 
had to purchase overpriced goods to sustain less efficient industries for prolonged 
periods of time; also, banks sometimes accumulated non-performing loans due to 
errors in directing credit to supposedly “strategic,” but actually inefficient, industries. 
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Second, export orientation had important stimulating effects on economic 
growth and productivity. International trade allowed the Asian countries to 
specialize in their respective comparative advantages and to increase their welfare. 
At the same time, export revenues allowed for the import of intermediate goods 
needed to utilize existing capacity and of machinery and equipment needed to 
modernize the industrial infrastructure and expand capacities. Whereas import 
substitution strategies in most developing countries led to severe balance of 
payment problems, the newly industrializing Asian economies managed to 
match their increasing technology requirements with higher levels of exports. 
Furthermore, importing and applying increasingly sophisticated capital and 
intermediate goods triggered technological learning on the company and 
the national levels. At the same time, exposure to demanding and rapidly 
changing competitive markets obliged companies to continuously upgrade their 
technological capabilities.
Third, export-driven industrial development can rapidly expand the employment 
opportunities of the poor and even help to achieve equity goals. Labor-intensive 
export industries helped many Asian economies to manage the transition from 
low productivity agrarian to more productive urban and industrial economies. 
Today, income distribution in these countries is atypically equitable, especially if 
compared to most Latin American countries. Furthermore, the strong emphasis 
on education at all levels further helped to make the development trajectories of 
Asian catch-up economies not only more competitive but, at least compared to 
other developing regions, more inclusive.
4. Smart Industrial Policies: Lessons Learnt 
The previous chapters have shown that market failures call for and justify state 
intervention. Asian governments in many cases managed to build up successful 
and internationally competitive industries that would hardly have emerged 
without targeted government action. At the same time, state intervention 
carries substantial risks of government failure. As in any other policy field, it is 
therefore necessary to abandon the futile ideological discussions about markets 
versus states. Rather, one should ask how industrial policies should be designed 
and implemented so as to preclude government failure and to achieve the most 
appropriate balance of competitiveness, social inclusion, and environmental 
protection in an effective and efficient way.
In this final section, we will therefore attempt to give some answers to this question, 
drawing on practical lessons learned from industrial policy successes in Asia and 
elsewhere as well as on insights from different bodies of literature, including general 
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literature on political economy and more specific studies on new public management 
as well as donor guidelines on best practices in service provision. 
First, when choosing sectors and activities for governmental support, a number of 
issues should be kept in mind: 
Although the primary goal of industrial policy is to alter the sectoral 
composition of the respective economy in a way that enhances its competitiveness 
and allows for higher per capita income, it should always balance economic with 
social and environmental goals. Ensuring equal opportunities for all citizens to 
participate in the economy is of particular relevance in countries where a large 
portion of the population is poor and economically and socially marginalized. 
Also, it is necessary to make sure that environmental costs are internalized in 
the market economy as much as possible – something that the Asian tigers have 
greatly neglected. Social and environmental impact assessment should therefore 
be part and parcel of any new industrial policy initiative.
Asian countries have shown the importance of focusing on sectors and activities 
that are innovative and expand existing markets. As Rodrik notes, the “first order 
of business in development is to learn how to do new things, not to focus on what 
one already does well” (Rodrik 2006, 5). Taking up new activities creates new 
product or process technologies and facilitates organizational learning at the firm 
level as well as human capital at the level of the individual worker. Innovation in 
this broad sense is critical for productivity growth, product differentiation, and 
sectoral diversification. These productivity enhancing and learning effects cannot 
be fully internalized by firms and workers and generate positive externalities for 
the whole economy and society; it is therefore justifiable to target public support 
at innovative activities. 
Innovation and learning may be particularly strong in the area of emerging 
frontier technologies, but especially in developing countries they can also be 
triggered by imitating technologies that are already being applied elsewhere (Lall 
and Teubal 1998, 1375, 1378). Producers in developing countries are often trapped 
in a vicious circle, where they are unable to achieve economies of scale because 
the quality of their product is low, their knowledge about markets is limited, and 
marketing channels are weak. This results in low productivity, low returns, and 
little reinvestment. Barriers to entry for such activities are low, and new producers 
regularly move into the same type of activities. As long as the market does not 
expand, this will only result in cut-throat competition and decreasing returns. 
Hence, it is crucial for industrial policy to promote the development of products 
that are new to the local environment and would allow producers to access new, 
less oversupplied markets with higher returns (Altenburg and Eckhardt 2006, 
21, 28 ff.). This should be done by encouraging search processes (for example, 
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rewarding new business ideas or non-traditional exports) rather than letting 
policymakers define what they regard as promising activities. 
Although new trade and growth theories have shown that comparative 
advantage is not predetermined by the given factor endowments, but can be 
“created” through deliberate efforts by firms and supporting institutions (Porter 
1990), a note of caution is necessary in light of scarce public resources: Before 
entering into innovative markets, search processes should consider the economic 
viability of the sector or activity by assessing the current base of capabilities, 
feasible rates of improvement, and the expected evolution of demand. Moreover, 
they should try to assess the cost-benefit ratio of support, even though the benefits 
include environmental and social externalities that often cannot be measured in 
economic terms (Lall and Teubal 1998, 1379). 
Second, there are a number of lessons learnt with regard to the process of 
designing public support policies:
Many problems cut across the boundaries of sectors and cannot be overcome by 
actors from a single institution. Therefore, it is necessary to transcend bureaucratic 
boundaries and design joint working arrangements and coordination mechanisms 
(Bullock, Mountford, and Stanley 2001, 14). Importantly, cooperation and 
coordination among government agencies requires that mandates, competences, 
and responsibilities are clearly defined and agreed. Vague, conflicting, or 
contested competences lead either to inaction or to fragmentary or opposed 
actions – all of which waste public resources and prevent public actors from 
being held accountable (Rodrik 2007, 43-44). In particular, unbundling the roles 
of the government as an entity that defines targets, rules, and regulations, on the 
one hand, and provides services, on the other hand, is recommended. Separation 
of regulatory and operational functions creates clearer lines of accountability. 
Furthermore it gives service providers the autonomy to use flexible means to 
reach their goals without undue political interference in decisions (World Bank 
2006, 51).  
As governments are not market actors, they lack information about constantly 
changing market dynamics – the most promising sectors and activities, the most 
significant bottlenecks for market actors, and the most effective interventions 
to tackle them. These structural information gaps cannot be overcome if they 
are left to the lobbying and rent-seeking activities of the strongest individual 
actors. Therefore, policy making must involve a wide range of both public and 
private actors in a transparent manner. Possible mechanisms for collaboration 
with the private sector are deliberation councils, supplier development forums, 
investment advisory councils, sector roundtables, and private-public venture 
funds. Furthermore, care must be taken to obtain and integrate the views of other 
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stakeholders and other directly or indirectly affected persons in a systematic 
manner (Bullock, Mountford, and Stanley 2001, 14). Trade-offs may emerge 
between the need to draw on scientific expertise, on the one hand, and social 
inclusiveness and participation, on the other hand. Not listening to those at the 
receiving end, however, does not pay, as it leads to bad results, implementation 
problems, and loss of public legitimacy. Collaboratively, these actors should seek 
to assess and address problems in a comprehensive way, and to avoid unintended 
negative side effects, for example, regulations that crowd out poor producers or 
scare away investors. Value chain and sub-sector analyses are useful approaches 
that help to detect such interdependencies. 
When designing targeted support policies, policy-makers should take specific 
care that the complexity of policies does not overwhelm the implementation 
capacities of governments and bureaucracies. Even with regard to the Asian 
tigers, the existence of a “highly capable, coherent economic bureaucracy closely 
connected to, but still independent of the business community” has been called 
a “myth” (Evans 1998, 66, 79). Simple, uniform, and non-bureaucratic support 
schemes may, in certain conditions, be preferable to highly complex and 
differentiated measures, because they are easier to implement and provide less 
scope for arbitrary interventions and corruption. 
Moreover, if the addressed market failure is not of a permanent nature, 
conditionality and sunset clauses should be made part and parcel of each 
intervention, so that barriers to removing benefits will not emerge and policies 
remain flexible to changing needs. 
All policies should be subject to continuous monitoring and independent 
third-party evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation systems should measure 
outputs and outcomes rather than inputs. Hence, expected outcomes need to be 
defined in measurable and monitorable terms.  
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should include the views of all stakeholders. 
In addition to traditional M&E procedures, it is therefore in some situations 
advisable to set up mechanisms for social monitoring. The general public, 
especially those affected by a certain policy, are likely to hold public service 
providers accountable if they receive information about how well these agencies 
are performing and if they have feedback systems at their disposal. Holding 
service providers accountable is easier if these operate at a decentralized level. 
This calls for a greater implementing role for local governments. 
Last but not least, policies should be designed in a flexible way. The steps from 
policy design to implementation are usually not unidirectional. Instead, policy 
processes are search processes that necessarily build on trial and error and on 
feedback loops between implementation and (re)design.  
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Third, there are some best practices for service provision, which will briefly be 
recounted here. 
As a rule, state intervention should aim at strengthening or developing 
competitive markets. However, if a market does not develop because of 
coordination failures, the public sector may have a role in facilitating collective 
efficiency (Schmitz 1999) among state and non-state actors. Collective efficiency 
results from external economies of proximity – which accrue to firms quasi 
automatically, for example, through the existence of local labor pools and supplier 
networks – and from the potential gains of consciously pursued joint action, 
such as initiatives to introduce a certifiable quality standard. Governments 
may facilitate dialogue, help to build trust, and promote information sharing 
and mutual learning among market actors in order to exploit the advantages of 
collective efficiency (Neuchâtel Group 2002, 13).
Financial and non-financial enterprise support services are crucial “for effective 
market-oriented innovation to take place” (Neuchâtel Group 2008, 14), as they are 
geared to overcoming coordination failures and information deficits. At the same 
time, these services are themselves subject to market failures: if left to the market, 
these services will not always be provided or they may not reach out to specific 
groups of entrepreneurs and producers. Enterprise support services are placed on a 
continuum of private and public goods. Whereas some enterprise support services 
relating to day-to-day activities of businesses and farmers bear a strong private goods 
character, the outcomes of other services relating to “strategic,” long-term activities 
are less easily predictable and appropriable by individual actors and therefore will not 
be demanded by the poorer segments of entrepreneurs and farmers (Altenburg and 
Stamm 2004, 11ff.). Services with a strong public goods character therefore require 
public investment. This holds even more if they serve the public interest by enhancing 
environmental sustainability or public health (Neuchâtel Group 2006, 26-27). The 
extent and duration of public funding therefore depends on the degree to which 
benefits are privately appropriable or public, as well as on the capacity of those at 
the receiving end to pay for them. In the case of non-permanent market failures, it is 
advisable to install conditionality and sunset clauses before funding starts. Funding of 
services with a strong private goods character should also be based on a realistic cost-
benefit analysis, so that costs of services do not exceed the amount that the users are 
able to pay in the future when their capacities are fully developed (Neuchâtel Group 
2006, 26). In general, the decision to fund a specific intervention should be taken on 
the basis of long-term financial planning rather than in an ad-hoc, reactive manner.
Even in the case of services with a strong public goods character, donors and 
governments should avoid directly providing services whenever possible, but 
rather support market-based service providers, be they public, semi-public, or 
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private. Having the same organizations managing the funds and providing services 
is bound to lead to inefficient use of funds, crowding out of private suppliers, 
as well as to lack of accountability to users. There are several ways to separate 
the institutions: (a) “Service mandates” allow the use of public funds without 
maintaining a public delivery system, but are susceptible to the same problems 
as public provision of services: inefficiency and crowding out. (b) In order to 
prevent political capture and to elicit private-sector needs and priorities, contests 
that allow private sector firms to bid for public resources can be particularly 
useful (Rodrik 2007, 39). (c) Another possibility is demand-side financing via 
grants or a voucher system – however, the administration of such systems is 
fairly complex (Neuchâtel Group 2002, 24). The last two options can be used to 
stimulate the development of a diversity of different service providers. If users are 
able to choose between different providers, competition will press providers into 
good quality services and promote more specialized services. Users will be able to 
demand the services that suit their needs best.
In addition, public service providers should be obliged to measure the cost and 
income generated by each service, and mechanisms for gathering and feeding back 
users’ opinions of the services delivered should be developed. Performance results 
must be the basis of future funding. However, when setting criteria and measuring 
performance, it must be clear that there may be trade-offs between different objectives, 
for example, between financial sustainability, on the one hand, and impact, on the 
other, or between outreach and impact (Altenburg and Stamm 2004, 24). 
Another important instrument for making service provision more market 
based is co-financing by users, even if (in the case of poor target groups) it is only 
a small part of the total cost. This serves a double purpose: Paying for services 
increases the pressure to improve service quality and the accountability of service 
providers to the users. At the same time, it prevents crowding out of commercial 
providers by subsidized programs and increases efficiency of resource allocation, 
as users will only avail those services for which they actually see a demand 
(Altenburg and Stamm 2004, 25). Co-financing can take many forms: payment 
in installments and deferral until harvest time, payment in kind, or financing 
through member organizations (Neuchâtel Group 2002, 60, 20).
Lastly, in order to ensure sustainability, governments and donors should 
facilitate the development of permanent local institutions and mechanisms that 
raise awareness among entrepreneurs and farmers about the benefits of services 
and help to exchange information on the quality and outcome of specific services. 
It is equally important to facilitate long-term links between service providers and 
professional and up-to-date backstopping institutions, so that suppliers are able 
to react to changing demands.
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5. Conclusions 
This article has shown that industrial policy has an important part in 
developing social and ecological market economies. There is now a broad 
consensus that unregulated markets are unable to achieve optimal results in 
terms of economic efficiency, social equity, and environmental sustainability. 
Government interventions are needed to correct market failures, but the public 
sector often intervenes in ways that generate new problems of mismanagement 
and corruption. Governments should therefore adopt “smart industrial policies” 
that are light-handed, build on market forces wherever possible, and ensure 
accountability where the public sector directly engages in service provision. In 
this way, it is possible to combine the creativity inherent in markets with the 
checks and balances provided and executed by the state in a way that ensures 
more balanced socioeconomic and environmental development trajectories. 
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Social and Ecological Market Economy –  
The Future for China?
Feng Xingyuan
 
Introduction
This paper will compare the model of the social and ecological market economy 
in Germany with the Chinese vision of a market economy reflected in the laws 
and regulations governing the Chinese socio-economic system and in the relevant 
ongoing debates. It analyzes the differences in social values between Germany and 
China, assess the significance of the model for Chinese reforms, and, last but not least, 
makes some policy recommendations for the reforms. Thus, the author will analyze 
how Chinese social values are imbedded in the constitution, the changing role of the 
state in socio-economic planning, and reforms in the regulatory framework and state 
institutions in China in the context of globalization.
Features, Achievements, and Problems of the Social Market 
Economy in Germany: A Chinese Perception
The social market economy in Germany is perceived by the government and 
the general public in China as a successful market economy, in contrast to the 
common view that a laissez-faire economy in its true and original sense is actually 
not acceptable anywhere in the world, including Germany and China. 
According to a recent survey conducted by the author,1 the general public 
in China appreciates highly the role of the European (including German) 
governments and enterprises in promoting environmental protection and 
admires the social welfare and high living standard in the EU-15, including 
Germany. Although very few Chinese have heard the term social and ecological 
market economy, labeling the German social market economy in this way is 
understandable and acceptable to the Chinese, given that many Chinese not only 
regard Germany and the Nordic countries as special types of market economies 
that emphasize the social dimension of their economies, but also take them as 
examples of best practice in environmental protection. 
1As part of an European Commission Project on “Perceptions of the EU in China and of China 
in the EU,” September 2007-March 2008.
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Many Chinese take the real-world socio-economic system of Germany as the 
ideal and normative model of a social market economy and as the model for the 
Chinese economic system, as well. However, one must make clear exactly what 
one is referring to when speaking of a social market economy, as there are big 
differences between that real-world socio-economic system, on one hand, and 
the normative model of a social market economy as conceptualized in the early 
stages, in the 1950s and 1960s (hereafter model I), or as now conceptualized in 
Germany (hereafter model II), on the other hand. 
The model of a social market economy in the early stages is best described in 
the famous book Wohlstand für Alle (Wealth for all) by Ludwig Erhard, the first 
Economics Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, published in 1957 in 
German, and in English in 1958 as Prosperity through Competition. In his book, 
wealth or prosperity is generated through competition, not redistribution, and 
this wealth or prosperity is the foundation of welfare for those disadvantaged 
in the market economy, or redistribution. Erhard made a further distinction 
between wealth creation and redistribution. According to Erhard, social policy 
should not harm the productivity of the national economy in any way, and it 
should not counter market economy principles. For him, the welfare state was a 
modern illusion. The “Wirtschaftswunder” (economic wonder) of Germany in 
the 1950s and 1960s can be traced, to a great extent, back to the practice of social 
market economy in line with its model in this early stage.
The current model of a social market economy (model II) corresponds neither 
to the early one (model I), nor to status quo of the socio-economic system 
in Germany. This becomes clear when one examines the rigid labor market, 
the coercion by trade unions of non-members in the same sector or region, 
and the excess burden of the social safety net imposed upon the economy in 
contemporary Germany. In general, many people in Germany understand their 
problems well and wish for reform towards a more free market economy and 
less social burdens, although in concrete situations, they as individuals tend to 
protect their vested interests and are often not willing to draw back from their 
status quo. The expansion of social policy towards a welfare state in the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in a ratchet effect, which has been detrimental to the incentives 
for entrepreneurs to innovate and increase productivity. However, no one is able 
to draw back easily. 
Over time, many people in Germany have come to take their social benefits for 
granted and they have increasingly forgotten the market economy principles to 
which the founders of the social market economy in Germany, including Walter 
Eucken and Andreas Müller-Armarck, held. They also make little distinction 
between social entitlements and basic individual rights. Furthermore, since the 
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1970s, in contrast to the earlier period, the state and society in Germany have 
made significant efforts in the area of environmental protection, which have 
proven to be useful. So the present model of a social market economy (model 
II) lies somewhere between that of its early stage (model I) and the status quo of 
the socio-economic system in Germany today, with somewhat more emphasis on 
market economy principles, less rigid labor markets, and leaner social safety nets 
than in Germany today, and with a stress on environmental protection perhaps 
as strong as that at present. It seems that the Chinese people have no reason to 
refuse to adopt such a model in China, since it reflects an optimal combination 
of economic efficiency and social balance which would be highly valued by both 
the Chinese and German people, if a fair competition order is well preserved and 
property rights are well protected. 
New Model of the Social and Ecological Market Economy 
in Germany
In July 2007, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) announced that the guiding principles of social and 
ecological market economy would serve as the overall orientation for German 
development cooperation.2 These principles for shaping the social and ecological 
market economy (hereafter “model III”) in Germany are:3
1) Promote the rule of law;
2)  Strive for growth that benefits the broad population (involve the poor in 
the growth and wealth creation process);
3) Strengthen the private sector;
4)  Improve the framework for the functioning of a market economy (promote 
competition);
5) Make the economy forward looking and viable (promote innovation);
6) Commit to social partnership (protect labor rights);
7) Align the economy with ecological protection;
8) Secure equal opportunity.
2German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007.
3Author’s translation. 
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In comparison with model II, the only controversial principle for shaping the 
social and ecological market economy in model III might be the sixth principle: 
commit to social partnership. The shaping of real-world social policies based 
on this principle goes in two directions: On the one hand, the policies create 
an enabling environment for growth and employment, and therefore also for 
employment and redistribution. On the other hand, they produce a disabling 
environment for growth and employment, and are therefore also detrimental to 
employment and redistribution. A rigid labor market impedes many newcomers 
and unskilled workers from entering it. Thus, we need a set of principles or 
rules to concretize the principle of social partnership in order to ensure that an 
enabling environment is the result. In a modern society, factors such as rule of 
law, proper social security, a safe working environment, a dynamic labor market, 
and proper ecological and environmental protection (as referred to under the 
principle of “align the economy with ecological protection”) belong to the 
framework for sustainable economic and human development, and thus deserve 
special attention.
The Chinese Transition towards a Market Economy
The Chinese economic transformation began in 1978. However, it was not 
until 1992, during its 14th Party Congress, that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) set the “establishment of a socialist market economy” as the final goal 
of the Chinese economic system reform. It was then even written into the 1993 
amendment of the Chinese constitution, article 15, that “the state enforces 
a socialist market economy.” 4 Both steps reflected the CCP’s commitment to 
fostering and furthering the economic reform course in China, after the stagnation 
of economic reform for several years following the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
turbulence. In 2003, the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee 
of the CCP passed a “Decision on Some Issues Relating to the Perfecting of the 
System of the Socialist Market Economy in China.” It declared that a rudimentary 
system of the socialist market economy had been established.
However, a market economy needs to have at least two basic properties: 
private ownership and competition order. Since there has been a system of 
private ownership from (and even before) the very beginning of the founding 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the release of the Restraint of Competition 
Act in 1957 roughly marked the establishment of the system of the social market 
4In this paper, the English formulations of Chinese laws, regulations, and policy documents are in 
part the author’s own translations. 
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economy in Germany. Hong Kong is also a market economy: it enforces private 
ownership and a competition order without an explicit competition law, but 
with a set of common law rules and an open market which makes monopoly 
impossible in the long run.5 
In comparison with Germany and Hong Kong, China obviously has not 
permitted sufficient private ownership, although great progress has been achieved 
up to now. It has not established a fair competition order either. China is still an 
economy in transformation. 
In the above mentioned 2003 decision, the CCP announced its intention to 
“perfect the basic economic system, keeping public ownership as the mainstay of 
the economy and allowing diverse forms of ownership to develop side by side.“ 
The constitution provides better protection for public ownership, that is, state and 
collective ownership, than for private ownership. For instance, article 6 affirms 
that “the state practices the basic economic system keeping public ownership as 
the mainstay of the economy and allowing diverse forms of ownership to develop 
side by side”; article 7 asserts that “the state economy is the sector of the socialist 
economy under ownership by the whole people; it is the leading force in the national 
economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state economy.” 
The 2003 decision also announced the intention to “construct a unified, open, 
competitive, ordered, and modern market economy system” while at the same time to 
“perfect the macro-control system.” The exact formulation of the latter phrase can be 
found in article 15 of the constitution. Article 12 asserts that socialist public property 
is “sacred and inviolable” and that the state protects socialist public property, while 
according to article 13, private property is not protected as much as the public property: 
“The legal private property of the citizens is not to be violated. The state protects by 
law the citizens’ private property and the right of its inheritance” (article 13). 
In 2007, China passed the Property Law. It provides that “the state protects 
the equal legal position and development rights of all market actors” (article 3), 
thus including state, collective, and private actors. This is a degree of progress 
in comparison to the constitution. But the rule of “protection of the equal 
legal position and development rights” is not strong enough since the state and 
5This insight is attributed to the Austrian economists. See especially von Mises 1927. The 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government has been considering passing a general 
competition law. This trend fits with the general trend of switching from a free-market port 
to an administration-dominated polity in Hong Kong, which has occurred gradually since its 
handover to mainland China. It also reflects the Hong Kong government’s distrust of the power 
of civil society in enforcing self-regulation in competition issues. In an economy of common law 
tradition, business society is indeed very creative in making and enforcing informal merchandise 
laws (internal rules). 
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collectively owned economy is backed by the state and collectives, and can easily 
constitute an anti-competition force and crowd out the private economy. 
As is provided in the new Anti-monopoly Law released in 2007, the legal 
business activities in the state-controlled branches that have direct bearing 
on economic lifelines and national security or are subject to exclusive sale are 
protected. This is a clear signal that industrial policy has priority over competition 
policy. Also the so-called macro-control includes instruments such as planning, 
direct administration, monetary policy, fiscal policy, land use control, industrial 
policy, etc. This involves many more instruments than the classical instruments 
of modern market economies that in general include only monetary and fiscal 
policy. There has been a clear “spiral of intervention” in market processes since 
2003.6 The central bank and Ministry of Finance have opened and have been 
jointly running a giant state-owned controlling company, the Hui Jin Company. 
A fair competition order is absent in this regard.
Recent Chinese Strategies Relating to Social Security and 
Environmental Protection
Although marketization in China has been set forth gradually, the social and 
ecological dimensions of the socio-economic system had been neglected by and 
large until several years ago. Consequently, while China has been admired for its 
high-speed economic growth since 1978, on the one hand, it has also been frequently 
accused of practicing “social dumping,” on the other hand. The move to greater 
emphasis on the establishment of a social safety network for all just started in recent 
years. At the same time, environmental protection has also been put on the policy 
agenda of the central government. In 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao admitted that the 
government had not fulfilled the target of reducing the energy consumption per 
unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 4% and the emissions of main pollutants 
by 2% within that same year. In 2007, the government defined this reduction task as 
a main criterion for measuring the performance of local governments. Before that 
time, economic growth was the sole criterion for measuring their performance. 
Several recent strategic developments related to the shaping of Chinese 
policies on social and environmental protection in China should be noted. First, 
China put forward a new development concept during the Third Plenary Session 
of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 2003, later 
dubbed the “scientific development concept.” The concept places high priority 
6Von Hayek points out how government action on an ad hoc basis will result in its being driven to 
further actions that were not contemplated nor desired. See Von Hayek 1960.
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on the needs of human beings and pursues “comprehensive, coordinated, and 
sustainable development.”7 The main elements and basic requirements include: 
1) economic development as the central task; 2). coordinated economic and 
social development; 3) coordinated urban-rural development; 4) coordinated 
regional development; 5) sustainable development; 6) reform and opening up; 
and 7) high priority to the needs of human beings. The 17th Party Congress 
reemphasized the importance of the concept. 
Second, China firmly endorsed the concept of a “socialist harmonious 
society” in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 2004 (Hu 2005). In February 2005, Hu Jintao, 
the Secretary-General of the CCP, enumerated the six basic requirements of the 
concept as follows: democracy; 8 the rule of law; equality and justice; dynamism; 
peacefulness and order; harmonious coexistence of human beings and nature. In 
October 2006, the party passed a resolution on building a socialist harmonious 
society which reemphasized these requirements.9 Hu Jintao’s speech at the 17th 
Congress of the CCP on October 15, 2007 not only reemphasized the building of 
a socialist harmonious society, but also put forward the building of an “ecological 
civilization.” Such a civilization should have a basic sectoral structure and a 
growth and consumption pattern that saves energy and protects the ecological 
environment, a relatively large scale circular economy, a significantly increased 
share of renewable energy, effective control of emissions of the main polluters, and 
a significantly improved ecological environment. At that time, awareness of an 
ecological civilization should have been soundly anchored in the whole society.
Third, the CCP put forward the full-scale building of the “well-off society” at 
the 16th Party Congress in 2002 and set the goal of quadrupling 2000 GDP by 
the end of 2020. According to the party resolution of the 17th Party Congress, 
the party also called for a quadrupling of 2000 per capita GDP (RMB 7078) by 
the end of 2020 (to around US$3,500. US$1 = RMB 8.56 in 2000). 
In line with all the above-mentioned strategic concepts, the party and the central 
government launched the “new socialist countryside construction” campaign at 
the end of 2005, addressing problems of rural socio-economic development. The 
7Communique of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP, October 
14, 2003; and Hu 2007. 
8However, in contrast to “democratic socialism” or “liberal democracy,” the full formulation is still 
“socialist democracy,” which is manifested in a so-called “system of democratic centralism.”
9The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several Major 
Issues Relating to the Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society, passed at the 6th Plenary 
Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, October 11, 2006.
162  |  Part 3  Partner Country Perspectives
basic requirements include: advanced production, improved livelihoods, civilized 
social mood, clean and tidy villages, and democratic management.
Furthermore, all these concepts are reflected in the outline of the 11th Five-Year 
Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of 
China, passed on March 16, 2006. In line with this outline, the 11th Five-Year Plan 
has specific outlines for the different areas at each administrative level, such as labor 
and social security, health care, education, environmental protection, energy, etc. 
Up to now, the government departments in charge of these various areas have 
been responsible for designing specific reform concepts for their own areas, 
which can easily lead to protection of their vested interests. Consequently, such 
reform concepts tend to maximize the budget at their disposal. This is exactly the 
case predicted by Niskanen in his model of a budget-maximizing bureaucracy 
(Niskanen 1971). For example, the Ministry of Health intended to propose a 
reform concept similar to the British National Health Service System, based 
on a tax financing principle. In such an overall “reform strategy,” government 
departments have no incentive to reduce their budgets; they tend to enlarge them 
instead, especially in the areas of social security and environmental protection. 
Significance of the Model of the Social and Ecological 
Market Economy for Chinese Reform
The principles for shaping the social and ecological market economy have 
great significance for Chinese reforms: 
1)  Promote the rule of law: Although China is striving to enforce the rule of law as 
a component of the “harmonious society” concept, a mixture of rule of law and 
rule of man prevails. In many fields, including social security, labor protection, 
environmental protection, and the internal market, there are a set of laws and 
regulations. However, there are severe problems with law enforcement, for 
instance, regarding the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs).10 
2)  Strive for growth that benefits the broad population (Involve the poor in the 
growth and wealth creation process): China made great efforts to alleviate 
poverty. But, according to the China Poverty Alleviation and Development 
Association, there were still 23.65 million absolutely poor people in 2003 
in the rural areas, and 28 million in urban areas, measured by a per capita 
10With regard to the protection of intellectual property rights, China tends to rely on special 
campaign to crack down on piracy. In March 2006, the Ministry of Public Security launched the 
campaign “Eagle II” (shan ying dong er hao). By the end of 2006, more than 3,700 cases of IPR 
violations were discovered, involving a total amount of RMB 2.6 billion. In these cases, over 5,600 
suspects were detained. See Zhang and Yong 2007. 
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income of less than RMB 683, the 2003 poverty line, and around 50 million 
at the hunger fringe, measured by a per capita income between 683 and 882 
yuan. If they are economically weak or disadvantaged, these poor people 
should be supported so that they can participate in the growth and wealth 
creation processes. If they are socially weak or disadvantaged, they should 
also be covered and empowered by a basic social safety network. 
3)  Strengthen the private sector: Chinese economic success can be largely 
attributed to development of the private sector. By the end of 2006, there 
were 498.1 million private enterprises (siying qiye) and 25.96 million 
individual industrial and commercial households (geti gongshang hu). There 
are 12.7 million investors and 53.1 million employees in private enterprises, 
and 46.4 million employers and employees within individual industrial and 
commercial households. The non-state sector comprises ca. 65% of total 
GDP in China.11 Beside the urban unemployed and newcomers in the 
labor market, there will be around 150 million surplus workers from rural 
areas who need to find employment in the non-agricultural sector in urban 
areas. The private sector is almost the only sector that could absorb this 
labor force. It is thus very important to boost private sector development. 
However, many hindrances remain. 
4)  Improve the framework for the functioning of a market economy (promote 
competition): A competition order is essential in a market economy. But 
as mentioned above, China does yet not have a fair competition order. 
In China, the state-controlled branches are exempted from the new anti-
monopoly law. Macro-control and industrial policy have priority over 
competition policy. 
5)  Make the economy forward looking and viable (promote innovation): In 
China, “dynamism” is one of the core components of the “harmonious society” 
concept; it means full of creativity and vitality. Although it does not directly 
refer to competition, such a status can only be attained through competition. 
Currently, there are still large hindrances to innovation, and innovation is 
lagging behind in China; thus an enabling environment should be created. 
6)  Commit to social partnership (protect labor rights): As above mentioned, 
China is often criticized by the international community for “social 
dumping.” Labor protection laws and regulations are not yet enforced. For 
instances, most of the employees in private enterprises and the individual 
11All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 2007. Non-state enterprises (minying qiye) 
refer to domestic enterprises, excluding state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. 
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economy are not insured, or not properly insured. There is still child labor. 
In 2007, the media publicized the fact that some coal mines in Shanxi 
province use slave labor. On the other hand, some clauses in some laws and 
regulations might constitute overregulation and need to be reviewed. 
7)  Align the economy with ecological protection: Environmental and 
ecological protection is an urgent and long-term issue in China. It also has 
a central position in the new “scientific development concept.” According 
to the World Bank, air pollution alone is costing China 3.8% of its GDP, 
causing much disease and claiming many lives.12 
8)  Secure equal opportunity: It is very important to empower economically 
and socially disadvantaged people in China through equal opportunity. 
Basic education and health for all and poverty alleviation, vocational 
training, etc. are all important for this purpose. 
Although these principles are acceptable in the China context, one must first 
protect property rights. Only then can the property owner be also required to 
shoulder his social responsibilities, which should, however, be defined very carefully 
after considering the whole set of the above mentioned principles for shaping the 
social and ecological market economy. It would be one-sided to only stress the 
basic principle of model III, “Eigentum verpflichtet” (property entails obligations), 
which is detrimental to a free and open society with growth dynamics, equality 
of opportunity, and proper social and environmental protection. We need a basic 
principle which explicitly states that: “Eigentum ist geschützt, aber verpflichtet” 
(property is protected, but entails obligations). In a broad sense, this reflects a basic 
principle of human action: Freedom implies responsibility. 
Concluding Remarks
In summary, we can conclude that the new model of social and ecological 
market economy is very significant for Chinese reforms. But this doesn’t mean 
simply copying the current German social, environmental, and economic system 
in China. Some relevant German laws constitute overregulation. In development 
cooperation, it is essential not only that knowledge of the Germany model and 
its real-world system is transferred, but also that the historical background of 
the German system, the relevant interest conflicts, their positive and negative 
consequences, etc. are made known and discussed in China. 
12See “World Bank Says Air Pollution Alone Costs 3.8% of China’s GDP” 2007.  
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Market Economy with Socialist Orientation 
in Vietnam and the Concept of the Social and 
Ecological Market Economy
                                                                      
                                                                                         Le Dang Doanh
Historical Background and the Doi Moi  Process in Vietnam
As Vietnam gained independence on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh, in 
Vietnam’s Declaration of Independence, quoted Thomas Jefferson in the American 
Declaration of Independence: “All men are created equal.” The official names of the 
new state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and, later, the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, reflected the ideals of “independence, freedom, and happiness” of the san 
min1 doctrine of the Chinese leader Sun Yat Sen, instead of socialist ideals. 
However, various historical circumstances led Vietnam to follow a Soviet-style 
economic model of central planning, with a brutal land reform (1954-1956) and 
“socialist reconstruction” (1957-1960) in North Vietnam. Despite serious criticism, 
after reunification in 1975, the Fourth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV) decided to lead the whole country to socialism (1976). 
The Sixth Party Congress identified bureaucratic over-centralization and lacking 
material incentives as the main weaknesses of the economic system; economic 
growth had been stagnant or negative as the following table illustrates:
Table 1: Sectoral GDP Growth Rates
chain-linked index, base year 1975
Year Total GDP Agriculture Industries Services
1977 105.3 100.7 113.2 104.9
1978 101.1 93.6 107.5 109.0
1979 98.2 103.3 95.4 92.4
1980 96.4 105.6 88.7 87.8
1981 102.3 104.3 99.9 100.7
Source: Dang Phong 2002, Economic History of Vietnam 1975-2000.
1Chinese, means literally “three (time) peoples.”
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With an acute scarcity of all basic necessities, the dream of equality and fairness 
in distribution of food and goods was unrealistic, as the following table shows:
Table 2: Food Rations for Monthly Consumption  
in North Vietnam 1963-1989
Categories Class of Rations Meat (kg) Sugar (kg)
Special A1 More than 7  (not specified) 
More than 3.5  
(not specified)
Minister and equivalent A 6 3
Vice Minister and 
equivalent B 5 2
General Director C1 3 1.5
Dep. Gen. Director C 2 1
Director D 1 0.5
State employee E 0.3 0.25
Special worker DB 2.5 0.75
Hard worker I 1.5 0.75
Worker II 1.2 0.5
Light worker III 0.3 0.35
Children under 6 years TR 0.3 0.5
Children 7-16 TN 0.3 0.35
Population N 0.3 0.1
Source: Dang Phong 2002, Economic History of Vietnam 1975-2000.
Children and older, vulnerable citizens were the main victims of the many 
years of extreme hardship indicated by this rationing and coupon system. 
Moreover, in the 1980s, inadequate policies led to rampant inflation of 700% per 
year, the supply of basic rationed foodstuffs and goods could not be sustained, 
and Vietnam was in a deep socio-economic crisis.
This internal situation and the collapse of the Soviet Union were the driving 
forces behind the doi moi reforms begun by the Sixth National Congress of the 
CPV: gradual transition to a market economic system, acceptance of a domestic 
private sector, and foreign direct investment, as well as development and 
diversification of international economic relations.
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The Doi Moi Process and the Market Economy with 
Socialist Orientation
After more than twenty years of doi moi, Vietnam has established the 
main elements of a “market-economy with socialist orientation,” which has 
some parallels to the social market economy in Germany. The doi moi process 
introduced the most glorious development period in Vietnam’s modern history, 
with high economic growth, rapid poverty reduction, and improved human 
development. A new private sector is emerging. 
Vietnam is an active member of ASEAN and APEC and joined the World 
Trade Organization in January 2007. Vietnam is now generally better placed to 
reach its declared aims through this path of market economy and international 
integration instead of central planning and autarky. However, socialist orientation 
is not only – and not mainly –  a matter of the market economic system; it is 
an orientation of the whole social and political system intended to unfold 
the strength, dynamism, and creativity of the people and compensate for the 
weaknesses and failures of the market economy. In a globalizing world, the state 
and the market must work hand in hand to seize the opportunities and overcome 
the challenges. 
How successfully Vietnam will be able to implement the socialist orientation 
will depend on how efficiently market-economic principles and institutions can 
be established in Vietnam, how well they function, how market friendly the state 
is, whether red tape, bureaucracy, and corruption can be eradicated, to what 
extent freedom, democracy, and civil society can be developed, and if the socialist 
orientation can be sustained. 
In 1991, the Seventh Party Congress adopted a new party program to build 
up socialism in Vietnam, a mixture of Ho Chi Minh ideology and the orthodox 
socialist model. Socialism was declared to be “a society with a prosperous nation, 
a strong state, a democratic society in equity and civilization.” The aim was to 
provide a broad-based platform for national unity and to strive for a bright future 
for the whole nation. The party program and the party statutes, adopted by the 
Seventh Party Congress, specified five characteristics and seven fundamental 
orientations for the socialist society in Vietnam. 
The five characteristics are:
• a society where the working people are the master;
•  a highly developed economy based on modern production forces and 
national ownership of the main means of production;
• an advanced culture with deep national characteristics;
•  people are liberated from repression, exploitation, and injustices; 
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working according to their abilities and consuming according to their 
work contributions; enjoying a prosperous, free, and happy life with the 
possibility of developing their full potential; ethnic races in the country 
enjoy equality, solidarity, and mutual assistance for common progress;
• friendly and cooperative relations with all nations in the world.
The seven fundamental orientations are:
•  build up a socialist state of the people, through the people, and for the people, 
based on the alliance between the working class, farmers, and intellectuals, 
under the leadership of the Communist Party;
•  develop production forces, industrialize the country, and build up the 
material-technical basis of socialism by steadily enhancing social productivity 
and improving the living conditions of the people;
•  develop an economy with multiple economic sectors operating according 
to the market mechanism with socialist orientation; the state-owned and 
cooperative sector is to increasingly provide the foundations for the national 
economy;
•  conduct the socialist revolution in ideology and culture, with Marxism-
Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology as the guiding perceptions of the world;
• exercise the policy of national unity;
•  construct socialism and defend the fatherland are two strategic tasks;
•  build up a party, which is clean and strong in politics and ideology, as a 
leading force for the socialist revolution.
In 2006, the Tenth National Congress of the CPV (April 18-25, 2006) 
included some important changes in the program: it stopped requiring that 
party members not be exploiters, thus allowing party members to open private 
businesses, accepted that the “private sector plays an important role and is one 
of the driving forces of the economy,” etc. These pragmatic changes bring the 
concepts of market economy with socialist orientation in Vietnam and the social 
market economy in Germany closer together.
The Tenth National Congress also adopted various important and progressive 
measures to “realize social progress and justice in every step of economic 
development as well as in every economic policy,” to “provide social equality in 
education,” develop a “learning society and provide education and training for 
the whole life,” and to “establish and consolidate the social safety net, providing 
equal basic public services in education and training, employment, health care, 
culture and information, physical exercise, and sports etc.” These aims are similar 
to the principles of the social market economy, as well.
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As an economy in transition from central planning to market economy, it 
was never possible for Vietnam to embrace a liberal economic model; a market 
economy with socialist orientation was an appropriate choice for Vietnam.
Ecological Market Economy
Vietnam is at the beginning of the industrialization process, but environmental 
damage is already severe: deforestation, erosion in mountainous regions, water 
pollution due to rapid increase of aquaculture, abuse of fertilizers, insecticides, 
and herbicides, uncollected solid waste, lacking ecological control in so-called 
handicraft villages and industrial villages in rural regions, industrial pollution 
in urban regions, increased dust, and alarming increases of toxic gases are 
widespread. Environmental degradation is becoming an increasing problem that 
is undermining agricultural productivity, reducing the availability of clean water 
for the rural population, causing health problems in rural and urban areas, and 
leading to a deterioration in living conditions in both urban and rural areas. Air 
quality is worsening in urban areas and in some industrial centers, resulting in 
increased respiratory problems. All solid waste cannot be collected and processed. 
Industrial pollution is widespread. Deforestation is aggravating flooding and 
landslides in mountainous areas. Flooding badly affects even several districts 
of Ho Chi Minh City. These are the outcomes of both market failures and the 
weakness of the state. The Law on Environmental Protection was promulgated in 
1993, but more efforts are needed to actually implement it.
Climate change and a rising sea level could have major adverse impacts in low-
lying river deltas of Vietnam. According to the Report of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development on Global Warming, Vietnam will be 
one of the countries most affected by global warming. If temperatures rise by two 
degrees Celsius, 22 million Vietnamese will lose their home and land, and 43% of 
the Mekong River Delta will be flooded over. If the sea level increases by 0.2-0.6 
meters, 1708 square kilometers of the Mekong River Delta will be lost and more 
than 100,000 people will be affected. Vietnam is actively participating in world 
efforts to stop global warming.
 While it may not be the major immediate bottleneck to investment, 
deteriorating environmental conditions already impose social and economic 
costs, and any further deterioration will eventually discourage new investment 
(tourism, ship-building, cement, and high-tech industries could be among the 
worst affected by any further deterioration in the environment). 
The government has had some success with its reforestation programs, but 
more needs to be done to improve water management in river basins and to better 
manage effluent from all sources. Accelerating urbanization and industrialization 
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needs to be reflected in public investment plans and other policies to ensure 
that secondary cities and towns have the infrastructure and services to attract 
those leaving farming, and to attract business investors who will generate 
the employment needed for an increasingly urbanized population. Failure to 
adequately develop secondary urban areas will lead to increased environmental 
and social pressures in the major urban centers. Increased investment in mass 
transport systems and other public services will also be needed to minimize 
congestion and other environmental problems in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. 
More environmentally friendly sources of power need to be developed. In brief, 
an ecological element must be added to the Vietnamese market economy with 
socialist orientation.
Institutional Issues
The final aim formulated by the program of the CPV, to build a society where 
“people are liberated from repression, exploitation, and injustice, and are enjoying 
a prosperous, free, and happy life”  is not different from the aim of the social 
market economy concept in Germany. This declared aim is universal; it does not 
relate to specific national conditions, and is appreciated. The problem lies in the 
implementation, for which the differences between the two systems in terms of 
history and specific national characteristics, such as development levels, political 
systems, and the roles and functions of the state, must be analyzed in detail.
Vietnam has fifty-four different ethnic groups and various religions. The Viet 
or the Kinh account for 87% of the population; they live mainly in the delta 
and urban regions, while the ethnic groups are scattered in various mountainous 
regions from north to south. The Government of Vietnam has paid great 
attention to the problem and continues its efforts to reduce poverty, with success. 
However, pockets of poverty persist in mountainous regions occupied by various 
ethnic groups. 
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Table 3: Poverty Rate across Regions
in percent
1993 1998 2002 2004 2006
Northern mountains 81.5 64.2 43.9 35.4 30.2
Northeast 38.4 29.4 25
Northwest 68.0 58.6 49.0
Red River Delta 62.7 29.3 22.4 12.1 8.8
North central coast 74.5 48.1 43.9 31.9 29.1
South central coast 47.2 34.5 25.2 19.0 12.6
Central highlands 70.0 52.4 51.8 33.1 28.6
Southeast 37.0 12.2 10.6 5.4 5.8
Mekong Delta 47.1 36.9 23.4 15.9 10.3
Vietnam 58.1 37.4 28.9 19.5 16.0
 Source: World Bank, Vietnam Development Report 2008.
In 2007, the average poverty rate in Vietnam was 14.8%; the rate was 32.36% 
in the northwest; 23.4% in the northeast; 23.4%, in north central Vietnam; 
21.34% in the central highlands; and only 5.1% in the southeast.2 This gap should 
not be underestimated, and the greatest efforts must be mobilized to provide 
infrastructure and education for these groups and include them in integrated 
market economy activities. The various poverty reduction programs must be 
institutionalized and given legal backing in order to have durable and efficient 
impacts in the long term.
2Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs, http://www.vietnamweek.net  
(December 30, 2007).
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Figure 1: Percentage of People below the Poverty Line
Source: World Bank, Vietnam Development Report 2008.
Table 4: Poverty Rates and Poverty Gap 
in percent
1993 1998 2002 2004 2006
Poverty rate 58.1 37.4 28.9 19.5 16
Urban 25.1 9.2 6.6 3.6 3.9
Rural 66.4 45.5 35.6 25.0 20.4
Kinh and Chinese 3.9 31.1 23.1 13.5 10.3
Ethnic minorities 86.4 75.2 69.3 60.7 52.3
Source: World Bank, Vietnam Development Report 2008. 
Equality and prosperity must be shared by all ethnic groups as well by different 
religious communities. Social consensus and solidarity must also include the 
relations between employers and employees and between farmers and the state.
A New Challenge: Increasing Labor Conflicts
In the past, under the centrally planned economic system, strikes were 
unknown or extremely rare in Vietnamese society.  However, according to a 
report by the Institute of the Vietnamese Trade Union at a workshop on August 
14, 2007 in Hanoi, there were 1333 strikes in Vietnam from 1995 to 2005; of these, 
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878 strikes or 66% took place in foreign direct invested enterprises, mainly in 
smaller ones. This share increased to 70.7% in 2006. Most, if not all, strikes were 
spontaneous, in other words, not organized by the trade union. They were thus 
illegal according to Vietnamese labor law. More seriously, some of the strikes 
were violent and destructive of property.  Seventy-seven percent of the strikes 
were related to salary payment: employees believed that their salary was too low, 
bonus and over-time payments were not paid as promised or were delayed, etc. 
(Institute of the Trade Union Vietnam 2007).
The report revealed a huge gap of mutual understanding between foreign 
employers and Vietnamese employees: 45% of the interviewed employees 
expressed dissatisfaction with payment, working conditions, and others matters. 
Foreign investors complained about undisciplined behavior, high turnover of 
employees, etc. Poor information exchange between the two sides, inefficiency 
in the work of related local state agencies, trade unions, and others have been 
named as causes of the strikes. Proposals to amend the labor law have been made. 
If no appropriate and efficient actions are taken soon to reduce wild strikes to a 
tolerable minimum, strikes could harm the business environment and turn some 
foreign investors away.
Industrialization: Not Always a Benefit to the Rural Population
Urbanization and industrialization have taken their toll on rural and arable 
land. In the period from 2000 to 2005, 366,000 hectares of arable land were 
converted into construction land, affecting at least one million rural people or 
13% of total farmer households (Dang Kim Son 2007). The farmers received 
lump sum compensation according to a state-fixed price and realized later that 
the very same piece of land had been leased for ten times the so-called market 
price. The frustrated farmers were dissatisfied with the compensation and held 
several demonstrations in big cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The 
landless farmers became unemployed, which created social problems, an issue 
that remains unresolved. Due to the large income gap between the urban and 
rural regions, young workers migrate to urban regions, either seasonally or 
permanently, creating problems for both rural and urban regions. In the period 
between 2000 and 2004, the agricultural labor force declined by 2.17% (Dang 
Kim Son 2007). In the province of Thai Binh, 45% of the rural labor force has 
migrated to urban regions, adversely affecting agricultural production as well as 
social and familial development (Tuong Lai 2007). 
The migrants do not have the same legal status in the new regions as the 
original residents: without residential registration (ho khau), they cannot access 
public services; they cannot even obtain a legal marriage registration, and their 
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children cannot attend public schools, etc. This discrimination is so serious that 
the National Assembly decided in 2007 to change ho khau registration, but 
implementation takes time.
These examples illustrate the fact that there are many development problems 
that need to be addressed in order to implement the socialist orientation and 
create equal opportunities for all.
Legal and Regulatory Reform
The principles of the market economy, such as the freedom to engage in 
business, equal footing, and competition, have been only gradually accepted in 
Vietnamese official documents through a long and difficult internal discussion 
in the last twenty years.  The Enterprise Law of 1999 and 2005 has successfully 
implemented the freedom to engage in business according to law, as provided by 
article 57 of the Vietnamese constitution, and has helped develop the private sector 
in Vietnam. But several market economy practices like auditing, accounting, and 
credit rating of companies are under-developed and insufficiently implemented. 
The Competition Law was promulgated in 2005, but its implementation in 
practice so far has been insufficient and has had no tangible impact on business 
life. To date, no anti-monopoly law has been promulgated, and the state-owned 
monopolies in public utilities like electricity, airlines, and telecommunications 
are not sufficiently controlled and monitored. There is no redistribution of 
monopolist profit; the Law on High Income Tax has led to redistribution of only 
a very small share of real income. 
Corruption – A Persistent Problem
There is little transparency or openness; there is no independent, private press. 
A right-to-information law, as proclaimed in article 69 of the constitution, has 
not yet been promulgated and is still under preparation. Different interest groups, 
such as the major state-owned conglomerates, influence political decisions and 
enjoy excessively high profit, especially through access to lucrative land plots, 
credits, and investment projects.
The declared principle of equal footing was and continues to be overshadowed 
by the “leading role of the state sector.” State-owned enterprises produce 38% of 
GDP, but use 70% of the economy’s total assets, 60% of the total credit supply, 
and 70% of official development assistance and have privileged access to land and 
big state investment projects. 
Signs of crony capitalism instead of a free market economy are visible 
everywhere, including in the real estate market and in the equitization of state-
owned enterprises (SOE); the impact of this phenomenon is still emerging and 
176  |  Part 3  Partner Country Perspectives
developing. Inequality between different social groups and regions is rising. In an 
economy where cash payments comprise an estimated 80% of total transactions, 
according to various estimates, including by the State Bank of Vietnam, control 
of income is only symbolic and redistribution from high-income to low-income 
groups through income tax will only start in 2009. The outcome is obvious: in 
2007, 68% of companies reported that they have to make extra-legal payments 
to operate their business. This figure has remained stable since 2005, when the 
Provincial Competitiveness Index started (Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative 
and Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2007). 
In 2005, for the first time, the Central Commission of Internal Affairs of the 
Central Committee of the CPV permitted a study on corruption Sixty-three 
percent of the interviewed entrepreneurs admitted that they frequently paid 
bribes. This is so-called small-scale, daily corruption, which affects all people and 
enterprises, as Table 5 indicates.
Table 5: Most Corrupt Government Agencies
Investment Climate Survey Diagnostic Study on Corruption
Traffic police
Customs department
Tax department
Land administration agency
Market controller
Construction permit authorities
Import/export license authorities
Land administration agency
Customs department
Traffic police
Tax department
Regulators in construction
Construction permit authorities
Health care
Planning and investment agencies
Regulators in transportation
Economic police
Source: Based on data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey (ICS) 2005 and on 
a report presented at the workshop of the Central Commission of Internal Affairs of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam on November 30th, 2005 in Hanoi. In the case of the ICS, 
rankings are based on the share of respondents declaring that corruption is widespread or gifts are 
required to get a favorable decision. Only agencies with a share in excess of 5% are reported.
An anti-corruption law was promulgated in 2006, and a high-ranking 
National Committee to Prevent and Fight against Corruption, chaired by the 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, was established in 2006. Sixty-four such 
committees at the provincial level, chaired by the chairman of each provincial 
peoples committee himself, were established in 2007. The real impact of this 
anti-corruption campaign has so far been limited. It should be noted that 
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daily corruption affects poor people the most, because they have to pay a 
disproportionately high share of their income for bribes.
In the last few years, Transparency International has included Vietnam in its world 
ranking, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), as the following graph shows:
Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index
Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
According to Transparency International, the ranking of Vietnam in the CPI 
has declined, as an increasing number of countries have been included in the 
survey: Vietnam’s position went from 102th among 144 in 2004, to 111th among 
163, to 123th among 180 in 2007. 
Competitiveness
The Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (Lopez-
Claros et al. 2006) could provide a comprehensive and reliable basis for evaluating the 
business environment and thus the efficiency of the market-economic institutions and 
the government. The gap between the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) ranking 
of Vietnam and that of other Asian economies is widening: Singapore ranked 7th, 
Malaysia 21st, Thailand 28th, and China 34th, while Vietnam ranked 68th, indicating 
that other economies in the region are more efficiently reforming than Vietnam. 
Following are the World Economic Forum rankings for Vietnam since 2005:
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Table 6: Vietnam’s Competitiveness
2000 2005 2006 2007
Out of 59 
countries/
economies
Out of 117 
countries/
economies
Out of 125 
countries/
economies
Score 
(out 
of 7)
Out of 131 
countries/
economies
Score  
(out 
of 7)
Global Competitiveness 
Index 53 81 (3.37) 77 3.89 68 4.04
Institutions 74 3.62 70 3.78
Infrastructure 83 2.79 89 2.80
Macroeconomic stability  53 4.63 51 5.08
Health and primary 
education 56 6.43 88 5.14
Business 
Competitiveness Index 53 80 82 76
Sophistication of 
company operations and 
strategy 
50 81 83 79
Quality of the national 
business  52 77 77 78
Source: Lopez-Claros et al. 2006, World Economic Forum.
Table 7: Key Components of the Global Competitiveness Index for Vietnam
 Indicators Ranking
 Group of basic components 77
 1. Institutional organization 70
 2. Infrastructure 89
 3. Macroeconomic stability 51
 4. Primary education and health care 88
 Group of efficiency components 71
 5. University education and training 93
 6. Efficiency of goods market 72
 7. Efficiency of labor market 45
 8. Sophistication of financial market 93
 9. Technology readiness 86
 10. Size of the market 32
 Components of business innovation and sophistication 76
Source: Lopez-Claros et al. 2006, World Economic Forum.
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Efficiency of the public administration is a major factor in developing a 
business environment and providing support for people. Since 2005, the Vietnam 
Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI), in cooperation with the Vietnam Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and with the support of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), has issued an annual report on 
the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) in Vietnam. It is based on surveys 
conducted on ten indicators (market entry, land access, transparency, time costs, 
informal payments, SOE bias, proactivity of provincial leadership, private sector 
development policy, labor training, legal institutions). The PCI focuses on private 
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) only; no SOEs or foreign-
invested enterprises have been included. It can provide a basis for comparative 
analysis as well as an indicator of the dynamism of reforms since 2005.
In 2007, 6700 registered companies from all 64 provinces replied to the survey.  An 
appropriate number of manufacturing, fishery, and service SMEs were selected. There 
were at least 50 answers from every province, which provided a statistically significant 
basis for analysis. The outcome was very interesting as following graph illustrates.
Figure 3: Provincial Competitiveness Index 2007 (first and last three ranks)
Source: Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative and Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2007,  
http://pcivietnam.org/reports.php.
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Despite the fact that Vietnam has a centralized state with a unified legal 
system, there are huge differences between the provinces when it comes to 
implementing this legal system. The best province, Binh Duong, has a score 
(77.20) twice as high as the worst province, Dac Nong (36.19). This means that 
the market economy with socialist orientation operates much more efficiently 
in Binh Duong than in other provinces and that there is enormous potential for 
the public administration in Vietnam to apply best practices from the province 
of Binh Duong to the other provinces. Some provinces, such as Ha Tay, have 
been progressing rapidly, while the capital, Hanoi, has occupied a very modest 
position for two consecutive years.
Whether Vietnam will be able to achieve its declared aim of developing 
the economy to a middle-income and then to a high-income economy and 
eradicate poverty depends on the role and function of the government, its 
efficiency and professionalism, the fight to reduce corruption, improvement 
of education and training, and last, but not least, the continuing reforms 
of the SOEs. The predominance of resources in the state sector, in general, 
and the state-owned conglomerates, in particular, are the focal points in this 
process.
Privatization – a Slow Process
While the equitization process has progressed very slowly (in 2007 only 
21% of the planned equitization of SOEs were implemented), establishment 
of state-owned conglomerates proceeded quickly. To date, the following eight 
conglomerates have been created:
1. Vietnam Coal & Minerals Group;
2. Electricity Vietnam Group;
3. Vietnam Post and Telecommunications;
4. Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group;
5. Vietnam Rubber Group;
6. PetroVietnam;
7. Vietnam Insurance (Bao Viet);
8. Vietnam National Textiles and Garment Group (VINATEX).
These conglomerates control a very high share (80%) of the total assets 
of the SOEs. They enjoy a monopoly position (for example, Vietnam Coal & 
Minerals Group, PetroVietnam) or de-facto monopoly position, by controlling 
the predominant share of the market (for example, Electricity Vietnam Group, 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications). 
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The legal framework and criteria for an “economic conglomerate” is not 
clearly defined. Article 149 of the 2005 Enterprise Law defines an economic 
conglomerate as a large-size corporate group. Conditions, organizational 
management, and operation of economic conglomerates are to be stipulated 
in detail by the government, but so far, no guidance from the government has 
been available. After establishment, the conglomerates quickly expanded their 
activities into banks and securities companies, and diversified into hotels, real 
estate, power plants, etc. by establishing holding companies. Former Premier 
Minister Vo Van Kiet warned against careless handling of these state-owned 
conglomerates by making a comparison with the South Korean chaebols.
By the end of 2007, the State Bank had allowed the establishment of four joint-
stock banks that report to these state-owned conglomerates. There is concern 
that the state-owned conglomerates could use their power to arbitrarily impose 
their will and restrict the duties and responsibilities of the banks with respect to 
project evaluation, credit risk rating, etc. It would be a major systemic failure to 
allow such conglomerate-dominated banks to mobilize financial resources for 
the seemingly boundless ambitions of these conglomerates. Even without their 
own banks, the South Korean chaebols destabilized the South Korean economy 
in 1997. 
Subsidiarity
The subsidiary principle underlying Germany’s social market economy is 
similar to the concept employed in Vietnam. The Tenth Congress of the CPV 
“encourages all peoples to get rich according to laws” and urges them to “overcome 
the tendency of passively relying on state subvention.” Because of limited resources 
and nearly unlimited demand, the state is unable to provide subsidies to all needy 
people. Fortunately, traditional family cohesion and solidarity and the dynamism 
of most of the Vietnamese has meant that they have mobilized their own ability 
to help themselves instead of relying on the expected subsidy from the state.
Economic Outlook 
Vietnam’s economy achieved high growth rates in the last decades, but the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the economy are low.
182  |  Part 3  Partner Country Perspectives
Table 8: GDP Growth Rates and its Contributing Elements
in percent
Malaysia 
 (90-03)
Korea 
 (90-03)
Hong 
Kong 
 (90-03)
Singapore 
 (90-03)
Taiwan 
 (90-03)
Thailand 
 (90-03)
Vietnam 
 (96-05)
GDP 
growth rate 6.48 4.89 3.96 6.27 5.30 5.13 7.23
Contributed 
by:
· Capitalized 
asset 40.28 38.24 45.20 40.51 56.42 34.11 60.11
· Labor force 39.20 25.15 27.27 35.73 16.04 51.66 20.51
· Total factor 
productivity 20.52 36.61 27.53 23.76 27.55 14.23 19.38
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2007. 
The contribution of total factor productivity to the Vietnamese economy 
is the lowest among the economies of the region; most of the growth has been 
contributed by investment and the increase of capital assets. Despite high 
economic growth in the last decade, Vietnam is still a low-income economy, 
with GDP per capita at US$835 in 2007. Vietnam aims to leave the ranks of 
low-income economies in 2009 by reaching US$960 (Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 2007). 
There is no doubt that Vietnam will soon become a middle-income country, 
but it remains an open question whether Vietnam can then overcome the so-called 
“middle-income trap,” which is also faced by other South East Asian countries 
such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and others. Crony capitalism and vested 
interests could produce low efficiency, a high income gap, financial instability, 
etc. The triad “miracle–nightmare– crisis,” which periodically affects these South 
East Asian economies, could be repeated in different forms in Vietnam. There 
is no guarantee yet that Vietnam’s economy is immune to this trap. It is obvious 
that such crony capitalism is hardly compatible with the socialist orientation.
The Vietnamese population increases by 1.1 million each year and will reach 86 
million in 2007. Moreover, the rapid increase of the population in the Mekong 
River Delta and in mountainous regions increases the burden on education 
and health care tremendously. This demographic pressure complicates the 
rapid improvement in wealth and human development as the following table 
illustrates:
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Table 9: World Ranking of Per Capita GDP 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Singapore 9 6 7 9 18 21 24 24 25
Hong Kong 14 14 17 19 15 15 19 23 26
Taiwan 30 31 33 32 33 35 37 39 41
South Korea 35 37 44 44 43 45 43 38 39
Malaysia 54 54 64 68 62 62 58 61 64
Thailand 69 72 79 82 81 83 84 82 85
Philippines 98 97 102 105 106 110 105 108 112
Indonesia 103 103 118 118 115 118 116 113 107
China 116 114 115 111 112 112 108 105 101
Vietnam 150 148 145 138 132 131 129 130 132
Source: The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 1999-2007.
Education3
Vietnam had a long tradition of valuing education. Article 59 of the Vietnamese 
constitution provides a clear statement: “Primary education is compulsory and 
free.” Under the centrally planned economy, education was generally free to 
university level, but access to universities was limited through selection exams. 
Health care was also free for those who could get access to public hospitals. 
Education and health care are considered the main pillars of the socialist 
orientation in the market economy of Vietnam.
The Government of Vietnam steadily increased the education budget by 27% 
per year, to 20% of total budget expenditures, equivalent to US$3.45 billion 
or 6% of GDP, in 2006 and to 22% of total budget expenditures in 2007. The 
following table shows the total expenditure on education in Vietnam in absolute 
terms and as a share of GDP, as well as government expenditure for education as 
a share of GDP.4
3See also Vu Quang Viet 2006 and www.thesaigontimes.com , World Bank, Vietnam Development 
Report 2005, 2007, and Harvard 2008.
4See Vu Quang Viet 2006 and www.thesaigontimes.com (December 2, 2008).
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Table 10: Education Financing in Vietnam in the Period between 2000-2005
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total education
expenditure in billion 
VND
23,219 25,882 34,088 37,552 54,223 68,968 
As a share of GDP (%) 5.3 5.4 6,4 6.1 7.6 8.3 
Gov’t budget expenditure 
for education as share of  
GDP
3.2 3.2 3,8 3.7 4.6 5.0
Source: Vu Quang Viet 2006.
Estimates indicate that the population must spend at least US$1.3 billion 
additionally, which is equivalent to 2.3% of GDP, for education (Vu Quang Viet 
2006). According to following comparison, Vietnam spends the highest share of 
GDP on education:
Table 11: Education Financing in Vietnam and Selected Economies
 Vietnam USA France Japan Korea OECD
  Total expenditure on 
education as share of 
GDP (%)
8.3 7.2 6.1 4.7 7.1 6.1
    From gov’t budget 5 5,3 5.7 3.5 4.2 4.9
     From the population 
and other sources 3.3 1.9 0.4 1.2 2.9 1.2
  Share of education 
expenditure (%)       
    From gov’t budget 60 74 93 74 59 80
     From population 
and other sources 40 26 7 26 41 20
Source: Vu Quang Viet 2006.             
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Since 2000, the government has intensified the so-called socialization of 
education, health care, cultural activities, etc. For the ordinary citizen, socialization 
has meant a greater financial contribution to education. Indeed, the press has 
reported on 30 to 100 items for which money is collected from the parents of 
students from kindergarten to university. The outcome is worrisome: families 
with many children can hardly afford to send all their children to school.  For 
example, for a primary school student in Hanoi, a parent must pay at least VND 
500,000 per month.5 With an average monthly income of VND 2.5 million, 
the parent could not send two children to school for twelve years, because the 
payment increases progressively with the level of the school class. 
Vietnam’s education record is poor and lags behind the regional average, 
despite the high level of education expenditure as a share of GDP. Only 12% of 
the population has completed 13 or more years of education. In the Mekong River 
Delta, 5.4% of the adult population are illiterate; 25.8% are literate, but could not 
finish their primary education (four years); 41% finished primary school; 16.4% 
finished their secondary education (eight years); 11.4% completed high school 
(twelve years) (Institute of Development and Strategy Studies 2006). Only 10% 
of Vietnam’s young people between 20 and 24 are able to attend university, while 
this ratio is 15% in China, 41% in Thailand, and 89% in Korea. 
The quality of education and training is below that required by the business 
community. Nearly all foreign investors have to invest in re-training of recruited 
staff (World Bank 2007a). According to the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, 
and Social Affairs (MoLISA), only 32% of the labor force have been trained and 
14.4% had only short-term (three months) training courses (MoLISA 2007). 
According to a survey by JETRO published in May 2007, an acute shortage 
of highly qualified workers in information technology, finance and banking, 
auditing, law, etc. has been reported by foreign investors.
Health Care System
Before 1975, Vietnam succeeded in establishing a three-tier (commune, local, 
and central) health care system, which operated efficiently during the war. 
Health care was generally free in all public health care centers, but depending 
on one’s position in the political system, the quality of health care was drastically 
different.
Given the low GDP per capita, the performance of Vietnam’s health care 
system, measured by childhood mortality and life expectancy, is relatively 
good. Between 2000 and 2005, the infant mortality rate declined from 36.7 per 
5See http://www.vietnamweek.net (December 30, 2007). 
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thousand to 17.8; the mortality rate for children under five fell from 42.0 to 27.5 
per thousand. Accordingly, life expectancy at birth increased from 67.8 to 71.3 
years (World Bank 2008).
In 2007, there were 1030 hospitals run by different levels of government 
and an additional 49 hospitals owned and operated by the private sector –  a 
total 16.3 beds for every 10,000 persons. There are now 200,000 health staff of 
all categories for 86 million Vietnamese. About 70% of the doctors working in 
private hospitals are employees in state-owned hospitals, too. The salaries of the 
publicly employed doctors are too low, around US$100-150 per month, which 
is under the subsistence level (World Bank 2007b). Public hospitals, especially 
well-known central clinics, are desperately over-crowded; two patients (or even 
more for children) must share a hospital bed, and family members must take care 
of the patients and must fight for reasonable service. This imbalance between 
demand and supply provides fertile soil for bribery and abuse of power by the 
hospital staff. Illness is one of the major causes of poverty or misery in Vietnam 
and is one of the most serious concerns of the population. 
Government health care spending constitutes 1.8% of GDP, while total health 
care spending reached 6.2% of GDP in 2006. This means that the patient and 
the family had to make payments equaling 4.4% of GDP, more than double 
government spending on health. Per capita health spending increased from 
US$25.4 in 2003 to US$45 in 2006, but the government pays only US$12 of that 
US$45 (World Bank 2008). 
The public hospitals in Vietnam receive their income from three different 
sources: the central or provincial budget, payments from patients and their family, 
and heath care insurance.  By 2000, around 60% of budget spending for health 
care was undertaken by provincial governments, leading to significant differences 
between better-off and poorer provinces. Most troublesome are the direct out-of-
pocket payments from patients to the hospital staff for quasi-legal or completely 
illegal fees: there are no norms or standards, no regulations, no receipts for 
these payments. According to various surveys, these payments comprise 30% of 
total household spending on health care, the remaining 70% is for medicines or 
technical charges for X-rays or scanning, etc. (World Bank 2008).
Health care insurance covered 25% of the population in 2004 and has now 
increased to around 40%. There are programs for free health care services for 
the poor, but considering the huge imbalance between demand and supply, the 
likelihood that the poor (non-paying patient) can access the same quality health 
services as the paying patient is quite small (World Bank 2007b). Vietnam’s health 
care system must be further reformed to implement the socialist orientation for 
the poor.
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Emerging issues in 2007
In 2007, the year that it began to implement its commitments to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Vietnam achieved a GDP growth rate of 8.44% 
and attracted US$20.25 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). Exports grew 
by 20.4% and reached US$48.5 billion, but imports grew by 35% and reached 
US$60.83 billion. The trade deficit reached a record high of US$12.45 billion, 
and the current account deficit rose to an alarming level. 
Figure 4: Trade and Current Account Balances
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2007, www.gso.gov.vn.
The high FDI inflow reflects the increasing expectation of foreign investors 
that the Government of Vietnam will implement the WTO commitments and 
the business environment in Vietnam will steadily improve. As the following 
graph shows, the disbursement of committed FDI is slowly increasing in absolute 
terms, but declining in relative terms, from around 90% in 2000 to 25% in 2007. 
The positive development is that more FDI is being attracted to central Vietnam 
than previously.
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Figure 5: FDI Commitments and Disbursements
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam 2007.
Inflation in 2007 was 12.6%, the highest in 20 years, negatively affect the living 
conditions of vulnerable groups of people. Especially the food price increase 
of16.8% has had a tangible impact on living conditions of the poor. The year 2007 
was typical in the sense that various social groups did not equally benefit from 
the high economic growth rate.
Figure 6: Components of Inflation in 2007
Source: General Statistics Office, www.gso.gov.vn.
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The external debt to GDP ratio reached 31% in 2007, but has declined again 
since then. As two-thirds of this debt is on highly concessional terms, the debt 
service to export ratio remained stable at 5%.
Figure 7: Vietnam’s External Debt
Source: International Monetary Fund 2007a, Country Report No. 07/387.
In 2007, Vietnam reduced 1800 different taxes, resulting in a relative decline 
of income from import tariffs, which was, however, over-compensated by the 
rapidly increasing trade volume.
Figure 8: Sources of Budget Revenues in 2006 and 2007
                         2006             2007
  
Source: Ministry of Finance of Vietnam, Budget Plan 2006 and 2007, www.mof.gov.vn.
PIT: personal income tax; CIT: corporate income tax.
!
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Budget revenue was relatively unaffected in the first year of WTO membership, 
but was still very dependent on crude oil, while the share of personal income tax 
as a means of income redistribution was very modest. The revenue from property 
rose by only 1%, not at all proportionately to the high increase in real estate prices 
of 10-40% (depending on location), and the real estate market grew strongly. 
The income gap widened in the first year of WTO membership: salaries for 
professionals in banking and securities soared by 60-80% (VND 6-7 million a 
month), while salaries for workers in the garments industry increased by 10% and 
net income of farmers in central Vietnam declined (MoLISA 2007).
Conclusion
Vietnam’s market economy with socialist orientation has many parallels 
and similarities to the concept, principles, and final aims of the social and 
ecological market economy of Germany. There are problems in the institutional 
arrangements and functions of both the market economy and the role of the state 
in Vietnam. Despite impressive economic growth and social progress, there are 
many crucial issues in education, health care, and environmental protection. 
As the preceding outline of emerging issues has indicated, the social and 
economic situation in Vietnam remains fragile. Vietnam is not yet immune 
to the trap of low wages or to the trap of middle-income economies. It is thus 
imperative that the reforms required to fully implement the market economy 
with socialist orientation be pushed quickly and decisively forward. 
Through efficient implementation of reforms to unfold the freedom, creativity, 
and dynamism of the Vietnamese people and by sustaining macroeconomic 
stability in a globalizing world, Vietnam will hopefully continue its progress in 
implementing a market economy with socialist orientation.
Le Dang Doanh  |  191
References
Communist Party of Vietnam. 1986, 1991, 2006. Documents of the National 
Party Congress in 1986, 1991, 2006, Party Program, Party Status (in Vietnamese). 
Hanoi: National Publishing House for Political Literature Su That.
Communist Party of Vietnam, the Central Commission for Internal Affairs. 
2005. “Report on Studies on Corruption in Vietnam” (in Vietnamese). Paper 
presented at a workshop in Hanoi on November 30, 2005. 
Dang Kim Son. 2007. “Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (IPSARD) Report at Tia Sang Seminar” (in Vietnamese). Hanoi, 
June 1, 2007, http://www.tiasang.com.vn.
Dang Phong, ed. 2002. Economic History of Vietnam, 1945-2000 (in Viet-
namese). Hanoi: Publishing House for Social Sciences, Hanoi.
Dasgupta, Susmita, Benoit Laplante, Craig Meisner, David Wheeler, and 
Jianping Yan. 2007. “The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis.” Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4136. February 2007.
The Economist. 2008. Pocket World in Figures 1999-2007. London: Economist 
Books.
General Statistics Office of Vietnam. 2007. “Internal Report to the Institute of 
Development Studies.” General Statistics Office, Hanoi.
Harvard University, John. F. Kennedy School of Government. 2008. “Success-ful 
Options” (in Vietnamese), January 2008.
Institute of Development and Strategy Studies. 2006. “Development Master 
Plan Report” (unpublished).
Institute of the Trade Union Vietnam. 2007. “Report on the Study on Strikes” 
(in Vietnamese). Paper presented at the workshop on August 14, 2007.
International Finance Corporation. 2007. Doing Business 2008. Washington DC: 
World Bank Publications.
192  |  Part 3  Partner Country Perspectives
International Monetary Fund. 2007a. Country Report No. 07/387. Hanoi: IMF, 
December 2007.
International Monetary Fund. 2007b. “Statement at the Consultative Group 
Meeting,” Hanoi, December 6-7, 2007.
Le Dang Doanh. 2007. “Vietnam’s Economy in 2007.” Saigon Economic Times, 
December 27 2007. 
Le Van Lan and Nguyen Dinh Cu. 2006. “Causes of Corruption in Vietnam at 
Present.” Paper presented at the Roundtable Discussion on Corruption in South 
East Asia, organized by GTZ and the Goethe Institute, Bangkok, March 3-4, 
2006.
Lopez-Claros, Augusto, Michael E. Porter, Klaus Schwab, and Xavier Sala-
i-Martin. 2006. Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, World Economic 
Forum. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs. 2007. “Report to the 
Consultative Group Meeting.” Hanoi, December 6-7, 2007.
Ministry of Planning and Investment. 2007. “Report to the Consultative Group 
Meeting.” Hanoi, December 6-7 2007.
Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index 2007, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
Tuong Lai. 2007. “Report to Institute of Development Studies Seminar” (in 
Vietnamese), Hanoi, January 4, 2007, http://www.vnids.com.
 
United Nations Development Program. 2007. “How Progressive is the Social 
Safety in Vietnam?” Hanoi, UNDP.
Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI) and Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce (VCCI) and Industry. 2005, 2006, 2007. Provincial Competitiveness 
Reports 2005, 2006, and 2007, http://pcivietnam.org/reports.php.
Le Dang Doanh  |  193
Vo Van Kiet. 2007. “Caution is needed by the establishment of state-owned 
conglomerates” (in Vietnamese), http://www.saigontimes.com.vn/tbktsg/detail.
asp?muc=216&sobao=867&sott=5.
Vu Quang Viet. 2006. “Education Financing in Vietnam” (in Vietnamese), www.
vnn.vn, (13.02.2006).
World Bank. 2005a. Investment Climate Survey. Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2005b. Vietnam Development Report. Hanoi: World Bank
World Bank. 2007a. “Taking Stock: An Update on Vietnam Economic 
Developments and Reforms.” Paper prepared by the World Bank for Consultative 
Group Meeting, Hanoi, December 6-7, 2007.
World Bank. 2007b. Vietnam Development Report. Hanoi: World Bank.
World Bank. 2008. Vietnam Development Report. Hanoi: World Bank.
194  |  Part 3  Partner Country Perspectives
Introduction
GTZ has been working in Thailand for almost 30 years. It has supported a 
number of technical cooperation projects addressing a wide range of issues. Since 
2004, GTZ has put all its technical cooperation efforts funded by the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) under 
a single program – the Thai-German Program for Enterprise Competitiveness 
(T-G PEC) – to create a singleness of purpose and a consistent approach. The goal 
of the T-G PEC is to improve the competitiveness of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the Thai agro-industry sector and, by doing so, to provide 
Thailand with an alternative approach to ensure prosperity for its citizens.
Thailand’s competitive advantage as a low wage country in the region is 
eroding. Many businesses are working with outdated production technologies 
that are both uncompetitive and environmentally unsustainable. The Thai 
government recognizes the problem and has assigned high policy priority to 
SMEs, in particular. However, the government’s SME promotion policies and 
programs are government-centric, subsidy oriented, and not demand driven. 
Promotion of environmentally friendly production methods is rarely integrated 
into SME promotion programs. If these problems persist, poverty alleviation and 
an improvement in living conditions will be difficult to achieve.
The alternative development approach that the T-G PEC is demonstrating 
focuses on improving the institutional environment for specific value chains1 in 
the Thai agro-industry sector, although the applicability of this approach is not 
limited only to the agro-industry sector. The agro-industry sector was chosen 
because it offers the greatest potential to extend the prosperity provided by 
Thailand’s rapid industrialization to the rural population, which is being left 
1The terms value chain and subsector are used interchangeably in the T-G PEC.
Significance of the Model for Thailand –
Role of the State, Constitutional Values, and 
Planning Models
Visoot Phongsathorn
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behind. More than 60% of Thais still live in rural areas. And more than two-thirds 
of this rural population is still engaged in agriculture, which produces a mere 10% 
of national income. In the other words, Thais working on farms are earning, on 
average, 85% less than their counterparts in the other economic sectors.
Adding value to agricultural products through environmentally sustainable 
industrial processes will contribute enormously to bridging the income gap 
between rural and urban Thais. Neither a laissez faire approach nor central 
planning is able to advance the Thai agro-industry sector. Only policies in line 
with a social market economy can do so. However, introducing social market 
economy ideals to Thailand is not without its complications. Thailand has its 
own institutional setting and its own constitutional values, results of a long 
evolutionary process.
This article will elaborate on some of these complications. First, it will lay out 
the institutional setting in Thailand. Then it will discuss how the T-G PEC is 
introducing social market economy ideals to Thailand and some of the difficulties 
that it is facing. Lastly, the article will describe two recent Thai economic models 
– “Thaksinomics” and “sufficiency economy.” Examining them may shed some 
light on the future of the social market economy in Thailand.
Institutional Setting
Thailand is a very hierarchical society. Giving is a great social virtue. The 
masses are kept poor. The elites enrich themselves. The elites maintain their 
spiritual prestige by way of giving either directly to the poor or indirectly through 
religious institutions. Being poor is deemed to be the result of lacking spiritual 
accomplishment. This ethos is very deep rooted.
At the height of the Angkorean kingdom in the twelfth century, a king 
portrayed himself as an embodiment of Avalokitesvara, a deity in Tantric 
Buddhism. Statues of Avalokitesvara built during Jayavarman VII’s reign bore 
a resemblance to himself. To project his love and care for his subjects, as he 
perceived that Avalokitesvara would, he built and supported 102 hospitals and 
101 rest houses for pilgrims. His self-glorifying projects laid a heavy burden on the 
state’s economy. By the end of his reign, the Khmer state was mortally weakened. 
The Thais, who adhered to Theravada Buddhism, did not accept the divinity of 
the Khmer king; they declared independence upon Jayavarman VII’s death in 
1218 and established their own state with Sukhothai as its capital. 
Having rejected the Khmer state’s hierarchical rule, the Thai state remained 
egalitarian for about a century. By the mid-fourteenth century, Ayutthaya rose as 
a new Thai polity in place of Sukhothai. Early Ayutthaya kings relied on Khmer 
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scholars of Lopburi, which had been the administrative center of the Khmer 
state for the Chao Phraya Basin. Khmer administrative and legal systems were 
re-adopted by the Thai state. 
Thailand’s ancien régime crystalized a century later under King Paramatrailokanat. 
The king consolidated centralized bureaucratic rule. Every stratum of the kingdom’s 
subjects was assigned to its appointed place in a bureaucratically organized and 
well-coordinated polity. State functionaries were allotted fixed areas of land in 
accordance with their rank and remuneration. Their lands were to be returned 
to the crown upon their death or dismissal. The commoners between 18 and 60 
were obligated to give three months of their time each year to cultivate the local 
lords’ lands or participate in public works.2 Local lords, in return, were to provide 
protection and legal representation for their subjects. State functionaries and 
monks were exempted from these corvée obligations.
State administration was divided into provincial and central administration. 
Major towns were ruled by the king’s sons. Minor ones were ruled by bureaucrats 
appointed by the king. Tributary states were self-administered. The king reserved 
the right to interfere with their internal affairs. They were expected to pay 
tributes and provide the king with corvée laborers and soldiers. The central 
administration was divided into a military and a civil administration, with the 
civil administration composed of four ministries. The Ministry of Finance was 
in charge of harbors and customs. The crown participated directly in trade. Most 
ships, excluding foreign vessels, were registered in the king’s name.
The regime lasted for the remainder of the Ayutthaya period and survived the 
sacking of Ayutthaya by the Burmese in 1767. Early Chakri kings still followed the 
regime set up by King Paramatrailokanat. Only the encroachment of the Western 
powers in the nineteenth century convinced the Chakri kings to change their 
ways; however, what followed was not democracy, but absolute monarchism and 
military dictatorship. 
Prior to the reforms, Thai kings were not lawmakers. The kings only enforced 
laws passed on to them from previous generations. The law was ultimately 
based on the Code of Manu.3 Occasional codifications of the law were done 
by Brahmans. A king’s conduct was governed by Rajashastra and Nitiprabani. 
King Rama V, however, influenced by Bodin and Hobbes, among others, saw it 
differently. In his own words, he described his authority as follows:
  “The sovereignty of the King of Siam is not prescribed in any law, 
for it is absolute and cannot be restrained by anything or anybody. 
2Corvée tax was later introduced in the early-seventeenth century.
3An ancient Hindu text that lays down the principles, laws, and rules governing society.
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Nevertheless, in reality, the King’s conduct must be in accordance with 
reason and equity.”
Despite its absolutist nature, King Rama V’s reform brought many positive 
changes. One of the most far reaching was the abolition of slavery and corvée 
labor service. Government officials were paid wages instead of being accorded 
temporary rights to the production and labor service of the inhabitants of parcels 
of land. The apparatus of the state became centrally administered. The judiciary 
became independent. Laws based on European models replaced ancient laws. A 
large number of students, including the sons of the king, were sent to study in 
Europe.
Absolute monarchism in Thailand was, however, short lived. It came to an end 
on June 24, 1932. A group of mid-ranking military officials carried out a bloodless 
coup ostensibly to introduce democracy and a constitutional monarchy.4 The 
country has since been dominated by the military. The written constitution has 
been, by and large, disregarded and was suspended 12 times in the past 75 years. 
Legal positivism5 reigns supreme. John Austin’s jurisprudence was introduced to 
Thailand by Prince Rabi, a son of Rama V. He studied law at Oxford in 1888-90. He 
opened a law school in 1897. The teaching of legal positivism as the authoritative 
school of legal thought remained unchallenged until the 1970s. Opening up the 
legal curriculum eventually bore results. Other schools of legal thought began 
to make inroads. Inspired by rechtsstaat,6 the judicial review of government 
decisions has become feasible since 1999. Nevertheless, the intellectual and moral 
dominance of legal positivism can still be clearly felt.
The encroachment of the Western powers and the associated treaties that 
opened up trade in the nineteenth century also brought about a commercial 
society. Rice became an important trade commodity. Rice trading created a new 
commercial class comprised mainly of Chinese migrants.7 Their commercial 
4The Great Depression created serious difficulties for the state’s finances. King Rama VII decided 
to cut salaries and lay off government officials. Discontent among the officials was also a major 
factor behind the coup.
5Legal positivism holds that the law is nothing but a command issued by the sovereign. The law 
owes its validity to neither religious principles nor judicial precedents.
6Rechtsstaat holds that the state must be subject to the law. Citizens must be furnished with a 
remedy for any violation of their legal rights. In practice, this means that citizens can bring court 
cases against their own government.
7Initially, most Thai commoners were still subject to slavery and corvée labor service, which were 
not completely abolished until six decades after the signing of treaties with the Western powers. 
Massive migration of Chinese to Southeast Asia was also fueled by political turmoil in China at 
the time.
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success made them the target of discrimination, which worsened significantly after 
the 1932 coup. Their opportunity came with World War II, which disrupted the 
trading activities run by European companies and allowed Chinese merchants to 
step into their place. Some made enormous fortunes. Plaek Pibulsonggram, the 
pre-war, anti-Chinese prime minister, was removed toward the end of the war for 
his allegiance to Japan. The business environment became friendlier for Chinese 
merchants. They began branching into manufacturing and banking. Four years 
after his removal, Plaek staged a coup and came back to power. To safeguard 
against discrimination, the Chinese merchants began inviting government 
officials to sit on the boards of their companies. In 1957, Plaek was removed by a 
coup, and Sarit Dhanaraj replaced him as prime minister.
Sarit’s rule marked the beginning of Thai corporatism. Under him, the 
National Economic Development Council was set up.8 With the help of the 
World Bank, the Council prepared and implemented a series of five-year plans. 
Import substitution was heavily promoted and tariff barriers were put up. A 
large number of internally traded items were put under price controls. Chinese 
merchants, enjoying the economic rents provided by these tariff barriers and 
price controls, deepened their close relationships with the government. The 
initially informal relationships finally turned formal: The Joint Government-
Business Committees were set up in 1981. The business sector was represented by 
the Federation of Thai Industries, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and the Thai 
Bankers Association. There were committees at both national and provincial 
levels. The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) acted 
as the secretariat for the National Committee.
The prominence of the committees came to end under the premiership of 
Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991). Chatichai pursued an export-oriented 
economic policy, fueled by the relocation of the Japanese manufacturing base 
that resulted from the massive yen appreciation after the Plaza Accord.9 Anand 
Panyarachun, the prime minister after Chatichai, dismantled most protectionist 
barriers and anti-market price controls. Without economic rents, the relationship 
between the Chinese business community and the government became less cozy. 
The influence of the business community on the government has been further 
counterweighted by the growing prominence of NGOs.
8The National Economic Development Council was transformed into the present-day National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which continues to draw up five-year plans 
today. 
9The value of the yen against the US dollar doubled over the two-year period after the Plaza 
Accord. Many industries in Japan became uncompetitive. Japanese companies responded by 
moving manufacturing facilities to countries with weaker currencies, such as Thailand.
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The relationship between the business community and the labor movement 
has also been hierarchical; they have never formed a close social partnership. 
Business owners have always relied on the government to deal with the labor 
movement. Initially, the government used force to deal with industrial actions. 
In the 1970s, the government began to cultivate labor leaders who were willing to 
ally themselves with the government. A number of labor organizations were set 
up under the government’s initiative.
In sum, the defunct Thai corporatism was a government-centric and 
authoritarian arrangement. The existence of a pluralistic and self-regulating 
corporatism is essential to the effective functioning of a social market economy, 
and the weakness of the pluralistic and self-regulating corporatism in Thailand 
is a major challenge for the T-G PEC’s efforts to enliven social market economy 
ideals in this country. This will be discussed in further detail below.
Thai-German Program for Enterprise Competitiveness
Following a program approach, the Thai-German Program for Enterprise 
Competitiveness has the flexibility to design its underlying projects when and as 
needed. The designs of the projects are driven by key performance results specified 
in the program proposal drawn up with GTZ support and accepted by BMZ. It 
is also driven by a set of guiding principles. These guiding principles are:
1) Make markets work.
2)  Improve business performance by improving framework conditions and the 
markets for relevant business services.
3)  Be results oriented and use value chains as units for measuring competitiveness 
results.10 and
4) Partners11 must make significant contributions to the projects.
The rationale behind the adoption of these principles and the complex 
implications of implementing them will be discussed next. Specific case examples 
will then follow.
10In other words, the impacts of the T-G PEC’s interventions must reach a significant percentage 
of SMEs in the value chains.
11The T-G PEC’s partners are from both the public sector and the private sector.
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Guiding Principles and their Complications
Make Markets Work
Ludwig Erhard expressed quite succinctly why we need to make markets work. 
In a crucial debate in the Bizonal Economic Council on June 17, 1948, he argued:
  “We must find our way back to a market organization free from controls. 
In place of interventionism, we must insist on personal responsibility and 
performance. The market is not a diabolic invention to subdue particular 
classes. On the contrary, it is the only organization of economic life which 
creates a just and optimal distribution, a function which no collectivist 
authorities can replace... we must eliminate uneconomic enterprises and 
cannot carry lame ducks indefinitely. Individual risk bearing must be 
rewarded, yet the penalties of mistakes cannot be shouldered by the 
community... Profitability must be restored in order to steer capital into 
the appropriate channels... Inflation must be squeezed out through strict 
monetary disciplines making the individual to run after money and not 
after goods. Only such policies will raise the national product and enable 
us to carry out our social responsibilities.”
Properly functioning markets not only “enable us to carry out our social 
responsibilities,” but also enable us to carry out our environmental responsibilities. 
Emissions trading is a well-known case in point. Less glamorous examples 
abound.12 This is why the social market economy principle of marktkonform is 
very important. Working against the market is not only anti-market; it is also 
anti-social and anti-ecological.
In Thailand, however, this principle is rather alien. Social responsibilities13 mean 
“giving” – and giving without regard to the impact on the functioning of the markets. 
Thais expect their governments to give, just as their ancestors depended on their 
sovereigns’ and overlords’ giving. If a cluster of small cottage-industry producers 
pollute the local watercourses, the government’s most likely reaction will be to give 
a wastewater treatment plant free of charge. What, therefore, is the incentive for the 
12Scavenging for recyclables is probably the least glamorous example. People scavenge garbage 
dumps because there are markets for recyclables. Still, the markets can be made more efficient and 
the practice less health hazardous. GTZ’s cooperation with a local government and the private 
sector in Thailand’s province of Phitsanulok is a case in point (see www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-
factsheet-solid-waste-management-thailand.pdf ).
13While the definition of  “social responsibilities” is still a subject of open debate, we can all agree 
that enabling others to carry out their own social responsibilities is socially responsible. On the 
contrary, hindering others from carrying out their social responsibilities is socially irresponsible.
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producers to connect to a wastewater collection system, or even take responsibility 
for their own waste? Who will bear the costs of running and upgrading the plant? 
These are the kind of questions that often slip Thai government officials’ minds. The 
small producers do not care one way or the other. They often accept that polluting 
the local watercourse is bad. But what can they do? They think of themselves as 
poor and incapable of dealing with the problem.
Business Environments14
All, however, is not lost. Not all cases of giving are bad. There are cases where 
giving can make markets work better. The givers, however, need to be clear in 
their own minds which weaknesses in the markets they are trying to fix. First, they 
need to understand what a market is. A market is not just buyers and sellers. All 
markets operate within their specific business environments. On the one hand, 
there are framework conditions that govern all transactions. These framework 
conditions can be formal or informal. They can be explicit or implicit. They can 
affect supply and demand in a dramatic way. At the same time, there are services 
that make transactions affordable or, in some extreme cases, possible. Telephone 
directories and telephone services are obvious examples. Unlike phone calls, 
many services are not generic. Some are even specific to individual value chains 
and not marketable elsewhere.
Figure 1: Elements of a Market14
Source: Springfield Center, modified using GTZ terminology
14Within GTZ, another commonly used term of an equivalent meaning is meso level or mesoebene.
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When a giver, be it a national government or an international development 
agency, decides to give to a market, it can give directly to the buyers for their 
immediate usage or directly to the sellers to lower their prices, even to zero. But 
what impact will that make? Most likely the market will be distorted. When the 
giver stops giving, what the buyers need will no longer be available at the price 
that most of them can afford. Nevertheless, there are cases of increasing returns 
to scale where initial subsidies can be beneficial to the markets. Except for such 
exceptional cases, the givers should focus on making changes to the framework 
conditions or the service markets or both, in such a way that the core market 
functions better. This approach follows the social market economy principle of 
ordnungspolitik and takes it one step further.15 
Walter Eucken’s position on framework conditions or wettbewerbsordnung, as 
he called it, still serves as a good guide for anyone working in this area. Eucken 
asserted that framework conditions for a properly functioning market must 
comply with the following constituent principles:
• Prices must be free from any controls.
•  The freedom of contract must be safeguarded by the government, as must 
the sanctity of contract.
•  Markets must be open. New entrants must be able to enter the market. 
Existing competitors must be free to leave the market. No one should have 
the power to prevent market mobility – neither the government nor the 
dominant player in the market.
•  Private property is inalienable. Ownership must come with responsibilities. 
All social and environmental costs should be internalized to the greatest 
extent practical.
• Policies must be reasonably constant.
• The currency must be stable.
Following Eucken’s advice in this regard presents a major challenge for anyone 
working on market framework conditions in Thailand. Over 200 products are 
still subject to price controls. The concept of private property is weak. Private 
properties are protected against outright expropriation, but, owners have no 
remedy if the usefulness or value of their properties is undermined by actions of 
the government, except in some rare and specific cases. In a way, the spirit of the 
old landholding rights from the days before passage of the Civil and Commercial 
Code in 1925 is still alive. Lastly, there is no constancy of policies. Policies can 
15When the principle was conceived, transaction cost economics was not as well developed as it  
is now.
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change at the whim of not only elected policy makers16 but also unelected 
bureaucrats. Public consultation is now being encouraged but, in most cases, not 
required. 
On the positive side, almost all markets are open. New products and new 
services can be introduced by new providers most of the time without any 
consent from the government. This is very important to the T-G PEC, as one of 
its main tasks is to promote new services to help the Thai agro-industry sector to 
be competitive. Another positive factor is that the government has no intention 
of using inflation to facilitate its deficit spending. Nevertheless, the currency 
has been mishandled occasionally. The last time was in December 2006, but its 
impact was not as devastating as in 1997.
Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity goes beyond federalism. At its core is respect for human dignity. 
Institutions, whether they be the government, the market, the community, 
membership organizations, or other types of institutions, exist only to allow 
persons to realize their full humanity. In other words, they exist to serve human 
beings.17 The choice of an institution’s form should be made with the people to 
be served at its heart. Subsidiarity and ordnungspolitik go hand in hand. On 
the one hand, whatever institutional form is chosen, all institutions need well-
ordered institutional environments in which to operate. On the other hand, 
the maintenance of specific institutional environments should be in the hands 
of the bodies that are best suited to do so. Self-regulation can be effective and 
efficient, but self-regulation is only possible in the context of strong pluralistic 
corporatism. Self-regulation does not mean that the government has no role. 
Self-regulation requires a strong super-ordinate regulatory regime administered 
by the government. Without this, corporative bodies would turn themselves into 
cartels. They would use regulations to unduly limit competition by blocking new 
entrants from the market.
Subsidiarity drives the way the T-G PEC implements its program. Prior to 
starting any project, value chain analyses are conducted. All the key players in 
the value chains are identified. So are the key constraints and opportunities in 
the value chains. Next, the T-G PEC considers what changes in the framework 
16Thailand has changed its prime minister 20 times in the last 50 years.
17The term subsidiarity was coined by Pope Pius XI. He used it in the encyclical Quadragesimo 
Anno to designate the principle that social and political institutions only existed to serve human 
beings, either directly or indirectly, through other institutions. The encyclical was ghost-authored 
for the Italian Pope by Oswald von Nell-Breuning, a German Jesuit.
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conditions and service markets serving the value chains are needed to unlock 
the constraints or capitalize on the opportunities. The potential owners of these 
changes are identified and engaged in discussion. Willingness to contribute to 
the changes is the crucial test of the commitment of potential partners to the 
issues at hand. In this way, the T-G PEC is able to identify the institutions that 
will be responsible for improving business environments. The last step before 
implementation of the project is formulation of the project plan with clear 
exit strategies to ensure the sustainability of the changes beyond the life of the 
project.
The main challenges that the T-G PEC is facing here are twofold. On the one 
hand, the government often feels that it is its duty to improve the competitiveness 
of the value chains. It sees its role as that of giver, as discussed above. On the other 
hand, Thai corporative bodies are very weak. Business and labor organizations 
have been set up mainly to work with the government, not with each other. Value-
chain-level business organizations are often poorly managed. It is not unusual to 
find a business organization being managed by just one of its members, who uses 
his or her own company as the secretariat of the organization.  Consequently, the 
state has locked itself into the role of giver and is not an enabler, and the private 
sector is encouraged to be a passive and grateful recipient, as opposed to being a 
confident, active, and efficient producer for a dynamic market.
Case Examples
Palm Oil Industry
Palm oil is the second most consumed vegetable oil globally; current production 
of palm oil is 32 million metric tons, and its market share is 29% (compared to 30% 
for soybean oil). It is also the most traded edible oil, with a global market share of 
56%. Historically, palm oil has enjoyed the fastest growth of all major vegetable oil 
products. Globally, the palm oil market has been growing at the rate of 8% a year 
compared to 4% for the overall vegetable oil market. However, Thailand hardly 
participates in the global market; it has a market share of only 3%.
The Thailand palm oil industry is protected: the average price of crude palm 
oil (CPO) in Thailand is 12% higher than in neighboring Malaysia. Inefficiency 
spans across the entire value chain. The production cost of oil palm fruit is 29% 
higher than in Malaysia, due principally to poor farm management by its 67,000 
smallholders. The oil extraction rate is 25% lower, due to poor harvesting and 
post-harvest handling practices. Overall, both oil palm growers and palm oil 
millers in Thailand are making less money than their counterparts in Malaysia. 
The government’s response to the situation is rather amazing: It announced that it 
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would promote an expansion of oil palm cultivation from the current 0.3 million 
hectares to 1.3 million hectares. It planned to absorb the increased production 
by promoting the use of bio-diesel through preferential tax treatment. After a 
change in government in 2006, the idea of importing bio-diesel from Malaysia 
instead of producing it locally was floated and received strong opposition from 
the industry. Only one shipment of 60,000 tons was allowed to be imported.
The T-G PEC believes that for the Thai palm oil industry to be able to develop 
downstream processing, including bio-diesel and oleochemicals, it needs to reduce 
the cost of CPO to the same level as in Malaysia. This can only happen if oil palm 
growers can deliver better oil palm fruit to the mills at a lower price. Oil palm 
plantations in Thailand are not as well managed as those in Malaysia. Plantations 
in Malaysia are very large and managed by big companies with all the necessary 
know-how and supporting technological facilities. Plantations in Thailand are 
owned and managed by smallholders who lack know-how and laboratories. The 
solutions for the Thai palm oil industry lie in the service markets – the market for 
training and the market for soil and leaf testing. Mills are willing to buy training 
services for the growers supplying them. Each mill has very few competing buyers 
of oil palm fruit, as it cannot be transported very far before it become rancid.
A team of university professors developed the training course with the 
assistance of T-G PEC. The professors have been providing consultancy services 
to one of the very few big plantations in Thailand, to provide them with practical 
know-how. But, they did have the ability to train small farmers with limited 
education. The T-G PEC  arranged experts in micro-enterprise training to help 
them tailor courses for small farmers. Once the growers understood the benefit 
of soil and leaf analysis, they were willing to buy the service. The T-G PEC also 
helped  a mill upgrade the equipment and management of its defunct laboratory 
to the level where its services could be sold. Simple as it may sound, this will 
help lower the cost of CPO at participating mills close to Malaysia within two 
years’ time. All this operates against the backdrop of the free training and free soil 
analysis offered by the government, but not utilized by the growers. That which is 
free frequently has no value!
This is one of many projects that the T-G PEC is carrying out in the palm oil 
industry. 
Fruit and Vegetables
Thailand is growing and exporting a large variety of fruits. Longan is one of 
the most interesting examples, both for its taste and for its politics. It is one of the 
few products that still requires export permits. China is by far the largest buyer 
of longan, purchasing half of the fresh longan exported and three-quarters of the 
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dehydrated longan exported. The import market in China is highly concentrated. 
Importers buy from only a few exporters. This causes the export market on the 
Thai side to be highly concentrated as well. Growers have always complained about 
manipulations in the market. They allege that the exporters and the government 
officials handling export procedures have been intentionally causing occasional 
gluts and shortages of longan by manipulating the timing of export permit issuance. 
Whether this is true or not, longan is a fruit that is naturally prone to gluts and 
shortages due to its seasonality: almost all longan is harvested between July and 
September. The government’s usual response to the problem has been to step in and 
buy longan at above-market prices. This has led to a worsening of the oversupply 
and a larger price-support scheme. It took a major corruption scandal to stop the 
price-support scheme, but export permits are still required.
It does not take much to break a cartel. In case of an oligopsonistic cartel such 
as this one, falling supply, increasing demand, or the entry of non-cartel buyers 
with significant buying volume will break the cartel. The T-G PEC is therefore 
promoting a market for pruning services and adoption of a GLOBALGAP 
standard for fresh fruit and vegetables. Pruning longan trees will reduce overall 
production, but increase the yield of larger, better-priced longan. GLOBALGAP 
certification will expand longan markets in Europe from the ethnic market to the 
retail chain market, where volume is potentially much larger. The promotion of 
a production standard is a rather complex undertaking and cannot be explained 
here in its entirety. But it is important to point out that GLOBALGAP is 
owned by its members, who are buyers and producers of agricultural products, 
and is administered by a nonprofit private sector organization. By promoting its 
adoption in Thailand, the T-G PEC is working with the Thai Fruit and Vegetable 
Producer Association and the Thai Chamber of Commerce as the standard owner 
and administrator, while keeping the Thai government informed. This is a clear 
example of the subsidiarity principle in action.
In both cases, the goal is to stimulate private actors to take on the role of “social 
entrepreneurs” in order to create changes in business environments and introduce 
services that will close the efficiency gap between them and their competitors. 
Recent Economic Models in Thailand
The year 1997 marked another major point in Thai economic history. The baht 
collapsed, and the economic bubble burst; the International Monetary Fund led 
a rescue mission. Thailand moved from a currency regime that pegged the baht to 
a basket of currencies weighted heavily towards the US dollar to one of inflation 
targeting. The baht was allowed to float freely. The government also introduced 
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an austerity program and a package of laws to further liberalize the economy. A 
new Competition Act and a new Pricing Act were promulgated. The number of 
products under price controls came down to 16.
The austerity program proved immensely unpopular with the local populace. 
In 2002, Thaksin Shinawatra came to power promising to stimulate the economy. 
His economic policy was later branded as “Thaksinomics.” Thaksinomics is a 
combination of grassroots economic stimulation, a Japanese MITI-style industrial 
policy, heavy investment in infrastructure projects, and bilateral trade promotion. 
The “Bht 30 Healthcare Program,” village funds, farm debt relief, and One Tambon 
One Product made up the cornerstones of his grassroots economic package. 
•  Healthcare was made available at Bht 3018 per visit to all those not covered 
by social security. Farmers, who make up over 40% of the labor force, are 
outside the formal employment arrangement and therefore outside the 
coverage of social security. Given their low income, healthcare expenditures 
can be quite burdensome. 
•  A micro-credit scheme was set up in each of the country’s nearly 80,000 
villages with an endowment of Bht 1 million19 per fund. Loan amounts were 
capped at Bht 20,000 per loan.20 Over 5 million people took out loans from 
the funds. The funds are supposed to be managed by the people within the 
village.  At first, young university graduates were hired and trained to be 
advisors to the villagers. Over time, the quality of credit management has not 
been maintained across the board. Some funds are still very well managed, 
while a large number of them have delinquency rates of over 50%.
•  Debt restructuring with a three-year repayment grace period and sometimes 
with debt reduction was offered to farmers. The offer was terminated in 
2004 after 2.4 million farmers had participated in the program. The total 
amount restructured was Bht 94 billion.21
•  The One Tambon22 One Product (OTOP) program was modeled after 
the successful OVOP Movement in Japan. The idea was to have local 
communities develop local specialty products that could be sold at a 
premium. The implementation in Thailand was overly ambitious. Around 
36,000 OTOP groups were created in less than five years.
18Approximately €0.60.
19Approximately €20,000.
20Approximately €400.
21Approximately €2 billion.
22A tambon is roughly equivalent to a civil parish in England. Each tambon covers 10-20 villages.
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Thaksin’s style of governance, which he billed as “CEO style,” was very 
interventionist. He pushed to see results in a very short period, without much 
regard to the means of achieving such results.23 The funding of the above-
mentioned programs was partly off-budget; they are still being fiscalized.
Under Thaksin, Thailand’s competition policy suffered. The Competition Act 
was never enforced. Over 200 products were put back under price controls. The 
WTO process was by and large disregarded. The government opted for preferential 
bilateral trade arrangements, euphemistically billed as “free trade agreements.”
Thaksin was ousted by a coup on September 26, 2006. The government 
appointed by the incoming junta needed to come up with a rallying cry that 
could rival Thaksinomics, which was still very popular among the rural populace. 
They chose “sufficiency economy” – a philosophy that has been advocated by 
the present king for a number of decades. The government heavily promoted a 
large number of sufficiency economy projects around the country. These projects 
amounted to no more than small-scale integrated polyculture farming with a bit 
of puritanical Buddhist ethics thrown in. The king’s philosophy is, however, much 
more than that. The king stresses that large-scale undertakings are not against his 
philosophy; he often uses the 785 million cubic meter Pasak Jolsit Dam, which 
could not have been built without his moral support, as a prime example. He also 
stresses that the possession of luxury goods is not against the sufficiency economy 
philosophy, so long as the goods are not ill-gotten. 
It is not possible to say what precisely the sufficiency economy philosophy 
is. The king has never put his thoughts into one single treatise. There have been 
several attempts by scholars to distill the king’s thought from a large number of 
his speeches, but these attempts have not been entirely satisfactory. There are a 
number of claims about features of the sufficiency economy in these works, but 
these cannot be attributed directly to the king’s speeches. This does not mean that 
these features contradict the king’s thoughts. Whether or not they do, only the 
king knows, and he does not often contradict other people in public. Moderation, 
prudence, and not being destitute are the only features of the sufficiency economy 
that he has personally laid out.
Thaksinomics and the sufficiency economy philosophy show that there is 
growing concern for the well-being of less-well-off members of society. Rapid 
growth and industrialization have greatly benefited those who can participate. 
The number is not small: tens of millions of Thais now have a very high standard of 
23The epitome of his style of governance was his war on drugs, where almost 3,000 people were 
shot dead in a space of a few months. Most of the incidents were extrajudicial executions. Only 
one case was brought to court.
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living. But tens of millions are also being left behind. These two economic models 
try to tackle this same problem in their different ways. Both have their weaknesses. 
Thaksinomics’ grassroot economic package could be much strengthened if it were 
grounded in the principles of the social market economy, namely: marktkonform, 
ordnungspolitik, and subsidiarity. The sufficiency economy philosophy, on the 
other hand, focuses exclusively on consumption and production. How the 
philosophy is applied to exchange has not been elaborated lucidly. The sufficiency 
economy philosophy may be able to draw from the social market economy with 
its emphasis on the market’s central role to enable social progress when guided by 
the right principles and rules. Both Thaksinomics and the sufficiency economy 
philosophy share a common strength: both aim to empower the disenfranchised 
so that they can become more prosperous by participating in the modern market 
– which will also make the Thai market economy more social.
Ways Forward
The T-G PEC is the last Thai-German technical cooperation funded by BMZ. 
The funding is foreseen to end in 2011. Thailand is graduating from the ranks of 
developing countries. Thai-German technical cooperation will have to enter into 
a dramatically different phase. A few modes of funding have been explored. One 
of the more likely possibilities is trilateral cooperation whereby Germany and 
Thailand work side by side to provide technical cooperation to a third country. 
GTZ would be working on the German government’s behalf. A variation of 
this is trilateral cooperation in which Thailand’s donor partner is a multilateral 
agency. The Thai government has been interested in technical cooperation with 
less developed countries. Thailand is currently working with Lesotho on the 
sufficiency economy philosophy and with Tanzania on rain making. Officials 
from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guatemala, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste also came 
for week-long visits to Thailand at the invitation of the government to study 
development projects in Thailand. 
In the technical cooperation game, Thailand is very much a novice donor. It 
has no established system and procedures to efficiently and effectively implement 
technical cooperation. It will soon realize that working alongside established 
players like Germany will provide it with valuable on-the-job training. For 
Germany, this will be an opportunity to convey the social market economy 
ideals to Thailand in a potentially more favorable environment. Most professors 
learn new ideas when they are teaching their students. Both Thaksinomics and 
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sufficiency economy can be developed to their full potential if they draw from 
the social market economy.
Developing a social market economy is more than getting the macro economic 
“levers” –interest rates, currency rates, and fiscal prudence – to function; it 
involves allowing markets to operate in a way that encourages the emergence of 
entrepreneurs from all classes of society. In principle, it is a meritocracy. Thailand 
has done well in achieving greater economic growth in the past two decades, so 
that many millions have found a way out of poverty.  This effect, however, was 
a byproduct of growth. It was not the aim of this economic policy.  To build 
up a more mature economic policy founded on the philosophy of “growth with 
equity,” Thailand has played with a few variations of its own. But, because they 
have not been rooted in a culture that rewards “tough love” or in a re-definition 
of the relationship between Thailand’s state and its people, these experiments 
have been short lived and far from successful. Is there a way out?  Certainly, but 
that is the subject of another article!
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Rolf Sülzer1
Introducing the Setting
Asia is the fastest developing continent in the world today. Rapid growth and 
rising inequality, among other divides, are proceeding hand in hand, diminishing 
further the potential for rapid poverty reduction on the basis of pro-poor growth 
or shared growth, called “inclusive growth” in India – the hallmark of the upcoming 
11th Five-Year Plan for 2007 to 2012.2 India is recognizing that it has “failed to provide 
a comprehensive national scheme in order to protect 93% of its workforce”3 of 
about 400 million4 workers. These 93% or about 370 million unorganized workers 
contribute about 60% of Indian gross domestic product. Despite this overwhelming 
importance for the national product, economists, using economic terms, often refer 
to these workers – the backbone of rural and urban India – as the “residual sector.”
In the Indian context, the term social security encompasses social assistance, 
social safety nets, social insurance, micro-insurance or “insurance for the poor,” 
social protection, and any other preventive, promotional or protective measures.5 
1The author is grateful for the overviews, synopsis of schemes, and insights into the actual debate 
provided to GTZ India by the consulting  company Diaspora – Social Development Consultants, 
New Delhi, who undertook a great deal of background research for this article.
2The comprehensive 11th Plan is still under discussion; however, the following document is available: 
Government of India, Planning Commission, Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth.  An 
Approach to the 11th Five-Year Plan Government of India, New Delhi, December 2006.
3Mridula Ghai, “The Coverage Gap: Informal Labor Markets in the Developing World with 
Special Reference to India,” (paper read at the 5th International Research Conference on Social 
Security, Warsaw, March 5-7, 2007).
4Figures related to the workforce in India and the unorganized sector are quoted from  
S. Sakthivel and  Pinaki Joddar, “Unorganized Sector Workforce in India: Trends, Patterns, and 
Social Security Coverage,” Economic and Political Weekly (May 27, 2006): 2107-2114.
5Uday Kumar Varma, “Social Security for Unorganized Sector – Some Issues,” (paper read at 
the Seminar on Social Security for Workers in the Unorganized Sector, Shri Ram Centre for 
Industrial Relations and Human Resources, New Delhi, November 25-26, 2004).
Social Security in India - A System  
in the Making
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Despite the broad coverage of the term social security in India, the policy is not 
coherent, and “spending” on these measures is extremely low and extremely 
scattered, if not paltry, as will be outlined below. According to the World Labor 
Report 2000, public expenditure on social security in India is 1.8% of GDP, 
against 4.7% in Sri Lanka, or 3.6% in China. In view of the interesting social 
assistance programs emerging in rural China, India and China recently (October 
2007) renewed the memorandum of understanding of September 26, 2000 on 
broadening exchange and extending cooperation in the field of employment, 
vocational training, and social security for another three years.6 
At the same time, in a multi-polar approach, India is discussing and exchanging 
views on social security issues with institutions in Europe and in the Americas. 
Especially the discussions with European institutions give rise to the question 
if Europeans and Germans will ever fully comprehend the dimensions of social 
security in India and the meaning of the terms unorganized workers, unorganized 
sector, or informal sector as commonly used in India’s debate.  We would have to 
go back more than 150 years in our history to find a remotely similar situation – 
when the majority of workers in Germany were working as day laborers without 
any formal contract with their “employer,” as some 370 million Indian workers 
are doing today – or working as bonded laborers (that is precisely what more 
than 2.6 million Indian workers7 are still today). 
The terms unorganized sector workers, informal sector workers, or residual sector 
workers hide the fact that these individuals have almost no legally enforceable 
rights vis-à-vis their  “employers,” have almost no voice in their dependency on 
employers and, more often than not, on money lenders or landlords, have no 
direct contractual relationship with the employer, and depend largely on charity 
for “social security measures” through social assistance that is granted but not a 
legal entitlement. 
On the eve of independence, 60 years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru in his famous 
“Tryst with Destiny” speech stressed the creation of “social, economic, and 
political institutions which will ensure justice and fullness of life to every man 
and woman.” These objectives have been embodied in the Constitution of India: 
The Directive Principles of the constitution direct that “the State shall strive to 
promote […] a social order in which justice, social, economic, and political, shall 
inform all the institutions of the national life” and, in particular, shall ensure 
“that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means 
6Signed by Chinese Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Security, Wang Dongjin, and Union Labor 
and Employment Secretary, K.M. Sahani.
7Government of India, Report of the National Commission on Rural Labor, New Delhi, 1991.
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of livelihood.” This was a visionary statement that could have led to the model of 
a social market economy. It was however never realized, as the social programs in 
India developed rather late and became charities. The predominant provider of 
social security until today remains the family.
It is extremely difficult to imagine the living conditions and the resulting 
resilient attitude of the urban and rural poor who form the majority of people in 
the unorganized sector – many of them living “below the poverty line” (BPL – a 
famous term in Indian social assistance programs).8 The Government of India has 
defined the poor as those who do not get the minimum required daily calorie intake 
of 2400 (rural) or 2100 (urban) Kcal per capita per day. In order to get the minimum 
food to obtain these calories, the estimated income requirement is Rs. 229 or Rs. 264, 
respectively, per capita per month at 1993-94 prices – that is an income of at least Rs. 
1150 (rural) or Rs.1300 (urban) per month for a family of five.9 Those who have less 
are considered to be living below the poverty line – though highly segregated into 
four strata: 2% of poor households, having no earning family member, are classified as 
destitute, 14% as paupers, 38% as very poor, and 46% as poor. And one has to recognize 
that those rural and urban households above the poverty line are by no means rich. 
The majority of workers in the unorganized sector living above the poverty line are 
surviving on an annual household income of Rs.13,000 to Rs. 20,000 – and at any 
time, catastrophic spending can push them below the poverty line.10
India, the World, and the Differences
India of today fascinates the world and makes headlines every day. It is growing 
stronger internationally, but this is very deceptive, as India simultaneously occupies 
what are almost parallel universes – three or four different centuries in numerous 
8According to international statistics, over 300 million people in India live in extreme poverty on 
less than US$1 a day, and over 500 million on less than US$2 a day. Only half of the population 
has access to piped water, and most health services (in fact about 92%) are paid for out of pocket, 
making India’s health system the biggest private health service in the world. 
9Rs. 1300 cash income per month for the average family of five persons equals about US$26 per 
month. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), this US$26 equals about US$156 a month for 
a family of five in the USA or about €106 for a family of five in the euro zone, the PPP conversion 
factor between US and India being 6.  In some international publications, the PPP conversion 
factor between the USA and India is between 4 and 6, depending on the formula being used and 
data availability and reliability in averaging prices from all over India, with its huge differences. 
10Vivid details about this issue and living conditions can be found in the article of Ghanshyam 
Shah, “Poverty Alleviation Programs in India,” in Contemporary India – Transitions, ed. Peter 
Ronald de Souza  (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), 150-172.
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stages of development.11 For decades it was believed that industrialization, 
modernization, and development would come about through investing in state-
owned heavy industries and by isolating the Indian market through protective 
measures; India today is clearly moving away from the earlier model of import-
substitution towards deregulation and export-promotion, swiftly adding the 
manufacturing sector to the already famous service industry/information 
technology sector. The messages in all these trends and developments seem to be 
clear: the frontiers of the public sector will recede, the private sector will become 
the engine of economic growth,12 and the question will arise whether the welfare 
state will continue to be the guiding model or whether “social security” and “social 
safety nets” will be left to the private sector and the few (approx. 27 million or 
7% of the total workforce) organized sector workers, who enjoy the benefits of 
secure jobs, price-adjusted salaries, sufficient and reliable access to multiple social 
security instruments, and protection under the law against loss or stoppage of 
income on account of illness, disability, maternity, old age, or death.13
Whereas in industrialized countries the controversy over how growth and the 
welfare state relate has intensified over the last two decades, the question is just 
emerging in India. Many economists, also in India, argue that globalization is 
making the welfare state unaffordable, citing conflicting goals of social justice 
and economic efficiency. On the other hand, one sees a worldwide trend of 
disintegrating traditional informal systems of social safety nets (families, social 
relations), so that the need for reliable and accessible social security systems is 
becoming even greater. 
The debates on these subjects are often not well grounded in empirical evidence 
and tend to mute the historically crucial role of coherent social welfare policies in 
boosting growth by:
•  compensating for negative effects of private sector developments (liquidation 
of companies, downsizing, exploitation of workers, etc.); 
11The Department for International Development (UK) published its strategic development 
program with India under the title “Ending Poverty in India: Consultation on DFID’s Plan for 
Working with Three Indias.” The three Indias are global India, developing India, and the poorest 
India.
12The issues of democracy, a free market system, and globalization are debated in the article of S.S. 
Bhandare, “Economic Progress: Industrialization, and Globalization,” in Contemporary India – 
Transitions, ed. Peter Ronald de Souza (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), 75-107.
13D. Rajasekhar, “Social Security in India,” (paper presented to the International Conference on 
Social Security Systems in Developing and Newly Industrializing Countries, Germany, September 
18-19, 2007).  Mimeo: ISEC Centre for Decentralization and Development, Bangalore, 2007.
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•  cushioning structural changes when whole sectors disappear from a country’s 
economy;
•  promoting human capital accumulation, the true essence of growth; 
andsharing and covering risks, thus enabling individuals and groups to turn 
to otherwise “risky” opportunities. 14 
In India today, one needs a strong orientation and a good compass in order not to 
go astray in the diversity and complexity of the simultaneously existing, distinctly 
different realities. For the author of this article, the Prime Minister of India, Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, provided the compass in his inspiring inauguration address to 
the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM, 2005-2012) on April 12, 2005. He 
emphasized the social reform agenda by stressing the point that India has “devised 
a system that fragments resources” – a situation that has to be overcome. 
Taking a closer look into the realities of fragmentation (numerous programs of 
different ministries at the union and state levels – literally hundreds of programs 
in the realm of social security or the social safety net in general), one realizes that 
in each of these numerous fragments only a fraction can and do benefit, only a 
fraction is aware of these programs, and only a fraction finally has access to these 
programs, and this again differs from region to region, from pocket to pocket.
An indicative, very detailed analysis was provided by a survey of 1356 sample 
households in the states of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka, on the outreach 
and effectiveness of various safety net programs. The survey demonstrated a variance in 
program access by intended beneficiaries (targeted families) between 10% and 70%.15 
A further illustration of the often very limited coverage is given by D. 
Rajasekhar in this publication, citing the case of the national old age pension 
scheme implemented in the state of Karnataka, which has a population of about 
53 million. The amount of old age pension, which was only very recently adjusted 
from Rs. 75 per month to Rs. 200 per month,16 was originally made available 
to about 800,000 persons in the year 1996-1997. It declined steeply thereafter. 
The reason for this decline was that financial constraints17 compelled the state 
14See Michael von Hauff, “Growing Safely,” D+C Development and Cooperation  (November 
2006): 408-410,  for a more detailed discussion.
15S. Mahendra Dev, K. Subbarao, S. Galab, and C. Ravi, “Safety Net Programs: Outreach and 
Effectiveness,” Economic and Political Weekly (September 1, 2007): 3555-3566.
16One has to imagine what Rs. 200 per month will pay for in a couple of years even under a 
modest inflation rate of around 5% to 8% a year.
17In budget debates around the world, these are generally given as “neutral” facts, rather than 
admitting that priorities for spending lie elsewhere.
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government to tighten the eligibility criteria by restricting old age pensions to 
only the destitute (see above) among BPL households and thus excluding a large 
number of unorganized workers living in vulnerable conditions. 
This anecdotal evidence and citations from empirical studies are glimpses 
that allow one to more easily follow the more abstract, generalized discussion of 
social security issues in India below, in which inequality, denial of access, severe 
problems of service delivery, and high delivery costs as well as highly fragmented 
social security systems are discussed.
Key Areas of Social Security in India – The Context
Social security systems are a critical part of the public policy of any country and 
its development agenda. Policies are crucially linked with the country’s economic 
growth and human development. It is not just the “welfarism” of a nation being 
displayed by its social security system; it is also a performance and governance 
index of the state as a whole and of its mechanisms and ability to delivery well-
being to the poor, the marginalized, and the vulnerable. 
The Indian Minister of Finance P. Chidambaran recently “admitted that the 
performance of the United Progressive Alliance government was below expectation 
on two fronts. One was its inability thus far in pushing ahead with further reforms in 
financial services, especially in banking, pension, and insurance. The other was the 
failure to improve the delivery mechanism for the social security programs. […] for 
the setback in social security programs, he blamed the rigidity of the bureaucracy, 
which still remained a hurdle in achieving inclusive growth.”18 
Furthermore, observers of contemporary Indian polity attribute the continued 
deterioration of India’s public sector – yet to be an important and reliable 
deliverer of social assistance and social security programs – “to the failure of 
accountability mechanisms in current governance structures. […] In a country 
such as India, where the poor rely on the state for basic survival and protection, 
the consequences of weak accountability are particularly debilitating. In the 
absence of accountability mechanisms, the poor are unable to interact, influence, 
or exercise enforceability upon the state (outside of electoral politics). Thus when 
government teachers and doctors do not come to work or when social security 
schemes do not cover intended beneficiaries, the poor have no recourse.”19
18Ashok Dasgupta, “Chidambaran Regrets Delay in Reforms,” The Hindu, December 3, 2007, 1.
19Yamini Aiya, “Salimar Samji: Improving the effectiveness of National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act,” Economic and Political Weekly ( January 28, 2006): 320. 
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International bodies such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) have, time and again, emphasized the significance of social security. 
The Global Social Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995 also placed social 
policy at the center of the development debate and called for the formulation 
and strengthening of national policies and strategies to reduce inequalities and 
eradicate absolute poverty. However, there seems to be a risk of an international 
race to the bottom, as labor markets become excessively deregulated (although 
not yet in India) and social systems are trimmed down worldwide.20 In such a 
situation, it is extremely difficult to establish a convincing, meaningful, and 
trustworthy dialogue on social security21 or concepts of the welfare state between 
developed and developing countries, because of the entirely different stages they 
are in.
Nonetheless, social security arrangements have a comparatively long history in 
India. From early on, India extended social protection measures to workers in the 
organized sector,22 which is about 7% of the total workforce. For workers in the 
unorganized sector and other poorer sections of population, the emphasis was 
on promotional measures through special programs and later on through social 
assistance programs.
Social security is a relatively neglected area in terms of both research and 
policy in India. For two to three decades after independence, there was hardly 
any discussion in this area in the Indian five-year plan documents, until the 
Ninth Plan. They were silent on social security planning and did not even take 
cognizance of the prevailing schemes.23 The turn around, or so it was believed, 
came with the 1991 economic reforms. They were regarded as a watershed, since 
these reforms paved the way for a beginning of debate, formulation, and visioning 
of viable social security programs in India. Sad to say, they are still based largely 
on social assistance rather then contributory programs, with the effect that 
the beneficiaries feel and are seen as petitioners rather than rightful claimants 
to whom the state, the public service utilities, or the village panchayat (village 
institution) must deliver.
20See von Hauff, “Growing Safely.”
21Or on emission reduction or energy conservation or ecological development, to add to the list.
22Shortly after independence, almost 90% of industries were state owned (public service utilities), 
emulating the USSR model. 
23Varma, “Social Security for Unorganized Sector,” 6.
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With decreasing productivity in agriculture and depleting livelihood options, 
the fact that increasing migration24 is serving as a social security buffer for millions 
of families and leading to increasing inequalities as well as the deprivation of 
different factions in society – encompassing millions – and the issues surrounding 
social security programs and their administration have of late come to center-stage 
in India. This occurred especially in the wake of the labor market trends resulting 
from the neo-liberal economic reforms. India at present is witnessing tough 
debates on deregulation of the labor market, further economic liberalization, and 
strengthening of social security programs. This debate suffers from the fact that it is 
segregating the interlinked problems associated with responsibility, accountability, 
coverage, delivery, legality, affordability, and sustainability of these programs – in 
the absence of any compulsory, uniform identification card in the country or a 
uniform social security number. All agencies roll out their very own peculiar and 
particular program and means of verification or registration of individuals.
The debate in India is heated, rightly so, but also extremely fragmented, and 
the core issues of any comprehensive discussion about social security or the 
establishment of a social (and ecological) economy seem to be understood only in 
a few academic pockets. The main shortcoming is still the predominant influence 
of the “welfare state” concept, by which the state, the benevolent patron, grants 
social assistance to its clients. Given the fragmentation and the societal factions 
on top, the typical problems of “defunct” social security systems prevail: 
 •  corruption in complex programs resulting in payment for access or 
entitlements;
 •  “creaming of the poor” – excluding beneficiaries, combined with low 
credibility of programs or “service providers”; 
 •  poor transparency, little “marketing” effort, and resulting high information 
deficits;
 •  exclusion of rural areas because of their poor accessibility (difficult road 
connectivity as well as low penetration of monetary systems and few “pay 
points”);
24India is now the largest recipient of remittances in the world, according to the World Bank. 
With US$25.7 billion in remittances from workers overseas in 2006, the annual inflow of 
remittances from the Indian diaspora is equivalent to about five times India’s annual expenditure 
on education and is roughly equal to total revenues from income and wealth taxes. On the 
macroeconomic level, remittances lend crucial support to the current account. At 3% of GDP 
in 2006, they offset much of India’s large and rising trade deficit. For many Indians, remittances 
are the only way out of extreme poverty. And in some states in the south, Kerala, for example, the 
remittance economy contributes to the economic success stories.
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 •  in general, high transaction costs in reaching the poor;
 •  overambitious, too finely developed targeting of the beneficiary population 
resulting in exclusion;
 •  unsustainable calculation and projections of programs;
 • low impact of programs on effective poverty reduction.25
These issues should be regarded as the cornerstones of an international 
dialogue, as different countries worldwide at various historical moments found 
different solutions to overcome these hurdles.26 There has never been a blueprint 
solution anywhere. It was and is experimenting, adjusting, and piloting that 
works in a given context, borrowing from elsewhere or inventing a fresh approach 
– provided vision and strategy are in place. 
How the System Has Been Structured so Far – A Glimpse 
and an Overview of the Institutions 
In the Indian context, various authorities define the concept of social security 
differently and hence there is no commonly accepted definition of the term. Recently 
some new concepts such as safety nets, social protection, and social funds have 
emerged. Broadly speaking, all these concepts are part of the all-pervasive term social 
security, which comprises mainly two elements: security related to jobs or work in 
general and income security.27 In view of this, a broad concept of social security in 
India includes: the sum of all government regulations and provisions that aim at 
enhancing the people’s living conditions, including legislation/acts/laws, regulation, 
and planning in the fields of old age, wage, unemployment, and social exclusion, 
sickness and health care, and also income security measures such as food security, 
employment, education and health, housing, social insurance, and social assistance. 
The Indian social security system is very complex in terms of its evolution, 
expansion, administration, and coverage – from several million under the old age 
25See the interesting examples given in Lutz Leisering, Petra Buhr, and Ute Traiser-Diop, “Soziale 
Grundsicherung in der Weltgesellschaft,” (Bielefeld, 2007, transcript).
26One could raise an interesting issue in a dialogue between India and Germany on the degree of 
centralization and decentralization of programs. The trend in the debate in India on the issue of 
social health insurance is moving in the direction of a centralized system, whereas in Germany 
at the beginning of the twentieth century social health insurance was provided through almost 
11,000 different service providers – the consolidation and concentration process to about 600 
providers happened much later.
27Government of India, Planning Commission, “Working Group Paper on Social Security,” New 
Delhi, 2007.
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pension scheme for destitute BPL families (see above) to the minuscule coverage 
under the Universal Health Insurance Scheme. Despite the literally hundreds 
of programs for social protection of the underprivileged, the social security 
situation in India is characterized by lack of policy.28 Until the1960s, granting 
social welfare was the cornerstone of social policy in India, with some concrete 
provision of security for workers in the formal sector. It was followed by a series 
of social assistance programs, which continued later complementary to wide-
ranging social-sector development programs.29
At present, India has not only social security laws, but also a number of social 
assistance, welfare, and social sector development programs and schemes. At one 
level, there are protective social security schemes, which address contingent poverty 
or employment-related poverty, and, at another level, there are promotional social 
security schemes, which address immediate economic needs of the population. 
The majority of promotional social security schemes are social assistance programs. 
Cash, subsidy, and in kind are prominent modes of assistance. Promotional measures 
include financing and provision of education, health, nutrition, employment, etc, 
whereas protective measures comprise pension and provident funds, maternity 
benefits, sickness allowance, employees’ state insurance, etc. Protective measures are 
largely available for central and state government employees and for the minuscule 
organized workforce in India in general.30
The other feature of social security programs in India is that a large number of 
programs and schemes are cross sectoral in design, involving various ministries, 
boards, and departments. The number and diversity of such schemes31 and initiatives 
are mind-boggling and have grown significantly, with the state governments also 
paralleling their own programs with the centrally sponsored schemes funded from 
the union budget. While there is somewhat of a social security framework in place 
for the organized sector, there has been a serious gap in social security policy for the 
unorganized sector (see above). Summarizing the situation, one can say that out of 
399 million workers in 1999-2000, it is estimated that 371.2 million (nearly 93% of 
28Further details can be found in the article by Varma, “Social Security for Unorganized Sector.” 
29Typically, in India integrated rural development programs were also regarded as contributions 
to social security.
30The coverage figures (up to 98% of the unorganized workers are not covered) are explored and 
covered in detail in the account by Sakthivel and Joddar, “Unorganized Sector Workforce in 
India.” 
31Add to that the complex application forms (numerous copies) to be filled in (pages and pages 
of details to finally avail of Rs. 200 monthly), a process that siphons off a considerable amount of 
money for the illiterate poor who have to pay for the service of getting the forms filled in.
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the entire work force) were employed in the unorganized sector, as compared to 
only 27.8 million (7%) in the organized sector.32
In general it is possible to structure and cluster the social security programs in 
India into four categories:33
• contributory social security schemes;
• welfare schemes;
• social assistance;
• promotional social security.
Contributory schemes are generally statutory, administered by the govern-
ments (except insurance schemes). These schemes cover accident insurance, 
medical facilities, old age pension, gratuity, provident fund, maternity benefits, 
income security, and unemployment allowance. Many of these are operated by 
boards at the state level. The government of Karnataka, for example, has set up 
more than twenty welfare boards for the benefits of agriculture workers, cashew 
workers, coir workers, handloom workers, construction workers, fishermen, 
motor transport workers, etc. Not surprisingly, the neighboring state of Kerala, 
with a similar multiplicity of boards, has even established an apex body to 
coordinate, regulate, streamline, monitor, and control activities under the many 
schemes of the different boards.34
Still, part of the contributory schemes were and are subsidized insurance 
schemes of earlier governments, for example, Landless Agriculture Laborer 
Group Insurance, Group Insurance for the Beneficiaries of IRDP (integrated 
rural development programs), Personal Accident Social Security for Poor 
Families, Rural Group Insurance, Group Insurance for Weaker Sections, Railway 
Passengers Insurance Scheme, etc.
Under the welfare schemes, the central government imposes a cess on 
employers for workers engaged in, for example, lime-stone, dolomite, iron ore, 
manganese, chrome, and mica mines, the beedi (local cigarettes) industry, and 
32Sakthivel and  Joddar, “Unorganised Sector Workforce in India.”
33See also R.S. Tiwari, “Existing Schemes of Social Security for Workers in Unorganised Sector,” 
(paper presented at the Seminar on Social Security for Workers in the Unorganized Sector, Shri 
Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources,  New Delhi, November 25-26, 2004) 
and  Rajasekhar , “Social Security in India.” 
34The question “who controls the controller” is a serious, not a sarcastic, question and must be 
discussed in earnest. This is a vital institutional issue in a country where the concept or idea of 
self-regulatory mechanisms is probably still inconceivable, as almost everything is controlled 
by “Inspector Raj” – this, indeed, a sarcastic term for the prevailing accepted state control 
mechanisms rooted in old British arrangements.
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the film making and theater industry, serving definite and distinct geographic 
pockets of the country and its population and entailing the major problem of 
identifying the beneficiaries and issuing separate identity cards.
Legend: CSPS – Civil Service Pension Scheme; EPFO – Employment Provident Fund Organizations; EPS – 
Employees Pension Schemes; DB – Direct Benefit; DC –Direct Contribution;  EDLI – Employees Deposit 
Linked Insurance; GS – Gratuity Schemes; GPF – Gratuity Provident Fund;  NAS –National Assistance 
Schemes; SAS – State Assistance Schemes
The social assistance programs (protective measures) are, in part, centrally 
sponsored schemes like the National Social Assistance Program (NSAP)35 with 
its three components of an old age pension scheme,36 national family benefit 
scheme,37 and national maternity benefit scheme.38
Finally, promotional social security led to nationwide programs such as the public 
distribution system, the Integrated Child Development Program (ICDS), the Mid-
35The NASP came into effect on August 15, 1995.
36Coverage of 7.28 million beneficiaries (2005) – benefits: Rs. 200 per month after the age of 
65 for destitute BPL individuals having little or no regular source of income or support through 
family members.
37Coverage of 2.11 million beneficiaries (2005) – benefits: Rs. 10,000 in case of accidental and 
natural deaths.
38Coverage of 1.15 million beneficiaries (2005) – benefits: Rs. 500 given 8-12 weeks prior to 
delivery.
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Day Meal Program in primary schools, the Supplementary Nutrition Programs, the 
Rural Employment Programs (Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana, SGRY), and 
the most recent innovation of the National Rural Wage Employment Guarantee 
Act 2005 (NREGA), which aims to provide 100 days per year of guaranteed 
employment (unskilled manual work) to one person of each rural household in 
India, with the panchayati raj institutions (PRI, village level institutions, last tier of 
government) as the key implementing body – about 3.2 million men and women 
are now formally part of the government all over India.39
Are Conclusions Premature – Where is the Trend Going?
Over the last few decades, India has witnessed a shift in the social security 
discourse. The policy debate seems to be moving from the welfare notion towards 
social security and, furthermore, to its closer link with economic growth and an 
improved labor market. However, two major issues remain unresolved and partly 
undisputed as the enormous pressure to come forward with reforms brings about 
yet more schemes, tied together to win additional voters. The two major issues 
relate to (a) funding of social security measures and (b) the availability or rather 
unavailability of reliable data.
The debate about funding mechanisms covers a wide range and touches on 
issues such as:
•  imposing a special cess of 1 to 3% on the income of the top 12% of 
households; 
•  specified central-government taxes setting aside 1% of GDP40 as the initial 
amount for the proposed National Workers Welfare Fund;
• pooled social security trust funds; 
•  individually owned and managed social security funds in the name of a 
worker (IRA system - individual retirement account).
This debate is so far (not only in India) inconclusive and, in practical terms 
(apart from the booming life insurance business, called “life” in India), the 
majority of schemes rely on state grants, in other words, social assistance or 
charity with very questionable sustainability. 
Part of the debate is going in the direction suggested by Uday Kumar Varma, 
the Director of the V.V. Giri National Labor Institute (NOIDA). He points 
out that at least three pillars must be systematically employed for social security 
39Result of the 73rd amendment to the constitution in 1993.
40This would amount to Rs. 11,000 crore or approximately €1.1 billon. 
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schemes: “(1) a comprehensive package of social assistance and welfare financed 
by the exchequer and wholly based on tax revenue for the poor,41 (2) a means-
tested contributory scheme of social insurance42 financed by a cess for selected 
occupations for people belonging to lower-income strata, but not below the 
poverty line, and (3) market-oriented voluntary schemes to be managed by 
private players for those who can afford to pay.”43
It is, however, very difficult at this moment to forecast in which direction the debate 
may go. The approach paper to the 11th Five-Year Plan has missed the opportunity 
to go beyond “inclusive growth” – the common term of today’s discussion – and 
subsequently no chapter on social security was inserted into this important document 
of the Government of India. The outcome of the five special commissions established 
as working groups of the Planning Commission to develop chapters (directives and 
plan figures) of the 11th Five-Year Plan related to social security remains to be seen. 
Their results are yet to come. The high-ranking and high-powered commissions have 
been established to help draft the 11th Five-Year Plan, which is supposed to be out 
with a delay of about a year in early 2008 (instead of April 2007, the beginning of the 
planning period of the 11th Plan and the beginning of the Indian fiscal year):
•  the Steering Committee on Social Welfare and other Special Groups; 
•  the Working Group on Health Care Financing including Health Insurance 
for the 11th Five-Year Plan; 
• the Working Group on Social Security; 
•  the Working Group on Social Protection Policy – National Social Assistance 
Program (NSAP) and associated programs for the 11th Five-Year Plan; 
•  the Steering Committee for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation 
System for the Social Sector Development Schemes in the Country during 
the 11th Five-Year Plan.
It cannot be expected that these committees, accountable to distinctly diverse 
institutions, boards, and ministries, at both the union and state levels, will provide the 
much needed comprehensive picture. It seems far too early to expect a concise debate 
on social security, as even more fundamental issues are still dominant – the decision 
41A uniform, universal social assistance approach that can be combined with a means-tested social 
assistance approach targeting people who are most vulnerable, having little or no income.
42Contributory social insurance approaches financed through earmarked payroll taxes or contributions 
– the social security benefits being proportionate to the contributions, that is, the wages – a severe 
problem when it comes to informal enterprises with the problems of identifying, registering, 
and taxing “their” workers (day laborers); for a mote detailed discussion see Mridula Ghai of the 
Employees’ Provident Fund Organization, India and her contribution, “The Coverage Gap,” op.cit.
43Varma, “Social Security for Unorganized Sector.” 
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between a socialist or capitalist approach to the economy, as the Indian Ambassador 
to Germany, Meera Shankar, recently framed it.44 The fragmentation of subjects, 
governance, interest, portfolios, budgets, and implementation responsibilities is still 
too strong to allow for a more focused and coordinated approach that could bring 
together the vital components of any strategic sustainable development perspective: the 
interlinkage and interlocking of economic policies, social policies, and environmental 
policies – issues which were and partly are dominant features in the debate in Europe. 
What is probably hindering a more inclusive debate is, indeed, a very common feature 
hitherto in India: the lack of involvement (participation through hearings, for example) 
of the people in designing the packages of the diverse schemes. The professionals and 
actuaries of the insurance business and social welfare boards will have to go out to meet 
with the people, as their living situations, demands, needs, and willingness to pay45 
fundamentally differ in India from the world of the administrators. 
For the Indo-German technical cooperation programs and the German 
ministries, we do see a role in this field, if India wishes to engage in an even deeper 
dialogue concerning issues such: starting from the local level, keeping schemes 
diversified, maintaining multiplicity, coping with local risks, speaking with the 
people, and responding to their needs. These methods should take center stage. 
One would then probably encounter quite a few surprises in openly discussing 
management of mandatory or voluntary schemes when it comes to coverage and 
delivery, performance and governance, and matching the actual living situations.
Secondly, a wide variety of new delivery mechanisms with innovative and 
revolutionary approaches, including public-private partnerships, must be 
developed: use of digital devices, smart cards, the comparatively inexpensive 
RFID46 technology, mobile telephones for payments and claims, internet hubs 
in villageinternet kiosks, the eChoupals47 or the innovative employment of 
44“Welcome Speech by H.E. Meera Shankar, Indian Ambassador,” in International Dialogue, 
Social Security: Summary Report (Berlin: InWEnt and BMZ, 2007), 11. 
45A concept developed and tested by D. Rajasekhar and the ISEC team. See his contribution in 
this reader about social security in Karnataka and Indo-German technical cooperation through 
GTZ and the Department of Labor, Karnataka.
46Radio-frequency identification, a tag system being widely used today even for money transfers, 
bank operations, fee and tax payments, etc. – very innovative usages are under way in Asia, for 
example, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore. 
47And people are increasingly demanding their constitutional rights when it comes to social 
security. A strong movement of 500 civil society organizations under the umbrella of the 
consortium  Social Security Now www.socialsecuritynow.org is demanding that the Government 
of India earmark at least 5% of GDP for the social security needs of unorganized workers.
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dabbawallahs48 and postmen in delivering bank services to the doorstep with 
hand-held devices. Given the dimensions of India,49 one must anticipate various 
technology “revolutions” – skipping development stages experienced elsewhere 
and jumping to new dimensions, also in the most remote rural areas, as the 
success stories of contract farming for high-value products and the marketing via 
Internet kiosks in villages clearly demonstrate. 
And if the Indo-German technical cooperation program50 on Social Security 
Benefits for Unorganized Workers, Karnataka (21 million in the state) succeeds, it will 
do so because of the priority set to establish modern and advanced workers’ facilitation 
centers at the village and community levels. Their ultimate goals are to bring awareness 
to all, to set up exhibits on transparency and accountability, and to create demand from 
below based on the understanding of what is out there in the market and available from 
the government through easily accessible instruments. Only such experiences could 
stimulate the debate about the seemingly inconceivable: universal social security for all.
The Bread and Butter Approach – First Things First
In the last decade, the country has witnessed important assessments of social 
security needs that led to the introduction of: 
• new, additional social security schemes; 
•  implementation of innovative methods of effective identification and 
enrollment of beneficiaries; 
• contemplation of comprehensive legislation; and 
•  development of a more effective framework to ensure social security of 
unorganized sector workers. 
These debates have shifted the paradigm of the conventional development 
discourse. The government and its agencies have come forward acknowledging 
that the existing legal and protective frames are inadequate. In view of the growing 
48Dabbawallah is an institution in Mumbai: the men who ferry hot lunches to office workers across the 
city. They and vegetable street vendors and postmen are now being commissioned as correspondents by 
the Corporation Bank, the Union Bank of India, and others, with the approval of the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI). The novel idea was for a consortium of banks to set up the Financial Operation Network 
and Operations Ltd (FINO) in 2006 to find technological solutions that would help the spread of 
banking to the rural areas. Gargi Banerjee, “Dabbawallahs , Postmen Helping Banks Extend Access to 
Services,” LiveMint.com  – The Wall Street Journal, Mumbai, December 3, 2007. 
49…and also China.
50Committed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) end of 2006 and about to commence in early 2008.
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fiscal deficit scenario, they also bemoan that it is extremely difficult to sustain 
even the existing social security provisions. This has initiated debates among 
economists, social development experts, and politicians especially concerned 
with adverse labor market implications in the current phase of globalization.
The present phase of the debate on social security for unorganized sector 
workers mainly focuses on labor market transformations, which include: 
•  shrinking employment in the organized sector and unprecedented growth of 
the unorganized sector;
•  deterioration in the quality of employment in terms of job security and terms 
and conditions of work;
• weakening of collective bargaining institutions and workers’ organizations; and 
•  a marked decline in social security while prices of common goods and 
services are rising.
In September 2004, the Government of India constituted the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS). The 
commission submitted its report along with a draft bill, called the Unorganized 
Sector Workers Social Security Bill, in May 2006. The recommendations of the 
commission have generated many debates on the draft bill since then:
•  It recommends covering all unorganized sector workers as well as those in 
the organized sector having no social security cover.
•  It stipulates the monthly income limit for qualifying as an organized worker 
at Rs. 6500 per month.
• It foresees 300 million workers to be covered in five years.
•  It asks for health insurance cover for hospitalization of up to Rs. 15,000, 
maternity benefits of up to Rs. 1000 per delivery, disability allowance of up 
to 15 days at Rs. 50 a day, life insurance at Rs. 15,000, and accidental death 
cover at Rs. 25,000.
•  It would introduce old age security for all workers above 60 belonging to 
BPL households at Rs. 200 per month as pension.
•  It would introduce a contributory provident fund with a contribution of Rs. 
1 per day for 365 days per year by workers, employers, and government.
•  In view of the difficulties in identifying employers among the informal 
enterprises, it suggests the government also pay employers’ contribution, 
meaning Rs. 730 per year in the ratio of 3:1 by central and state governments.
•  It suggests the contribution of the BPL workers be paid by the central 
government.
•  As a means of financing, it foresees levying a cess or social security tax with 
additional commitments by central government departments.
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•  The management is to be given to a national social security board at the 
central level to handle a national social security fund; state level boards to 
manage state social security funds.
•  Workers’ facilitation centers are to be established at the local level for 
registration.
•  Contributions are to be collected and the bookkeeping done through the 
universal post offices of the Department of Posts.
Some have hailed the recommendations described as the first ever 
comprehensive social security scheme for the unorganized sector in India. They 
believe that this proposal will develop a healthy workforce, which, in turn, will 
have a positive impact on national income and economic growth. They also believe 
that the recommendations have a “rights-based perspective” as the NCEUS report 
envisages the scheme in the form of legally enforceable entitlements, unlike the 
many schemes floated by the central and state governments in the past. 
There are still discussions going on indicating some of the shortcomings of the 
proposal and suggestions for further refinement of the proposed plan of action:
•  actual need to focus first on promotional security measures rather than 
rushing into protective measures;
•  impracticability of the recommended contributory model;
•  meagerness of the benefits envisaged;
• exclusion of some vital segments such as unpaid women workers.
Recently, in September 2007, the Unorganized Sector Workers Social Security 
Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha (upper house) by the Minister of State for 
Labor and Employment. If enacted, it would provide legislative backing to all 
social security schemes. 
Prior to parliamentary debate of the bill, three schemes51 (out of the eleven to 
be introduced once the bill is enacted) were announced by the Prime Minister on 
August 2007 and launched on October 2, 200752 and November 17, 2007:
1)  The Health Insurance Scheme for BPL workers will cover 60 million families 
progressively in the next 5 years. Ultimately, more than 300 million workers 
will benefit. A provision has been made for issuing a smart card, carrying 
a unique identification number, to each of these families. Both public and 
private health facilities will be utilized to provide medical services and there 
51See the press release of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, September 10, 2007, Press 
Information Bureau, www.pib.nic.in. 
52M.K. Gandhi’s birthday in 1869.
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would be cashless transactions to ensure that there is no harassment of the 
beneficiaries. Each family would be entitled to health care worth Rs. 30,000 
per annum.53 Under the scheme, expenditures of about Rs. 700 crore (about 
€140 million) are estimated during the first year. 
2)  The existing National Old Age Pension Scheme will be extended to all 
persons below the poverty line above the age of 65. A pension of Rs. 200 
per month will be provided and states will be requested to add another Rs. 
200 to this scheme.54 An amount of more than Rs. 4000 crore (about €800 
million) per annum will be spent under the scheme, administered by the 
Ministry of Rural Development. 
3)  Under the Common Man Insurance Scheme (Aaam Admi Bima Yojana), 
all the rural landless households in the country will be provided life and 
disability insurance cover. This cover will be for Rs. 75,00055 upon death 
and permanent disability due to accident. In case of partial disability due 
to accident, the insurance cover would be Rs. 37,500. The premium to be 
charged under the scheme will be Rs. 200 per annum per member. Fifty 
per cent will be contributed by the central government and the remaining 
by the state governments. The finance minister has already committed Rs. 
1000 crore (about €200 million) for this scheme in the 2007-08 budget.
As the mechanism must be implemented through the states, it is hoped that 
some states go ahead and start piloting measures to test practicability. Karnataka 
will likely be among them, joining hands with the Indo-German technical 
cooperation program. This would be rather important “as the central government 
has been passing the various welfare fund acts from as early as 1976, but only a 
handful of state governments have actually brought these acts to the ground level 
in their states. […] The point therefore is that no matter what legislations are 
passed, unless there is a sincere effort on the part of the state governments, there 
are bound to be endless delays”.56 Here, the dialogue that started between the 
Department of Labor, Karnataka, and German institutions in Berlin in January 
2007 might be supportive.57
53About €550 per annum for the average family of five.
54Eventually a monthly pension of about €7.
55About €1360.
56D. Rajasekhar and J. Y. Suchitra, “India. Showing the Way Forward: India’s Redistribution 
Experience in Extending Social Protection to all,” (ILO, Plan, Care, New Delhi, 2006).
57International Dialogue, Social Security: Summary Report (Berlin: InWEnt and BMZ, 2007).
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“Learning Does Not Mean Copying” –  
Supporting Macroeconomic Reforms in  
Vietnam
Nguyen Thanh Hai and Ulrike Maenner
Introduction: Vietnam, a Transition and a Developing Country
Since the introduction of the doi moi (renovation) policy 20 years ago, Vietnam 
has been both a developing and a transition country. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) has quadrupled, and poverty has been greatly reduced from 58% (1993) 
to less than 20% of the population.1 Vietnam’s growth path has thus been viewed 
as strongly pro-poor (Klump 2007). Vietnam wants to achieve middle income 
country status by 2010. Having been transformed from a socialist country to a 
“socialist market economy,” the structure of the economy has changed in favor 
of the private sector, but the share of the state sector is still high, as the following 
table shows: 
Table 1: Structure of the Vietnamese Economy
Sector Thousand 
billion VND
Share of GDP 
(%)
 State sector 415 36
 Cooperative sector 70 7
 Private sector 453 40
 FDI sector 197 17
 Total GDP 1,138 100
Source: General Statistics Office (GSO), estimates for 2007.
1This is on the basis of the international poverty line. Based on preliminary GSO data; estimates for 2006 are 
unofficial. See World Bank 2008 on social security.
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The core of the transition process is the so-called equitization (part 
privatization, whereby government and employees still keep an important share 
of the total assets). A large number of companies have been equitized, but only 
very few large ones. Only 17% of the total capital of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) was equitized from 1992 to 2006. In important sectors of the economy, 
for example, telecommunications, railways, oil, energy, steel, coal, cement, 
banking, and insurance, etc., SOEs still play a dominant role. After accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the government aimed to equitize the 
100 biggest joint stock companies by 2010. However, the start of this ambitious 
process in 2007 was slow (only two large companies in 2007). As a result, major 
trading partners like the European Union, the United States of America, and thus 
the WTO have not yet approved the status of a market economy for Vietnam. 
Also, there are delays in implementation of a legal environment in conformity 
with a market economy, there is no independent judiciary, and the administrative 
structure has not been fundamentally reformed either.
An important component of a modern society is the establishment of a social 
protection system. So far, only a pension system (not yet covering the total 
population) and a health insurance scheme exist. However, important risks are not 
yet covered, namely, disability, unemployment, and basic welfare for the poorest. 
Global climate change and the rapid growth process have created severe 
environmental problems. The number of floods, strong storms (typhoons), and 
droughts, as well as water and air pollution are fast increasing, while shortages 
of energy will soon become a serious problem for the industrialization process. 
According to a study by the World Bank, Vietnam will be the one of the countries 
in Asia most affected by a rising sea level (Dasgupta et al. 2007, 27). Awareness 
among politicians and in academia is increasing, but no strategy exists yet for 
designing environmentally compatible economic policies. The transition process 
in Vietnam towards a market economy with a social and ecological face will still 
take a number of years. 
German Technical Cooperation in the Vietnamese  
Reform Context
Over ten years ago, in the context of Vietnamese-German development 
cooperation, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH provided information to interested Vietnamese academics on 
the model of the social market economy and supported an initial debate on the 
Nguyen Thanh Hai and Ulrike Maenner  |  233
significance of the model.2 Vietnam has developed its own model of the socialist 
market economy (Dinh Van An 2003), reflecting the fact that both socialist and 
market economy elements are supposed to comprise the foundation of Vietnam’s 
development path. 
However, with the accession of Vietnam to the WTO and even before, 
globalization has been challenging the traditional socialist role of the state vis-
à-vis the private sector and other parts of society. Keeping extensive control 
over private sector activity seems to be no longer feasible, particularly in the 
government’s planning process. Maintaining large shares in economic sectors 
and companies and subsidizing them, for example, via credits extended by state-
owned banks, may guarantee a certain degree of state control over economic 
activity, but creates inefficiencies, drains scarce public resources, and is not 
compatible with WTO regulations. Social and environmental challenges also 
require state action in new areas. It is in this very fundamental context of seeking 
an appropriate model for Vietnam that the German model has recently regained 
significance for the work of the GTZ in the area of economic policy, because the 
German model represents a flexible framework that promotes an active role of 
the state and a balance between economic, social, and ecological goals.3
Technical cooperation in the area of economic policy started already in the 
first half of the 1990s and is still ongoing. German development cooperation has 
accompanied the transformation process through GTZ, specifically in helping to 
modernize the role of the state in line with the requirements of a market economy. 
A number of projects were set up in the early 1990s, during the transformation 
process, helping to reshape state functions in conformity with the requirements 
of a market economy. The selection of the areas of assistance was, to a certain 
extent, guided by the policy fields of the social market economy,4 which together 
form the regulatory and organizational framework necessary in a social market 
economy:
1) planning and coordination;
2) property regime;
3) monetary order;
4) enterprise order;
5) competitive order;
6) fiscal order; and
7) social order.
2Environmental goals were not felt to be significant at the time and did not formally enter the German model.
3See Benecke in this reader.
4See Benecke , Section VI: Shaping the Social and Ecological Market Economy, in this reader.
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Although some of the projects never got off the ground or came to a quick 
end, an attempt was made cover most areas except for the competitive order and 
the social order, because it was too early for these areas at the time. Long-term 
assistance was directed towards the monetary order, planning and coordination, 
the enterprise order, and the fiscal order. From this starting point, the cooperation 
has evolved, although its main characteristics have remained: provision of long-
term advisory services through practitioners from the respective German public 
administration or occasionally also from other countries, in order to provide state-
of-the-art expertise. This profile is quite different from that of most other donors 
who came to Vietnam much later: they are often involved on a much shorter-
term basis and do not deal with state economic reform in such a comprehensive 
manner, incorporating the most important actors and institutions in Vietnam.
At present, the support is combined in a single Macroeconomic Reform Program5 
and one project supporting the State Audit Office, thus covering planning and 
coordination; monetary order and financial systems development; the fiscal order; 
and, to a lesser extent, the enterprise order. The focus has moved from establishing basic 
state functions and the respective regulatory environment in line with the requirements 
of a market economy (for example, the role of the State Bank of Vietnam, which is 
Vietnam’s central bank, vis-à-vis the banking sector was defined) to modernizing 
state functions in accordance with international standards and strengthening core 
functions (for example, banking supervision or government audits), while further 
reducing direct state control over private sector activities, as required by WTO rules. 
The following sections of this article will describe the main thrust of the 
support to macroeconomic reforms provided through GTZ in the areas of 
planning and coordination, financial systems, and public finance, while pointing 
out the underlying principles guiding our work.
Planning and Coordination
The planning system in Vietnam reflects the transformation towards a market 
economy. The role of the state in the socialist-oriented market economy has 
been described as follows: “To move from command planning and subsidy-
based centralized bureaucratic management to the system of market economy 
with socialist orientations, with the state assuming the new role of initiating, 
facilitating, guiding, and regulating the economy in an appropriate manner, 
mainly by economic means, while bringing into full play various forces of the 
market and overcoming its weaknesses” (Dinh Van An 2003, 5). 
5www.macroreforms.org
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Five-year plans are highly significant for policy making in Vietnam; they are 
ratified by both the party plenary and the National Assembly. They contain the 
main strategic orientations, including changes in the regulatory framework, for 
a period of five years, after which a new five-year plan is drawn up. The plan thus 
represents a fairly rigid framework. Five-year plans are broken down into annual 
plans and investment budgets. It is the function of the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment or the respective departments on the lower level to elaborate the plans, 
monitor their implementation, and decide upon investment projects and official 
development assistance projects. Five-year plans and annual plans can be found 
on all levels of government, namely, central, provincial, district, and municipal. 
While the five-year plan of the central government is a strategic document, 
other planning documents are of lesser quality. Annual plans focus very much on 
fulfilling targets in the economic sphere by means of public investment (including 
investment in state-owned enterprises), and very little on strategies and policies. 
This approach is particularly problematic for “planning” in the private sector, as 
it calls for state interference in private economic activities, outside of the state’s 
functions as regulator, provider of incentives for private activity, and provider of 
public goods. Although the socialist-oriented market economy calls for reduced 
state activity and a state that sets the framework and provides incentives, the 
actual planning framework and the way it is executed and monitored produces a 
tendency to keep public ownership of enterprises at a high level, particularly in 
the so-called strategic sectors, namely, telecommunications, railways, oil, energy, 
steel, coal and banking, in order to give the state the control and leverage to fulfill 
the targets. In addition, data for realistic targets and for monitoring them is not 
always available or of adequate quality, particularly on lower government levels. 
As a result, the quality of the exercise is often debatable.
The government and the party still view planning as necessary for Vietnam. In 
order to address the problems, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
intends to draft a law on planning or, if this is not possible, a regulation that 
would bring the planning system closer into line with the requirements of an 
open and quickly developing economy for a more modern system of addressing 
social problems. The reform, therefore, aims to reduce the complexity of the 
planning process by granting more authority to the provinces and local levels; 
reduce the rigidity of the planning process; and ensure that actual planning is 
focused on strategic issues. The elements of the reform include:
•  redefining the role of the MPI and the Departments of Planning and 
Investment at the provincial, district, and municipal levels to that of drawing 
up strategies;
• adopting a flexible, multi-annual rolling plan framework;
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•  linking planning, especially medium-term fiscal planning, more closely with 
budgeting;
•  including more participatory elements to involve the private sector and civil 
society;
•  reducing the number of sectors in which government needs to be involved; 
•  defining a larger role for the private sector (public-private partnerships and 
build-operate-transfer models for various sectors);
•  defining a new format for results-based monitoring;
•  improving the statistical data base for monitoring; and
•  reinforcing the capacity and the mandate for strategic planning at the 
provincial level and especially at the district and local levels. 
The support by the Macroeconomic Reform Program is mainly directed at:
• supporting the partner’s own analysis of the shortcomings of the system;
•  providing information on the global debate surrounding the role of the state 
in planning and policy coordination vis-à-vis the private sector and civil 
society;
•  building capacity in macroeconomic analysis and forecasting with the 
aim of linking planning with forecasting and improving macroeconomic 
management;
•  fostering public and academic debate on the socio-economic situation; and 
•  commenting on the partner’s reform concept on the basis of German and 
international expertise.
The German transformation process was a rapid exercise; in most areas, the 
approach of western Germany was simply transferred to the former socialist 
east. This had a number of advantages, specifically fostering efficiency in the 
markets, but also had very high social costs in terms of unemployment. However, 
the transformation process proceeded quickly and without political unrest, this 
being a strength of the German model, both in the east and the west. These 
results were achieved without a planning system for overall socio-economic 
development like that in Vietnam, albeit not without planning in specific areas, 
for example, regional planning, infrastructure planning, and sectoral planning. 
While Germany has no equivalent to the Vietnamese planning system, support 
of planning system reform in Vietnam via the Macroeconomic Reform Program 
draws on certain elements of the German political system closely linked to the 
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model of the social and ecological market economy, for example, subsidiarity6 
and participation through political dialogue and partnership between the state, 
the private sector, and civil society organizations.
The rather gradual transformation process that Vietnam has been undergoing 
requires that the roles of actors in the economy and the society be constantly redefined. 
The model of the social and ecological market economy contains certain elements 
that are relevant for this process, particularly the shared responsibility between 
state, the private sector, and civil society and the mechanisms of dialogue that are 
an important element of the political culture and institutions in Germany. While 
this contrasts with the present political culture and system in Vietnam, it provides 
a perspective for further reform. The principles and elements of the model are used 
as an input into the advisory process, but not as a blueprint for Vietnam’s further 
reform path. Information is also provided on the transformation process in Germany, 
which can point to successful avenues of transformation and pitfalls that should be 
avoided. This was the understanding expressed when Deputy Minister for Planning 
and Investment Cao Viet Sinh stated that: “learning does not mean copying.”
Germany is a country with strong coordination mechanisms, particularly in 
the sphere of macroeconomic management. This is a result of the belief shared by 
most citizens that macroeconomic stability is absolutely necessary for the welfare 
of society. Stability has thus been a top priority of German policymakers and has 
been based on very powerful institutions, for example, the German Bundesbank, 
one of the most independent central banks in the world. The law on stability 
and growth, passed in the late 1960s, sets out what constitutes stability and how 
the government and other relevant institutions must achieve macroeconomic 
stability. Low inflation rates were more important to the Bundesbank than high 
growth rates, an approach quite different from other industrialized countries and 
one that has been repeatedly criticized by some German academics.7 This same 
emphasis, however, has found its way into European Central Bank policy. 
Strengthening institutions responsible for macroeconomic management and 
stability has been at the core of German technical assistance support, implemented 
by GTZ since the early 1990s and directed at the main players, the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Bank of Vietnam. The next sections describe financial 
systems reform and the approach to building the fiscal order in Vietnam.
6As Benecke states in his article in this reader: “Subsidiarity means in general that the higher level entity only 
becomes active when the lower level entity cannot solve a problem. In the social market economy, it means 
that the state only gets involved if individual efforts and community solidarity cannot solve an individual or 
social problem.”
7See Hein and Truger in this reader.
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Financial Systems Reform as an Important Element of the 
Transition Process
The financial system in Vietnam has developed rapidly during the last 10 
years: Monetization8 increased from 23% in 1997 to 110 % in 2007, representing 
a significant financial deepening. Market capitalization9 jumped from 0.5% in 
2000 to 45% in 2007. Institutional development in terms of the regulatory and 
organizational framework (especially financial market supervision), as well as 
equitization, have not kept pace, albeit to varying degrees in the different market 
segments. This institutional deficiency represents a major risk for the stability of 
the financial sector and the economy as a whole. 
Banking Sector Reforms
The first important reform step was taken in 1991 when the two-tier banking 
system (de-linking the role of the central bank from the role of commercial bank) 
was established: The State Bank of Vietnam took over the role of central bank 
and five state-owned commercial banks were established. To date, 36 private 
joint-stock banks have been set up, some very small. 
German development cooperation in the banking sector started in 1993 
when GTZ supported the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) in establishing and 
using modern monetary policy and foreign exchange management instruments, 
thus building the monetary order. The support was provided by international 
and German experts, many from the German Bundesbank. The impact of the 
application of these instruments by the SBV was significant: inflation, which 
was 70% per annum in 1994, was reduced (to less than 9% in 2005, although it 
has increased again since then). The banking association was also founded with 
GTZ support. Thus, while supporting the establishment of the monetary order, 
the project took up two themes incorporated in the model of the social market 
economy: macroeconomic stability as a precondition for citizen welfare and 
creation of a representative structure for commercial banks, as the foundation for 
dialogue between the state and the private sector. 
In other areas, reform was slow until 2005, despite continued support by German 
development cooperation.10 Amendments to the two main laws governing the 
banking sector, namely, the SBV Law and the Law on Credit Institutions, in 1997 
and 2002, did not represent a major step forward towards a modern regulatory 
framework for the banking sector (which requires an independent central bank). 
8Measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP.
9Measured by the ratio of all shares officially listed on the capital market to GDP.
10…and other development partners who came later.
Nguyen Thanh Hai and Ulrike Maenner  |  239
The SBV continues to function like a ministry, with the governor of the SBV as 
a member of the cabinet. According to the constitution, the National Assembly 
decides on monetary goals, and the SBV implements the decisions taken by 
parliament and the government. Branches exist in most of the over 60 provinces 
and are heavily influenced by the provincial people’s councils (elected bodies at 
the provincial and municipal levels) with respect to personnel and credit policy. 
Banking supervision is carried out by several overlapping departments within the 
SBV and by provincial branches,11 and basically continues to function as part of 
state inspection (like all ministries) on the basis of the Inspection Law. Modern 
risk-based techniques are not applied in banking supervision, in contradiction to 
the Basel recommendations, which constitute the international standard.
In addition, state-owned commercial banks continue to maintain a high 
share in the market (63% of the credit market and 69% of the deposits market), 
while private joint stock banks (with 21% of the credit market and 22% of the 
deposits market), foreign banks (with 8% and 7%, respectively) and people’s 
credit funds (a cooperative banking system serving mainly rural areas and 
holding only 1% in both markets)12 still have a much smaller share, even if 
taken together. Only after WTO accession did the pace of equitization (part 
privatization) accelerate. Plans for 2007-2008 are ambitious and include all five 
state-owned banks. The start has been slow, however,13 and will be limited to 
51% of total assets of these banks.
The year of WTO accession, 2006, also marked a change with respect to 
regulatory reform in the banking sector. The revisions of the SBV Law and the 
Law on Credit Institutions planned to bring the regulatory framework in line 
with market development and WTO accession requirements and would, if 
carried out consistently and not diluted, bring the reform standstill of almost 10 
years to an end. The core of the reforms contains three elements: 
1)  a more independent modern central bank,14 with a clear mandate for 
monetary policy and with only a few regional offices under the roof of the 
SBV, concentrated at locations with a strong banking presence;
2)  effective banking supervision in line with international standards 
through creation of a general directorate under the roof of the SBV, with 
11At present the supervision division is organized under the director of the SBV branch office. 
12Figures are from the 2006 Annual Report of the State Bank of Vietnam.
13In 2007, only the largest bank, the Vietcombank, was able to carry out a first initial public offering, with only 
6.5% of its total assets; equitization of other banks has been postponed.
14Independence potentially means operational, institutional, and financial independence and independence in 
personnel policy and human resource development.
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representation in regional offices and a direct reporting line to the general 
directorate – a structure which would apply modern risk-based supervision 
techniques; and
3)  a regulatory framework for modern corporate governance in the banking 
sector, in the revision of the Law on Credit Institutions.
 
The debate on an adequate framework for financial sector supervision has 
advanced further. It has become obvious that all segments of the financial sector, 
namely, the capital market, banking sector, and insurance companies, are strongly 
interlinked.15 Therefore, there is agreement within the government that Vietnam 
should aim for an all-finance supervision model in the medium term. For the 
short term, the establishment of a national all-finance supervisory committee is 
planned as an umbrella organization for the different supervisory authorities in 
order to coordinate their activities.
In spite of good intentions and respective decisions both by the party (in 
2005) and the prime minister (in 2006), there may be substantial resistance 
against core elements of the regulatory reform planned for 2008: independence 
of the SBV from the government may be opposed from within the SBV, which 
fears to lose influence in the government if it is no longer represented there; a 
clear mandate for monetary policy conflicts with the constitution and it may 
be difficult for the National Assembly to accept delegation of power to the 
SBV; and creation of regional offices directly under the SBV may be resisted by 
provincial authorities who stand to lose power over financial operations. While 
aspirations are high, there is the danger that the reform standstill in the banking 
sector may not be over yet. 
Regulatory reform of the banking sector has been supported by GTZ for 
a long time through numerous expert missions, a number of study tours, and 
provision of training and advisory services to the highest level of Vietnam’s 
decision makers. Many elements of the framework broadly outlined above 
can be attributed to this advisory work. However, the decision to upgrade the 
framework to meet international standards and agreed best practices can only be 
taken by Vietnamese decision makers themselves.
In the last five years, the Vietnamese banking sector has not only grown 
tremendously, but it has also become more diversified in terms of products. 
These developments are creating new challenges for financial sector stability. 
Dealing with financial risks in the banking sector has become more important 
than before. The GTZ-supported program has therefore not only focused on 
15The capital market and the insurance companies are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
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banking supervision, but also on the establishment of instruments for banks 
to deal with risks, namely, internal audit and internal control (for a number 
of years now) as well as risk management (more recently); these instruments 
complement modern banking supervision from the commercial banking side. 
The support has been provided on two levels simultaneously: (1) working 
with SBV in creating the necessary regulations and (2) working with pilot 
commercial banks to show what implementation of the regulations can 
look like in practice. This approach has been successful: the regulations for 
internal audit and internal control have been in place since 2006 and are now 
being implemented by the commercial banks. For risk management in banks, 
regulations exist in draft form.
Vietnam has become fairly open to financial inflows and outflows. With 
large inflows not only of foreign direct investment but also of foreign indirect 
investment, it has become increasingly difficult if not impossible for the SBV 
to sterilize (absorb) these inflows, while maintaining the existing exchange rate 
regime (constant slow depreciation against the US dollar). This development 
creates new challenges for monetary and macroeconomic stability, specifically 
with respect to inflation,16 and requires a review of monetary policy operations 
and the exchange rate regime, as well as an examination of means to better 
control capital inflows and outflows. Therefore, monetary and exchange rate 
policies have regained importance within the program supported by GTZ, and 
adjustment of the monetary order to open-economy requirements in order to 
maintain macroeconomic stability remains a significant theme.
Institution Building for the Capital Market
To ensure long-term mobilization of capital for investment, the Government 
of Vietnam has established the State Security Commission (SSC), now the 
supervisory structure under the Ministry of Finance. Since the establishment 
of the first securities trading center in Ho Chi Minh City in 2000, market 
development has been rapid, although daily trading volume is still small 
(between US$70 and 140 million), compared to other countries in the region. 
Since 2006, a securities law has regulated trading of listed companies (250), but 
trading of shares of non-listed joint stock companies (around 1200) has not yet 
been regulated. The bond market is still underdeveloped (around 5% of GDP), 
especially corporate bonds, which comprise only 15% of the total bond market. 
It is further restricted by the policy of the Ministry of Finance to define upper 
ceilings for interest rates, although inflation has been on the increase in recent 
16A development which had been predicted by the key financial sector adviser of the project.
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years. At present, capital market supervision through the SSC is not in a position 
to prevent insider trading, as staffing levels are extremely low and transparency 
regarding market developments is inadequate.
GTZ has supported the establishment and development of the capital market 
since 1997 through advisory work on the regulatory framework and training of the 
executive staff of the SSC. Support for institutional development will continue 
in the future (development of the bond market, creation of an independent 
depot and clearing center; and the transfer of securities trading settlements from 
a state-owned bank to the SBV). This work is directed at a modern institutional 
environment for the capital market, thus contributing to financial sector and 
macroeconomic stability, a recurring theme as pointed out in previous sections.
Institution Building for the Cooperative Sector of the People’s Credit Funds
A main source of finance for people in rural areas (still around 75% of the 
population in Vietnam) is the People’s Credit Fund (PCF) system, which goes 
back to the credit cooperative system of the planned economy. The system 
underwent major crises and changes, first during the high inflation years and 
later during the Asian financial crisis, which revealed the weaknesses and risks 
in the system. A large number of funds had to be closed down, causing unrest in 
the population and forcing authorities to put the system on a sounder footing. 
The PCF association, which was set up in 2005 and today has almost 1000 
members, is about to establish an institutional basis to better deal with risks and 
ensure stability, namely, a safety fund (which will get initial funding from the 
government) and a system of internal and external audits to better detect risks. 
A major part of these features can be traced back to the advisory support 
of GTZ. Germany has an existing cooperative structure in the banking sector 
(seen by many as part of the institutional structure of the German social market 
economy), which has helped recruit expert practitioners from among its member 
institutions to advise the Vietnamese PCF association since 1999. Present 
support focuses on setting up the audit system in combination with the future 
establishment of the safety fund, thus contributing to stability in a segment of 
the financial sector that is highly significant for poorer parts of the population.
Public Finance Reforms
In 1993, when GTZ began supporting budget reform, there was no fiscal order, that 
is, no legal framework for public finance and no government audit function. Creating 
this order for budget planning, budget execution, including the treasury function, and 
external audit was the focus of technical cooperation advisory services on preparation 
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and implementation of the first State Budget Law in 1996 and its revision in 2002. In 
2005, a separate project began providing advisory services on the legal framework of 
the highest audit institution of Vietnam, the State Audit Office of Vietnam (SAV).
The State Budget Law of 1996 defined, for the first time, the structure of the 
budget, the process of planning and executing the budget, and the roles of all 
branches and all levels of the state, including:
•  the role of the National Assembly and the people’s councils in the planning, 
approval, and oversight of the budget; 
• the execution of the budget on all levels;
•  the establishment of a treasury office; and responsibilities of budget offices, 
treasury offices, and spending units. 
In terms of content, three themes linked to the German model17 (but of course 
also found in other countries) found their way into the legal framework:
•  macroeconomic stability through the introduction of certain budgetary 
rules; 
•  subsidiarity through strengthening of the local level and decentralization; 
and
• accountability and transparency.
Following the theme of macroeconomic stability, the State Budget Law 
stipulates that the budget must be balanced according to the principles that 
expenditures plus debt service may not exceed revenues and a deficit is only 
allowed to finance investment and will be strictly monitored. The State Budget 
Law also limits the budget deficit, including debt repayments, to 5% of GDP. 
To achieve this, basic principles of modern budgeting were introduced, such as 
annuality (one budget for one year), anteriority (the budget is passed before the 
beginning of the budget year), and completeness (all expenditures are covered 
in one budget [only partially achieved until now]). There were incentives for 
local levels to keep certain revenues and manage their budget proactively. 
The accounting functions of the state budget were improved step by step. The 
introduction of a treasury system for cash and liquidity management in 1996 
completely eliminated the previous problems with illiquidity of spending units. 
The budget was publicized for the first time in 1997, making it more transparent 
to the citizens. 
17See the section on Planning and Coordination in this article.
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The revisions of 2002 made further advances in key areas: 
•  The role of the National Assembly and the people’s councils was significantly 
strengthened. Instead of the so-called standing committee of the National 
Assembly, it is now the National Assembly itself which passes the budget for 
the coming year, providing more accountability. 
•  Budgets on all levels must be publicized, and publication is monitored by 
the Ministry of Finance, resulting in more accountability and transparency 
than before. 
•  Budget decentralization advanced further, providing more budget autonomy 
to the local level in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Sub-national units 
are now responsible for a substantial share of overall public expenditures, 
particularly in health, education. and social spending. 
•  In stark contrast to earlier years, spending units have considerable freedom in 
budget execution and can shift expenditures between four broad categories 
of current spending.
German development cooperation implemented by GTZ has for a long 
time been the only development partner working on building the fiscal order. 
Advisory services, including orientation and practical inputs, were provided to 
accompany the process of drawing up the two budget laws and the regulations 
and guidelines to implement them. The achievements outlined above reflect the 
main elements of the assistance provided. To build capacity for implementation 
of the regulations, a substantial percentage of the staff of the budget office at 
the Ministry of Finance and of the National Assembly’s budget committee 
participated in training on the application of the Budget Law. With support 
from GTZ, about 4000 participants were trained in various aspects of budget 
management between 1994 and 2005, and many study tours were carried out. 
In 2005, a law on the State Audit Office of Vietnam (SAV) was passed in the 
National Assembly. This law is in line with international standards represented 
by the Lima Declaration of Supreme Audit Institutions (World Bank 2007), 
and provides the SAV with an independent status, as it now reports to the 
National Assembly. Again, GTZ provided the primary support for preparation 
of this law. In 2006, the SAV made public its annual audit report summary. 
Today, the accounts of all public entities, including state-owned enterprises, 
must be audited by the SAV, thus strengthening the financial accountability of 
government activity.
The commitment from the German side was much longer term and started 
much earlier than that of most other development partners in Vietnam. This 
allowed the Vietnamese and the Germans to build a trusting relationship and 
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to maintain a dialogue on what constitutes a fiscal order in a market economy 
in general and also on the relevance of German experiences and institutional 
characteristics for the Vietnamese fiscal order. The budget and external audit 
reform process was accompanied by practitioners from the respective German 
institutions. The same advisors offered pragmatic advice over a number of years, 
staying with the process in order to ensure continuity. A former budget director 
characterized the German contribution as follows: “Multilateral institutions 
provide us with theoretical know-how, showing us where we should go in the 
longer term, but the approach is often very theoretical. The German assistance 
helps us to get from here to there.”
The progress in establishing a modern fiscal order is reflected in the World Bank’s 
2007 Vietnam – Country Financial Accountability Assessment, which contains a 
thorough appraisal of the degree to which Vietnam’s public finance system is 
in line with international best practices and standards. The document rates the 
fiduciary risk for budget aid18 in Vietnam as moderate. Also, in terms of fiscal risk, 
the deficit as a percentage of GDP remains low in spite of massive investment in 
infrastructure development. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, this 
ratio (excluding debt repayments) is estimated to be slightly below 2% for 2007 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2007, 15) – a fairly low ratio, which is, however, 
expected to increase with major increases in personnel expenditure.
The reform process is by no means complete. While in the past the focus was 
on establishing the basic features of the fiscal order, further steps are needed 
to ensure that international standards are established, for example, for budget 
classification, reporting, and management and for treasury functions, medium-
term fiscal planning, and dealing with extra-budgetary funds. The State Budget 
Law will be revised again, most likely in 2009, and a law on treasury operations 
may be tabled to the National Assembly in 2012. Bringing the legal framework 
into line with international standards has been the focus of German technical 
cooperation since 2006 and will continue to be so. On the basis of the federal 
tradition of the German fiscal order, subsidiarity and decentralization will 
continue to be important themes, both in terms of finding a scheme for the 
highly complex system of aggregating the budget into one including all levels of 
the state and in terms of providing a better and more stable revenue base to the 
provinces, particularly poor provinces.
18“Fiduciary risk is defined as the risk that funds are not properly accounted for, are not used for the intended 
purposes, and do not represent value for money” (Welton 2005, 3). Thus, the level of fiduciary risk reflects the 
quality of the fiscal system.
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Perspectives
Vietnam has been extremely successful in reducing poverty, largely as a result of 
its pro-poor growth policies, rather than of the social protection system. In line with 
the level of development of the country, the focus was initially on targeted poverty 
reduction programs and not so much on a formalized system of social security. In 
recent years, a health card for the poor was introduced, thus providing health insurance 
for large parts of the population. However, the social protection system is by no means 
complete. It still must be complemented by modern, affordable, and universal old age 
and unemployment insurance and by mechanisms for insuring citizens against other 
risks, increasingly also environmental risks, for example storms and flooding. 
Thus, the transformation of social systems in Vietnam will continue to gain 
prominence as a major challenge for the country in the coming years. The 
experience of the German social system, which has undergone major changes 
during the last 15 years, in order to create more intergenerational justice with 
respect to old age pensions and to increase efficiency in the labor market 
through changes in unemployment insurance, may prove useful to Vietnam. A 
strategy paper by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development lists social protection as one of the fields of cooperation on the 
basis of the model of the social and ecological market economy. 
Environmental issues will also take center stage. Vietnam is an oil-producing 
country; revenues from oil exports represent a comparatively large share of the 
budget (about 25%). To make sure that these resources can be used for more than 
just one generation’s needs, other revenue sources need to be found in order to 
change the revenue composition.19 Furthermore, imminent domestic shortages of 
energy will be a major impediment to further industrialization and development. 
These energy shortages and the specter of global warming suggest that energy 
efficiency is one of the most important future themes for Vietnam. Pollution of 
the air and the water is also a significant and increasing problem in the cities and 
in industrial areas, creating serious health hazards for the people. 
The ecological part of the German model is therefore becoming increasingly relevant 
for development cooperation in Vietnam in the area of economic policy issues Energy 
prices in Vietnam need to be increased further to provide an incentive for more energy 
efficiency in production regardless of the type of energy used. It is time to support 
Vietnam in designing environmentally compatible economic policies and developing 
the respective tools. It may soon be the moment to introduce an energy tax. 
19The Income Tax Law, which is expected to generate more direct tax revenue, was passed by the National 
Assembly in 2007.
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At present, prices for gasoline in Vietnam are subsidized and thus do not reflect 
the true market value. The government has lowered the subsidies, with adverse 
effects on inflation, demonstrating that there is a trade-off and that no decision is 
without adverse effects. The macroeconomic implications of such decisions need 
to be thoroughly analyzed and evaluated. Recently, the National Assembly asked 
the Ministry of Finance to submit a proposal for a comprehensive tax approach 
to ecological problems. There are very few examples of such a comprehensive 
approach. The German ecological tax, which taxes energy and thus results in 
more energy efficiency, is one of the few successful schemes worldwide to achieve 
greater ecological sustainability by way of the tax system.
German development cooperation has already contributed to the reform 
process in Vietnam with a number of interventions based on the concept of 
a social market economy. In the future, the German model of the social and 
ecological market economy could therefore play a renewed role in German 
technical cooperation with Vietnam, including, as today in China,20 the theme 
of the ecological compatibility of economic policies21 and the establishment of 
some aspects of the social order.
20See Juergen Steiger on economic policy advising in China, in this reader.
21At present and until end 2008, the ecological tax is covered by a project supported by the European Union 
and advised by a team of German experts.
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Social and Ecological Market Economy in 
Advisory Services – Providing Economic Policy 
Advice to China
Jürgen Steiger
Introduction
For almost 30 years, the People’s Republic of China has been undergoing a 
process of economic reform and opening. The introduction of a “socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics” in 1992/1993 signified the transformation 
from a planned economy to a market economic system, which was initially 
characterized by the dominance of public property and was several years later 
based on the coexistence of various forms of property. German development 
cooperation, through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH, has accompanied the Chinese reform and transformation process 
since 1987. The German model of the social market economy, the economic 
success of Germany after the Second World War, and especially the economic 
and political experiences of German reunification – these were the areas in which 
the Chinese were particularly interested and in which they requested advisory 
services in the early years of cooperation. In the last few years, however, the 
Chinese partners have also shown an increasing interest in the experience of 
implementing socio-political reforms in Germany and, above all, in implementing 
the foundations of sustainable development. Thus, the new model of social and 
ecological market economy underlying German development policies will play a 
leading role in the future design of economic policy advisory services provided to 
the People’s Republic of China. 
This article will begin by outlining the model, development, and implementation 
of the socialist market economy in China and by highlighting the challenges 
facing Chinese leaders today. It will then describe the changes which economic 
policy advisory services underwent in the past decades, and present concrete 
examples from the current portfolio of Sino-German technical cooperation in 
the area of economic and structural reform. 
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Model and Doctrine of the Socialist Market Economy  
in China
When Deng Xiaoping initiated the policies of reform and opening in 1978, the 
People’s Republic of China crossed the threshold to an open-ended transformation 
process. At that time, however, the Chinese leadership was only certain that the 
Chinese planned economy should be carefully supplemented by a few market 
elements. But how that should be implemented remained unclear and subject to 
a trial-and-error process. Only in 1992 did the 14th Communist Party Congress 
define China’s economic system as a “socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics.” In the following years, market forces were to play a fundamental role 
under the macroeconomic guidance of the Chinese state. This economic system was 
initially characterized by the dominance of public property, several years later by the 
coexistence of various forms of property. Nevertheless, it was explicitly accepted that 
only part of the population could profit from the prosperity in the beginning. 
It took almost another ten years until the model of the socialist market economy 
was gradually adapted and expanded to include social and ecological aims and 
principles. In 2002, the political leadership at the 16th National Party Congress of 
the Communist Party of China decided to establish a “moderately well-off society 
for all,” assuming an equal distribution of wealth. In November 2003, the Politburo 
of the Communist Party endorsed the “scientific development concept,” which 
sought qualitative growth as well as “comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable 
development,” and placed “people in the center.” In September 2004, the Fourth 
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party endorsed, 
for the first time, the concept of a “socialist harmonious society.“ This concept entails 
the improvement of the social situation in the rural areas under the slogan of the “new 
socialist rural development,” the reduction of regional disparities between the wealthy 
east coast and the poor hinterland, the decrease of income disparities, the provision of 
better access to education, the establishment of a solid social and health care system, 
and the goal of harmony between people and nature. The Sixth Plenary Session of 
the 16th Central Committee passed a comprehensive catalogue listing 14 measures to 
achieve such a harmonious society.  
Given that all these goals are to be achieved by 2020, they may be referred to as 
the Chinese “social and environmental agenda 2020.” The current 11th Five-Year 
Plan for the years 2006 to 2010 incorporates all these concepts and adds the goal of 
building a “resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society” by 2010. The 
17th Communist Party Congress in October 2007 not only underlined the above-
mentioned goals of the 2020 agenda, but also elaborated its key points in greater detail. 
Viewing this concept in its entirety, the outline of a model very similar to the 
German social and ecological market economy can clearly be envisioned. 
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Reality of the Socialist Market Economy in the People’s 
Republic of China
The reality of the socialist market economy diverges considerably from this 
model. If we examine China’s recent development process, the economic system 
can best be described as a transformation economy with ideological restrictions: 
On the one hand, the political leadership made very pragmatic and often non-
ideological decisions in the course of implementing the reforms. On the other 
hand, China undertook a gradual and rather experimental reform process, which 
can hardly be described as a coherent strategy. This approach, which Deng 
Xiaoping famously described as “groping for stones to cross the river,” did not 
correspond to a search for optimal economic efficiency, but rather took into 
account political resistance at various government and party levels. China thus 
followed a two-track reform process, in which plan and market coordination 
coexisted side by side. Economic reforms were initiated at different times and 
with varying urgency depending on the sector and branches; when the central 
leadership met resistance, the reforms were put on hold up to the point where the 
reform deadlock became so unbearable that the central government was forced to 
take decisive action again. In this process, reform efforts were blocked time and 
again when they threatened to endanger the ideological foundation and thus the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party. This approach became apparent just recently 
with the reform of property rights, which, for ideological reasons, still do not 
allow private ownership of agricultural land. As a result, the Chinese leadership 
faces a fragmented economic system today, which does not lack complexity.  
Although party and state undoubtedly dominate the political management 
process, these forces are decreasingly able to control the development of the 
society in all its aspects. In the increasingly materialistic and individualistic 
society of China, the Communist ideology is hardly attractive, especially among 
younger people. Unable to fill this growing ideological vacuum, the Communist 
Party desperately needs to sustain economic growth and the prospect of 
enjoying a more prosperous life than previous generations in order to preserve 
its legitimacy. At the same time, the interest of the population in religion and 
spiritual experience has recently been growing, particularly among the wealthier 
classes in China. At the administrative level, important responsibilities for 
steering economic policy were transferred to regional governments. Within this 
decentralized public sector of the economy, it is therefore difficult today for the 
central government to push through economic policy reform initiatives against 
opponents at the provincial and local level. Corruption and arbitrariness are 
widespread among officials, especially at the local level; this leads time and again 
to, at times violent, protests against local decision makers.  
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To manage economic and structural reforms in China is thus not without 
risk for the political leadership: They have to generate rapid economic growth 
while at the same time taking into account social demands and environmental 
costs. Their decisions need to be effective from the central government level 
down to the local level. If they do not succeed, there is the real danger that 
the potential for social conflict is no longer controllable, thus threatening the 
political stability of China. 
Despite its economic success in the past, its high growth rates of 10% on 
average since 1978, and immense foreign exchange reserves of US$1.4 trillion, 
China continues to face enormous economic and social challenges. Even as the 
world’s fourth-largest economic power, the People’s Republic of China remains a 
developing country with an average annual per capita income of US$1740. Over 
135 million people still live under the poverty line of US$1 per day. Central China, 
the northeast, and above all the 12 western provinces are developing very slowly, 
have low growth rates, and are losing their existing competitiveness potential and 
thus also their ties to the world market. 
The regional disparities between the wealthy coastal provinces and the poor 
hinterland as well as between urban and rural areas are growing. At the same 
time, migrant workers coming from rural areas put increasing pressure on the 
urban centers and intensify social polarization there. China‘s ailing government 
enterprises have to increase their competitiveness, which often results in massive 
lay-offs. This, in turn, requires a basic social security system that cushions the 
unemployed and other losers to growth. The Gini coefficient, a measure for the 
equality or inequality of income distribution, is estimated to be at least 0.46, 
significantly higher than Germany’s 0.27. The Chinese leadership has also 
recognized that energy consumption and the utilization of natural resources 
needs to be more efficiently organized and that climate change will entail high 
economic and social costs for China.
Thus, the Chinese leadership is confronted with a plethora of complex, 
urgent problems that must be resolved without delay. In order to deal with these 
challenges, they need access to scientific expertise, high-quality advisory services, 
and, above all, international exchange. 
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Changing Economic Policy Advisory Services 
GTZ has accompanied the Chinese reform and transformation process since 
1987. The initiation of cooperation in the area of economic policy was characterized 
by a high-level reform dialogue between the Chinese planning administration 
and German institutions such as the German Council of Economic Experts, the 
German Central Bank, line ministries, and economic research institutes. At a time 
when the Chinese economic system was still dominated by government planning 
elements, over 70 young managers in the Chinese planning administration were 
offered training in the theory and practice of the social market economy in 
Germany between 1988 und 1995. Since their return to China, the recipients of 
these fellowships have played a very important role in the establishment of market 
economy structures in China. The Chinese were particularly interested in the 
German model of the social market economy and the economic reconstruction 
of Germany after the Second World War.  
In the transitional phase from the planned economy to the socialist market 
economy between 1993 and 2001, GTZ concentrated its advisory services on 
questions of transformation, sectoral policies, and the establishment of market 
institutions. In addition to the former government planning commission, the 
China Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD) in Hai kou (Hainan) 
and the structural reform commission were included in the economic policy 
cooperation. Key topics covered in the advisory services, for example the 
reform of state enterprises, were guided by the German experience of economic 
transformation during reunification. 
After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001, the economic policy advisory services of GTZ focused primarily on the 
alignment of economic reform with WTO rules and principles and on China’s 
accession to WTO membership. As part of German technical cooperation, the 
WTO Secretariat set up an official WTO Center at CIRD in Haikou, which 
concentrated, above all, on capacity development in WTO areas.
Beginning in 2003/2004, the cooperation was expanded to new partners, 
for example the economics office of the prime minister (State Research Office, 
SRO), and the previously rather isolated economic policy advisory projects were 
consolidated in a Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program, 
running from 2004 to 2007. This allowed for networking among the different 
Chinese partners and for a new flexibility that enabled quick responses to 
current advisory needs. The demand by the Chinese side for exchange among 
experts in this phase was directly related to the new goals, concepts, and themes 
of the Chinese government (well-being for all; scientific development concept; 
254  |  Part 4  Practitioners‘ Perspectives
harmonious society) and ultimately to substantive and strategic preparation of 
the 11th Five-Year Plan. However, the advisory services also addressed further 
development of market economy structures that were accompanied by the 
reorganization of the Chinese economic and planning administration. 
In addition to socio-political topics, questions of sustainable development 
have recently been brought into the Chinese discussion process. Consultations 
with experts have touched upon the areas of environmental, resource, and energy 
economics, which are particularly relevant for the establishment of a resource-
conserving and environmentally friendly society.
The changes in economic policy advisory services can also be observed in the 
adaptation of employed instruments: in the initial phases, as outlined above, 
various capacity building activities were at the center of cooperation. Today, the 
focus is primarily on high-level economic, social, and regional policy dialogues 
on an equal footing. By providing access to German and international expertise, 
GTZ assists the Chinese partners in solving complex problems. Today, capacity 
development is only offered to new partners. Current cooperation concentrates 
instead on guaranteeing the sustainability of previous measures for institutional 
reform and training, for example through follow-up programs.    
With the new model of social and ecological market economy, German 
development cooperation offers a concept with very attractive principles, 
especially for economic policy reform advisory services: as mentioned above, 
the Chinese partners have shown particular interest in Germany’s experience 
in establishing a social market economy after the Second World War and the 
process of transformation in the wake of German reunification. Today the 
economic power Germany is admired and respected in China for its relatively 
equal distribution of income, the great sensitivity of its people to environmental 
matters, and, more recently, for its pioneering role in climate issues. Its recent 
experiences with the implementation of economic and social structural reforms 
make Germany an interesting discussion partner for Chinese authorities. In the 
daily work of GTZ, Chinese partners often regard Germany as the ideal model 
for the envisaged Chinese harmonious society. 
An essential prerequisite for the willingness to cooperate in the area of 
economic and social reform policies is the basis of trust that was created 20 years 
ago and was continually deepened. It has given Germany and German technical 
cooperation a unique position in economy policy advisory services. 
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The Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program
The Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program of technical 
cooperation in China, which was launched in 2004, has been continually developed, 
and runs until 2011, is building on 20 years of experience in the area of economic 
policy advising. It is a program at the macro level that aims at deepening the 
economic, social, and structural reforms in China. It is designed as a topic-oriented 
exchange on economic policies with various high-level partners in China, each 
of which has different mandates for reform. The partners include, among others, 
the State Council, represented by the State Research Office (SRO) with access 
to the prime minister, and the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), which is responsible for the implementation of development, reform, and 
adaptation strategies. The Office of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs (OLGFE) plays a special role since it reports directly to the president and 
party chairman. The independent China Institute for Reform and Development 
(CIRD) as well as other specialized and research institutes are also involved. 
The program focuses its work mainly at the central government level. At the 
same time, case studies and regional analyses in selected pilot provinces, primarily 
in the western region and in central China, are also being prepared. 
Key cooperation instruments, which are applied in a flexible way, include the 
implementation of high-level economic, social, and regional policy dialogues for 
the exchange of expertise with representatives of the German Government, the 
European Union, countries of other regions, and international organizations. 
In addition, consultations with experts, reports, position papers, and briefs on 
reform topics are offered as is the establishment and maintenance of networks with 
national and international economic and social research institutions. Capacity 
development measures are employed with new partners, but also instruments, 
methods, and processes of market-oriented analysis on macroeconomic and 
regional economic development. 
The program, with its five components, is thematically, instrumentally, and 
institutionally connected: the guiding principle is the social and ecological market 
economy, which fits into the priority area of “sustainable economic development” 
as defined by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). All individual interventions of the program deal with partial 
aspects of the social and ecological market economy and are in full compliance with 
China’s reform strategies and initiatives. The program cooperates with the Chinese 
partners particularly with respect to the issues of structural change, sustainability, 
regional development, and social reforms. Issues of rural development are dealt 
with in all program components in a complementary manner so that concentrated 
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experience can be offered to the Chinese counterparts and increased policy 
coherence can be achieved. The thematic corridors of the program are in line with 
the short- and long-term goals of the Chinese government set out in the 11th Five-
Year Plan and the so-called social and environmental agenda 2020. At the same 
time, new development and reform topics are also addressed, such as economic 
aspects of climate change, development of rural distribution systems, technology 
and innovation policy, and relevant financial policy. Additional current topics 
include good governance at the local level and the inclusion of civil society in the 
Chinese development and reform process. These concern reforms with regard 
to the integration of disadvantaged social groups, such as poor people, labor 
migrants, minorities, and farmers. 
The Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program plays a significant 
role in the implementation of the BMZ’s anchor country concept. This concept 
supports the integration of key players in certain regions into global and regional 
governance structures, for example China in East Asia and India in South Asia: 
For several years, the program has been organizing dialogues between China 
and other anchor countries like India, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in order 
to start an exchange on social policy and sustainability. In Latin America, the 
program works closely with the Economic Commission for Latin American and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile. Building on the exchange between 
China and Vietnam on issues of economic transformation, economic policy 
dialogues have been initiated with Asian transformation countries of the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Central Asian Re gional Eco nomic Cooperation 
(CAREC) Program, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the East Asia Summit, and recently the Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Zone (South 
China Sea) in order to begin a regional integration process. Within this context, 
the program also addresses issues that are relevant to the solution of global issues 
such as the economic consequences of climate change and WTO-related topics, 
such as the advancement of the Doha Round.
In order to guarantee the desired scientific foundation of the cooperation, 
the Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program works closely with 
German and international institutions and economic research institutes and 
universities. There has been long-standing cooperation with the German Council 
of Economic Experts. German practical experience is brought in by the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, and the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, but also by state 
agencies, for example the Bavarian Ministry for Economy.
International cooperation is continually expanded. A positive example of 
cooperation is the regional policy dialogue with the Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission, 
which also includes the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO). Traditionally, there has been an constant exchange of information 
and ideas with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the WTO, and also with 
other EU member states and bilateral donors, for example Canada and Australia, 
whenever feasible, depending on the specific topics.      
The Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program has exclusive 
access to influential decision-makers in China’s economic policy. Regular discussion 
partners include Minister Wei Liqun from the economics office of Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao, Vice Minister Liu He from the economics office of the President Hu 
Jintao, and the leadership of the influential NDRC, which draws up and implements 
the Five-Year Plan. This access to the highest political level provides GTZ with the 
potential to have a real impact on the formulation of market framework conditions 
in China, the design of sustainable reform strategies in economic, social, and 
regional issues, and the implementation of structural change processes. 
Improving market framework conditions, liberalizing economic sectors, and 
opening up, for example, the service sector, also serve German interests. Of 
particular importance is ensuring China’s compliance with international rules 
and norms, but also with the WTO principles set out in the Doha 2001 protocol. 
The protection of intellectual property rights and the reduction of protectionist 
measures should be mentioned in this regard. Ultimately, the program 
contributes to the promotion of China’s regional and global responsibility, the 
search for viable solutions to environmental problems, and the preservation of 
social stability in China, and thus regional stability in East Asia.
Conclusion
The Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program supports 
Chinese partners in the development and implementation of economic, social, 
and structural policy concepts, policy recommendations, reform proposals, and 
strategies in the context of China’s development strategy as defined in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan, the reform agenda 2020, and government reform initiatives. The 
overall goal is to design reform policies of the Chinese Government is such a way 
that they are guided by the basic principles of a sustainable social and ecological 
market economic system and increasingly rely on scientific foundations and 
international experience. The new guiding principle of a social and ecological 
market economy serves as a reference for the implementation of these goals.
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Competition Policy in Southeast Asia  
and German Technical Cooperation
Frank Tibitanzl
This contribution will focus on competition policy as an element of economic 
policy advisory services. It comprises a short description of the importance of 
competition policy in developing and transition countries and its relevance for 
the social market economy (Section 1). After that, a case study (implementing 
the competition law in Indonesia) is presented in order to describe the GTZ 
approach to technical cooperation in this area (Section 2). The contribution 
will close with an outlook on the potential for additional German technical 
cooperation in the area of competition policy and related subjects in Southeast 
Asia (Section 3). 
1. Competition Policy and its Relevance for the Model of the 
Social and Ecological Market Economy 
Functioning competition is an essential prerequisite for growth and 
employment in a market economy. Competition promotes innovation, an 
efficient allocation of resources, and consumer sovereignty; it limits economic 
power and also produces positive social results. Competition in free and open 
markets makes markets work much better and is the basis of the social market 
economy.
However, private companies always have an incentive to maximize their 
profits by squeezing their competitors out of the market and increasing 
their market share and power. In a market economy, there is always the risk 
of concentration and monopolization, which often lead to inefficiencies (for 
example, high prices and low product quality). Furthermore, especially in 
developing countries, heavy state intervention in the market also hampers 
competition, for example, through privileged state enterprises with high levels 
of market power, protectionist measures (subsidies, etc.) to selected private 
enterprises (national champions), or long-term market entry barriers to protect 
new (foreign) investment.
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Another threat to functioning competition are unfair business practices. In 
order to ensure fair competition, certain business activities (for example, misleading 
information to consumers, disparagement of competitors, psychological obligation 
to buy, etc.) are prohibited in many countries. 
Competition policy is an element of economic policy.1 Using a broad definition, it 
can be described as all rules and interventions that are designed to prevent all restraints 
on market competition that have negative impacts on economic welfare. Hence, 
competition policy comprises all activities of the government to ensure fair competition 
as a fundamental element of the social market economy. Coherent and consistent 
competition policy benefits consumers through wider choice and better product 
quality at a lower price, but also it helps promote innovation and entrepreneurship. In a 
globalized world with growing international trade and investment, competition policy 
becomes even more important. Anti-competitive behavior in a market of one country 
may cause negative effects on the markets of other countries through international 
trade and investment. In many countries, the legal framework for competition 
policy consists of unfair competition law (dealing with the unfair business practices 
mentioned above) and antitrust law (often called simply “competition law”).
The protection of competition is regarded as one of the key regulatory policy 
objectives of the social market economy in Germany. One antitrust law is the Act 
against Restraints of Competition (ARC),2 which came into effect in 1958 and 
assigns antitrust enforcement to the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) and 
to the Landeskartellämter (State Cartel Offices). The relevant areas regulated by the 
ARC are: (1) the ban on cartels, hence agreements between companies on prices 
and quantities are prohibited in principle; (2) prevention of the abuse of a dominant 
market position by single companies, for example, the fixing of extraordinarily high 
prices or unjustified limitations against competitors; (3) control of mergers in order 
to prevent an “unhealthy” concentration of market power in certain markets.
Another important act dealing with competition policy is the Law Against 
Unfair Competition,3 which aims to protect competitors, consumers, and other 
market participants against unfair competition (excluding cartels and mergers, 
which are governed by the ARC), and to protect the interests of the general 
public in undistorted competition.
1In Germany, competition policy is regarded as an essential part of the so-called Ordnungspolitik, which is a 
special German term signifying the need for the state to guarantee the legal framework of the economy (for 
example, property rights, enforcement of contracts) and for state intervention to avoid anti-social outcomes.
2Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB). The GWB was regarded by its founders as the “constitution 
of the social market economy.”
3Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG).
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On the European Union (EU) level, competition policy was set out already 
in the Treaty of Rome (1957), which gave the EU wide-ranging powers to 
oversee and prevent activities that restrict competition between firms. The 
EU Commission (Directorate General for Competition) is empowered to 
investigate price fixing, the abuse of market power, and agreements that fix 
market share, limit production, or prevent technical development. Furthermore, 
the EU is allowed to intervene against governments who attempt to provide state 
aid to uncompetitive companies. If several EU member states are affected by a 
competition case, the European Commission will be responsible, whereas the 
national cartel offices focus on the investigation of cases with merely national 
scope. Another example are mergers that extend beyond the national borders of 
a member state. These are investigated at the European level.
In the development policy context, a sound and effective competition policy 
(antitrust policy) is highly important for economies in transition to a market 
economy, where the role of the state has to be redefined. In the early 1990s, many 
Eastern European countries and countries of the former Soviet Union privatized 
their state-owned companies very quickly, assuming that competition would 
develop automatically if former state-owned companies were privately owned. 
However, in many of these countries, this strategy failed as the privatization 
process did not lead to more efficient economic structures, but often resulted 
in private monopolies with few incentives to improve their services or decrease 
prices. The lessons learnt here are that a privatization strategy always has to 
be accompanied by improvements in the institutional framework that make 
it conducive to competition. Hence, powerful competition policy together 
with market regulation (in case of natural monopolies like electricity, railways, 
telecommunications) are needed to really encourage functioning competition. 
In developing countries, competition policy has to ultimately address the 
needs of consumers. This is because poverty reduction is the major objective on 
the development agenda (Millennium Development Goal 1). Thus, competition 
policy has to show clear evidence that it can contribute not only to economic 
development but also to poverty reduction. Developing countries increasingly 
recognize the importance of competition policy. At the beginning of 1990, 
there were only about 30 countries that had introduced a competition law, while 
currently the number exceeds 100.   
GTZ has been engaged in technical cooperation in the area of competition 
policy for many years in countries like Albania, Croatia, and Morocco. A 
prominent example of this engagement is its long-term cooperation with the 
Government of Indonesia, helping it set up and implement the competition law 
(or antitrust law) which will be described in the next section.
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2. The Reform of Competition Policy in Indonesia
During the last decades of the twentieth century, the Indonesian economy 
was dominated by highly concentrated industries, large state-owned sectors, and 
inefficient firms operating behind various kinds of barriers to entry. Due to very 
strong ties between business and the political elite, a few huge conglomerates 
controlled a large market share in several sectors, creating disadvantages for other 
enterprises that did not have the same opportunities and for consumers, who 
paid high prices but often got low product quality. The development of private 
business during that period was characterized by all kinds of inefficient government 
policies that caused market distortions. This kind of crony capitalism and lack 
of competition had its origin in the interest of the Indonesian Government 
during that time to maintain political control over the business sector and was 
also regarded as one of the factors facilitating the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Dismantling restrictions on competition was, therefore, an important condition 
of the support provided by international institutions to overcome the crisis. 
The new government under Jusuf Habibie (President of Indonesia from 1998 – 
1999) realized that Indonesia urgently needed a competition law and a strong 
implementing agency to systematically deal with unfair business competition; it 
asked the German Government to provide technical assistance through GTZ.
The cooperation started in 1998 with a high-level dialogue, facilitated by GTZ, 
between representatives of the Indonesian government and parliament and Prof. 
Wolfgang Kartte (a former president of the Bundeskartellamt) and his team. 
The talks led to a common understanding about the philosophy and principles 
of the new competition law: It was agreed that under the new competition 
law all national and international enterprises should be treated equally; hence, 
no discrimination against single enterprises or groups of enterprises would be 
allowed. It was also agreed that the Indonesian competition law would be drafted 
according to a Model Law for Competition provided by UNCTAD4 to make 
sure that widely accepted international standards were met. Many developing 
countries, including Indonesia, are members of UNCTAD. 
The German team’s contribution was to provide comments on the draft law 
written by Indonesian experts. The Indonesian Competition Law was finally 
introduced in March 1999 and incorporates three key principles of competition 
policy that are part of German Competition Law, as well: (1) the existence of 
market power is not a violation of the competition law, but its abuse is; (2) the 
4United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
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creation of an independent competition authority (KPPU5) enforcing the law; 
and (3) no discrimination against any enterprises or persons is allowed.
In June 1999, a GTZ-supported project was launched to intensify the 
cooperation, focusing mostly on capacity development in order to establish 
the new KPPU as quickly as possible. The main activities were: (1) drafting a 
legal commentary on the new competition law (in Indonesian as well as in 
English), (2) training KPPU staff (in Jakarta as well as at the Bundeskartellamt in 
Germany), and (3) consultancy services for KPPU staff to help them handle their 
first cases. Furthermore, training for members of civil society (entrepreneurs, 
lawyers, NGOs, etc.) on the legal framework of a market economy in general was 
provided. During that period, considerable technical assistance was also provided 
by other development partners, especially the World Bank, JICA/JFTC,6 US 
FTC,7 ELIPS/USAID,8 and the EU. 
5Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha.
6Japan International Cooperation Agency/Japan Fair Trade Commission.
7US Fair Trade Commission.
8Economics Law, Institutional, and Professional Strengthening/United States Agency for International 
Development.
 -
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Despite this initial success, it became clear that to effectively implement 
competition law the assistance could not be restricted to KPPU, but had to 
involve the courts in charge of dealing with competition cases. Therefore, the 
Governments of Indonesia and Germany agreed to continue their development 
cooperation in the field of competition policy. In December 2005, the Government 
of Indonesia and GTZ began a new project to assist in implementing the existing 
competition law credibly and effectively (project objective) for five years. The 
following results chain describes the output and impact of the project. 
The new GTZ-supported project has two Indonesian partner institutions: 
in addition to KPPU, the Indonesian Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) 
also joined the project. Furthermore, the project cooperates with selected 
district courts responsible for competition cases. The activities also address 
lawyers, representatives of the police, the public prosecutor, and law faculties 
at universities. Civil society is targeted through public hearings and intensified 
public relations work. 
Support from the Bundeskartellamt has been continued during implementa- 
tion. In addition, cooperation between the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH – German 
Federal Court of Justice) and the Indonesian Supreme Court has been started. In 
May 2007, the presidents of both institutions signed an agreement at the BGH in 
Karlsruhe (Germany) to intensify their cooperation. 
Other partners of the GTZ-supported project are the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation (FNS) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). There 
is also close coordination and cooperation with other development partners, for 
example with UNCTAD and the Asian Competition Forum (ACF).
Until now, long-term German development cooperation (together with the 
support of other development partners who joined at a later stage) was highly 
effective and had great impact: During the first years of implementation, a 
competition law was endorsed and the KPPU was established as an independent 
authority for implementing this law. Whereas in many other developing countries, 
the commission authority (if there is any) is more or less a toothless tiger, the 
rulings of the new KPPU became, after initial reputation problems, more and 
more accepted by the responsible ministries and courts. Since its establishment, 
the KPPU has identified or received over 300 cases and has ruled on 33. The 
first rulings, which were not accepted by the corporations and were therefore 
appealed to the Supreme Court, were all refused by the Supreme Court, often 
due to procedural violations. However, the KPPU and the Supreme Court have 
improved their ability to handle the competition law, and today the Supreme Court 
now affirms more than 75% of the KPPU rulings. Better enforcement of the law 
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has already helped improve business competition in shipping and airline services, 
benefiting the public with cheaper fares. The decisions and recommendations of 
KPPU have also had an impact on consumer prices (reduction of prices for flight 
tickets) through increasing competition (rising number of airlines).
For the success of German technical cooperation in the area of competition 
policy, several factors are highly important: 
•  High-level dialogue in the beginning to create a common understanding 
about the principles of competition policy. Here an explicit link to elements 
of the model of the social and ecological market economy was made and 
accepted by the Government of Indonesia. This high-level dialogue has 
continued throughout the project implementation and is now being 
continued by Prof. Bornkamm, the leading judge of the Cartel Senate of the 
BGH.
•  Long-term technical cooperation mobilizing all relevant stakeholders 
provided a holistic approach with a clear priority on appropriate advocacy and 
adequate sustainable capacity development to enable the relevant Indonesian 
partner institutions to design, draft, and implement the new competition 
law. Many partner institutions and other stakeholders have been involved 
in this project: policy makers (for concept development), executive bodies 
(competition authorities, relevant line ministries), the judiciary (judges and 
lawyers), the media (to generate awareness and support among the wider 
public), private business (to ensure their compliance with the law), and 
academia (universities and research institutes).
•  Involvement of high-level experts and practitioners of German institutions 
in charge of competition policy, the Bundeskartellamt, Bundesgerichtshof, 
and recently also the Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency). Hence, 
the long-term, trusting, and effective institutional cooperation between the 
two countries is still ongoing.
•  Assisting the KPPU in regional activities: This contributed to greater 
ownership of competition policy by the Indonesian Government, as Indonesia 
took on a leadership role among the ASEAN countries9 by organizing the 
first regional conferences on competition policy.
These success factors are essential elements of the holistic approach that 
GTZ advocates. Furthermore, a cost-efficient mix of resources has been used. 
The project not only had a remarkable impact; it was also cost-efficient. Until 
now, the project has not employed long-term international experts, but only 
9Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Frank Tibitanzl  |  265
local advisers, for project management. To reduce expensive travel, cross-country 
video conferences were organized, during which KPPU staff were able to discuss 
with experts from the Bundeskartellamt and the BGH.
However, a lesson learnt is also that for such a politically charged and 
controversial issue like competition policy, progress is not a linear process. There 
are always periods of frustration without any steps forward. 
3. Future Options for German Technical Cooperation
German technical cooperation in the area of competition policy in Indonesia 
will phase out in 2009. Therefore, the next steps in the ongoing project will 
concentrate on sustainability, including improvement of the interplay between 
the relevant institutions (especially KPPU and the Supreme Court) and 
improvement of the methodology (market definition, measurement of the impact 
of competition policy on social welfare, etc.) to improve the reputation of all 
institutions in charge of competition policy. All competition authorities share the 
problem of legitimacy, as the impact of improved competition on social welfare 
is not easy to demonstrate. The benefits are widespread and distributed among 
many companies and consumers. Furthermore, big companies always have an 
interest in a less powerful competition law and try to lobby against competition 
policy. Even in Germany, it took the Bundeskartellamt more than 10 years after 
its establishment in 1957 to become an effective and widely accepted institution. 
Thus, the importance of functioning competition for the development process 
in Indonesia must be continually emphasized. There has to be a broad consensus 
in the society that the success achieved so far must be protected against the 
interests of a few powerful companies.
The successful methodical approach of German technical cooperation in 
strengthening competition policy in Indonesia should be repeated in other 
countries of the region: So far, only four (out of 10) ASEAN member countries have 
introduced a competition law (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
Indonesia is the only ASEAN member that has a really independent competition 
authority and has started to restructure its judicial system to competently handle 
competition cases. However, implementing an effective competition policy is an 
important issue for all countries of Southeast Asia. Apart from Laos, which is 
still in the accession process, all ASEAN countries are already members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which recommends the implementation of 
competition policy and law for each member country. 
266  |  Part 4  Practitioners‘ Perspectives
GTZ has sufficient knowledge and experience for technical cooperation in 
competition policy, especially through its collaboration with German practitioners 
from GTZ’s strategic partners (Bundeskartellamt, Bundesgerichtshof, and 
Bundesnetzagentur). More support in competition policy and related areas like 
consumer protection policy could easily be provided to other ASEAN countries 
and to the ASEAN secretariat within an integrated approach. Especially 
the ASEAN secretariat should be strengthened in its role of advocating and 
harmonizing competition policy within member countries in the framework 
of the ongoing economic integration. This is the lesson learnt from the process 
of European Integration: From the beginning, the European Union has dealt 
extensively with antitrust and unfair competition. Article 85 of the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome sets out the basic parameters; these basic parameters of competition 
policy are still missing in ASEAN.   
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Private Sector Development, Labor Conflicts, 
and Corporate Governance in Vietnam –  
The Search for New Models
Ricarda Meissner and Ho Sy Hung
Executive Summary
Vietnam is undergoing a rapid transition from a centrally planned economy 
to a free market economy, which is being accelerated by global integration and 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the government 
has introduced important changes to the legal framework, there are still many 
reforms required to ensure proper functioning of the market and the private 
sector. However, besides liberalizing, Vietnam also needs to think about steering 
the new market economy into the right direction in order to avoid polarization 
of society, new poverty, and increasing dissatisfaction by segments of society that 
may be left behind. The Vietnamese constitution clearly aims at an economic 
model in which the state has the role of ensuring that the entire society is uplifted 
and that economic growth will sooner or later ensure access to education, health 
services, and social security for all citizens of the country. 
While the economic performance of Vietnam in the last few years has been 
impressive, there is growing concern about labor conflicts and strikes, which 
are on the rise all over the country. This paper looks more closely at the factors 
behind those strikes and argues that one of the main causes is the fact that 
Vietnam, with its current legal framework, is moving, more or less involuntarily, 
towards an economic model clearly biased towards shareholder interests and 
has not yet built up structures allowing stakeholder influence, participation, 
and control. The paper looks then at instruments of the social market economy 
and discusses whether some of these may offer interesting ideas or solutions to 
Vietnam’s current problems. As a conclusion, several approaches are identified 
which would constitute an appropriate next step for Vietnam. They combine 
a free market economy and dynamic growth of the private sector with a legal 
framework that responds to stakeholder values, leading to social justice, balanced 
growth, and improvement of living conditions for all. 
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Private Sector Development in Vietnam
Since the mid-1990s, Vietnam has undergone rapid economic growth. Impres-
sive changes have been made by the government to move the country towards a free 
market economy. The National Assembly reformed the constitution, making the 
private sector a key pillar of the economy, and confidence in the private sector has 
substantially improved since then. Significant legal reforms have helped establish 
a sound framework for dynamic development of the private sector. Integration 
into the world economy has been one of the main drivers of economic reform 
in Vietnam, and more profound changes need to take place in the next years 
in order to comply with WTO requirements, but also in order to support the 
domestic private sector in its efforts to become globally competitive.
One of the most important milestones for private sector development was 
the Enterprise Law of January 2000, which combined the previous Company 
Law and Private Enterprise Law. It represented a radical change in approach 
to private sector activities. Until then, private enterprises had been “allowed” 
to operate, if they obtained government approval and complied with special 
government controls. It was only the Enterprise Law that gave citizens the right 
to establish and operate private businesses without unnecessary intervention 
from government officials. Since the beginning of 2000, enterprise creation has 
increased continuously at an average pace of 1600 new companies per month. 
In addition, the Investment Law resulted in an immense increase of foreign 
investment, and state-owned enterprises started to be privatized. 
The private sector now accounts for 33% of the value of production in 
manufacturing, and provides wage employment to 21% of Vietnam’s labor force. 
Massive job creation has allowed 1.4 to 1.5 million entrants to be absorbed into 
the labor market every year. In addition, the average wage has grown at around 
7% in real terms over the last decade. In 2006, annual GDP growth reached 8.2%, 
and around 8.3% is expected for 2007. New commitments for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) reached US$3.7 billion in the first five months of 2007, an 
increase of 25% over the same period in 2006.
In general, the dynamic business development has resulted in rapid poverty 
reduction in Vietnam and has allowed a large part of the population to raise 
their living standard. A very positive effect of the Vietnamese growth miracle 
is reflected in the poverty index: while real GDP per capita has increased by 
5.9% per year on average since 1993, the Gini index (measuring inequality) has 
increased only slightly, reaching 0.37 in 2004. In total, the poverty rate fell from 
57% to less than 20% during that period (World Bank 2005).
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New Problems: Labor Conflicts and Strikes
The Current Situation
There is an expression in Vietnam comparing the ongoing reform process to 
“jumping on a driving train and changing its direction.” This image illustrates 
very well the current conditions under which reforms must be made: in the 
middle of a fast and dynamic process, struggling to keep pace, but often running 
a few steps behind. Thus, reforms have been completed successfully in some 
areas, while in other closely interlinked areas the necessary reforms have not yet 
been implemented – sometimes because there has been no strong lobby fighting 
for it or because there just has not been sufficient time. This results in a certain 
“bumpiness” of the reform process, which is normal, but becomes worrying when 
the lack of appropriate legal reform negatively affects the livelihood of people 
and in particular those who are in a rather vulnerable situation. This is exactly 
the case with regards to labor issues in the dynamic private-sector development 
process in Vietnam. 
One of the few negative by-products of the impressive development of the 
private sector in recent years has been the increasing number of labor conflicts, 
strikes, and violations of labor laws by foreign and domestic employers.
From 1995 to 2006, there were 1250 strikes in the country, 66.8% in companies 
representing foreign direct investment and 26.2% in domestic private companies, 
not one of which was called in accordance with the legal procedures. In general, 
there has been a 7% annual increase in the number of strikes since 1995.  In 2007 
there was a steep increase: already in the first six months there were 300 strikes, 
involving 200,000 strikers (Nguyễn Bá Ngọc et al. 2007).
According to official information sources, the cause of the large majority of the 
strikes (80%) is legal violations by the employers. Almost all of these strikes are, 
therefore, “walk-outs” or work stoppages rather than strikes: workers refuse to 
continue working due to accumulated violations of their rights by the employer 
and with the objective of forcing the employer to comply with his obligations. 
“Real” strikes, during which employees collectively fight for higher wages or 
other benefits in addition to those in their current labor contracts, have started 
only recently. This is related to the fact that inflation has been eroding the 
workers’ standard of living. Living space all over the country has become more 
expensive, as have other necessities. Workers have also become more aware of 
new opportunities and increasing demand for labor. There is strong pressure 
on the labor market from the lack of skilled workers, which increases workers’ 
bargaining power.
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Typical violations which led to strikes or walk-outs included:
•  issuance of no or only temporary labor contracts, in violation of labor 
regulations and labor contracts. This allows the employer to avoid payment 
of social security and allows flexible lay-offs, but leaves workers completely 
unprotected;
•  failure to pay salaries in a timely manner or reduction of salaries without 
proper  justification;
•  excessive overtime: in some enterprises workers put in around 1000 hours of 
overtime a year, while the legal maximum is 300 hours per year. A new way 
of forcing workers into overtime is to set high targets that workers can only 
fulfill by staying longer. 
•  inadequate or no payment for overtime; 
•  failure of the employer to increase wages as contractually agreed upon;
• lack of payment for social security and other legal obligations;
•  failure to allow sufficient rest and breaks, in particular for sick workers (in 
one case, striking workers demanded 30 minutes rest for sick workers instead 
of 12 minutes);
•  frequent lay-offs without giving a reason and without paying the legal 
compensation; and
•  low quality of accommodation and food, which in some cases is so bad that 
workers get sick.
A good overview of how labor regulations are currently implemented is a study of 
the labor inspection department in 2006, which listed 12,720 cases of violation of labor 
regulations in 3998 companies – 3.18 violations per firm. These numbers were obtained 
from a “self-test” and via questionnaires sent to enterprises (Nguyen Ba Ngoc 2007).
Around 75% of the strikes have occurred in FDI enterprises, where the highest 
rate was among the Asian investors. The strikes usually took place in labor-
intensive industries with a low level of technology, mainly footwear, textiles, 
garments, and processing sectors and often in provinces which are “hot spots” of 
industrial development, leading to high demand of labor and the employment of 
migrant laborers (Clarke et al  2006). 
The real number of violations of labor regulations is surely much higher than 
3.18 per enterprise, as most take place on a more individual basis. As long as an 
employer does not violate the rights of a critical mass of workers, an individual 
has very little recourse. Thus, most violations are unreported and do not have any 
negative consequences for the employer.
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Negative Effects of Strikes and Government Measures to  
Improve the Situation
Strikes in general have a negative impact on the reputation of Vietnam as a place 
to do business. The problem is still moderate, but is starting to lead to frustration 
in the business community, in particular among foreign direct investors. While the 
government steps in and tries to solve the conflicts that cannot be solved through 
legal procedures, the question sometimes arises why the government is not more 
active in preventing strikes. International chambers in Vietnam have already jointly 
made public “their grave concern over the potential impact on Vietnam’s reputation 
as an investment destination” (Schaefer 2006). Workers, on the other hand, wonder 
why more effective methods to sanction violation of their rights are not in place.
The government is worried that strikes may become “standard procedure” 
for workers and may lead to social unrest and a climate of rioting, which could 
become difficult to keep under control in the long run. Larger strikes often spread 
to neighboring companies and may end in destructive behavior. In addition, 
strikes may also be supported by surrounding villages that have problems with 
the company, often related to pollution, additional traffic, wrecking of their 
infrastructure, waste water, or other kinds of damages. 
From the private sector’s point of view – whatever the reason for the unrest – 
strikes mean loss of time and money, may prevent deadlines from being met and 
thus result in penalties from international trading partners, and destroy a good 
working climate, the work ethic, and productivity. Besides that, the firms also 
end up with the negative image.
The government has in the mean time issued several decrees which should help 
to improve the situation. For example, one recent decree instructs the government 
and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) to enhance regular 
dialogue between the government and enterprises, with the objective of informing 
foreign direct investors about the situation of the workers and improving the firms’ 
voluntary commitment to comply with regulations and possibly to increase salaries.1 
In addition, new incentives have been launched for investors, in particular tax 
breaks when they improve the living conditions of their workers by supporting 
the building of living quarters. Furthermore, the government itself started to 
invest more into improving the houses of workers in export processing zones.2
Nevertheless, all this will not improve the situation significantly as long as no 
sustainable mechanism for communication, cooperation, and partnership among 
workers and firms has been institutionalized. 
1Decree 6/2006/CT-TTg.
2Decree 133/2007/ND-CP.
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The Legal Framework
Vietnam has a comprehensive legal framework for labor relations: The 
Labor Code of 1994, amended in 2002, gives a framework for labor contracts 
and collective agreements and provides a basis for protection of employees. It 
specifies details such as duration of rest and meal breaks, maximum length of the 
working week, and minimum wage. A limit is set on overtime, and guidelines are 
given for payments for night and holiday work, social insurance contributions, 
and benefits (Clarke et al. 2007). The Labor Code also restricts the ability of the 
employer to impose fines on employees or to dismiss them, provides relatively 
generous redundancy payments, gives the trade union considerable rights to 
consultation, in addition to its role in collective bargaining, and requires the 
employer to provide facilities and time for union work. In addition, the 2002 
amendment required all employers to establish a trade union organization 
within six months. 
According to the Labor Code, responsibility for monitoring the enforcement 
of labor legislation is shared between the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA) and the labor union, the Vietnam General Confederation of 
Labor, but in practice the main responsibility falls to MOLISA, since the union 
has almost no power outside the state-owned sector. The sanctions on employers 
who violate the Labor Code are minimal. What the labor department or the 
union can do is to refer an employer to the People’s Committee or the relevant 
ministry, which could make life very difficult for an employer, in the last resort 
even stripping the company of its investment licenses. However, in reality, it is 
very rare for sanctions to be imposed on employers who violate the law.
Enterprises should be inspected at least once a year. However, MOLISA has 
only 350 inspectors and the union has 100 inspectors. In the Hanoi Department 
of Labor, there are 11 inspectors responsible for 700 state enterprises, 600 foreign-
invested enterprises, and over 20,000 private enterprises. The Ho Chi Minh City 
Labor Department has five inspectors for more than 30,000 enterprises.
The Department of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs reintroduced labor 
inspections in 2005 and found in one survey that 14 out of 16 enterprises inspected in 
the Export Processing Zone had very poor working conditions and violated the labor 
law. The department’s conclusion was that the zone trade union had failed to enforce 
the labor law and was “too pro-company.” There are no consistent statistics on the 
number of legal violations uncovered by the labor inspectors. It is obvious however, 
that the inspectors have very little time to make routine inspections, as they are already 
overwhelmed with cases of industrial accidents and strikes (Clarke et al. 2007, 550).
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Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution 
Conflict Resolution as per the Labor Code
The Labor Code provides a system for the resolution of individual and collective 
labor disputes through conciliation and arbitration and gives employees the right 
to strike in the case of a collective labor dispute, once these procedures have been 
exhausted, provided the strike decision is made by the trade union and endorsed by 
a majority of employees. Employees in certain essential industries and enterprises 
are prohibited from striking (Labor Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam).
The procedures described in the Labor Code demand that enterprises with 
trade unions should set up a labor conciliation council with an equal number of 
employee and employer representatives. If a conflict arises, the labor conciliation 
council shall commence the conciliation within three days of receiving a request 
for conciliation.  If the labor council cannot find a solution, the dispute is referred 
to the provincial arbitration council. If still there is no solution, the trade union 
can either go to court or officially call a strike (Nguyễn Bá Ngọc et al. 2007).
In reality, these procedures are almost never applied because:  
•  They are too complicated and take too much time.
•  They apply only to enterprises with trade unions. In firms that do not have a 
union – and usually the FDIs do not – strikes are theoretically illegal anyway 
and there is no official conflict resolution procedure. 
•  The conciliation council includes the same number of representatives of 
employees and employers. Negotiations such as these are only bilateral and 
will often end without finding a solution. 
•  The labor arbitration councils do not have sufficient power. Their decision 
can be rejected by any of the parties.
•  If there is a trade union, its representative is usually appointed by the provincial 
union branch or the employer and is not elected by the workers. Thus, he/she 
often does not have the trust of workers. In addition, he/she is usually not even a 
worker, but one of the managers, usually the human resource manager. 
In fact, since their set up, the labor arbitration councils have received very few 
requests for settlement of dispute. The labor arbitration council in Ha Noi has settled 
only two cases since its establishment in 1997, while the labor arbitration council 
in Ho Chi Minh City has settled just one case since 1998. Almost all labor disputes 
have been settled by fire-fighting interventions of the local labor departments.
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 … and Conflict Resolution in Practice
As legal procedures are obviously inadequate, a “firefighting” approach has 
been developed to allow quick reaction in case of a strike and has proven quite 
effective in resolving conflict. When a strike breaks out, the local government is 
called in and will usually send officials from the provincial labor department to 
the strike-affected enterprise. Sometimes, a task force is also set up by the people’s 
committee, comprising, besides the local government, the union and in some 
provinces also the chamber of commerce (VCCI).
Negotiations start, and in most cases the strike is called off after a few days 
when the demands of the workers are met by the employer. This often happens 
quickly after the governmental task force has stepped in, as the firm prefers to 
keep a low profile if it has violated the Labor Code.
However, this procedure has a few structural problems:
•  First, legal regulations are based on the assumption that workers/employees 
feel and are indeed represented by the enterprise unions in labor conflicts. 
This is obviously not the case.
•  Second, while the legal regulations foresee a period of formal negotiation to 
settle a conflict and avoid a strike, strikes and walk-outs seem to be the only 
means workers have to pressure their employer to listen and/or to accept 
their requests, even if their demands are within the law, as they usually are. 
Effective dialogue or compliance enforcement mechanisms are absent.
•  Third, protecting the rights of the labor force does not seem to be a priority 
of local governments at the moment. This may be related to the importance 
given by the national government to the attraction of foreign investment 
and the intention (strongly pushed by almost all donor agencies) to be as 
“business-friendly” as possible. The priority given to business friendliness 
may, however, lead to overexploitation of the labor force, if they do not have 
a powerful lobby to fight for their rights.
•  Fourth, labor inspections are not effective. Labor inspection departments are 
seriously understaffed and cannot cope with the number of cases they need 
to look after. Instead of proactively pursuing compliance with regulations 
– which the Vietnamese Government does in other areas – the role of the 
department is only reactive.
The most important issue, however, is the role of the unions, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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The Role of the Labor Unions 
Status of the Vietnamese Labor Unions
The Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) is a powerful 
organization with around 5.5 million members. Traditionally, the role of labor 
unions in Vietnam was to help the government achieve production plans by 
strengthening labor motivation and discipline and by providing social welfare, 
sports, cultural, and entertainment facilities to its members. Many unionists and 
employees still see their organization in this way (Clarke 2006).
The main tasks of the labor union were not considered to be in the workplace, but 
rather on a national level, where they represent workers’ issues within the political 
system. Thus, unions are considered to be institutions which secure laws, decrees, and 
regulations that ensure better working conditions for workers, and, as a matter of fact, 
they have been successful in their role as lobbyist for the general interests of workers.
However, unions are not what they are actually supposed to be and what is 
urgently needed in a free market economy: they are not the elected representatives 
of the workers! The primary reason for this is that labor unions operate under 
the leadership of the Communist Party and are therefore ruled from the top. 
The subordination of the union to the party demonstrates the subordination of 
the immediate interests of union members to the wider social, economic, and 
political goals of the party, and at the enterprise level these generally coincide 
with the interests of management (Clarke et al. 2007).
This means that labor unions are acting more like a governmental agency, 
department, or even ministry, but not like an institution that represents workers’ 
interests against the interests of their employer. 
The Enterprise Unions
According to the Vietnamese Labor Code, the regional branches of the labor union 
must establish labor union branches in all private and foreign-invested enterprises 
that have more than ten employees. The Labor Department recognizes that unions 
do not do much to prevent strikes from happening, but sees that it is much easier to 
settle a strike in an enterprise with a trade union.  
When planning to set up a labor union branch in a private or foreign-invested 
enterprise, the provincial union will normally approach the employer and asks for 
his consent to establish a union. The provincial union does not approach workers 
directly, as “this would infringe on the rights of the employer.” If the employer does 
not want to permit a trade union, even though by law he is obliged to do so, it seems 
that there is neither any pressure on him, nor any sanction prescribed by the law.  As a 
result only very few enterprises in the Export Processing Zones have a union at all.
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After it is set up, the union will usually appoint a temporary president and will 
set up a provisional standing committee through agreement with the employer. 
Elections to these positions are supposed to be held a year later. The president 
appointed by VGCL is usually not worker, but in most cases a manager, often 
the human resources manager of the company. Also the enterprise standing 
committee is usually dominated by line managers and white-collar workers, 
with fewer than one in five committee members being production workers. 
The appointment of managers is often justified by the fact that he/she would be 
more knowledgeable. Once set up, the enterprise unions are basically left alone 
and receive little backstopping from the VGCL. Performance is therefore very 
dependent on the personal capabilities and commitment of its leaders.
In enterprises with more than 500 employees, there is supposed to be one or 
two full-time officials appointed and paid by the higher union, but the VGCL 
does not have the funds to cover this. Therefore, most enterprises do not have 
any full-time union staff, and in others full-time officers are usually paid by the 
employer. 
The main expenses covered by the labor-union budget are for weddings, 
funerals, sports, and entertainment events. These activities are considered to be 
more important than proper trade union activities, as, according to some union 
leaders, “without these activities the union will not be able to attract members” 
(Clarke 2006).
Union leaders have only weak protection from victimization. According to the 
law, a trade union president cannot be dismissed without the permission of the 
higher union body, but in practice it seems employers ignore this restriction and 
are never sanctioned for violating the law (Clarke 2007). Moreover, there is no 
requirement that an employer renew the contract of a trade union activist who is 
employed on a fixed-term contract. Accordingly, a recent study found that most 
union presidents accepted nominations only under pressure from the employer. 
Provincial unions state that it is extremely difficult to find people who are willing 
to take up trade union positions.
Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Interests
The Vietnamese Enterprise Law has been one of the most progressive laws in the 
country’s transition process and has had immense influence on the development 
of the private sector. Endorsement of its first version in 2000 led to a boom of 
new firm start-ups and opened up the way to fully independent operation of 
private enterprises. In its revised version of 2006, the Enterprise Law established 
greater equality of legal treatment among state-owned enterprises, FDIs, and 
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private companies. Although the Enterprise Law was an important step forward 
for Vietnam, it has room for improvement with regard to stakeholder interests 
and rights. 
In European countries, stakeholder participation is a key instrument of corporate 
governance. The stakeholder model has basically the following advantages:
•  greater commitment and ownership by employees;
•  joint decision making by employer and employees, leading to a joint vision 
within the firm;
•  higher investment in areas which ensure long-term prosperity of the firm 
and sustainable jobs; and 
• better control against mismanagement via supervision of stakeholders.
 
When screening the Enterprise Law and other related laws on stakeholder 
representation, it quickly becomes obvious that European practice is not at 
all reflected in Vietnamese laws – they neither provide a legal framework for 
employees nor give stakeholders a role in supervision of the management 
board. Thus, Vietnam joins the group of countries applying a neo-liberal model 
of corporate governance that leaves decision-making power and supervision 
exclusively to the shareholders.
When comparing the OECD Corporate Governance Principles to Vietnam’s 
legal framework on the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, the result 
is not very impressive:
Principle IV A, which recommends that “the corporate governance framework 
should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements and encourage active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises” is 
only partly observed. Under the Enterprise Law of 2005 and the Model Charter 
of 2002, stakeholders, including employees, labor unions, suppliers, and 
creditors, do not participate in the internal corporate decision-making process. 
Party organizations, women’s unions, former line ministries, and people’s 
committees – all state bodies – are considered stakeholders and only they have 
a certain role to play in the decisions of corporations. Furthermore, no specific 
codes of conduct or recommendations for the treatment of stakeholders have 
been developed, and the level of awareness of corporate social responsibility is 
low (World Bank 2006).
Principle IV B, which states that “where stakeholder interests are protected by 
law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of 
their rights,” is also only partially observed. Employees and creditors can in theory 
seek redress through the courts. Employees are protected by the Labor Code, a 
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collective labor agreement (if any), and the Law on Bankruptcy. Creditors are 
protected by the Civil Procedure Code and the Law on Bankruptcy. In practice, 
however, there have been few cases that have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
current mechanisms.
Also the principle which recommends that “performance-enhancing mech-
anisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop” is fulfilled only 
in individual cases as there are no formal rules for this. In practice, very few listed 
companies have obtained shareholders’ approval to issue convertible preferred 
stock as a performance bonus for their management or employee stock options. 
However, this practice has become more common in the last two years.
Information access is not as open as it should be: The principle that ”where 
stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access 
to relevant, sufficient, and reliable information” is “materially not observed.” The 
stakeholders’ special access to information is not regulated by law and stakeholders 
are not allowed to access corporate information beyond what is available publicly. 
The only exception is that creditors may have special access to information under 
the loan covenants.
And – most importantly – stakeholders have no role in controlling the 
activities of the board: the principle that “stakeholders, including individual 
employees and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their 
concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board, and their rights should not 
be compromised for doing so” is “not observed.” 
Whistleblowers (employees who report misconduct of their management) 
are required to provide concrete evidence, rather than just voice their concerns 
before authorities can accept their concerns as a valid case for further processing. A 
“Whistleblower Rule” similar to the one stipulated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the 
US is unknown in Vietnam. Stakeholders, particularly employees, may articulate 
their concerns to the control committee and ask them to act in the company’s 
interests. In practice, whistle blowing outside of official channels does not exist.
Technical Cooperation for Private Sector Development  
in Vietnam
Assistance by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies for private sector 
development (PSD) in Vietnam has been extensive in the last years. Important 
contributions have been made to support the economic transition process, 
in particular with regards to legal and administrative reform, institutional 
strengthening, and building capacity of the private sector for global 
competitiveness.
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Donor-funded PSD programs in Vietnam typically focus on improvement 
of the business climate, legal and administrative reform, investment promotion, 
public-private dialogue, and competitiveness. Via the SME Partnership 
Group, there is a strong mechanism for coordination among donor-funded 
programs under the leadership of the Agency for Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development, which reports to the Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
Looking at donor approaches to PSD development, it is obvious that these 
approaches generally reflect the point of view of owners and shareholders – as it 
is normal in PSD activities. While, for example, a large number of public-private 
dialogues and consultation forums are held every year to provide feedback on 
laws and regulations, representatives from the unions or at least the local labor 
departments are never invited. Donors have also not promoted ideas of stakeholder 
representation in corporate governance or a specific role of stakeholders in the 
supervision of management. 
This is strange, in particular when considering the fact that in most cases 
bilateral donors active in Vietnam do not follow shareholder oriented and neo-
liberal economic models in their own countries, but instead often have highly 
redistributive and socially oriented economic systems.  And it becomes even 
stranger, when considering the Constitution of Vietnam, which does not seem 
to call for a neo-liberal economic model:
The Constitution of Vietnam states that “the State ensures and constantly 
fosters the people’s rights as masters in all spheres, realizes the targets of building 
a prosperous life for its people, a strong country, and an equitable, democratic, and 
civilized society, ensuring the well-being, freedom, and happiness of all citizens as 
well as conditions for their all-round development” (Constitution of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 2001).
As per its constitution, Vietnam aims to establish an economic system in which 
a free market is combined with equality and “well-being” for all citizens and in 
which the state plays a prominent role in providing access to health, education, 
and social services” (article 59ff.). However, while the country and its main 
development partners are preoccupied with the important task of liberalizing 
the economy, insufficient thought is given to the question on how to “balance” 
the economy and how to steer it into the right direction.
When discussing the actual components of a “socialist-oriented market 
economy” with government officials, party members, or political researchers in 
Vietnam, it becomes obvious that the ideas are not very clear, but that an intensive 
search is underway for adequate models.
In this situation, on the one hand, technical cooperation is required to present 
the values and instruments of the social market economy to Vietnam and thus 
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offer strategies for a transition to a market economy that do not create disparities 
and new poverty. On the other hand, the government and the party should 
proactively seek to create awareness and familiarize itself and its senior levels with 
instruments of the social market economy.
In the following paragraphs, instruments of the social market economy 
that may be of great relevance and interest to the Government of Vietnam in 
its current endeavor to push forward private sector development are presented 
(Roesner 2003). In addition, strategies with which technical cooperation could 
support promotion of the social market economy are discussed.
Introducing Concepts of the Social Market Economy in 
PSD in Vietnam 
Creating Awareness of the Social Market Economy
An important task for the Vietnamese Government is to first make itself and 
its relevant political decision makers familiar with values and instruments of 
the social market economy. The issue of how to combine a rapid transition to a 
market economy with establishment of a proper social system and the promotion 
of social values is a hotly discussed topic and arouses great interest within the 
government and also within the party. Regular discussion groups, seminars, and 
workshops on this topic should be organized.
Development partners involved in this area should view the Communist Party 
as a new and important partner, as it is currently seeking appropriate instruments 
with which to make its socialist-oriented market economy more meaningful. As 
an example, the party could include elements of the social market economy in its 
regular training programs for their senior government officials, where “capitalist” 
and “socialist” models are usually discussed, but where insufficient information 
is provided on more modern forms of social and economic order. Cooperation 
partners here could be the German and other political foundations, which usually 
have extensive experience with capacity building in these areas.
Promoting Workplace Representation: Building Capacity of Grassroots 
Organizations and Workers’ Representation at the Enterprise Level 
Structures to represent employees at the workplace level exist in almost all member 
countries of the European Union. Workplace representation is usually manifested 
via works councils or board-level representation (Joerges and Roedel 2004).
Because unions cannot be considered to be a real form of employee representa-
tion at the enterprise level in Vietnam, certain parts of the government are 
currently seeking ways to build the capacity of the workers to better represent their 
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interests and manage a dialogue with their employers. At the moment, capacity 
building of labor unions will not solve the problem, given the factors mentioned 
above. The social market economy and its instrument of social partnership offers 
many models for building a joint vision of employees and employers, for building 
capacity of employees in negotiation, collective bargaining, and representation, 
and for raising management awareness of stakeholder values, building employee 
commitment, etc., also in the case that labor unions are not fully functional.
Promoting Employee Representation at the  
Board Level/Co-determination
Co-determination or employee representation at the board level is a widely 
discussed issue in European Union countries at the moment and is an important 
pillar of a stakeholder oriented economic system. While opponents usually claim 
that co-determination would scare off investors3 (which does not seem to be 
verified by recent research), its supporters emphasize the many positive effects 
it has, including higher commitment of employees, higher productivity, and 
more investment in long-term strategies (over against  a model where the firm 
is used as a cash-cow) (Trade Union Advisory Committee 2005). In particular, 
co-determination is effective in preventing labor conflicts and strikes: countries 
with a functioning system of co-determination have on average many fewer 
annual strike days. One of the most important advantages of co-determination is, 
however, that employee representation on the board is a mechanism by which to 
control management, thus greatly restricting options for misconduct and fraud. 
Eleven states of the European Union have legally ensured that employees have 
a representative on the board, both in the public and private sectors. The basic 
threshold above which employees must be on the board in a private company 
ranges from 25 employees in Sweden to 1000 in Luxembourg. In most cases, the 
employee representatives are on supervisory boards in a two-tier board structure, 
but in some countries they are on the management board in a one-tier structure. 
As mentioned, employee representation on the board does not exist in Vietnam, 
but may be a valid model for the future, when real worker representation can be 
ensured. In the meantime, the government could look at different models of co-
determination and develop a specifically Vietnamese model of worker representation. 
Technical cooperation from relevant countries of the European Union could offer 
Vietnam information about specific models and provide insights into the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. Unions should be assisted to lobby for inclusion of co-
3See Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende (Confederation of German Employers‘ Associations) 
2004.
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determination into the relevant laws. Awareness of co-determination should be 
enhanced in the relevant government think-tanks, chambers, and the Communist 
Party, which could become a powerful promoter of this model. 
Awareness should also be created of the important function of workers’ 
representation on the board as a control mechanism – a valid alternative to the 
currently ineffective and understaffed regulatory agencies of the government.
While the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows control over the 
management board and protects whistleblowers against retaliation, an 
instrument like this is not really required in a functioning co-determination 
system, as whistleblowers can report cases of fraud, misconduct, or violations of 
the law to their representatives in the supervisory board. However, as long as 
co-determination is not in place, the government of Vietnam might consider a 
special law to protect whistleblowers. 
Promoting Concepts and Instruments of Social Partnership 
Concepts of social partnership – cooperation between employer and employee 
organizations for the common objective of economic growth and social justice 
– should be promoted throughout the private sector and the labor force and 
should be included in capacity building programs, not only for unions but also 
for parts of the government.
The government should ensure that tripartite dialogue and cooperation for 
promotion of economic and legal reform is organized, in addition to the usual 
public-private dialogue forums. On a national and political level, the unions may 
be valid promoters of the concept of social partnership and should be helped 
to understand this concept and to promote it in consultations on new laws and 
regulations.
Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility 
Even if Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) cannot and should not be 
seen as a replacement for legal rights, it is an important voluntary instrument 
with which to improve working conditions and enhance commitment by the 
labor force. 
CSR is already extensively promoted by many donors, mainly via their 
public-private-partnership programs in Vietnam. Multinationals are the most 
active players in CSR and are usually used as benchmarking examples or linkage 
partners for local firms in their supply and distribution chains. However, CSR 
should also be promoted as a strategy for domestic firms, which then would not 
be only recipients but also initiators of CRS plans.  
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The government and the chambers might also consider setting up annual 
awards for the best domestic CSR program or could launch major public relations 
campaigns promoting the idea that CSR is a valid instrument with which firms 
can demonstrate their commitment to the community (Eigentum verpflichtet 
- property entails obligations). Tax breaks for specific CSR measures or other 
incentives could also be considered in the future.
Improving the Labor Code and Ensuring its Implementation
As seen above, the Labor Code needs to be amended if it is to be relevant to 
resolution of current labor conflicts. Legal procedures should be drafted on the 
basis of the fact that the union may have a role in lobbying but cannot replace 
elected workers’ representatives. If this fact is continuously ignored, the situation 
will not improve. Donor agencies could support the process of dialogue among 
local and national governments, grassroots organizations, FDI representatives, 
and chambers, with the objective of working out realistic procedures for the 
resolution of labor conflicts.
The labor standards that have been adopted by the Government of Vietnam 
can theoretically be considered a model for other countries in the region – if they 
are implemented. As mentioned above, due to the current importance given to 
the attraction of FDI, there seems to be little enthusiasm for making sure that 
they are implemented, as this may frustrate investors. In addition, agencies in 
charge of inspections are seriously understaffed.
Technical cooperation can support the Ministry of Labor and its departments 
in their efforts to improve labor inspections and thus avoid labor conflicts and 
strikes caused by violations of the law. This should be done with sensitivity to the 
potentially negative impacts of inspection on private enterprises with regards to 
bribery and unjustified harassment of firms, and/or high administrative burdens. 
Technical cooperation can assist the government in making labor inspections 
business friendly and service oriented. The labor inspection departments 
could become a source of information for firms and workers, holding regular 
information seminars and public relations events and disseminating guidelines 
on labor standards for employers and workers, self-assessments, and all kinds of 
other informational materials.
Legal Protection against Dismissal of Worker’s Representatives
Employee and union representatives need legal protection against dismissal, 
if they are to take up their tasks correctly and in an unbiased manner. As per 
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the German labor law,4 elected worker representatives enjoy special protection 
against dismissal during their term and a period of one year after that. The fact 
that Vietnam also has a law protecting union representatives from dismissal is 
rather unknown in Vietnam among both managers and respective officials. The 
Ministry of Labor could aim to raise awareness of this law and find strategies to 
ensure compliance with it. 
Conclusion
Mainstreaming social market economy values in private sector development 
in Vietnam is an urgent task for the economic and social development of the 
country. The social market economy offers many potential solutions for the 
growing tensions and problems accompanying Vietnam’s transition process.
The government, the party, and the private sector alike are highly interested 
in the concepts of the social market economy, as its values correspond very 
well to the objectives of the Vietnamese constitution, in combining a free and 
dynamically growing market economy with improvement of living conditions 
and access to security, health care, and education for all Vietnamese citizens. For 
Vietnam, the social market economy is therefore an important alternative to a 
neo-liberal system, with its limited trickle-down effects that sooner or later create 
deep inequalities and serious ruptures within the society.
However, the concepts of social market economy are not yet sufficiently 
well known in Vietnam, and where they are know, then mainly on the level 
of theoretical concepts, but not with regards to its practical instruments. The 
Government of Vietnam should proactively examine this model and use it as a 
source of inspiration and practical guidance to further strengthen and deepen 
their vision of a socialist-oriented market economy. The Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, together with other European 
agencies, would have a competitive edge in promoting this economic model 
and its methodologies in Vietnam, thus providing practical solutions for many 
current problems in the transformation process of the country and ensuring that 
the transition to a market economy results in social justice and improvement in 
the living condition of all Vietnamese citizens. 
4§ 15 Absatz 1 Satz 2 KSchG (Employment protection act, paragraph 15, clause 2).
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Cambodia: Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Cambodia Business Initiative in Rural 
Development (C-BIRD)1
Peter Bolster and Peter Brimble
Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is becoming an important instrument 
to link profit-oriented operations with social engagement. Thus, CSR is 
responding to one of the main principles of the social market economy, the 
principle of Eigentum verpflichtet (property entails obligations).2 Firms are 
beginning to acknowledge a certain responsibility for their social environment, 
even in the absence of a corresponding legal framework. CSR does not replace a 
proper legal framework and cannot in general replace the state as the guarantor 
for balanced growth. However, the CSR approach can be particularly significant 
in countries where state structures that would allow the introduction of proper 
social systems by the government are not yet set up. CSR has up to now been 
familiar as an instrument of multinationals that would like to improve their 
image as socially and ecological responsible entities. In the meantime, however, 
CSR is becoming more important as an instrument for larger or even medium-
sized domestic firms, which are increasingly seen as potential partners in the 
search for greater social equality. These firms also view their engagement as a 
way to increase the commitment of their employees and thus improve the overall 
performance of their operations. 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Cambodia
Because of the low level of business and private sector development in 
Cambodia, the level of CSR remains at a nascent stage. This is perhaps 
compounded by the extensive number of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which might appear to make it unnecessary for firms to undertake 
1The presentation draws on Brimble and Kang 2006 and Brimble 2007.
2Article 14, paragraph 2, German constitution.
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significant CSR-type activities. In addition, there are no policy measures designed 
to promote business CSR activities as a tool for rural development, indicating a 
critical need to advocate for more promotional and proactive policies to support 
CSR, in particular, and business involvement in rural development, in general.
CSR has become extremely popular in developed economies in Europe and 
North America over the past decades. However, in developing countries in East 
Asia, such as Cambodia, CSR is a relatively new concept, and the implications of 
developments in CSR for local companies are still being explored. 
The Kenan Institute Asia (2005) provides a useful summary of why corporate 
citizenship is particularly important for East Asian corporations at the present 
time: “Over the last five years, there has been increasing pressure for corporations 
to be better corporate citizens. This pressure has come from customers, buyers, 
investors, employees, governments, the news media, NGOs, and local communities. 
The corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, etc. have drawn attention to 
corporate failures and led to greater government scrutiny. In response, forward-
looking companies are strengthening their corporate governance, improving 
labor conditions, exceeding environmental standards, and positively engaging 
their communities in order to build trust with their stakeholders. Many business 
managers have concluded it is no longer sufficient for companies to have simply 
philanthropic mechanisms; they must become active partners in helping prevent 
and solve social problems.”
In Cambodia, the size of the industrial base and the extent to which the industrial 
structure offers potential for CSR activities are limited. At present, most businesses 
are concentrated around Phnom Penh and urban and other provincial or district 
centers, and appear to take little interest in rural development issues. There seem 
to be few businesses interested or willing to be involved in CSR-type projects in 
Cambodia. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the private sector generally has an 
entrepreneurial way of operating that is based on vision, innovation, and planning. 
This business know-how is traditionally lacking in rural societies, in NGOs, and 
in the public sector.  For example, farmers are eager to grow food and vegetables, 
yet they are disconnected from the information and resources needed to develop 
their activity so that it becomes a strong and sustained source of income. With 
the business sector’s expertise, farmers can learn the skills needed to create more 
profitable and sustainable enterprises and activities and generate income. 
The following examples demonstrate the potential for CSR activities in 
Cambodia, especially those that connect businesses and rural society through 
innovative partnerships which leverage resources from both sides to develop 
sustainable income-generating activities for rural areas:
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•  Total (Cambodge) Company: As part of the UNDP Growing Sustainable 
Business for Poverty Reduction Program, Total Company carried out 
a project called “Promoting Energy Entrepreneurship in Cambodia’s 
Rural Areas,” which promoted four rural electricity entrepreneurs directly 
supplying electricity to rural villagers in four provinces: Battambang, Banteay 
Meanchey, Prey Veng, and Kampong Cham. The project aimed to support 
the development of rural electricity enterprises by building up the capacity 
of entrepreneurs. The project was conducted from May to December 2005 
with an amount of US$40,000 spent on training in accounting software, 
business plan development, electrical techniques, etc. This project is part of 
a global Total CSR program. 
•  British American Tobacco (BAT) Company: In 1997, BAT set up an 
extension service program to support tobacco farmers in Kampong Cham 
province, with the mission to improve product quality, reduce production 
and maintenance costs, as well as to be socially responsible. BAT supports 
tobacco farmers in Kampong Cham by supplying seeds, training, and quality 
control. The company’s staff supervises and provides technical information 
to farmers on how to improve the quality of production and also encourages 
them to take up new techniques. At the start of project, BAT focused on 
capacity building for the farmers. The initial goal was to substitute local 
products for around 10% of imports in the first few years. BAT has contracted 
with around 350 farmers, mainly in Kampong Cham, to grow tobacco with 
new seed varieties. Their yield per hectare has increased to 1.7 tons from just 
750 kg in 1996. The programs undertaken by BAT illustrate the significant 
role of BAT in poverty alleviation through corporate social responsibility. 
•  Manhattan Textile Company: Manhattan Textile initiated a cotton project 
in Koh Sotin district, Kampong Cham province, to support cotton farmers 
by providing seeds, training, and quality control. Through the project, 
Manhattan Textile is looking at long-term investments and encouraging 
government ministries and agencies, as well as authorities at all levels, to work 
closely with it in order to rehabilitate cotton production. The company’s 
cotton project is a campaign to promote cotton plantations. The main thrust 
of the project is to invigorate and modernize the agricultural sector, generate 
employment, enhance household incomes, and improve access of the less 
privileged to food. 
•  Les Artisans D’Angkor: Les Artisans d‘Angkor was established to provide 
sustainable and fair development for arts and crafts in Siem Reap province. 
It offers young artisans a job on-site or in its rural workshops in Siem Reap 
surroundings. In addition, Artisans d’Angkor is a center for vocational 
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training where young people can express their talents and continue to 
develop their skills. To date, Artisans d’Angkor is completely self-financed. 
It continues to invest in new apprenticeships and skill creation by providing 
on-going training, setting up new rural village workshops, and participating 
in major promotional events to help promote Cambodian culture and 
handicrafts (for example, 2005 World Expo). At the core of the company’s 
activities are ideas for the social, economic, and professional advancement of 
Cambodian artisans. The company guarantees fair pay as well as social and 
medical welfare. The artisans have formed an association and have a 20% 
stake in the company.
CSR and the Thai Business Initiative in Rural Development 
(TBIRD)
The Population and Community Development Association (PDA), one of 
the largest NGOs in Thailand, initiated the Thai Business Initiative in Rural 
Development (TBIRD) in 1996 to complement PDA’s core activities in family 
planning.  The experience of TBIRD in Thailand proves to be an invaluable guide 
for possible CSR activities in Cambodia.
TBIRD’s overall concept is to encourage the private sector to help improve the 
quality of life of rural people throughout Thailand.  The basic idea is to mobilize 
relatively untapped private-sector resources and recruit successful businesses to 
participate actively in rural development.  Ideally, each company would “sponsor” a 
village and help villagers to develop the business skills necessary for successful income 
generation activities. Long-term sponsor involvement is important to sustain the 
village development.  Two pioneering TBIRD companies were Swedish Motors Co., 
Ltd. (Volvo), which started a project in 1988, and the Bangkok Glass Co., Ltd., which 
got involved in 1989. The Ford Foundation was the first donor to support TBIRD; its 
assistance was in the years 1990-1993. German Agro Action (GAA) started to provide 
assistance to PDA’s TBIRD Bureau in 1994 and continued the funding until 2003.
TBIRD has proved that it is possible to recruit businesses to transfer business 
skills to villagers, establish income generation activities in the villages, slow down 
migration to urban areas, and improve the quality of life of rural people. TBIRD 
is a partnership involving the government, the private sector, and the villages; 
the villages are the focus of the projects and the main actors in implementing 
the specific activities. The government builds up the infrastructure and plays a 
supporting role. The private sector takes the lead in providing business skills, 
appropriate technology, market opportunities, and business networks. A well-
established NGO creates awareness of business social responsibility and serves 
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as a facilitator. Key strategies are resource mobilization, integrated development, 
human resource development, and local institution building. There are a number 
of key lessons from TBIRD that are relevant for Cambodia and other developing 
countries:
•  There appears to have been considerable discussion within TBIRD and 
PDA on present and future directions – especially regarding corporate 
social responsibility and its implications for TBIRD-type projects. Indeed, 
the TBIRD Division has recently been renamed as the CSR Division.
•  The government has put in place generally supportive policies for industrial 
decentralization – in particular, the additional benefits provided by the 
Thailand Board of Investment for investors locating their factories far away 
from Bangkok, as well as certain policies of the Ministry of Industry.
•  Recruiting companies to actively participate in rural development is not 
an easy task.
•  A critical facilitating role was played by the PDA, which is a strong NGO 
with strong outreach into Thailand’s rural areas and with sufficient financial 
and related resources.
•  Dynamic leadership with a clear vision and strong networks in the business 
and political communities is required to attract sponsoring companies. It 
should be noted that the initial concept of TBIRD was actually developed 
by the chairman of PDA; this doubtless contributed to the successful 
development of a dedicated unit within PDA.
•  The TBIRD project developed an innovative project implementation 
process that emphasizes inclusiveness – involving all stakeholders. This 
has been critical in creating ownership among the rural villagers and 
contributing to sustainability.
•  The previous experience of PDA in rural areas before TBIRD had resulted 
in the perception that PDA and its staff had high levels of integrity and 
a clear mandate to contribute to rural development through building 
linkages between business and the village communities.
The Cambodia Business Initiative in Rural Development
In an effort to stimulate CSR in Cambodia, the Asian Development Bank 
supported a technical assistance project in 2005 to facilitate the establishment of the 
Cambodia Business Initiative in Rural Development (C-BIRD) project, drawing on 
the experiences of TBIRD, similar projects in Cambodia, and additional research.3 
Supported by a task force of business and government leaders, NGO representatives, 
3see Brimble and Kang 2006 and Brimble 2007.
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and selected donors, the Ministry of Rural Development and a team mobilized and 
financed by the Asian Development Bank worked from July 2005 – March 2007 to 
develop the C-BIRD concept and implementation methods.
In particular, a C-BIRD Public-Private Partnership Task Force, chaired by 
H. E. Lu Lay Sreng, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Rural Development, 
was constituted to support the project implementation. It comprised: (a) senior 
representatives from Cambodia’s main business associations – the Phnom 
Penh Chamber of Commerce, the Garment Manufacturers Association in 
Cambodia, the International Business Club, the Cambodia Hotels Association, 
the Association of Banks in Cambodia, and the Cambodian Federation of 
Employers and Business Associations (CAMFEBA); (b) senior representatives 
from the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy, 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, and the Council for the Development of Cambodia; (c) 
representatives from interested NGOs; and (d) donor agencies as needed. The 
overall role of the task force was to steer the C-BIRD initiative, provide overall 
guidance on policy and institutional issues, facilitate the capacity building 
exercises, assist in developing pilot partnerships, and generally support project 
implementation.
The Cambodia Business Initiative in Rural Development developed as a 
program to connect businesses and rural society through innovative partnerships 
that leverage resources from both sides to develop sustainable income-generating 
activities for rural areas. C-BIRD provides benefits to the business side as well as 
the rural community. First, the involvement of staff members from the business 
enterprise has resulted in higher levels of morale. Second, the company has been 
able to achieve higher levels of corporate social responsibility. And third, to the 
extent that the C-BIRD activities relate to the core business of the company, 
either through deepening the supply chain or supplying raw materials or products 
to the company, the profitability of the company may also increase. 
In the development of the C-BIRD project business plan, some critical lessons 
were derived from previous experiences in Cambodia:
•  Lesson 1: Business commitment is required. The importance of business 
commitment cannot be overstated, and will depend, to some exten, on the 
type of C-BIRD modality being considered. Firms that develop activities 
that strengthen their supply chains – like BAT – are likely to have a strong 
commitment to the activity, as are firms that see C-BIRD activities as major 
elements of their corporate philanthropy programs.
•  Lesson 2: C-BIRD projects are not easy to implement. C-BIRD projects often 
are complex, involve many stakeholders, and require considerable resources – 
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both financial and human – for successful implementation. This is especially the 
case in an environment like that in Cambodia – where business impediments are 
numerous and infrastructure is rather weak. In that case, a strong facilitator and 
high levels of awareness of the importance of C-BIRD type projects among the 
business community and the rural communities are required.
•  Lesson 3: A participatory approach is important. Since C-BIRD projects 
are the initiatives of businesses from outside the village, using a participatory 
approach can help ensure that such projects fit the needs and demands of 
local people. In addition, a participatory approach is a tool that includes the 
needs of both men and women in the village.
•  Lesson 4: The village information base is critical. Rural development is 
an erratic process. To eliminate or minimize the losses incurred by certain 
groups as well as to avoid misunderstanding among groups, it is critical 
to have a reliable, updated, and accessible information base in the village 
that communicates to both villagers and external stakeholders (businesses, 
government, NGOs, donors, etc.).
In order to meet the objective of developing C-BIRD and related activities, 
mainly through developing the structure of a business plan for the most suitable 
institutional mechanism, the following institutional options for the C-BIRD 
initiative in Cambodia were considered:
• Option 1: Form a new C-BIRD institution or NGO as the facilitator;
• Option 2: Use an existing NGO (or NGOs) as facilitator; and
• Option 3:Use a public agency as facilitator.
In the Cambodian context and on the basis of numerous interviews and 
deliberations in the task force meetings and a major national stakeholder 
meeting held in November 2005, option 1 was selected as being the most 
suitable. The Ministry of Rural Development was to play a transitional role 
in facilitating the formation of the new institution and in facilitating the 
implementation of selected sample C-BIRD projects. The project team 
therefore proceeded with this element of the project – the formation of the 
C-BIRD Foundation.
To guide the preparation of C-BIRD, a second phase of technical assistance 
commenced in December 2006 to prepare a draft C-BIRD business plan, a draft 
C-BIRD governance framework and strategy, a C-BIRD Foundation briefing 
paper, and some notes on fund raising. In addition, a C-BIRD retreat was held 
on January 18, 2007 to review the range of issues to be covered in the business 
plan and the governance framework, and then the first meeting of the C-BIRD 
Foundation was held on February 27, 2007. 
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A number of factors critical to success were identified to guide the achievement 
of the C-BIRD Foundation’s principles and objectives:
1) Strong leadership with a business orientation;
2) Top-level commitment for C-BIRD;
3) Clear focus, mandate, objectives;
4) Need to engage business;
5) Development of information and capacity to interface with rural areas;
6) Good governance;
7)  Networking with NGOs, donors, and other key stakeholders, likely 
through involving them on a board of directors;
8)  Support from donors or other sources of finance for certain institution 
and project activities; and
9) Starting with manageable projects and with initial successes.
The C-BIRD Foundation, as a newly created institution under the umbrella 
of NGO status, is intended to play a critical role as the facilitator of activities 
and resource mobilization among four key groups of players (and stakeholders) 
in Cambodia: the two key partners in any C-BIRD project – rural communities 
and villages, and business associations and businesses; and the two key supporters 
of such projects – government agencies, and donors and NGOs. These groups 
Figure 1: C-BIRD Institutional Context
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are illustrated in the institutional context chart presented in Figure 1, drawn from 
the C-BIRD Foundation business plan. 
All key groups and stakeholders will be explicitly involved in the activities of 
the C-BIRD Foundation, either through direct involvement in the foundation 
or through proactive efforts to create additional mechanisms to link them into 
foundation activities. Figure 1 presents the roles and activities of key stakeholders 
and the contributions expected from each.
The proposed organizational structure for the C-BIRD Foundation is shown 
in Figure 2, drawn from the C-BIRD Fou ndation business plan. This structure is 
designed to support the full range of activities required to facilitate and support 
C-BIRD type projects in Cambodia, and to involve all key stakeholders explicitly 
in the C-BIRD Foundation implementation process.The C-BIRD Foundation 
comprises three levels as indicated: 
First, the C-BIRD Foundation, with up to seven members from three of 
the key stakeholder groups: (a) business associations; (b) donors/NGOs; 
(c) government agencies. The C-BIRD Foundation will be a relatively large 
group in order to mobilize resources, networks, and influence. A chairperson 
Figure 2: Structure of the C-BIRD Foundation
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will be selected by all members to provide direction to and lead the C-BIRD 
Foundation.
Second, the C-BIRD management committee, with nine members selected 
from the C-BIRD Foundation as well as the manager of the C-BIRD secretariat. 
The C-BIRD management committee will be more closely involved in the 
activities of C-BIRD and will establish a number of sub-committees to deal with 
specific issues. These sub-committees will be chaired by a management committee 
member, but could involve additional resources from the C-BIRD Foundation 
or from outside, if required and deemed suitable.
Third, the C-BIRD secretariat, which will be responsible for day-to-day operations 
of the C-BIRD initiative and will support the foundation and management 
committee in their activities. Figure 2 indicates an initial proposed staffing of the 
C-BIRD secretariat of six persons: the manager (who will play an especially critical 
role in running the C-BIRD Foundation), the publicity and IT officer, the secretary 
and office administrator, the research and database officer, and two C-BIRD project 
account executives.
C-BIRD Foundation Next Steps and Lessons Learned
A number of critical next steps need to be carried out in order to ensure that 
the C-BIRD Foundation achieves its ambitious objectives. At the present time, 
the project has not made the rapid progress that was anticipated at the first 
meeting of the C-BIRD Foundation. The critical issues are as follows:
•  Urgent attention must be paid to raising funds to support the establishment of the 
C-BIRD Foundation and other matters (funding for basic setup and six months 
running costs should be a minimum – around US$50,000). This task appears to 
be difficult, with all parties waiting for the first move from another party.
•  Immediate efforts must be undertaken to identify possible candidates and recruit 
the C-BIRD secretariat manager. This person will play a key role in moving all 
aspects of the C-BIRD Foundation ahead, including fund-raising.
•  The structure of the management committee and sub-committees and 
definition of their roles must be finalized. Suggestions for possible sub-
committees are presented in the draft business plan.
•  The offer of the Population and Community Development Association 
(PDA) in Thailand to provide financial (US$10,000) and related support to 
the human resource development activities of the C-BIRD Foundation and 
related projects must be followed up.
Indicative Lessons Learned: Although it is a relatively small project, a number 
of useful lessons were learned from the implementation of C-BIRD activities:
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•  The initial C-BIRD task force was a valuable tool with which to mobilize 
a broad range of stakeholders to play a role in the innovative C-BIRD 
initiative. These included businesses and business associations, donors and 
development partners, and government policy makers.
•  An innovative concept like C-BIRD has the potential to draw together a unique 
group of public and private institutions and individuals to focus on poverty 
alleviation, rural development, business linkages and skills, and related matters.
•  There is strong potential for injecting valuable experiences from other 
countries through direct institutional involvement, as was done with the 
Population and Community Development Association from Thailand.
•  It is important to allow for carefully selected pilot projects (such as the 
Business Guide for Emerging Entrepreneurs) to demonstrate the basic 
concepts of a project model, create greater awareness, and show the potential 
for scaling up project activities.
In order to provide a indication of the kinds of projects that C-BIRD 
could carry out, two sample C-BIRD projects are presented here – one of 
which (the business guide book) has already been completed with financial 
support from the Association of Banks in Cambodia and the Asian 
Development Bank.
Garment Remnant Utilization Project: The Garment Remnant Utilization 
or Creating Village Workshops and Income Generating Opportunities Project 
aims to take advantage of the willingness and ability of garment factories to make 
available remnants, scraps, machinery, and training to help groups of villagers 
set up small workshops that can make products from these materials – such as 
toys, cushions, children’s clothes, etc. The Garment Manufacturers Association 
of Cambodia (GMAC) and selected garment factories and other groups would 
provide finance and training to the village groups, likely through micro-credit 
and small training programs. The project involves the provision of materials 
and equipment to the villagers, as well as assistance in identifying what types 
of products to produce and ways to market them. This project seeks to increase 
incomes in selected villages, create job opportunities in rural areas that will 
reduce migration to cities, link garment workers and their home villages, and 
create value-added applications for waste products and old machinery from 
garment factories.  Garment factories and the GMAC will benefit from an image 
of corporate social responsibility. 
Business Guide Book for Rural Communities: The Business Guide Book 
for Rural Communities or Promoting Understanding of Business among 
Rural Communities Project produced a written resource that assists rural 
communities in developing a better understanding of key business concepts 
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and how to establish and run small businesses. The guide book was based 
on existing materials from the Stock Exchange of Thailand and other books 
and manuals on doing business, in particular for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. In a broader sense, the project aims to increase credit extension 
from financial institutions to rural micro enterprises/entrepreneurs and to 
strengthen the confidence of financial institutions in providing credit to rural 
micro enterprises/entrepreneurs. Project activities included the production and 
dissemination of a business guide book for rural communities. The expected 
impacts of the project are:
•  Greater awareness among rural communities of business concepts and 
practices;
•  Publicity for the Association of Banks in Cambodia and for C-BIRD 
among rural communities; the guide book will be a flagship project of the 
association; and
•  Support to all rural communities that will become involved in C-BIRD type 
projects.
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Corporate Social Responsibility in  
Practice – Improving Working Conditions 
in Bangladesh
Peter Roggekamp
Bangladesh and its Economy
Bangladesh has made remarkable progress since its independence less than 40 
years ago. The country produces enough food to feed its population; agriculture 
has diversified in recent years, improving the nutrition of the poorest part of the 
population, of which two-thirds live from agriculture. The other main drivers of the 
economy are the readymade garment (RMG) industry, which employs over 1.5 million 
workers, and remittances, mainly from the Middle East. Bangladesh is an important 
exporter of shrimps and has some emerging industries like pharmaceuticals. 
According to official statistics, 40-50% of the population live below the 
poverty line. The growth that has changed countries like Thailand or Korea and 
is now changing China and India is not present in Bangladesh. The state is weak 
and only partly able to fulfill core tasks like security or basic education. This 
weakness has led to an economy where corruption and distortion rule and where 
regulation and direct stimulation of certain sectors is almost absent. 
These unfavorable economic foundations have created industries that are 
not able to compete with the regional giant, China. Small workshops produce 
products that are inferior in quality and price. The majority of the 18 million 
inhabitants of the capital Dhaka earn their income from these small workshops, 
from trading and distribution, or from transport and construction. 
Bangladesh is a perfect example of what happens in an economy when the 
state fails to regulate externalities. Investment and innovation are very limited 
and entrepreneurs are not really held accountable when they degrade the 
environment or create dangerous and unhealthy working conditions. This results 
in an economy where child labor is more the rule than the exception, where 
labor is a commodity that can be replaced if workers fall ill or injured, and where 
pollution of all kinds is visible everywhere. 
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Corporate Social Responsibility in Bangladesh
Companies in Bangladesh cope with the adverse conditions by staying small 
and invisible, or by becoming large economic conglomerates. 
• But how do they deal with social and environmental externalities? 
 •  Can these externalities be integrated voluntarily into enterprises’ daily 
business operations in the Bangladesh reality?
• What are the incentives for companies, large and small, to do so?
• Can development partners like GTZ stimulate companies to do so?
The next pages will give some answers to these questions.
Social and family networks play an important role in the Bangladeshi society. 
Aided by strong religious principles, the networks raise expectations for people to 
act socially and responsibly in their private lives. Once people enter the economic 
world, these forces seem to largely disappear.
Pressure from consumers has become a strong force in reducing socially and 
environmentally undesirable behavior of enterprises in western counties. This 
pressure has spread to the two Bangladeshi export sectors, RMG and shrimps. 
Codes of conduct regulate working conditions and environmental impacts. 
German development cooperation, through the project for the Promotion of 
Social, Environmental, and Production Standards in the Readymade Garment 
Sector (PROGRESS), is active in improving the working conditions in the RMG 
sector, by using this western consumer pressure.
However, consumers in Bangladesh mainly worry about how to feed their 
families. Consumer pressure is rare, though some pressure is starting through the 
media. Katalyst, a program funded by three European donors and co-implemented 
by Swisscontact and GTZ, is assisting the media to play this role better. The 
program supports newspapers and television stations in their efforts to report on 
business issues by training journalists and by increasing the capacity of the media. 
Awareness creation is a first step towards motivating companies to adopt a 
more socially responsible attitude. Katalyst has supported the creation of a 
forum on corporate social responsibility (CSR), where large companies interact 
and receive training on issues related to CSR. This CSR forum is funded by its 
private sector members and is operational. It is too early to say to what extent the 
center can motivate its member companies to deal with all their stakeholders in a 
socially responsible way, rather than simply “giving charity.”
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Child Labor and Working Conditions in Dhaka
Katalyst is working to stimulate pro-poor growth in many sectors of the 
economy by increasing the competitiveness of the private sector and supporting 
micro and small enterprises in a number of urban industrial sectors. However, it 
soon became apparent that by stimulating growth, Katalyst was also indirectly 
responsible for increasing child labor and negative working conditions. Over 
the last three years, the program has experimented with ways to reduce child 
labor and improve working conditions by way of sustainable mechanisms. 
In the workplace improvement initiative, the program focuses on a few sectors 
in Old Dhaka, where there are tens of thousands of small workshops with old, 
dangerous machines. The workers rarely use protective gear and the workshops 
are full of half-finished products and waste. Bare electric cables often crisscross 
the rooms, and lighting is dim. Clean drinking water and sanitation are normally 
not available. Most workshops employ young boys. 
As already mentioned, the state does not view it as a priority to improve working 
conditions, nor does the general public. However, most owners of workshops are 
worried about the working conditions in their workshops. Many are still working 
themselves or have worked in similar conditions in the past. A large number have 
had serious injuries, and they do not want their workers, often friends or family, 
to suffer a similar fate. How can these good intentions be translated into action? 
Approaching the issue from a productivity angle could be an entry point. A 
number of studies have clearly confirmed the hypothesis that better working 
conditions can lead to higher productivity, so that improvements pay for 
themselves. Three mechanisms could be employed here:
• Workers are more productive in a positive environment.
•  Better working conditions could attract better workers and keep them with 
the company longer.
• Better working conditions make it easier to control and improve quality. 
However, Katalyst found that in most cases entrepreneurs in small 
manufacturing workshops in Old Dhaka are not willing to invest in protective 
gear or in other measures to improve safety and working conditions, even when 
they understand the benefits. If their financial situation allows, they would rather 
invest in equipment that has a higher return on investment. It is therefore not 
enough to simply raise awareness or to show entrepreneurs the way.
 Katalyst has found a potential solution by looking at the incentives of other 
players in the value chain, by analyzing who else would benefit from improved 
working conditions in small workshops in Dhaka. Many small enterprises have 
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relationships with larger enterprises. It was found, for example, that around half 
of the small workshops in Old Dhaka have a working relationship with large 
garment companies. If the garment companies benefit from better working 
conditions in their own factories, then they would also benefit from improved 
working conditions in their backward linkages – this would give them an even 
cleaner image. 
Other players include the suppliers of inputs. These are often large companies 
that sell tools or products like welding electrodes. This group could embed safety 
information in their sales and in this way benefit from a safety image. 
Katalyst looks for opportunities where the mechanism that improves the 
working conditions is sustainable in itself – where others are interested to 
improve the working conditions in small shops. These could be large companies 
who buy from the small shops or vendors of safety equipment; they could be 
trade associations or financial institutions. Below are some examples:
Rahimafrooz Batteries 
Rahimafrooz is a company with a good reputation when it comes to working 
conditions and the environment. However, it took an intervention from Katalyst 
to make them realize that their supply line was not so clean. The top management 
was not even aware that most of the supplies and repairs came from small 
workshops. Rahimafrooz agreed to help some of its suppliers improve working 
conditions and to share the cost with the suppliers. Ventilation and lighting were 
improved, as were the layout of the machinery, housekeeping, and safe electrical 
wiring. The workshops agreed not to hire young children. All the companies 
gained. The suppliers got better working conditions, higher productivity and 
quality, as well as a more reliable client. Rahimafrooz gained reliable suppliers 
and, not unimportantly, a better reputation. Rahimafrooz may extend this 
arrangement to other suppliers. Other larger companies have also shown interest 
in similar plans.
The main role of Katalyst was opening the company’s eyes to opportunities 
and match making. 
Down-to-Earth Working Conditions
When asked, most workers in small workshops in Old Dhaka put a toilet 
and safe drinking water on the top of their priority list. The government never 
managed to place toilets in the hundreds of markets in Dhaka, but why do 
owners fail to build and maintain a toilet in their workshops? Here again, 
Katalyst was able to play the role of a catalyst. With its help, owners built a 
toilet and a safe water facility, but more importantly, owners were also helped 
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to jointly maintain the facility. The first toilet was built in the Golden Park 
Market. So far, five nearby markets have followed this example and taken the 
initiative to install toilets and safe drinking water facilities that serve more than 
1000 workers.
Safety as Part of Skill Development Training
The light engineering sector, one of the government’s thrust sectors, is facing 
problems related to skilled lathe and milling machine operators and inefficiency 
due to machine related accidents. It therefore has problems producing quality 
products. Katalyst helped the Bangladesh Engineering Industry Owners 
Association (BEIOA) to arrange low-cost training for workers at their respective 
workplaces on the weekends. Through this arrangement, 250 workers from 20 
workshops attained technical skills and better understanding of safe machine 
operating procedures. Based on the positive response, BEIOA has decided to 
continue this training. 
 Safety Fair 
Many owners and workers may see the need for improvements in working 
conditions, but do not know where to start. Vendors of safety equipment normally 
sell to large companies only. With the sponsorship of two large companies, 
Katalyst organized a road show, through which 12 safety and health product 
vendors met with around 10,000 workers and owners of small workshops. The 
show was made more attractive through comic skits, a photo booth, first aid 
instruction, and celebrity guest speakers.
Working Conditions attached to Loans 
Owners are often more interested in loans than in working conditions, but 
these do not need to be mutually exclusive. The Sajida Foundation, a micro 
finance institute in Old Dhaka, now appraises aspects of the working conditions 
of its borrowers. As a startup activity, a day-long workshop organized by Katalyst 
acted as an eye opener for 23 loan officers of the Sajida Foundation. The workshop 
explained the importance of assessing safety, health, and environmental aspects 
to reduce occupational-hazard-related risks and so to maximize loan recovery. 
The Sajida Foundation has the vision to incorporate working conditions as one 
of the prime loan eligibility criteria and to discuss these issues during weekly 
meetings with its 1300 enterprise borrowers. 
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Safe Food for All
The quality and hygienic standards of the food stalls where workers get their 
lunch and dinner are not contributing to a healthy and productive workforce. In 
general, small confectionaries, bakeries, and restaurants in Bangladesh are not 
aware of and therefore do not practice safe food handling procedures. In 2006, 
the government created a mobile court that has fined many of them. Together 
with a non-governmental organization called CaP & HuRDI, Katalyst has 
supported two restaurant and food producer associations in training 200 owners 
of food outlets and organizing a safe food fair.  
Final Remarks
Poverty and a weak state are two key obstacles to corporate social responsibility 
in Bangladesh. Owners of micro and small enterprises in Dhaka are in favor of 
improving working conditions, but have other priorities. With some creativity, 
however, there are many ways to reduce child labor and sustainably improve 
working conditions in these workshops. 
There are ways in which corporate social responsibility instruments can 
be used in cases where the state is too weak to set up proper systems for social 
balance, as the above examples show. Social values among the owners of small 
and medium-sized enterprises could very well provide the required readiness for 
strategies that support a better integration of the poorer parts of society into 
the growth process. Even if CSR may not be an alternative to institutionalized 
government systems of wealth redistribution, these are very promising examples 
of potentially powerful instruments that combine economic growth with social 
responsibility within the domestic sector of developing countries. 
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Social Security in Karnataka
D. Rajasekhar and Namerta Sharma1
Introduction
The Indian state of Karnataka is not only known for its famous capital city of 
Bangalore –Indian’s Silicon Valley; it has also earned a good name for passing 
path-breaking legislation on democratic decentralization in the mid-1980s, 
thus creating space for civil society institutions to emerge and make a positive 
impact at the national and international levels, and for the formation of a large 
number of people’s organizations (such as self-help groups [SHGs2], water-user 
groups, etc.). But, compared to its neighboring states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka is not well known when it comes to the provision of social security to 
unorganized sector workers, despite the fact that Karnataka has been one of the 
fastest growing Indian states in the recent past. 
The state domestic product in real terms grew at 8.7% in 2005-2006 and at 11.4% 
in 2004-2005. This translates into 10.8% per capita growth in 2004-2005 and 7.7% 
in 2005-2006. Between 1993-1994 and 2004-2005, real growth in Karnataka was 
almost 9%, largely on account of the growth of industry and services. Industrial 
growth was led by rapid expansion in manufacturing; growth in services, which 
was high across the board, was led by software exports. Karnataka has also been 
one of largest recipients of foreign direct investment among major Indian states. 
However, the high growth has not been equitably distributed among all the 
sections.  Although Planning Commission figures show that the incidence of poverty 
in Karnataka has declined from around one-third in 1980s to 17% in the year 2000, 
the poverty incidence was considerably higher among Scheduled Caste households 
(26.2%) and among Scheduled Tribe households (25.5%). Although some of the 
1The authors are Professor, Center for Decentralization and Development, ISEC, Bangalore and Program 
Coordinator, GTZ, Bangalore. They thank Rolf Sülzer, Ricarda Meissner, Ulrike Maenner, Suchitra, and 
Manjula for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2SHG is a small (with around 15 members) and homogenous (members belonging to similar socio-economic 
background) group often undertaking micro-finance (small savings and loans) activities in India. The group 
will enable the members to undertake planning, implementation, and monitoring of development activities 
including micro-finance. The potential for self-management, good governance, and self-reliance is known to 
be high among SHGs because of their small size and homogeneity. 
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industries in Karnataka have registered significant growth in terms of export earnings, 
the workers have not been paid statutory minimum wages and social security benefits 
(Rajasekhar and Suchitra 2006 and Rajasekhar and Manjula 2006). The workers 
have, therefore, been finding it difficult to meet livelihood needs and maintain 
safeguards against contingencies that result in stoppage or loss of income. In fact, the 
recourse to practices of informal work contracts with laborers has intensified since the 
liberalization policies introduced in 1991; manufacturers justify such practices on the 
grounds that they need to have a competitive edge in the international market.
As a result, the unorganized worker component in the labor force has 
been growing in the last one-and-a-half decades. In 2001, the total workforce 
in Karnataka was 23.5 million.  As is the case elsewhere in India, much of the 
workforce is in the unorganized sector. Unorganized or informal workers in 
India do not have formal contact with the employers and/or are characterized 
by an absence of an employer-employee relationship. Further, they do not often 
obtain minimum wages and social security benefits.
Unorganized workers comprised 91.9% of the workforce in 2004-2005. While 
the proportion of unorganized male workers to total male workers was 90%, that 
of unorganized female workers to total female workers was 95.3%.  The incidence 
of poverty was higher among urban unorganized non-agricultural workers (31.1%) 
as compared to their rural counterparts (7.7%).  The mean years of schooling 
were 3.6 for female rural unorganized workers, while it was 5.4 for male rural 
unorganized workers.  The mean years of schooling were higher for their urban 
counterparts; 7.3 for males and 4.5 for females (NCEUS 2006).  Thus, not only 
is the number of unorganized sector workers large in Karnataka, but they also 
suffer from widespread poverty and human development deprivation. This was 
especially the case with women unorganized workers.
Thus, although the growth rates in Karnataka have been very high, they have 
not resulted in trickle-down effects and improvement in the livelihood of poor 
unorganized workers. Further, the workers do not have any safety and security 
against contingencies (such as illness, accident, old age, maternity, and death) 
that result in the loss and stoppage of income.  In this context, an effective and 
efficient social security system would be a key instrument of the social market 
economy to improve this situation. In line with the values of the social market 
economy, the Karnataka government has been making efforts to soften income 
gaps, redistribute income, and ensure that social harshness is avoided for the vast 
majority of the unorganized workforce.  
The program Social Security Benefits for Unorganized Workers, Karnataka to 
be implemented by the Karnataka government with support from the German 
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Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, is one such effort. 
This program, based on years of preparatory work, promises to be different in 
its approach and institutional mechanism. The experience gained through this 
program will be relevant for other states in India and other developing countries.
Against this background, the present paper examines the formal social 
security schemes in Karnataka state, social security needs and contribution 
capacity of unorganized workers, as well as an Indo-German technical 
cooperation program that will be implemented jointly by the Department 
of Labor, Karnataka and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). This program will be 
introduced in the state from 2008 onwards.
Formal Social Security Benefits for Unorganized  
Workers in Karnataka
The social security benefits provided by the Karnataka government can be 
divided into three types: social assistance, social insurance, and other programs. 
In this section, we take a critical look at the first two.
Social Assistance 
Five social assistance schemes in Karnataka are being implemented for 
households living below the poverty line (hereafter BPL households); old age 
pensions, maternity benefits, family benefits, disability pensions, and widow 
pensions. While the first three are central-government-sponsored schemes, the 
last two are state schemes. The amount of old age pension, which until recently 
was Rs. 75 per month, went up to Rs. 200 per month in 2006-2007. An amount 
of Rs. 10,000 is provided as family benefit to households that lose the principal 
income earning member in an accident or through natural death.  The amount of 
maternity benefit is Rs. 500 per birth up to two live births. The widow pension 
is Rs. 75 per month per beneficiary.  The amounts of the benefits are, thus, paltry 
– ranging from as low as €1.5 in the case of old age and widow pensions to €9 in 
the case of maternity benefits. 
Figure 1 shows that the performance of social assistance schemes in Karnataka, 
in terms of number of persons assisted, varied over the period. Old age pension 
has been the largest program.  The number of persons assisted, which was about 
800,000 persons in 1996-1997, declined steeply in the late 1990s and picked 
up from 2001-2002. In contrast, the number of persons assisted under family 
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benefit and maternity scheme, 1146 and 11,730, respectively, in 1996-1997, 
increased in the late 1990s and declined thereafter.
Which factors influenced access to social assistance schemes in Karnataka? First, 
financial constraints compelling the state government to tighten the eligibility 
criteria resulted in restriction of old age pensions to only the destitute among 
BPL households and exclusion of a large number of unorganized workers living 
in vulnerable condition. Second, the poor access to old age and widow pensions 
was due to low levels of awareness of the schemes – eligibility conditions, whom 
to approach, and how to approach – and difficult documentation requirements. 
These, together with poor responses from the concerned officials and the high 
opportunity cost of wage labor income foregone in going around the government 
offices, forced unorganized workers to depend on middlemen and spend 
considerable amounts in the process. Third, the access to maternity benefits has 
been adversely affected by the mandatory rule of institutional delivery. However, 
accessing institutional delivery of meager amounts of maternity benefits is costly 
for the poor, as it involves costs of travel and accommodation at a distant place 
for a few days. Finally, weak bargaining power on account of limited membership 
in trade unions and people’s organizations such as SHGs has adversely affected 
access to social assistance schemes.
Social Insurance
In the year 2000, a group-based social insurance scheme, called the Janashree 
Bhima Yojana ( JBY), was introduced in Karnataka for persons in the age group 
of 18 to 60 belonging to BPL households. The insurance cover provided is up 
to Rs. 20,000 in case of natural death, Rs. 50,000 in case of accidental death or 
permanent disability, and Rs. 25,000 in case of partial disability. An innovative 
feature of the scheme has been that two school-going children of insurers are 
provided with scholarship of Rs. 100 per month to complete school education. 
Of the Rs. 200 annual premium, 50% is a subsidy from the central government.  
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Figure 1: Index Values of Number of Beneficiaries under Assistance
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Two striking positive features of the scheme are improved coverage of 
unorganized workers (Table 1) and an over 60% renewal rate (Rajasekhar and 
Suchitra 2006). These can be attributed to the following: First, being a group 
based scheme, it is largely SHGs which have accessed the scheme in the state. 
While the motivation and follow-up work by NGOs contributed to improved 
coverage, peer pressure in the group improved renewal rates.  Second, the 
scholarship scheme has been the principal mover to sustain the renewal rates. The 
lower and declining claim ratio (Table 1) can be attributed to the responsibility 
given to SHGs in assessing the claims and submitting the same to the higher level 
authorities.  Two lessons can be learnt in this regard. First, social security schemes 
implemented through SHGs are likely to result in good outcomes in terms of 
improved coverage and lower incidence of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Second, social security products need to be innovative, as in the case 
of JBY, which sought to combine life and disability insurance with scholarships 
for school-going children.
Table 1: Progress in the Coverage of Social Insurance Scheme in Karnataka
Years Number of lives
Number of 
claims
Claim 
ratio
Amount 
(Rs. 1000) 
claimed
Per capita 
benefits 
(Rs.)
2002-2003 38,470 518 1.35 10,720 20,695
2003-2004 68,511 608 0.89 12,540 20,625
2004-2005 168,231 880 0.52 18,035 20,494
Total 275,212 2006 0.73 41,295 20,586
The scheme would have had better coverage if the following problems have been 
taken care of:  First, awareness of the program has been found to be low. Rajasekhar, 
Manjula, and Suchitra (2006) found that only less than 5% of a sample of unorganized 
workers in Karnataka were aware of it.  Second, by extending the benefits only to 
BPL households, the scheme ignored heterogeneity among unorganized workers. 
While all the BPL households are likely to be in the unorganized sector, the reverse 
is not necessarily true. The BPL criterion is a very minimalist and inappropriate 
approach to extending social security to unorganized workers (Rao, Rajasekhar, 
and Suchitra 2006).  Finally, the poor are skeptical of contributing to a scheme 
when they realize that they will not get any returns unless and until the eventuality 
for which they have taken the insurance occurs. Since the JBY is not designed as a 
money-back scheme, the people prefer savings elsewhere.
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Social Security Needs and Contribution Capacity of 
Unorganized Workers
The state of Karnataka has been showing interest3 in initiating appropriate, 
effective, and sustainable social security benefits for unorganized workers. The state 
government prepared the Karnataka Unorganized Workers Welfare Bill in 2002, 
but this could not be implemented4 as the policy makers felt that they did not have 
adequate information on appropriate social security products, how to initiate and 
strengthen effective social security systems, and how to sustain the same.
The Karnataka government has, therefore, requested GTZ to undertake studies 
on design and management of social security benefits for unorganized workers. GTZ 
initiated three studies and the results of these studies are available in Rajasekhar, 
Suchitra, Madheswaran, and Karanth (2006); Rajasekhar, Manjula, and Suchitra 
(2006); and Rajasekhar, Suchitra, and Manjula (2006). These studies collected 
primary data from 505 agricultural laborers, 301 construction workers, 104 garment 
workers, 151 agarbathi (incense stick) rollers, and 152 domestic workers, and covered 
both female and male workers belonging to rural as well as urban areas.
The data collected by these studies are used here to show the priority social security 
needs of unorganized workers. Using participatory rural appraisal techniques, the 
workers were asked to prioritize the needs. As evident from Table 2, unemployment 
benefits, old age pensions, and medical benefits (sickness) were the three key needs, 
but the priority assigned to each of these needs differed across the occupational 
groups. Old age pensions were preferred by agricultural laborers, agarbathi rollers, and 
domestic workers, while construction workers assigned priority to unemployment 
benefits5 and garment workers to health insurance (sickness). 
3For example, the Yeshaswini Health Insurance Scheme, which was introduced in Karnataka in the year 2002, 
successfully covered over two million agricultural laborers and small and marginal farmers under contributory 
health insurance in 2004-2005. The International Labor Organization is providing some support to this. The 
World Bank is also planning to introduce a contributory health insurance scheme in the state.
4The Karnataka Legislative Council referred the bill to the select committee of the legislature to discuss and 
recommend whether the bill in its present form could be enacted in the legislature. The select committee, after 
detailed deliberations, could not reach a decision on this.
5Unemployment benefits here do not mean doles to workers during times of unemployment. Unorganized 
workers interpreted this benefit to mean an employment guarantee. And rightly so, since for these workers, 
unemployment was not really a contingency but rather a way of life. Not surprisingly, between 25 and 32.48% 
of workers across work categories assigned highest priority to this need. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Unorganized Workers (%) by Highest Priority 
Assigned to Social Security and Worker Category
Social security 
needs
Agricultural 
workers
Construction 
workers
Domestic 
workers
Agarbathi 
rollers
Garment 
workers
Unemployment 32.48 29.90  25.00 25.00 33.33
Sickness 9.50 12.29 11.54 17.57 49.33
Employment 
injury 7.72 22.92 5.77  2.70 4.67
Old age 
pensions 35.64 24.92 36.54 39.86 12.67
Death 5.15 6.64 10.58 14.86 0.00
Did not rank 9.51 3.33 10.57 0.00 0.00
Total 505 301 104 148 150
The above studies also found differences in preference for social security across 
regions, sex, age, and occupational groups. A greater proportion of workers from 
backward districts preferred unemployment benefits, while those from developed 
areas preferred old age pensions. The need for unemployment benefits was 
greater for women workers than for their male counterparts. Old age pensions 
were preferred by workers in the above-40 age group, while unemployment 
benefits were more highly preferred by younger workers. Households with higher 
education levels showed a higher preference for old age pensions, while the less 
educated households indicated a higher preference for unemployment benefits. 
Benefits for employment injury were strongly preferred by construction workers 
– a highly risk-prone group. 
More than 60% of the workers were willing to contribute to social security 
benefits, if they were reliable, effective, and efficient (Table 3). The proportion 
of workers willing to contribute varied across the different sectors, depending 
on economic conditions of households and coverage under existing insurance 
schemes.  The minimum, maximum, and average amounts that workers were 
willing to contribute towards their first priority social security need also varied 
across work categories.
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Table 3: Willingness to Contribute to Social Security and Amount of 
Contribution
Worker categories
Proportion of 
workers willing 
to contribute
Amount (Rs. per annum)  
that workers were willing to 
contribute towards first priority 
social security need
Minimum Maximum Average
Agricultural laborers 67.30 25 3000 624
Construction workers 82.00 100 9600 1092
Domestic workers 73.00 100 2400 906
Agarbathi workers 68.42 240 6000 1106
Garment workers 78.15 240 12000 1246
A good number of workers were unwilling to contribute to social security, as 
they belonged to households whose basic needs had not been adequately met. 
Such households were often the poorest and headed by women. For these workers, 
therefore, there is a need to facilitate reliable access to state social assistance and 
insurance programs, as well as ensure satisfactory fulfillment of basic needs, both 
of which are currently lagging, in part due to the poor institutional mechanisms 
for implementing the schemes. 
Important social security needs among unorganized workers in Karnataka 
are, thus, old age pensions, employment injury assistance, and health insurance. 
A significant proportion of the workers were willing to contribute towards 
social security, as against the widespread belief that they are not keen to join 
in a contributory social security scheme and that unorganized workers want 
free social security benefits. Rajasekhar, Suchitra, Madheswaran, and Karanth 
(2006) suggest that unorganized workers can be divided into two categories 
based on willingness to contribute and amount of contribution: first, those who 
cannot contribute to social security or need subsidies and, second, those who 
are in a position to join contributory social security schemes initiated by private 
insurance companies.
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Indo-German Technical Cooperation Program on Social 
Security Benefits for Unorganized Workers in Karnataka
The foregoing discussion on the existing social assistance and insurance 
schemes, and findings of studies initiated by GTZ suggest the following:
•  A fragmented approach has been adopted to provide social security benefits 
(both promotional and protective). Social assistance and insurance schemes 
have been made available only for the BPL households. As Rolf Sülzer’s paper 
in this reader shows, the households above the poverty line are not “rich” either. 
This implies that there is a need to cover all unorganized workers, whether 
they are in BPL households or not.  The poorest unorganized workers may not 
be in a position to join in contributory schemes in the short-run; but, a viable 
strategy would be to include them in a social security system to bring them 
to threshold income levels and enable them to join the contributory social 
security schemes. As the funds allocated to social security are spread out across 
the departments and schemes, there is a need to converge the resources.
•  The discussion on social security needs showed that unorganized workers have 
diverse social security needs and are willing to pay for social security if it is 
relevant, reliable, effective, and efficient. This implies that diversity in terms 
of social security needs and contribution capacities has to match with social 
security interventions that are flexible, relevant, and effective – and that one-
size-fits-all policies and implementation procedures would not work.  Here lies 
the crucial challenge: Which organization at the local level can partner with 
the government to capture the social security needs of the workers, present 
them to higher levels, and secure them? This can be done better by people’s 
organizations such as SHGs and village level decentralized governments (called 
gram panchayats in India), which have considerable informational advantages. 
•  Our analysis of social insurance programs in this paper showed that when 
multiple actors (government, insurance companies, people’s organizations 
such as SHGs, and civil society organizations such as NGOs) are involved 
in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of the program, the 
outcomes tend to be good. People’s organizations such as SHGs and civil 
society institutions such as NGOs, trade unions, etc. have better information 
with which to organize the unorganized workers at the local level, motivate 
them to join in a contributory scheme, and facilitate the provision of social 
security (both promotional and protective). The government can provide 
an appropriate legal framework and viable institutional structures and can 
manage the programs. The involvement of insurance companies would 
enable private-public partnerships to be created and ensure that the needed 
technical expertise is incorporated into the social security systems.
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•  As Rolf Sülzer argues in his paper included in this reader, the success of 
social security systems will depend on how well they use the information 
technology (for which India is now famous) for the management and 
delivery of social security benefits. The issues of lack of information on 
schemes, inadequate coverage (across social groups, rural and urban areas, 
accessible and inaccessible villages), inappropriate benefits, limited access to 
benefits, etc. can be dealt with very effectively by providing social security 
numbers, facilitating smart-card based registration, making information 
accessible through internet, etc. 
 
Learning from the above and positively influenced by the willingness of 
unorganized workers to pay for social security, the Department of Labor, 
Government of Karnataka, approached the German Government about funding 
a pilot project to introduce social security benefits for unorganized workers. The 
German Government (BMZ) has agreed to provide technical cooperation to 
the Karnataka government through GTZ. A pre-appraisal mission (consisting 
of representatives from the Karnataka government and GTZ) was constituted 
to refine the project proposal of the Karnataka government. After careful 
consideration of the situation of unorganized workers with regard to accessing 
existing formal social security schemes, the findings of GTZ-initiated studies, 
and the macro environment with regard to social security provision in India, 
the pre-appraisal mission designed a five-year program, Social Security Benefits 
for Unorganized Workers, Karnataka. This program will be implemented by 
the Department of Labor with technical support from GTZ, Germany, while 
InWEnt, Germany, will provide support for capacity building activities.
About the Program
The overall goal of the program is that “selected groups of unorganized 
workers in selected districts in Karnataka have access to efficient and improved 
social security systems.” Key outputs expected from the program are:
1)   Appropriate social security products for the unorganized sector are developed.  
2)  Delivery structures for implementing social security systems are established 
and working efficiently and effectively.  
3)  All actors involved in the program are qualified to implement social security 
systems.  
4)  Social security products for unorganized workers reduce their vulnerability 
and improve their living standards.  
5)  A comprehensive concept of social protection is developed for Karnataka.
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The target group (in other words, direct beneficiaries) of the program will be 
unorganized workers in the selected districts and occupations in Karnataka. 
The program has recognized that unorganized workers are heterogeneous 
and that it is illogical to assume that a particular type of policy would be 
applicable to all these workers. Therefore, the program will concentrate on 
different worker groups and develop social security products/packages that 
are most suited to their needs. During the first phase of the program, social 
security products/packages will be developed and subsequently promoted for 
construction workers, domestic workers, agarbathi rollers, garment workers, 
and agricultural laborers. The risks of health, accident, disability, and old age 
will be covered.6 
The organizational structure to implement the program includes public and private 
organizations at different levels – the state, district, and gram panchayat level. While 
the Department of Labor will be the counterpart of GTZ in this program and the 
main implementing agency, the other stakeholders will also find a prominent place 
in the implementation structure. The social security program will work closely with 
representatives of relevant government departments such as the Rural Development 
and Panchayat Raj Department, Health Department, Employees State Insurance 
Corporation, and Employment Provident Fund. Intermediaries will be trade unions, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), insurance providers, microfinance 
institutions, etc. At the village level, the main actors implementing the program will 
be local decentralized governments and SHGs. The program will also cooperate 
with academic and training institutions in undertaking policy-oriented research 
studies and in providing capacity building inputs.
Apart from the steering committee at the state level and workers’ facilitation 
centers that will be established at the district and gram panchayat levels during 
the first program phase, most of the stakeholders are already active and willing to 
support the program measures. 
Having provided a brief note on the program, let us now discuss the key design 
features. We shall show below that the program has taken the key debates relating 
to social security provision in the country into account and considered the lessons 
that have emerged.
6Maternal and unemployment benefits have also been considered by the program. However, as Karnataka is 
pushing for implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) Act, tackling the risk 
of unemployment in this program might interfere with this highly welcome initiative. The need for maternal 
benefits was ranked surprisingly low among the women of the cohort study, underlining the fact that other 
risks were considered more important threats.
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Target Group
The program plans to work with about 600,000 unorganized workers and 
about 20,000 SHGs in five districts of Karnataka. The program localities are 
diverse in agro-climatic endowment factors – one is a coastal district, while 
another is a semi-arid district. A third is a highly irrigated district, with better 
possibilities for workers to contribute, the fourth is a transient district with less 
possibilities for contributions. The fifth district is Bangalore city itself with a 
high concentration of unorganized workers. The diversity in these districts will 
provide an ideal situation for piloting the social security program.
The unorganized workers to be covered under the program would mostly 
belong to five occupational categories – agricultural labor, construction worker, 
domestic help, garment worker, and agarbathi roller. There will be equal focus 
on male and female unorganized workers in the program. While most of 
the agricultural laborers and garment workers are women, a majority of the 
construction workers are men. Domestic work and agarbathi rolling is almost 
entirely confined to women.
The program will cover both rural and urban unorganized workers. While 
agricultural laborers are predominantly from rural areas, other categories of 
workers are mainly or solely from urban areas.
There is a good mix in the target group in so far as the contribution capacity and 
levels of organization are concerned. The proportion of agricultural laborers and 
agarbathi rollers willing to join in a contributory scheme has been low compared 
to construction and garment workers. The amount of the contribution is also less 
in the case of agricultural laborers, while it is more in the case of construction 
and garment workers.  The other two categories fall in between. Construction 
workers are better organized as compared to the other worker categories. 
Program Approach
Unorganized workers are divided into two groups on the basis of their 
capacity to contribute to social security. The first category consists of those 
workers who have potential to contribute to social security and join in the 
schemes implemented by insurance companies. The second category consists of 
those who cannot afford to contribute to social security or have limited ability 
to contribute.
The program will cover both categories. The program will improve access to 
appropriate social security products in the case of workers in the first category 
and establish social security delivery structures which are efficient and effective. 
The program will assess their priority social security needs, develop suitable social 
security products/packages, link them with insurance companies, etc.
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In the case of the latter category, the program will identify and organize 
the workers. The program will subsequently link them with the existing 
government social assistance programs and improve their economic status 
by enabling them to access promotional social security. It should be noted 
that this group has not succeeded in meeting basic needs such as subsidized 
food, housing, education, access to public health, etc., due to factors such as 
lack of information and organizations among them. Their livelihoods are also 
affected by unemployment, low wages, and lack of opportunities to diversify 
into non-agricultural activities. The program will seek to link them with the 
National Employment Guarantee Program that is being implemented by the 
government to promote employment among them. By providing information 
and converging resources at the village level, the program will strive to link 
workers with the existing programs that aim to help the poor start income-
generating activities and provide social assistance/insurance. Once this group 
succeeds in improving its access to government programs that provide basic 
needs, social assistance, and insurance, workers will be in a position to join 
contributory social security schemes.
The approach is, thus, to enable the second category to reach a stage at which 
they can be linked to protective social security schemes offered by the insurance 
companies. This approach will contribute toward the coverage of most of the 
unorganized workers and will also overcome the weakness of the earlier approach 
of covering only the unorganized workers belonging to BPL households.
Implementation Structure and Arrangement
The implementation structure and arrangements are such that the government, 
civil society, and the private sector will be involved in implementation of the 
program. The Department of Labor will implement the program in collaboration 
with different stakeholders such as trade unions, NGOs, SHGs, employer 
organizations, insurance companies, academic and training institutions.
At the state level, a steering committee will be formed to undertake the functions 
of overall implementation of the program, overall monitoring, negotiations with 
insurance companies, and facilitation of a congenial convergence of existing 
government schemes for social security in the unorganized sector (such as social 
assistance and social insurance schemes). The steering committee will include 
representatives from the relevant government departments, insurance companies, 
employers’ associations, trade unions, academic institutions, etc.
In line with the draft national bill on social security benefits for unorganized 
workers, the program has made provision for workers’ facilitation centers at the 
district and village levels. 
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The District Workers’ Facilitation Center, which will to be formed in the first 
phase of the program, will undertake the functions of registering unorganized 
workers, facilitating favorable conditions for convergence of resources, facilitating 
the provision of training, and signing social insurance contracts with public or 
private insurance companies. It will be a working unit attached to the district 
administration. The center will work in close collaboration with stakeholders like 
the Workers’ Welfare Board, civil society organizations, trade unions, and NGOs. 
There are plans to staff the center with representatives of these stakeholders. 
Moreover, these stakeholders will be provided with a statutory confirmation 
of their functions. The center will maintain working relationships with line 
departments and the insurance companies as additional stakeholders.
At the village level (gram panchayat – the last layer of local governance), 
the workers’ facilitation centers will be established as a sub-committee of the 
gram panchayat (GP). Since the start of decentralization in the early 1990s, 
the GP has gained momentum and importance in India as a service provider 
for the rural population. GPs are responsible for preparing their own budget 
plans and implementing them in their areas of jurisdiction. On average, a GP 
is responsible for 5000 inhabitants in Karnataka. They implement various anti-
poverty programs initiated by central and state governments. They also have a 
constitutional mandate to provide social security to workers. In the context of the 
program, the GP will become the main direct provider of social security services 
to its population. This is important in the Indian context because this will provide 
the needed constitutional backup and sustainability to the workers’ facilitation 
centers. This is also in line with the decentralization reforms occurring in India.
Key Functions to People’s Organizations
The representatives of SHGs (consisting of unorganized workers) will be 
members of the workers’ facilitation center at the village level.  SHGs can be 
understood as informal groups of workers that negotiate with manufacturers, 
employers, and salespersons of different products (agarbathis, beedis [local 
cigarettes], etc.) or services (construction, domestic services, etc.). It is estimated 
that the program will work with around 20,000 SHGs in the program area.
The Department of Labor-GTZ program will not spend resources for the 
formation of SHGs; in stead, it will utilize the SHGs that have already been formed 
by the government and NGOs in the program localities. It is important to be 
familiar with the SHG movement in the state to understand the density of SHGs 
in the state. Many NGOs have been making efforts to form SHGs in Karnataka 
since the mid-1980s. The SHG movement received considerable support through 
the NABARD SHG-Bank Linkage Program, which was piloted in the state in the 
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early 1990s. The number of SHGs in each district registered significant increase 
during the decade of 1990s, largely on account of NGO efforts.  The micro-finance 
program started by the state government in 2000 aimed to form 100,000 SHGs in 
the state. It has been estimated that there are 3000 to 10,000 SHGs in each of 29 
districts in the state today. A recent study of 80 villages and urban wards in Bidar 
and Chamarajanagar districts showed that there are 5 to 50 SHGs in each of these 
villages (Rajasekhar et al. 2007). Thus, the number of SHGs has rapidly increased 
in the state, and the incidence of SHGs at the village level is high.
The SHGs will be the basic group interface of unorganized workers with the 
upper layers of the workers’ facilitation structures and with insurance companies. 
Insurance will be provided as a group policy. The SHGs will keep the records, 
collect the contributions, send them through commercial banks to the insurance 
companies, and receive claim payments. Transaction costs for these services are 
expected to be low for the following reasons:
•  Each SHG has a bookkeeper, the services of whom can be availed of for this 
program as well.
•  As it is planned to collect contributions in group meetings, costs of collection 
are expected to be minimal.
•  The cost of sending the premium to insurance companies via bank accounts 
is again expected to be minimal, because SHG members will in any case have 
to visit banks to deposit their savings.
The functions of the workers’ facilitation center at the village level are:
•  identifying and enrolling unorganized workers;
•  categorizing the workers into two groups, namely, those who can contribute 
and those who cannot;
•  facilitating participatory decision-making processes;
•  facilitating collection and deposit of contributions;
•  collecting claims and facilitating timely settlement of claims;
•  providing social assistance and social insurance schemes in a timely manner;
•  facilitating convergence of resources; and
•  addressing grievances and resolving conflict (arbitrage).
E-governance
It is important to institutionalize and strengthen transparent mechanisms for 
putting effective and sustainable social security systems in place. Towards this 
end, the program will adopt e-governance (including smart cards and unique 
social security numbers) for the identification and enrolment of unorganized 
workers, and also in the provision of social security benefits.
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Knowledge Centers at the Village Level
We noted in the first section of this paper that unorganized workers do 
not have adequate information on the existing social assistance and insurance 
schemes. Consisting of representatives of village level organizations (most of 
whom are illiterate), gram panchayats and others, the workers’ facilitation 
center at the village level is expected to facilitate a process in which unorganized 
workers are empowered to obtain resources provided by the government, not 
only for social security (promotional and protective) but also for their economic 
development. Towards this end, the village level workers’ facilitation center 
will provide information to unorganized workers on all social assistance and 
insurance schemes as well as poverty alleviation programs and schemes. It will 
also strengthen their capacity to access these schemes by strengthening their skills 
through need-based training programs.
Such information centers will not only provide information on what schemes 
and programs are already available, but will also help the workers access these 
as a matter of right. This will facilitate transparency and help develop voices for 
accountability from below.
Role of Civil Society Organizations
In this program, NGOs will provide services to the SHGs and function as 
intermediaries between unorganized workers/SHGs, on the one hand, and the 
state administration and insurance companies, on the other. The NGOs perform 
advocacy functions on behalf of the unorganized workers with regard to state 
policy, legislation, regulations, and enforcement. The NGOs operate primarily at 
the district and village levels. In the program context, they are likely to become 
the signatory partner for insurance companies in respect of micro insurance 
policies for different groups of unorganized workers.
Trade unions will also be involved in the program. They are expected to 
undertake advocacy functions on behalf of unorganized workers with regard to 
state policy and the legal framework for social security.
Public-Private Partnerships
Public-private partnership is an important feature of the program. Insurance 
companies are stakeholders in the program with regard to product development 
and delivery. The steering committee at the state level will negotiate best products 
and prices with the insurance companies. NGOs and SHGs will be the partners 
of insurance companies for operational issues.
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Conclusion
In the design of the program on social security benefits for unorganized workers 
in Karnataka, the Karnataka government and GTZ have taken into account the 
factors that constrain the access of unorganized workers to the existing formal 
social security schemes, as well as diversity in social security needs, contribution 
capacity, and amounts of contribution.  The program, thus, has all the ingredients 
to become a successful pilot program and influence policies relating to the 
provision of social security to unorganized workers.
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Social protection refers to the entire system of protective measures that assist 
individuals, households, and communities to better manage risks and economic 
shocks and that provide support to the critically vulnerable. Among the major 
risks covered are illness, accident, death, unemployment, or old age. Social 
protection includes public as well as private approaches.
Insufficient social protection can have a disastrous effect and impoverish people 
– or drive them deeper into poverty. However, especially in developing countries, 
the majority of people do not have adequate social protection coverage. 
Improving social protection coverage has the potential to contribute to 
poverty reduction in many ways: Social protection protects individuals from 
the adverse financial consequences of the above mentioned calamities. It thus 
prevents people from becoming poor or falling deeper into poverty (protection 
function). In addition, social protection entails an income generating effect and 
reduces prevailing poverty by enabling productive investments in human capital 
(investment function). For example, social health protection allows individuals 
to invest in health by facilitating access to health services. Another example are 
cash transfers, a form of basic social protection, which help to break the vicious 
intergenerational cycle of poverty by improving the health and nutritional status 
as well as education level of beneficiaries, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
better future employment opportunities for children. By reducing the existential 
fears of members of society, social protection policy encourages individuals to 
take risks which otherwise they would not be willing to take, like investing in 
new business opportunities. Further important benefits of social protection 
accrue from a reduction in the use of inefficient risk-coping methods like selling 
productive assets or taking children out of school. Finally, mutual protection 
against social risks strengthens the bonds of cooperation and reciprocity, thereby 
enhancing social stability and social cohesion. 
A system for social protection is inevitably linked to the concept of a social 
market economy. The social market economy aims to achieve a synthesis between 
The Role of Social Protection within a Social 
Market Economy
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efficiency and equity by combining the efficiency gains of a free market economy 
with a publicly induced social balance. In this context, the constituent feature of 
a social market economy is the complementary character of two distinct orders: 
the economic and the social order. The economic order provides the institutional 
framework for a free market economy (including, for example, private property 
rights, competition policies). It emphasizes the individual responsibility of all 
members of a society, who participate in society’s wealth according to their 
individual contributions to its creation. The economic order is complemented by 
the social order. The provisions of the social order are oriented towards the needs 
of society’s members and also attempt to provide equal opportunity. Besides 
solidarity with the needy, the principle of individual responsibility justifies 
only subsidiary public action. A system of social protection forms an integral 
component of the social order.
Subsidiarity, which combines individual effort and self-responsibility with 
collective (societal) support guided by solidarity, is the overarching principle of 
the social market economy. This major principle is also reflected in the setup of 
social protection within a social market economy: generally speaking, provisions 
against risks should always be the responsibility of the most basic unit possible, 
ranging from the individual and the family up to the different levels of the state.
Social protection within a social market economy is usually characterized by 
the so-called “social state model.” Within the social state model, social protection 
is based on (a) statutory social security comprising the key social insurances, 
including health insurance, old age insurance, unemployment benefits, work 
injury insurance, long-term care, and disability benefits (mainly contribution 
financed); and (b) complementary means-tested social assistance, meaning 
residual economic or social support for poor and needy individuals or vulnerable 
groups of society, which is financed by taxes.1 
Social insurance is the major pillar of social protection within the social state 
model. Self-responsibility is reflected by the fact that membership relies on 
individual contributions/payments; solidarity, in turn, is incorporated by either 
1The social state model is one of the two main approaches to public social protection. The second approach is 
commonly denoted by the welfare state model, in which comprehensive social protection against existential 
risks is primarily based on universal provision of public care financed by taxes and, only to a lesser extent, 
contribution-based. Some non-targeted tax-financed elements of the welfare state model are often also 
taken up by societies where social protection is primarily organized via the social state model (for example, 
family or housing benefits). The main difference between the two approaches is the relative weight they 
assign to individual and societal responsibility: the social state model stresses the primacy of individual 
responsibility and subsidiary societal support, whereas the welfare state model particularly emphasizes societal 
responsibility.
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income-related contributions (considering the individual ability to pay) and/or 
an at least partial de-linking of the size of benefits from the level of individual 
contribution paid, thus involving a redistributive effect. The shared financing of 
contributions by employees and employers is another expression of solidarity. On 
the provider side, subsidiarity is reflected by the principle of self-administration: 
insurance funds are self-governing corporations under public law. Public social 
assistance is essentially subsidiary assistance which is principally provided as a 
“measure of last resort” to the most needy groups within a society. It enables 
all eligible persons to live a life in accordance with human dignity. At the same 
time, social assistance does not aim at simply providing a form of alimentation, 
but rather it pursues the objective of strengthening people‘s self-help capacities. 
In addition, providing incentives for promoting private social protection forms 
another important component. Last but not least, public social protection 
measures should be tied to the economic capacity of a society in order to 
guarantee their sustainability.
Social protection is on the political agenda in many low- and middle-income 
countries. However, the objective is not and should not be to simply “transplant” 
concepts from high-income countries. Rather, tailor-made solutions adapted 
to specific national contexts need to be developed. This involves taking the 
specific characteristics of these countries and their impact on social protection 
into consideration while developing a social protection system. Among those 
characteristics are, for example, low coverage and fragmentation of existing 
systems, restricted contributory capacities and impaired tax systems, large 
informal labor markets, and confined administrative capacities. In this context, 
technical challenges for national policy makers and for development cooperation 
include the following:
•  defining an “optimal benefits package” that provides adequate protection 
but is financially sustainable; 
•  developing approaches that fit prevailing labor market characteristics in 
developing countries, where labor markets are often characterized by a high 
percentage of informal sector activities; and
•  linking access to social protection with quality improvements in service 
delivery.
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Social Protection Reform in Indonesia – 
In Search of Universal Coverage
Katja Bender and Johanna Knöss1
The Reform Context
Indonesia has achieved remarkable progress in its transition to democracy and 
its economic recovery from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Indonesia 
is now characterized by a young and growing democracy with a decentralized 
government in a vast archipelago of different cultures and a population of 230 
million people. Poverty levels that had increased by over one-third during the 
crisis are now back to pre-crisis levels. Indonesia has once again become one 
of the world’s emergent middle-income countries. The Indonesian Ministry of 
Finance estimates the country’s economic growth wil be around 6.6% in 2008.
Despite this encouraging success and the ambitious development goals of the 
Government of Indonesia, the number of people living under US$2 a day is at 
an alarming 49% of the total population. Around 40 million people, nearly 10 
million households, are clustered around the lowest two of the three national 
poverty categories with an average income between Rp. 125,000 and 150,000 
per month per person These figures are exacerbated by the fact that many 
households are close to the national income poverty line and are defined as near-
poor, indicating an even larger number of Indonesians who are vulnerable to 
poverty. Second, poor human development outcomes and lack of access to basic 
services for many Indonesians makes non-income poverty as serious, if not more 
serious than income poverty. Third, given the vast size and varying conditions 
in Indonesia, regional disparities are a primary challenge for the Indonesian 
Government. Poverty incidence is far higher in eastern Indonesia, but most of 
the population lives in the densely populated western regions. Recent poverty 
developments in Indonesia have been significantly affected by large increases 
in the price of rice and a rise in fuel prices in 2005. The latter has had a mixed 
1The authors thank Franz von Roenne and Thomas Wiechers, Health Policy and Social Health Insurance,  
GTZ Indonesia, for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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effect, as the price of fuel increased because fuel subsidies were scrapped in part 
to mobilize the funding for Askeskin, the new government program to provide 
basic health services free of charge to the poor strata of the population.
Thus, persistent efforts are clearly required to ensure that economic growth 
benefits the majority of the population, the poor, and the near-poor. This is crucial 
for achievement of the ambitious goals laid down by the government for social 
development. For example, the mid-term plan (RPJM) for 2005-2009 and the 
national poverty reduction strategy (SNPK) aim to reduce the poverty rate from 
18.2% in 2002 to 8.2% in 2009, in other words, to a rate below pre-crisis levels. 
The Government of Indonesia is also dedicated to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
A social protection system that enables the population to cope with risks and 
vulnerabilities is especially important in Indonesia, due to the high movement 
in and out of poverty among households and the large number of households 
clustered around the poverty line. These specific characteristics of Indonesia 
justify the decision of policy makers to develop a well-designed social protection 
system to safeguard citizens from risks and vulnerabilities such as income 
loss, illness and out-of-pocket health expenditures, a poor harvest, or the rise 
in commodity prices. Thus, given the well-established links between human 
capital and economic wellbeing, the Government of Indonesia recognizes social 
protection as a core part of development policies to prevent people from falling 
into poverty, combat existing poverty, and increase equity.
The current form of publicly provided social protection in Indonesia is based 
on two kinds of public interventions, namely (a) contributory social insurance or 
mandatory savings for civil servants (covered by PT TASPEN and PT ASKES), 
the armed forces (covered by PT ASABRI), and formal-sector employees (covered 
by PT JAMSOSTEK) and (b) targeted efforts to provide economic or social 
support for poor or vulnerable groups of society. The Government of Indonesia 
has undertaken several steps to increase coverage specifically for the poor. In the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997/1998, previous downtrends in poverty levels 
dramatically reversed, especially in the considerable near-poor segment of the 
population. As an immediate response and following recommendations of the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, several social safety net programs (JPS) 
to help especially poor people cope with their steeply declining purchasing power 
were hastily implemented by a wide array of government agencies providing health 
services (Kartu Sehat), subsidized rice (Raskin), fuel subsidies, and scholarships for 
poor children (Sumarto et al. 2005) as well as a multitude of small social assistance 
programs for specific target groups (abandoned children, disabled persons, poor 
elderly, etc.) operated by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Weber 2006, 107). 
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Early assessments of these ad hoc measures revealed low coverage, poor 
targeting, and, in general, little coordination.2 The fuel subsidy, which 
disproportionately benefited the medium-income and rich households and at 
the same time was one of the centerpieces of the Indonesian social protection 
system until 2005, was reduced in 2005, although the move generated intense 
political controversy (World Bank 2006, 181). Further, the Government of 
Indonesia recently launched several pro-poor programs to buffer the increased 
cost of living for the poor, reallocating Rp. 17 trillion for health, education, 
and village infrastructure programs and cash transfers to 19.2 million poor and 
near-poor households from 2005-2006. The government has further declared 
that it will bring in rice imports if the harvest is not sufficient, thus stabilizing 
prices of this important commodity.3 It also recently began a pilot household 
and community conditional cash transfer scheme targeting the extreme poor in 
order to improve human development outcomes. In addition, the long existing 
Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) will be scaled up to a National 
Community Empowerment Program, or Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat (PNPM), to provide block grants to some 2800 rural and urban 
sub-districts, with full national coverage of 5360 sub-districts by 2009 (World 
Bank 2007). 
These efforts to provide increased support to the poor were complemented by 
the government’s decision in October 2004 to implement Law No. 40 concerning 
the National Social Security System (Undang-Undang Sistem Jaminan Sosial 
Nasional or SJSN), which foresees reforming the existing social protection system 
towards universal coverage. A task force appointed through the Vice President’s 
Office, first created by Presidential Decree (Kepres) No. 22/2002, drafted the law. 
The key feature of the new law is that it mandates the creation of several social 
security schemes for citizens: old-age pension, old-age savings, national health 
insurance, work injury insurance, and death benefits for survivors of deceased 
workers. Law No. 40/2004 is an important milestone, because it stipulates that 
the existing social security programs in Indonesia will be expanded so as to cover 
all Indonesian citizens, including those who are working in the informal sector, 
the unemployed, and the poor.
2Although the intended beneficiaries of these programmes are in the poorest quintile, they have access to only 
31% of health cards, 39% of scholarships, and 29% of RASKIN benefits (Lindenthal 2004, 21). Tambunan and 
Purwoko (2002) present similar conclusions. 
3http://news.tradingcharts.com/ futures/4/8/91679784.html (April 19, 2007).
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The implementation of Law No. 40/2004 on the National Social Security 
System is currently bringing about a comprehensive reform of the existing 
system. Law No. 40/2004 provides the legal basis for the above-stated objective 
of social protection coverage for all. A task force, headed by the Coordinating 
Ministry of People’s Welfare, is working on the introduction of new regulations 
as well as the mapping and harmonization of existing regulations relevant in the 
context of Law No. 40/2004. A great deal has been achieved since its enactment: 
the mapping and extensive review of existing laws has been finalized, and so 
has a comprehensive design of a harmonized legal and regulatory framework. 
Based on the latter, there is now a roadmap for implementation in place, and 
technical sub-groups are working on new laws – most importantly, the “carrier 
law” and government regulations. The whole process has been aligned with 
Law No.10/2004 that stipulates how laws are to be drafted. It has recently been 
formally endorsed by the president and now looks set to be completed by the 
legal deadline in October 2009. 
Although some important initial reform steps have been taken, several major 
challenges lie ahead:4
•  Low coverage: Coverage by the existing contributory social insurance system 
is still low: only about 16 million workers are covered by Taspen, Asabri, and 
Jamsostek schemes, out of a total labor force of about 101 million people, 
including job seekers (Angelini and Hirose 2004). This means that only 16% 
of workers are currently covered by formal social security schemes. Health 
insurance coverage by public schemes is slightly higher, with around 18 
million insured. Extending coverage in terms of both organizational as well 
as sustainable financing options will be based on a comprehensive strategy 
that is currently being prepared by the ministries charged with building the 
new social security system ( Jaminan Sosial Nasional, JAMSOSNAS). This 
requires detailed conceptual work and decisions on, for example, benefit 
package(s), contribution rates, and necessary institutional reforms. It also 
requires deciding on appropriate social protection instruments with regard 
to some specific risks such as old age and unemployment.
•  Fragmentation: One objective of the reform is to build a coherent system of 
social protection and reduce the high degree of fragmentation that so much 
characterizes the current system. Benefits of streamlining include improved 
allocative efficiency of administrative resources. Coordination between the 
various programs that are targeting the poor needs to be enhanced. The 
cooperation and communication between different government ministries 
4For a more detailed treatment, the interested reader is referred to Bender et al. 2008.
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and service and insurance providers will be facilitated by a new statutory 
body, the National Social Security Council, soon to be installed by the 
president.
•  How to cover the informal sector? The present system excludes the non-
poor in the informal sector from any arrangement: they are not covered 
by the contributory social insurance and are not eligible for any form of 
social assistance. Considering the fact that the informal sector in Indonesia 
comprises a substantial part of the working population,5 with a high 
proportion of them being considered non-poor, developing an effective 
strategy on behalf of this population group is crucial for realizing the goal of 
universal coverage.
As already mentioned, a crucial reform issue is the streamlining of the 
numerous bodies that make up the current system and the defragmentation of 
their functions: at present, a relatively small part of the population is covered 
by public social security, namely employees of the military (through PT Asabri, 
PT Askes), civil servants (through PT Taspen, PT Askes), and those employed 
in private enterprises above a certain staff size and total payroll (through PT 
Jamsostek). The latter are insured against work accidents, illness, death, and 
funeral risks, but not against unemployment. In case of retirement, they receive a 
lump sum payment from a mandatory saving scheme (provident fund) related to 
their contributions plus interest. Members of the armed forces and civil servants 
are insured against illness (PT ASKES) as well as old age, in case of which they 
receive lump sum payments as well as annuity benefits for life after retirement 
(through PT ASABRI and PT TASPEN, respectively). Thus, the institutional 
setup of social security is mainly organized according to group affiliation. The 
responsibilities for programs of social assistance are vested within different 
ministries and different adminstrative structures. In addition, programs are 
operated at the central and local level.
From a technical point of view, there are two basic options for organizing the 
administration of social protection: (1) integration of all risk-related activities 
under one specific administrative body for each risk; (2) separation of all risk-
related activities for certain groups of society and their specific administrative 
bodies. There is also a third, more pragmatic approach: (3) harmonization and 
rationalization of regulations between existing administrative bodies.
5According to the National Labor Force Survey (2007), the informal sector in Indonesia comprises a 
substantial and growing part of the working population, currently with 69% of the total labor force.
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Focussing on the technical efficiency of a public social protection system with 
integration of carriers is an appropriate option for social insurance, whereas 
social assistance is best provided within a framework of (broad) separation: 
Insurance works by pooling risks across a large population. The larger the risk 
pool, the smaller the volatility of claims, thereby facilitating the management of 
the insurance. However, an insurance risk pool must not necessarily be as large 
as the entire population to effectively reduce volatility,6 and the positive returns 
to size diminish beyond a certain threshold. Yet for social insurance to work, a 
balanced composition of the risk pool is essential. This is achieved by integration, 
but not by separation. 
In contrast, social assistance is, generally speaking, best provided within the 
framework of a (broad) separation: Firstly, by definition, it targets specific groups 
within a population, namely the poor and other specific needy groups. Secondly, 
again by definition, all social assistance benefits are targeted benefits. As targeting 
methods involve non-negligible transaction costs, subsuming social assistance 
under one administrative body provides the opportunity for exploiting economies 
of scope. In the third option of harmonization, institutional path dependencies are 
taken into account, and the existing institutional framework for social protection 
is gradually adapted where this is required by new or changing needs. 
Harmonization is the option that Indonesia has chosen at present; it aims to 
harmonize all laws and regulations by 2009. Harmonization provides an important 
first step. However, given the limited technical benefits of harmonization in 
comparison to the other two options, the country may consider going further 
in the medium term. Options for later reforms are: (a) institutional integration 
of risk-related activities under one specific administrative body for each risk in 
standard social insurance and (b) institutional separation of activities for the 
poor and other vulnerable groups – in other words, social assistance – could offer 
an overall guiding framework. In this context, responsibility for social assistance 
should then be centered on a newly founded institution, perhaps under the 
umbrella of the Ministry of Social Affairs.7 
Social health insurance is one of the major components of the social security 
system. This fact is also reflected by the priority this component is given within 
6If this were the case, private insurances would not be not able to operate. 
7With regard to certain social insurances, the question arises if the poor or other specific needy groups should 
be included within the general insurance framework or covered separately. This is particularly relevant for 
social health insurance. In this case, the poor should be included within the specific social insurance, and the 
administrative body responsible for social assistance could remit the contributions on behalf of the poor to the 
respective social insurance administrative body, which would then be responsible for delivering the benefits/
services to the poor.
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the overall reform process in Indonesia. With regard to social health protection, 
the systemic question of which instruments to apply seems more or less settled 
with the plan to combine social insurance and tax-financed, means-tested social 
assistance for the poor. At present, PT Askes and PT Jamsostek provide social 
health insurance to civil servants and formal sector employees, respectively. In 
addition, the ASKESKIN scheme, managed by PT Askes, provides tax-financed 
healthcare to poor households. With ratification of Law No. 40/2004 on the 
National Social Security System, the basic principles of universal social security 
and a timeframe for the work necessary for the new system to be implemented 
throughout Indonesia were established. Within the boundaries already set by 
Law No. 40/2004 and the reform and implementation steps taken since then, 
however, many decisions still need to be made. For example, the choice about 
how to pool funds, namely, single or multiple funds, is currently under scrutiny.
Besides social health protection, the issue of old age protection is gaining 
increasing attention within the Indonesian context. Formal sector workers 
receive a lump sum payment from a mandatory savings scheme (provident fund) 
related to their contributions, plus interest. Thus, longevity risks are not covered. 
Members of the armed forces and civil servants receive a lump sum payment as well 
as an annuity benefit for life after retirement. In the absence of a comprehensive 
social insurance scheme providing life-long old-age benefits, the reform agenda 
for pensions in Indonesia is still open to innovative solutions. 
To obtain prevention against demographic risks, one option would be to combine 
funding elements with pension insurance in a new national pension scheme. 
Subsequently, once the new national pension scheme is fully established, the share 
of pay-as-you-go financing could be reduced gradually in favour of the funding 
principle. Low-income earners could be supported to a certain extent by tax-financed 
instruments. A second option would be to introduce a tax-financed universal basic 
pension scheme with pensions based on a fixed percentage of local minimum wage. 
However, in this option there are certain drawbacks to consider: first, like 
all universal schemes, it could be very costly to guarantee such a basic pension, 
considering the high percentage of the poor and near-poor population; 
second, a non-contributory pension scheme could create negative incentives 
for participation in contributory social insurance, so this solution could 
endanger moving from informal to formal employment. Another approach 
to solving the problem of old age poverty could be seen in the future role of 
social assistance, which would be subject to means testing and targeted to all 
persons with income below the national poverty line. However, this alternative 
is not a substitute for the previous options, but rather a complement to the 
first option.
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Unlike social health protection, the issue of unemployment compensation 
and the instruments to employ is still strongly debated at present. Currently, 
only severance pay plays an important role in Indonesia. Alternative instruments 
such as unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, individual saving 
accounts for unemployment benefits, and mandatory saving accounts for 
severance payments do not exist in Indonesia. Preliminary recommendations 
for unemployment compensation in Indonesia include a combined system of 
mandatory individual savings accounts and mandatory savings for severance pay, 
both of them complemented by solidarity funds.
One of the crucial questions remains how to extend social protection coverage 
to the non-poor in Indonesia’s large informal sector. The non-poor among informal 
sector workers are the population segment currently suffering the highest degree 
of exclusion from social protection: they are not covered by contributory social 
insurance and are not eligible for any form of social assistance. The legal postulate 
of universal coverage will have to bring about fundamental changes in order 
to provide social security to this group. Whereas standard contributory social 
security is designed for formal sector employees and the poor are targeted by tax-
financed and means-tested social assistance mechanisms, only few programs are 
directed towards the non-poor in the informal sector. Considering the enormous 
size of the informal sector in Indonesia, the overall integration of the informal 
into the formal economy should be the ultimate long-term objective. To include 
it in the social protection system in the medium term, specific social security 
programs will have to be designed and implemented, as standard social insurance 
with its defining characteristics of statutory membership and income-related 
contributions is not appropriate for reaching out to the informal sector. Due to the 
special characteristics of the heterogeneous and poorly defined group of people 
living in the informal economy and the resulting specifities of social security 
schemes for the informal sector, schemes for this group carry a variety of risks 
that endanger their effectiveness in terms of coverage and financial sustainability. 
Reliable data for planning, a careful design, and skilled administrative personnel 
for implementation are therefore necessary preconditions.
Linkages to the Concept of a Social Market Economy within 
the Indonesian Context
Social protection per se is an indispensable element within the concept of a social 
market economy. The structure of social protection within a social market economy 
is guided by the overarching principle of subsidiarity, which translates into a specific 
approach to social protection often referred to as the social state model. This 
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model combines statutory social insurance with means-tested and targeted social 
assistance for specific vulnerable groups as well as incentives for private measures. 
To what extent could this model be of relevance within the Indonesian context?
The outline above demonstrated that the current social protection system in 
Indonesia is based on two kinds of public interventions, namely contributory 
social insurance or mandatory savings for specific population groups, and 
confined targeted efforts to provide economic or social support for poor or 
vulnerable groups of society. Further, as mentioned, the Indonesian system 
displays a high degree of fragmentation and is currently undergoing a process of 
harmonization and consolidation. It is the stated objective of the government to 
achieve “universal coverage” and to take decisions on the policy issues relevant to 
this objective. At the present stage of the reform process, not all steps necessary 
for the operationalization of this objective have been fully developed yet.
In this context, the social state model has the potential to offer a unifying 
and guiding framework to provide orientation for extending, coordinating, and 
consolidating the current system, while matching existing structures. However, 
such a model should be used as a guiding model, not as a blueprint: Any model 
represents but a stylized and abstract representation of the real world. With regard 
to the social state model, this means for example that – at least to a certain extent – 
non-means-tested universal elements can easily be incorporated into the system.8 
GTZ Activities
The Governments of Indonesia and Germany are currently collaborating on 
social protection in the following, complementary areas: 
1)  Policy advice and support, also on the implementation of a national social 
security system in the context of the implementation of Law No. 40/2004. 
Together with its implementing partner, the Ministry of Health, GTZ is 
working with the National Social Security Taskforce under the leadership 
of the Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare. This taskforce is 
responsible for all aspects of the implementation process: formulation of 
new laws, presidential and government regulations, review of existing laws 
and their harmonization with the reformed social security system, and the 
government and public consultation processes required for the reform.
2)  Furthermore, GTZ is providing advice to the Ministry of Health on 
specific questions arising from the introduction of universal social health 
insurance. The issue has far-reaching implications for the health system and 
8Housing and family benefits are prominent examples in this context.
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is therefore intertwined with most current priority health-policy questions. 
In its role as a member of the national taskforce, the Ministry of Health is 
responsible for drafting a presidential regulation on social health insurance. 
This will regulate all questions of membership, benefits, and service 
provision. It implies that a number of important health policy questions 
must be answered; furthermore, around 15 national laws will have to be 
harmonized so that the regulation can meet the regulatory requirements 
of Law No. 40/2004.
3)  Policy advice to BAPPENAS, the Indonesian National Planning Authority, 
on strategic planning of the reform process: GTZ is providing BAPPENAS 
with international expertise for the development of strategies and policy 
recommendations for the Five-Year Plan 2010-2015 regarding the further 
development of the social protection system that will be launched at the 
end of the current legislative period in 2009. When asked by BAPPENAS 
to prepare a comprehensive report on options for social protection reform 
in Indonesia, GTZ assembled a team of academic and policy experts. A 
draft version was presented and discussed with various national and 
international stakeholders in a workshop held in August 2007; the final 
report will be published in early 2008 (Bender et al. 2008).
The Way Forward
As shown above, there has been remarkable progress in Indonesia’s social 
protection system from the financial crisis of 1997/1998 to date. By passing Law 
No. 40 in 2004, the Government of Indonesia initiated a comprehensive process 
of reforming the existing system towards universal coverage, aiming to improve 
access as well as enhance quality of service delivery. 
The reform process implies a multitude of policy decisions and legal and 
regulatory adjustments that are currently being addressed by the various 
stakeholders to the process. In this context, the incorporation of the non-poor in 
Indonesia’s large informal sector, as well as the provision and financing of basic 
social assistance to the high number of poor or near-poor are two of the most 
crucial challenges on the way to universal coverage.
In addition, in many reform areas such as administration and institutionalization 
of the entire system of social protection, political decisions on options to be 
implemented have still to be made. The government is currently working on 
reaching a political consensus on these open policy questions as well as on 
securing the space crucially required to manoeuvre in face of the multifold and 
diverse interests of stakeholders involved.
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BAPPENAS is involved in the ongoing reform process and is committed 
to accompanying the process and further developing strategies to optimize the 
process and work out and support the implementation of suitable options based 
on international experience. In this context, the joint BAPPENAS-GTZ report, 
Options for Social Protection Reform in Indonesia, is one contribution to the 
reform process. It analyzes visionary, but feasible options for the future of social 
protection within the Indonesian context. 
The report also provides an important contribution to strategic planning of the 
overall reform process. In this process, BAPPENAS is charged with the task of 
preparing a draft version of a mid- and long-term roadmap for social protection 
reform. The roadmap will provide guidance on the timing and sequencing of 
reform steps and will be discussed among relevant political stakeholders. GTZ will 
continue its support and assist BAPPENAS in the elaboration of the roadmap.
Reviewing the current situation and analyzing the options for the various 
social protection schemes for citizens also reveals that the efficacy of ongoing 
and future reforms depends greatly on developments and progress in other 
sectors. Most prominently, it will depend on private sector development and the 
expansion of the formal sector and attendant reduction of the informal sector, 
tax system reforms, and sustained efforts in decentralization reforms. Further, 
reform options need to be carefully designed in order to prevent adverse impacts 
on the labor market. As economic growth clearly impacts on the feasibility and 
outreach of publicly provided social protection, continuing efforts to promote an 
enabling environment for economic growth are essential. This includes, among 
other things, the creation of a conducive and investment-friendly business 
environment.
Further, reform efforts should be realistic and consider prevailing constraints. 
For example, given the unfortunate relation between the number of poor and 
near-poor persons in Indonesia and given the limitations of tax resources, the 
potential outreach of social assistance is limited, and ad-hoc measures should be 
avoided. Basically, the decision is either to provide a relatively broad range of 
social assistance measures to a very limited group of persons, or to focus on a 
reduced number of measures (such as health services or modest forms of income 
support via cash transfers) provided to a wider share of the poor population.
Last but not least, it must be pointed out that achieving universal coverage, as 
intended by the Government of Indonesia, is a lengthy and incremental process 
– especially in a vast and heterogeneous population like that of Indonesia. 
With its long-term political commitment to achieving social security for all, the 
Government of Indonesia has met a pre-condition for success. 
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Social Market Economy and Voluntary Social 
and Ecological Standards
Thomas Finkel and Christiane Fleischer
Introduction: Globalization, Social Market Economy, and 
Voluntary Social and Ecological Standards
Globalization – and climate change which is often described as its by-product 
– have been among the most discussed topics of the last decade. Associated 
with globalization is the opening up of emerging states such as many Asian 
countries and, in this context, the transition from a planned economy to a free 
market. These countries are looking for ways to smooth out the transition, 
in other words, to make the most of globalization’s benefits without leaving 
behind too many of their people. After years of tremendous growth in the 
region, the social question is becoming ever more important for the region’s 
governments as they attempt to deal with social disparities, ecological threats, 
and increasing allocation struggles (Andes et al. 2007). The anti-globalization 
movement (and the interested public) has long demanded a social cushioning 
of globalization’s worst effects. 
In this context, Germany’s social market economy appears to many to 
be a valuable model and has attracted the attention of some of the region’s 
governments. Although it is almost 60 years old, it is still achieving positive 
results with its mixed economy approach – a clearly market-based economy 
combined with social as well as environmental protection. In this model, the 
state aims to maintain a balance between a high rate of economic growth, 
low inflation, low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, social 
welfare, and public services. While basically respecting the free market, the 
social market economy is opposed to both central planning and laissez-faire 
capitalism. Due to the increasing pressure on natural resources and the negative 
impacts on consumers’ health of many industrial and agricultural production 
processes, the ecological aspect is given high priority – also in order to address 
the climate change agenda. 
While many countries have taken up the idea of the social and ecological 
market economy, there are different ways to achieve the three main goals of 
public prosperity, social justice, and environmental sustainability. Regarding 
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social and environmental standards, in practice there are two complementary 
approaches. One is to make use of the regulatory authority of the government 
by setting up and enforcing standards through the government and its many 
bodies, which is what is done by states trying to put the philosophy of a 
social and ecological market economy into practice. This distances these 
governments from a purely free-market-based philosophy, which maintains 
that the market is a better regulator, even when it comes to social and 
environmental practices. 
Nevertheless, many problems still remain, even where the government has set 
up standards. Enforcement is a major issue. The lack of adequate control systems 
and the weakness of regulatory and enforcement authorities stand in the way 
of better implementation of and adherence to obligatory standards. In addition, 
many Asian countries lack government consumer-rights policies and have no 
or only weak civil-society organizations, which are needed to push forward 
continuous improvements in social and environmental protection. The absence 
or failure of government standards has therefore given rise to a second approach: 
a movement by industry to set up and enforce voluntary standards.  
Multinational companies have become a driving force behind voluntary 
standard initiatives. As will be explained below, they do this either because of 
increased pressure from NGOs and consumers in their home country or because 
their supply chains become more sustainable and efficient in the long run if they 
pay more attention to social and environmental standards throughout the chain. 
Because of the increased importance of multinational companies in trade with 
developing and emerging markets, this article will focus on voluntary social 
and ecological standards and their (potential) contribution to the creation, 
implementation, and success of a social and ecological market economy. Before 
discussing this issue in more detail, we need to differentiate between the various 
types of standards.
Generally, we have to distinguish between product, process, and behavioral 
standards: Product standards are the simplest form of standards since they basically 
refer to specific attributes of the product. Process standards, on the other hand, 
regularize the production process which, in turn, has consequences for the product 
itself (for example, banning certain pesticides or chemicals used in the production 
process). Finally, behavioral standards relate to the design of internal operating 
procedures (for example, freedom of association). The latter two cannot always 
be differentiated, but as a rule of thumb, process standards are more quantitative-
technical whereas behavioral standards tend to be more qualitative in nature. 
Standards hence refer to both quantitative-technical as well as quality features that 
can be described, measured, and controlled (Reichert 2002).
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Environmental standards belong to both product and process standards. They 
address the question of the product’s environmental risks and usually delineate 
minimum and maximum values of hazardous residual in the final product 
(product standard) as well as environmentally negative impacts of the production 
process on the environment (process standard). Thus, they reflect the potentially 
negative impacts on both the environment and the consumer. In the case of 
organic products made of dairy products or meat, regulation of the treatment of 
animals could even be put in the category of behavioral standards.
Social standards aim at improving work and trade conditions and hence are 
process standards. Companies that aim to offer safe products and organize their 
processes in a socially and environmentally friendly way may wish to be certified1 
in order to be able to penetrate a specific market, better position themselves in 
a market, or create a better image. They can obtain a statutory inspection label, 
which describes the (technical) quality features a product needs in order to enter 
a certain market. These labels are based on international (ISO), European (EN), 
or national (DIN, etc. in Germany) norms. In addition, there are state-approved 
cachets, which are not binding but aim to provide orientation for consumers 
(for example, the RAL label in Germany2). Finally, there are those labels created 
by standard initiatives (for example, the Fairtrade label) that act as a credible 
marketing tool for social and ecological responsibility, as well as a tool to improve 
the sustainability of the business.
It is exactly the latter argument that is driving more and more companies to 
certify their products and processes according to internationally recognized social 
and environmental standards, as they see this as a fundamental way to improve 
the sustainability of their business model. 
This leads us to the main question: Can standards be used as a vehicle for 
German development cooperation to contribute to the creation of a social and 
ecological market economy in our partner countries? 
Theoretically, they can. Thus, our first hypothesis is that voluntary social and 
ecological standards – below referred to as standards – contribute to sustainable 
development, as they help to:
1Certification describes a process through which compliance with certain standards can be verified. 
Certificates are usually temporary and controlled by an independent body. Accreditation is an audit and 
authorization of certifiers. It is hence a certification of certifiers. 
2RAL labels indicate products and services that are produced according to highly specified quality criteria. 
RAL accredited organizations make up the RAL quality association, which implements and monitors quality 
assurance. Currently there are more than 160 quality labels for thousands of products and services that are 
monitored by over 130 quality associations with approx.10,000 member organizations from all sectors in 
Germany and abroad. For details, see http://www.ral.de/de/ral_guete/ home/index.php.
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•  foster competitiveness;
• improve working conditions; and
• conserve natural resources. 
These three issues, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of standards, 
will be discussed below.
Discussing the Advantages ...
The issue of competitiveness is probably the most fervently discussed, as 
opinions differ substantially here. On the one hand, many governments, 
especially those of developing countries, accuse governments and trading blocks 
that promote standards of creating another instrument of protectionism. They 
claim that developed countries use standards as a market barrier against cheap 
import goods and hence abuse them for political reasons. To a certain extent, 
they seem to be right. Recently, at the Asia conference prior to her visit to India, 
the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that “we in Europe can 
only remain competitive when minimum standards apply elsewhere as well.”3 
Although there surely is some protectionism in this argument, the clear objective 
of the Government of Germany is to make the commitment to and enforcement 
of social and environmental standards a global goal that benefits all nations. As in 
all trade issues, unfair competition through dumping prices (in this case through 
exploiting workers and the environment) is a short-sighted strategy that will 
cause more harm than good in the medium and long term to all trading partners 
and stakeholders involved.
On the other hand, however, most of the standards are based on the norms 
of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which bar gross forms of 
exploitation of labor and human rights abuse that can never be justified (see 
below). These norms have been agreed upon by the great majority of governments 
worldwide. In additional to this political commitment to human rights, studies 
by the ILO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
show that firms invest mainly in those countries that abide by minimum labor 
standards and provide legal security for the standards and for their employees, as 
this significantly increases productivity and hence long-term economic success 
(Kürschner-Pelkmann 2006). 
Furthermore, for companies from both developing and emerging economies, 
adhering to standards can also be a chance to enter new markets and thus steal 
3Süddeutsche Zeitung 248, October 27/28, 2007 (author’s translation).
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the protectionists’ thunder by producing the quality products that are more 
and more being demanded by consumers. Thus, it seems that both governments 
and companies benefit from fulfilling at least minimum environmental and 
social standards. Nevertheless, many companies still prefer to short-sightedly 
exploit both workers and the environment, cashing in on quick returns, often in 
cooperation with local governments that pursue their own wellbeing more than 
that of the population and the environment. 
However, introducing and implementing standards is always linked with costs 
of certification, verification, capacity building of management and employees, 
and sometimes investment in infrastructure and equipment. Nevertheless, in the 
long run, the benefits seem to outweigh these costs: Improvements in the quality 
of products and services can bring about higher sales, often at higher prices. Better 
management of resources will bring down costs. Improved working conditions 
and enhanced safety will lead to greater motivation of staff, fewer accidents, and, 
in return, increased productivity. Furthermore, higher product quality and better 
treatment of workers will improve the image of the company, which, in turn, will 
attract better employees and pave the way for greater access to markets and stable 
trading relations. The reduced environmental damage further contributes to the 
sustainability of the business model as a whole. 
An example of the problems that stem from a lack of product quality and 
safety is the case of toys made in China that erupted in 2007.4 After inspectors 
found excess lead content in some toys, several major retail chains in the USA 
and the European Union (EU) had to recall their products made at Chinese 
factories. Since China is the largest toy exporter worldwide (with approximately 
60% of global production), quality deficits pose a great risk and can lead to 
major market disturbances and economic loss to all businesses involved. The 
negative image created can even have a negative impact on the whole economy, 
as consumers start to mistrust the quality and safety of all products from a 
certain region. 
Calls for stricter controls and compliance with European (or at least uniform) 
standards are thus on the rise. Although these labels focus on technical quality 
aspects (for example, equal statutory inspection labels, see above), some experts 
argue they should cover the whole production process and even include the 
working conditions in firms, because there often is a direct link between 
degrading working conditions and product quality (Haas 2004). It is clear that 
both suppliers (the Chinese factories) and buyers would benefit economically 
from improved product and process quality.
4See Haas 2004, AFP/AP 2007, AFP/ DPA  2007, and “Mattel Entschuldigt sich” 2007.
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The second point, the improvement of working conditions, is explicitly 
mentioned in most standards and codes of conduct that originate from corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) policies.5 The ILO norms on decent work form the 
backbone of codes of conduct and standards relating to working conditions. The 
four main areas addressed by the ILO Declaration are:
• freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; 
• elimination of forced and compulsory labor;
• abolition of child labor; and
• elimination of discrimination in the workplace.
While these aspects are seen as minimum requirements, most standards focus 
on improving working conditions in more detail and include decent payment, 
fair working hours, overtime compensation and vacation allowances, paid 
maternity leave, health insurance, and work safety equipment and measures, 
among others. 
Also here, China, as an example of the ambitious and rapidly growing economies 
of the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), can underline the necessity 
for standards.6 To fuel its fast-paced growth and its booming industrialization, 
it needs energy, and 70% of this energy comes from burning coal. China’s coal 
belt, ranging from Manchuria in the east to the border of Kazakhstan in the 
west, is the largest coal mining area in the world. One-third of the coal deposits 
are in the province of Shanxi with approximately 15,000 mines operating. The 
number of workers is unknown. Working conditions are dramatic: China’s mines 
are known to be the most dangerous in the world: almost 60,000 miners were 
killed in Chinese mines from 1992 to 2002, compared to approximately 1000 in 
Indian mines during the same period. In 2004, 6027 workers died in the mines, 
17 per day. Still, productivity lags far behind that in industrialized coal countries: 
China produces 35% of global coal (approximately 321 tons per year per Chinese 
miner – only 2% of a miner’s output in the USA). The death rate, in contrast, is a 
hundred times higher than in the USA and 30 times higher than in South Africa 
(80% of all global mining deaths happen in China). Especially migrant workers 
from poor rural areas work under slave-like conditions to earn money for their 
families. Trade unions or associations do not exist in most cases. The boom seems 
to be taking place at the expense of the workers. 
The same applies to other industries, especially manufacturing and the textile 
industry. In the two biggest industrial quarters of Shenzhen, 27 workers lose a 
5For example, 4C, Fairtrade, BSCI, Cotton Made in Africa, Better Cotton Initiative, Flower Label Program, etc.
6All figures are from Vougioukas 2005 and Landwehr 2004a.
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hand, arm, or leg in workplace accidents every day. Each year, 136,000 workers 
die in industrial accidents. Additionally, employees regularly report bad food and 
accommodation, unpaid overtime (up to 50 hours per week), and no vacation 
allowance (Schepp 2004). The Chinese government is starting to recognize 
the importance of worker protection only slowly. Standards could regularize 
conditions for workers and close loopholes in security regulations.7 This would, 
again, also contribute to an improved competitive edge of the economy, as 
improved working conditions and the reduction of accidents have a direct impact 
on the productivity of firms. Besides, it would help to put the moral values of 
protecting workers and society into practice, making the harmonious society 
more than an empty promise. 
Some initiatives from developed countries are trying to improve the situation. 
Voluntary social standards initiatives like one by European retailers that was supported 
by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) through GTZ are all heading in this direction. This initiative attempted 
to improve working conditions in the garment, textile, and toys industries in 12 
producing countries, including China, as it is by far the biggest producer. Recently, a 
bilateral project focusing on corporate social responsibility was also set up in China, 
addressing similar issues. Another bilateral CSR project is set to begin soon in India. 
The third aspect of our hypothesis – that voluntary social and ecological 
standards contribute to sustainable development as they help conserve natural 
resources – is becoming ever more important. Natural resources are under 
considerable strain. Pollution is increasing tremendously throughout the region, 
with its attendant high social costs and economic losses due to increased health care 
expenses. Additionally – and particularly important from our perspective – is the 
fact that many business models and thus companies depend on a sustainable supply 
of natural resources and the quality of these natural resources. To give an example: 
The rapidly growing aquaculture sector in Vietnam is seriously threatening the 
ecosystem of rivers and coastal areas. If the ecosystem collapses and fails to provide 
enough fresh water for the fish ponds and river cages of the fish farmers, the whole 
sector will collapse, causing severe economic loss to fish farmers, the processing 
industry, and trade, as well as other directly related industries such as feed supply. 
In this case, taking better care of the natural resources is indispensible if the long 
term sustainability of the aquaculture sector is to be guaranteed.  
Also from a pro-poor perspective, the sustainable management of natural 
resources such as forests becomes crucial, as the poor typically depend heavily on 
natural resources for their livelihood. 
7For more detailed information see Landwehr 2004a, 2004b, 2005, and Schepp 2004.
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All of these aspects call for increased efforts to introduce and improve 
compliance with social and environmental standards, which would contribute 
to better economic performance, lessen the pressure on the environment, and 
improve working conditions. 
Our second hypothesis, then, is that poverty alleviation is a middle- and 
long-term impact of the introduction and implementation of standards. Pover-
ty alleviation is an urgent challenge, especially in emerging Asian countries, 
where the gap between rich and poor, urban and rural populations is widening 
significantly.
While Chinese industrial zones along the coast (Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc.) are 
booming and producing a small caste of super rich, the majority of the population 
in mainly rural areas is being left behind. Thus, migrant workers are streaming to 
the cities hoping to find work and a better living for their families, but they are 
extremely vulnerable in the current situation. They often have no rights, working 
long hours in factories that do not even pay their wages or only after long delays 
(AFP/DPA 2007). The situation is similar in other countries, as well. Standards 
can buffer the process by securing, for example, minimum wages, better working 
conditions, and job security. 
Thus, improving the sustainability of natural resources in the rural areas as a 
means of livelihood for the rural poor, as well as improving working conditions of 
migrant workers are two important pillars of poverty reduction and achievement 
of a more inclusive or – as the Chinese would say – harmonious society.  
The introduction of environmental and social standards is a good way to 
contribute to this goal. Fostering these standards should thus be a priority of 
both local governments and donors trying to support sustainable development.
… and Discussing the Disadvantages
All these arguments seem to suggest that the question is not if standards 
should be supported and implemented on a broad scale, but rather how this can 
best be done. 
Still, we should also discuss some major drawbacks of standards, especially 
for those who will have to comply with them: (often small-scale) producers and 
suppliers in developing and emerging countries who supply large retail chains or 
international firms sourcing from them. These drawbacks have to be considered 
carefully when we intend to promote standards. 
First of all, there are many different, often competing standards in all kinds 
of value chains. In textiles there are, among others, BSCI, ETI, and SA 8000. 
Additionally, many retailers have their own codes of conduct. In the forestry/
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wood sector, FSC and PEFC compete. The highest concentration of standards 
can be found in the coffee market where the Common Code for the Coffee 
Community (4C), Utz Certified, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, and own-brand 
standards like C.A.F.E. of Starbucks and others co-exist. Since these standards 
are not always harmonized and often do not mutually accept each other, 
many producers are confronted with a whole range of different guidelines and 
regulations if they wish to continue business relationships with their partners in 
Europe or the USA. Although in principle a certain degree of competition, even 
among standards, may not be bad, it is highly confusing, especially for small-
scale producers of agricultural products, and entails significant expenditure of 
time and money if a supplier sells to multiple buyers whose standards are not 
harmonized or reciprocally recognized. 
Certification costs and the question of who should bear these costs play a role 
here, too. Usually costs for first-time certification are fairly high. Subsequently, 
independent auditors verify compliance with the standard at regular intervals. 
Small-scale producers, unless they are organized and able to achieve some 
economies of scale, are often not in a position to meet these expenses. 
Consequently, management of the cost-related aspects of certification schemes 
needs to be carefully analyzed before promoting standards. 
What Does this Mean for German Technical Cooperation?
If German development cooperation decides to actively continue its policy 
on standards, the following are some practical suggestions for the technical 
cooperation of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH with partner countries. 
To begin with, GTZ must tackle the urgent problems associated with 
standards described above. Standard harmonization requires the willingness of 
all stakeholders (especially those of competing standards) to sit down and start 
negotiating. While it is not in the interest of single standards to be dissolved, 
mutual acceptance would significantly ease the life of those trying to comply 
with standards. These multi-stakeholder processes could be moderated by 
GTZ, which has the relevant moderation and mediation know-how, as well 
as detailed knowledge of the topic as a result of German involvement in many 
different standards initiatives such as 4C, Cotton made in Africa, and organic 
agriculture.
As to the costs of certification, GTZ should help build up local certification 
bodies, in order to keep down costs and foster long-term local structures. One 
successful example is Nairobi-based AfriCert, the first certification company in 
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eastern Africa, which has obtained international ISO 65 accreditation. AfriCert’s 
seal of approval confirms that producers subscribe to good agricultural practices.8 
“Rather than spending a lot of time and money for European companies to come, 
assess, and certify them, the growers are now able to receive the same service at 
much lower cost from a local company,” reports GTZ expert Doris Günther, who 
helped develop AfriCert on behalf of BMZ.9 
Similar efforts are now being undertaken by other GTZ-supported projects 
in Asia, such as the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Program in 
Vietnam. GTZ’s contribution in this field could be training and advice to local 
certifiers in their efforts to become accredited and to improve their performance 
as service providers. Additionally, GTZ could promote collaboration and 
networking between local and international certification bodies. 
Besides addressing problems related to the introduction of standards, GTZ can 
also assist in further developing their advantages. Since standards are related to 
business operations, GTZ can engage with private companies that have an interest 
in improving their supply chain, thus making use of their market influence. One 
promising instrument of such a joint venture is the public-private partnership 
(PPP) model. A successful example underlines its practicability: Cotton made 
in Africa (CmiA), a standard established to improve living conditions of small-
scale cotton farmers in Africa by supporting the sustainable production of cotton 
through capacity building of farmers. The set target is one million direct and 
indirect beneficiaries. The project does not aim to be another higher-priced 
niche product like organic cotton, but to generate its benefits (higher income 
for farmers and higher quality of cotton) in a cost-neutral manner by creating a 
demand alliance of large (European) retailers for cotton from Africa. 
In Zambia, CmiA is implemented by the world’s largest cotton trader, 
Dunavant. Through their program, tens of thousands of small-scale cotton 
farmers can be reached with capacity building on good agricultural practices, 
helping them increase their productivity and ultimately their output and income. 
Alongside the training program, the private company introduced an award-
winning HIV/AIDS prevention program, adding the social aspect of standards 
to the approach.
In addition to their market influence, private enterprises often have an 
extensive infrastructure at their disposal (for example, local offices, cars, trucks, 
8Resource conservation, safe use of pesticides, good post-harvest protection, hygiene, and occupational  
health and safety.
9See “First Certification Company in Kenya,” http://www.gtz.de/en/praxis/9479.htm or the AfriCert 
homepage, http://www.africert.com /.
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trained and motivated staff, local knowledge, and contacts, etc.) (Peltzer 
2007). Consequently, by using the PPP constellation, market forces and the 
expertise of private companies are linked to development know-how, jointly 
benefiting a large number of small-scale producers or workers. This applies to 
all businesses, not only those in the agriculture-based value chains, but also, for 
instance, retailers introducing standards into textile supply chains. While they 
use their power to push standards into the market, development cooperation 
can moderate among different stakeholders in order to develop standards. In 
this way, the standards introduced into the market would be adjusted to target-
group needs and local conditions. 
This is the case of the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Program 
in Vietnam, which has successfully moderated development of a GLOBALGAP 
(formerly called EurepGAP) standard for catfish among different private and 
public stakeholders. This standard is now being piloted in cooperation with 
international buyers and local fish farmers. It is anticipated that as other firms 
become aware of the successful implementation of the standard and its positive 
effect on product quality and sustainable management of natural resources, it is 
likely to spread throughout the whole industry. 
Another point of discussion is outreach. CmiA can be classified as one of 
the so-called mainstream standards that are highly effective when it comes to 
outreach, as large numbers of small-scale producers or workers benefit from these 
schemes. However, their innate nature of compromise between many different 
stakeholders limits them to minimum standards. On the other hand, it is this air 
of compromise that makes them acceptable in developing countries, as well. 4C, 
for instance, is a social and environmental code for the mass coffee market that is 
accepted even by the very skeptical Association of Brazilian Roasters, the world’s 
largest coffee supplier (Peltzer and Zahmt 2006). GTZ’s role should be to enable 
multi-stakeholder dialogue and act as a driving force behind standard design, in 
both conceptual development and preparation for introduction of the standard, 
so that broad outreach can be achieved.
Other opportunities on the other side of the spectrum are niche-market 
standards, such as those for organic food. This can have direct or indirect 
economic benefits. Fairtrade, for instance, pays an additional premium of 
US$0.15 per pound for organically produced Arabica coffee. Yet again, indirect 
benefits accrue as well. The organic Pangasius (catfish) initiative in Vietnam, for 
example, helped local fish farmers by providing stable trading relationships as 
well as more security, thanks to improvements in product quality that make it 
less vulnerable to external influences such as bad weather conditions or diseases. 
Furthermore, the improved quality has eased access to the European market by 
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diminishing the problem of rejection of “unclean” (containing excess amounts of 
antibiotics and bacteria) fish. GTZ successfully formed part of a PPP project; it 
supported implementation of the pilot organic production and used the concept 
of a value chain in order to bring all stakeholders together to seek joint solutions 
to the problems that arose. 
Thus, there are benefits to both mainstream standards as well as niche-market 
standards. GTZ therefore has to consider broad effectiveness versus in-depth 
impacts. A balanced approach supporting both cases seems to be the most 
adequate solution. 
Besides working with target groups directly or via private enterprises within 
value chains, GTZ can attempt to engage on the macro level by supporting 
national governments in creating framework conditions for the successful 
introduction of standards in their respective countries. Government backing 
of such initiatives is a necessary precondition for success. Although voluntary 
standards never replace national laws and regulations, in many countries 
(especially those with weak law enforcement) they can serve as a minimum 
basis and as a starting point for further development. In the above-mentioned 
case of Vietnamese catfish, the TC-supported project attracted the attention 
of central and local authorities. After understanding the preconditions for 
success in international food markets, the government launched a series of 
policies, campaigns, and decisions to support the production of “top quality 
Pangasius” and provided quality control systems. The local Department 
of Fisheries is directly involved in the pilot projects, and the national 
Ministry of Fisheries is directly involved in setting standards. Consultancy 
and moderation of stakeholder processes by GTZ can jump-start these 
developments. German development cooperation, however, also has to push 
the topic on the international agenda. This includes dialogue within the 
EU about trade restrictions. Developing countries will only be willing to 
enforce standards on a large scale when developed countries in turn allow 
them unlimited access to their markets. As Peltzer and Zahrnt (2006) put it: 
“Global implementation of social and ecological minimum standards is not 
compatible with protectionism.”
Finally, raising consumer awareness is another on-going process worthy of 
support. By funding and designing campaigns like “fair feels good” in Germany,10 
consumers can be profoundly informed about standards, their impacts, and what 
they can do to support the improvement of the lives of those who produce their 
daily goods. This also increases pressure on brand firms or retailers to supervise 
10For detailed information see: http://www.fair-feels-good.de/
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the production processes of their suppliers and only buy from those suppliers 
that comply with certain (at least minimum) standards. 
Summary 
While standards are not a panacea for all the evils of globalization, they seem 
to be a realistic way to buffer its most severe effects on people and the planet.
Cooperation of all stakeholders involved is a necessary precondition for 
developing, introducing, and implementing standards in the most successful way. 
The same is true for the smooth functioning of a social and ecological market 
economy. This underlines the interdependence between standards and the social 
and ecological market economy. Standards need certain governmental and 
societal preconditions in order to be implemented and function properly. Once 
they are implemented, they in turn foster a competitive social and ecological 
market economy where all stakeholders cooperate.
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GTZ’s Approach to Supporting Private Sector 
Development in Asia – Underlying Principles 
and Practical Experience
Corinna Küsel1
Introduction
The discussion on the relevance of the model of the social and ecological 
market economy for German development cooperation has recently intensified 
significantly. This discussion has been triggered, among other things, by the policy 
paper on its key principles recently issued by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).2 The policy paper builds on 
German and European traditions of designing economic and social policies in a 
way that ensures a balance between free market competition and the regulation of 
key aspects necessary to guarantee social equality and equal opportunities. It has 
led to systematic reflection on the foundations as well as the values and positions 
shaping the approaches of German development cooperation in different fields.  
The policy paper has also further spurred the ongoing international debate 
on the role of the state. This debate deals in particular with the question of 
whether reforms of the regulatory framework alone suffice to create the basis 
for the private sector to unfold, or whether they need to be complemented by 
selective and targeted promotional approaches to strengthen the competitiveness 
of specific sectors or regions via industrial policy.
The purpose of this article is to review the background and conceptual 
underpinnings of private sector development (PSD) approaches of German 
development cooperation (and in particular German technical cooperation)3 in 
1The author wishes to thank Anke Petersen and Peter Sommer for putting together the case studies for this 
article, as well as various colleagues for comments and suggestions. 
2See German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007a and 2007b.
3This review will refer in some instances to German development cooperation in general, for which the overarching 
orientation and guidelines are set by the German Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation. However, 
it will more specifically assess how the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, as 
an implementing organization for German development cooperation, has translated the overall framework and the 
guidelines into specific concepts and practical instruments for implementation.
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the framework of these debates, and to assess how they have been implemented 
in the specific socio-economic context of Asia.
The article will outline different concepts that have influenced the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH’s approach to 
private sector development, in particular, how it builds on the German experience 
of a strong Mittelstand, but also how it has both contributed to and incorporated 
international debates. The article will then review in more detail how these 
concepts are put into practice in GTZ work in Asia. Lastly, it will make some 
recommendations for reform and further development of GTZ’s approach. 
Foundations and Key Principles of GTZ’s Private Sector  
Development Approach 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how GTZ’s approach to private sector 
development builds on Germany’s own experience of developing a competitive 
small and medium-sized enterprise sector within the overarching context of 
the social and ecological market economy, as well as how it has been shaped 
by the international discussion on the most effective approaches to stimulating 
economic development. 
The Relevance of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Context 
of Germany’s Social and Ecological Market Economy4
Strengthening the private sector is one of the BMZ principles,5 because a 
strong and competitive private sector is a constituent element of the social and 
ecological market economy. It is one of the most essential levers for overall 
economic and social development and for sustainable poverty alleviation; it 
creates jobs and income, and also contributes to the overall state budget and thus 
to public expenditure in social and other domains. 
Germany’s own experience of successful economic development strongly builds on 
the dynamism of efficient and internationally competitive medium-sized businesses, 
many of them world leaders in their industries. Innovative and successful small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been and continue to be a growth and job 
4This section builds strongly on Meyer-Stamer and Wältring 2000.
5The principles of the social and ecological market economy are: 1. Supporting the rule of law; 2. Striving for 
broad-based growth; 3. Strengthening the private sector; 4. Improving conditions for the market economy;  
5. Making an economy viable for the future; 6. Creating a social partnership; 7. Shaping the economy based on 
ecological concerns; and 8.  Ensuring equal opportunities.
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machine.6 The relevance of the SME sector in Germany goes beyond its economic 
importance and builds on the historical and societal role of the Mittelstand, which has 
its historical roots in the social order of the Middle Ages, where the estates (Stände, 
that is, citizens grouped according to socio-economic status, for example nobility, 
craftsmen, traders, farmers, etc.) were assigned special responsibilities.7 
The success of Germany’s small and medium-sized enterprises builds on a 
sophisticated and systemic structure, different elements of which have been taken 
up by GTZ’s private sector development approaches.8 At the policy level, the 
development of the private sector and specifically of SMEs builds on a setting of stable 
macroeconomic, political, and regulatory framework conditions. Care is taken that 
policies and regulations have few discriminatory effects on SMEs.9 To create room for 
the creativity and initiative of SMEs, the German Federal Government launched the 
so-called Initiative for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in July 2006.10
The development of SMEs also builds on a highly differentiated system of 
organizations and institutions which offer services at the municipal, regional, and 
national levels. This institutional set-up includes public and private institutions as 
well as public-private partnerships. Research and training institutions like the dual 
vocational training system, higher education institutions (universities, etc.), and 
specialized R&D institutions play a key role in strengthening the competitiveness 
of the private sector. SME support distinguishes between regional policy (with 
a view to reducing disparities between German regions)11 and Mittelstand and 
technology policies at the national and Länder (federal states) levels.
6The approximately 3.4 million small and medium-sized businesses represent 99.7% of all businesses in 
Germany, produce 40.8% of the taxable turnover, provide 70.5% of jobs, and train 83.4% of all apprentices, see 
http://www.bmwi.de.
7See Meyer-Stamer and Wältring 2000, 7.
8It is important to point out that there has been a shift from a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises 
to a more generic orientation to development of the private sector. To reach the overarching objectives of 
economic development and poverty alleviation, the competitiveness of the entire sector and the linkages 
between smaller and larger companies need to be addressed.
9See Meyer-Stamer and Wältring 2000, 53.
10Some of the key elements of the SME initiative include creating a favorable environment for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, reducing bureaucracy, initiating a business start-up campaign as a catalyst for more 
start-ups, strengthening the innovativeness of SMEs, modernizing vocational training, improving the funding 
situation for SMEs, and mobilizing venture capital for innovation and stronger support for SMEs in overseas 
markets. See http://www.bmwi.de.
11The concept of regional policy as a “joint task” of the federal government and Länder (federal states) to 
improve the regional economic structure is explained in detail by Hutter in this reader.
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At the firm level, cooperation between SMEs and between SMEs and large 
enterprises has gained in importance as a result of the globalization process and 
the more knowledge-intensive production needs. The phenomenon of clusters and 
industrial districts in countries like Italy has received a lot of attention and underlines 
the importance of different forms of cooperation and supplier relations.
Most important for the development of the German private sector is, however, 
probably a value system which encourages entrepreneurship and achievement, 
and consensual relationships between major societal groups: in general, German 
institutions base their operations on a fundamental consensus that leads to a 
problem-solving-oriented style of negotiations between the private and public 
sectors as well as between unions and employers associations. The German 
political economy – with its foundation in the social market economy – is 
strongly shaped by regulatory constraints on employers in the remuneration, 
use, and dismissal of labor. This includes binding industry-wide agreements on 
wages and working conditions, a high level of mandatory or state-provided social 
security benefits, and substantial constraints on layoffs. Complementary to the 
collective bargaining model on the supra-firm level, works councils that represent 
employees at the shop-floor level have wide-ranging information, consultation, 
and co-determination rights within a firm.12 
The German experience of private sector development is thus, on the one 
hand, related to the systemic institutional structure and has an overall orientation 
conducive to enterprise development at different levels. It is also based on the 
specific societal model of the social (and increasingly ecological) market economy, 
which is the basis for the consensus-oriented relationship between capital and 
labor, as well as between the public and private sectors. This is a characteristic 
example of the importance of societal values and “shared mental models,” which 
Richter highlights in her essay in this reader as essential for understanding 
specific development patterns. On the other hand, international discussions and 
conceptual trends have influenced private sector development approaches.
International Discussion on Private Sector Development
Two of the most influential paradigms that are shaping the international 
discussion and influencing the intervention approaches of GTZ are “business 
development services” and “business enabling environment.”13 The platform and 
12See Meyer-Stamer and Wältring, 21 ff. On labor relations and co-determination, see also Meissner and Hung 
in this reader.
13This is necessarily a very selective view, which leaves out various other concepts of relevance in the 
international PSD debate.
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the instrument for this discussion has been the Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development (DCED) and its working structures.14 
Business Development Services (BDS)15
Since the late 1990s, the BDS concept has exerted significant influence over 
approaches to private sector development. In particular, it has induced a shift away 
from a traditional, rather supply-driven approach, in which donors and public 
sector institutions provided services – mostly training and consultancy, often 
free of charge – to enterprises. One of the key results of the BDS discussion was 
thus that it has led to a much more business-oriented and market-led approach. 
Over time, the BDS perspective has undergone significant development. The 
first generation approach still followed a rather narrow concept and focused 
mainly on the delivery of business services, mostly offered on a commercial 
basis by private providers. The second generation thinking already reflected a 
more comprehensive and systemic understanding and had a more appropriate 
consideration of the different roles of the public and the private sectors. Market 
development principles increasingly became integrated into more comprehensive 
private sector development projects.16 Internationally, market development as 
the overarching paradigm has in the meantime further developed to an (at least) 
third generation approach, which has been adopted by many agencies. 
Overall, the BDS concept has been used to further develop GTZ’s approach to 
private sector development: It stresses principles of market and competition (Leistungs-
wett be werb) that are essential ingredients of the social market economy, but were 
previously mainly addressed at the level of individual companies. It has brought about 
a shift to market and demand-oriented thinking, with an emphasis on the principle 
of subsidiarity and a focus on outreach, impact, and economic sustainability. Tools 
and instruments to develop business service markets and, specifically, to build both 
demand and supply in a sustainable manner have also been increasingly integrated into 
14The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (www.enterprise-development.org), formerly 
called the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development, is a forum for international 
conceptual development and coordination in private sector development. It comprises a large number of 
bilateral donors, development banks, and international agencies. It develops best practice guidelines based 
on practical experience gained in the field; it provides a forum where innovative thinking and approaches 
can be articulated and discussed and offers institutional memory to members and others in private sector 
development. It was informally established as early as 1979, but has since then continuously expanded and 
formalized its activities. 
15Various papers and case studies on practical experiences in the field of BDS market development can be found 
at www.bdsknowledge.org. 
16See Wältring 2006.
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approaches like value chain promotion and local and regional economic development. 
Over time, the BDS concept has also progressively reflected a systemic way of thinking 
and has at least partly considered the roles of the public sector in service provision.
On the other hand, the concept and implementation of BDS have, in 
hindsight, suffered from a too narrow interpretation and a too strong focus on 
strengthening the market for services offered by private providers. BDS has often 
been implemented as a micro-level approach, which in itself cannot do justice to 
the complex challenges of PSD. At the same time, it has not paid enough attention 
to the role of the state in creating the necessary preconditions for economic 
development and has lacked clarity on what can be considered public goods. 
Business Enabling Environment (BEE)17  
The most recent – and still very valid – paradigm that is both shaping the 
international discussion and influencing intervention approaches of GTZ is 
related to the business enabling environment. Since the beginning of this decade, 
increasing attention has been given to the political, legal, and institutional 
framework conditions which constrain private sector development in many 
countries. It is in this context that the Business Environment Working Group 
(established in 2001) of the DCED has addressed the subject, also by organizing 
three international conferences and preparing “donor guidance,” with a view to 
agreeing on common principles and best practice orientations.18
An enabling business environment refers to a legal, political, and institutional 
framework which favors the unfolding of private initiative and investment. 
The aim is to eliminate unnecessary regulations and red tape that hinder the 
development and performance of businesses. This relates, among other things, to 
the costs of compliance with regulations. It refers not only to direct costs, such as 
license fees, but also to indirect costs resulting from expenditures and time spent 
for – often unnecessary – transactions.
17For further information on concepts, research results, and field experiences, as well as the papers from the 
international BEE conferences, see www.businessenvironment.org. 
18The “donor guidance” defines the business environment as a “complex of policy, legal, institutional, and 
regulatory conditions that govern business activities. It is a sub-set of the investment climate and includes 
the administration and enforcement mechanisms established to implement government policy, as well as 
the institutional arrangements that influence the way key actors operate.” It emphasizes, in particular, that a 
“healthy business environment is essential for growth and poverty reduction. Business environment reform 
is needed where inappropriate regulation, excessive taxation, lack of fair competition, lack of voice, and an 
unstable policy environment restrict investment and the development of markets, and force many businesses 
to operate in the informal economy.” See Donor Committee for Enterprise Development 2008.
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An intensive discussion on the effective contribution of business environment 
reforms to economic growth and the development of the private sector and, 
specifically, to poverty alleviation is going on. Its advocates emphasize that 
business environment reforms constitute the most effective and efficient as well 
as cost-saving means (in contrast to promotional tools) to strengthen private 
sector development. They also claim that removing administrative obstacles 
enables particularly the poor to participate in business activities. 
Its critics, on the other hand, underline that BEE reforms may be important, 
but are by no means sufficient for achieving the above-mentioned development 
goals. Questions raised are, in particular, whether business environment reforms 
allow for the creation of competitive advantages in increasingly globalized and 
knowledge-intensive markets, and whether they really have pro-poor outcomes 
(Altenburg and von Drachenfels 2008). GTZ’s practical experience also un-
derlines that policy reforms will not be successful if they are not sustained by 
support to implementation and capacity building of stakeholders. 
For German development cooperation, in general, and GTZ, in particular, this 
debate on the relative importance of business environment reforms has helped 
develop and sharpen the conceptual understanding and practical implementation 
capacity of a systemic approach to private sector development. The discussion on 
business environment reforms has led to an increasing recognition of the relevance 
of macro-level reforms and improvements of the regulatory environment 
within GTZ private sector development approaches. This has in particular 
highlighted and specified the role of the state as an important partner within 
PSD approaches – in contrast to earlier cooperation approaches which focused 
mainly on private sector players and addressed policy aspects only indirectly, for 
example, by supporting business membership organizations in their government 
lobbying function. Addressing regulatory obstacles has increasingly become 
part of different service fields of GTZ: approaches such as local and regional 
economic development and value chain promotion integrate a BEE perspective 
in their toolbox for analysis and intervention.
GTZ’s Approach to Private Sector Development19
GTZ’s concept of private sector development builds on these various 
ingredients: It is based on the German and European tradition with its strong 
and competitive sector of private small and medium-sized enterprises and 
the diversified institutional set-up which has been bolstering private sector 
development in Europe. It has been informed by the conceptual debate and 
19See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH 2001 and Miesner 2004.
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exchange at the international level, which has helped hone its market orientation. 
It has also learned from the discussion within the research community. 
Among the concepts which have significantly contributed to shaping 
conceptual discussions and practical approaches within GTZ has been the 
concept of systemic competitiveness,20 based on the work of the German 
Development Institute in the 1990s. The understanding of competitiveness 
within GTZ has evolved notably over the past years and decades, from a focus 
on the competitiveness of individual companies and the strengthening of specific 
institutions to an increasingly comprehensive and systemic perspective. 
As a result, the following are essential elements of GTZ’s approach to private 
sector development:
•  GTZ’s approach to private sector development builds on a systemic 
perspective and addresses different intervention levels. It focuses on the 
interlinkages between the regulatory framework (at the macro level), the 
institutional environment (meso level), and inter-firm relationships (micro 
level) as a basis for the competitiveness of an economy. Among other things, 
this approach has been informed by the systemic and diversified institutional 
set-up that has shaped private sector development in Europe. 
•  In particular, GTZ’s PSD approach increasingly emphasizes the reform 
requirements of the regulatory environment and thus the macro-level 
perspective. This focus and the toolbox of analysis and intervention 
approaches have been developed in close interaction with the international 
discussion on the business enabling environment.21 
•  GTZ’s approach gives special attention to a differentiated perspective on the 
responsibilities and the subsidiarity of different legal entities at the national, 
sub-national, and local levels. In this perspective, the interlinkages between 
national level policy orientations and regional development approaches are 
addressed.
•  The systematic involvement and participation of multiple stakeholders is of 
particular relevance within GTZ’s systemic PSD approach. This is also based 
on the German experience, which underlines the importance of a close and 
consensus-oriented dialogue and cooperation between the state, the private 
sector, and labor representatives. 
•  The approach also builds on the interlinkages between enterprises of different 
sizes: A systemic perspective of the economy emphasizes the linkages 
20See Eßer et al. 1994.
21This increasing integration of a macro-level perspective is also reflected organizationally in GTZ in the 
merger of the Private Sector Development and Economic Policy Sections.
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between enterprises of different sizes that are integrated in local, national, 
and global value chains – in contrast to earlier approaches which focused 
mainly on micro and small enterprises. In this context, the involvement of 
big international companies is increasingly recognized as a prerequisite for 
developing the competitiveness of local producers.
•  Social and ecological principles constitute an integral part of GTZ’s PSD 
approach, as an essential element of an integrated concept of sustainability, 
but also in response to the requirements of globalization and international 
production standards. 
Private Sector Development Approaches in Asia
The objective of this chapter is to assess how the key principles and conceptual 
elements that have been outlined are translated into practical approaches and 
results in the context of German development cooperation in Asia. It will present 
practical examples of how GTZ approaches to private sector development are 
taking up the current challenges of economic development in the region and the 
demand from partner countries. 
In this context, it is important to underline that these private sector 
development approaches are based on priorities of and demands from the partner 
country. Governments and other stakeholders in Asia constitute strong and 
self-conscious partners who clearly articulate their demands and their specific 
requirements. They choose donors and concepts based on the specific solutions 
that these can offer to their problems and the objectives they want to achieve. 
The programs and approaches to be reviewed below thus always constitute the 
result of a dialogue and consultation process between the development partners 
involved. 
Framework for GTZ’s Private Sector Development Approaches in Asia
Economic liberalization as well as the rapid spread of new technologies are 
making the business environment in Asia continuously more competitive and 
demanding. WTO membership, competition from China and India, etc. imply 
steadily increasing adjustment requirements for Asian economies. Structural 
change in Asia is taking place at a rapidly increasing pace.
At the same time, socio-economic development in Asia is characterized by 
a significant level of heterogeneity: while many countries in Asia have been 
successfully integrating into the world economy, others lack the requisite 
preconditions and suffer from high poverty levels, in some cases exacerbated by 
conflict situations. 
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Despite this high level of heterogeneity among Asian countries, there is an 
overall understanding that economic growth is a key element of development. 
Most Asian countries – rich and poor alike – have recognized private sector 
development as a core element of approaches to strengthen competitiveness, 
employment, and income generation. Overall, across most Asian countries, 
balanced and broad-based economic growth is seen as crucial to poverty 
alleviation, despite some differences in thrust. 
At the same time, the rapidly industrializing economies face increasing 
challenges in relation to environmental and social aspects. As they pass into the 
stage of industrialization at quick-motion speed, they are already now facing 
social and environmental challenges similar to those of industrialized countries. 
In some countries, rapid growth has led to rising inequality, which may cause 
tension and result in political unrest. The key question is how to achieve fast 
growth as a basis for poverty reduction while ensuring equality of opportunities 
and inclusive development at the same time.22
Sustainable economic development as a path to broad-based economic growth 
constitutes a main concern for most Asian countries and is accordingly also high 
on the agenda of German development cooperation. In most countries in Asia, 
therefore, “sustainable economic development” constitutes one of the priority 
areas of German development cooperation, with private sector development 
constituting a key part in most cases.23 Under the BMZ Regional Strategy for Asia 
which defines (1) socially balanced growth, (2) ecologically viable development, 
and (3) good governance as priorities, the approach of sustainable economic 
development gives special emphasis to social inclusion.24 
22On the challenges for Asian development, see Richter in this reader. 
23Sustainable economic development has been agreed upon as a priority area of cooperation between Germany 
and China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. In Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, and Nepal, there are significant private sector development programs within other priority areas. 
On the approach of the priority area “Sustainable Economic Development,” see German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 2006a and 2006b.
24See German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008a and 2008b on the 
strategic framework for German development cooperation with Asia and the approach to socially balanced 
economic development in Asia, respectively.
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Key Elements of a Systemic Approach to Private Sector Development 
in Asia
A systemic perspective structures the approaches of German development 
cooperation in the field of economic development, in general, and private sector 
development, in particular. Most programs of German development cooperation 
in Asia thus include interventions at the institutional and the policy levels and at 
the national and sub-national levels, and involve stakeholders from the public and 
private sectors. Additionally, support to the private sector is often complemented 
by vocational training programs, regional development, or programs to strengthen 
the financial system or address ecological concerns.
The following section will review how some of the key aspects of the 
systemic approach are practically addressed and implemented in the Asian 
context.
The Multi-level Approach: Business Environment Reforms in  
GTZ-Supported Programs in Asia
Business environment reforms have increasingly become an integral element 
of private sector development programs supported by GTZ in Asia. Experience 
underlines the importance of an integrated approach, which links interventions 
at the policy level to practical implementation and capacity development and 
complements policy advice with support to specific regions or sectors.
Over the past years, it has increasingly been recognized by most governments 
and development partners in Asia that an enabling business environment is 
one of the foundations of effective private sector development. Policy reforms 
are thus high on the agenda of development cooperation, both as an element 
of policy conditionalities of larger often multi-donor-supported reform 
programs and credits and also supported directly by technical assistance 
programs. 
While other development partners frequently focus their support on policy 
reforms at the national level, German development cooperation generally 
addresses regulatory reform aspects as an integral part of broader and more 
integrated private sector development programs. 
The experience of GTZ emphasizes the importance of linking business 
environment reforms at the national level with support to capacity development 
of institutions and to the effective implementation of reforms. In many countries, 
ineffective implementation of reforms is one of the biggest shortcomings, 
resulting in only limited impacts of policy level changes. This also underlines the 
need to involve various stakeholders in the reform process. 
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Support for capacity development is essential to enabling partners to work 
towards sustainable development.25 The promotion of capacity development builds 
the capability of stakeholders to effectively combine and coordinate political will, 
interest, knowledge, values, and financial resources in order to achieve their own 
developmental objectives. GTZ considers capacity development a prerequisite 
to any integrated approach to furthering development processes. Its approach 
to capacity building is therefore based on an in-depth understanding of partner 
structures, process-orientation, and systemic thinking.26 
Programs in Asia, for example, in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, 
emphasize support for the implementation of reforms at the sub-national 
level. In Vietnam, GTZ works with the stakeholders in selected provinces to 
sensitize them to the reforms of the national policy framework and to build 
their capacity to effectively implement these reforms. For example, business 
registration procedures have been simplified by establishing one-stop shops 
and an IT-based registration system in several provinces. In most provinces, 
the time required for registration has been shortened from several weeks to 10 
working days. The focus is thus on translating an increasingly favorable business 
environment at the national level into practical results at the provincial level by 
building the required institutions, implementation mechanisms, and personnel 
capacities. 
Experience in the Philippines has shown how practical results of reforms in 
selected localities may create momentum for horizontal transfer and replication. 
The program initially focused on helping selected cities to streamline their 
business registration process. This allowed companies to obtain business permits 
faster and at a lower cost; as a result, the number of registered companies increased 
in these localities. On this basis, good practices of simplified and faster business 
registration could be transferred to further localities. Additional learning and 
replication may ultimately lead to improved business registration procedures 
throughout the country. 
Overall, GTZ’s experience in integrating policy-level reforms in private sector 
development approaches underlines the following aspects:
•  Addressing the macro-level and reforms of the regulatory environment as an 
integral part of a systemic PSD approach is an important pillar of effective 
and sustainable support to the development of a competitive private sector.
25“GTZ’s specific approach to capacity development support is rooted in our concept of sustainable 
development.” See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH 2007.
26Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-
DAC) 2006.
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•  Experience strongly underlines the importance of linking policy reform 
interventions with support to implementation and capacity development of 
institutions, both at the national and the sub-national levels. This practical 
experience from implementation also enables GTZ as well as its partner 
organizations to provide well-founded and thus more effective inputs to the 
debate on policy reforms at the national level. 
•  Regulatory and administrative reforms thus need to be complemented 
by support to specific sub-regions (in the context of local and regional 
economic development approaches) or sub-sectors (in the context of value 
chain approaches) in order to be effective. The reverse is also true: experience 
shows that local economic development or value chain approaches will be 
less effective if specific bottlenecks and constraints at the policy level are not 
addressed. 
Addressing Local and Regional Economic Development in a Systemic Manner
GTZ’s approach to local and regional economic development (LRED) 
attempts to strengthen locational factors and the competitiveness of a region 
or a locality. Its systemic conceptual framework integrates support to the 
implementation of policy reforms as well as selective promotional tools. It 
particularly emphasizes a participatory and dialogue-oriented process to 
engage the various relevant stakeholders in problem analysis and planning 
and to mobilize their participation in implementation. There is increasing 
recognition that this approach needs to be inserted into a national perspective 
of regional or territorial development policies.
In the context of decentralization processes in many Asian countries, support 
to economic development at the sub-national level is gaining attention. With 
its approach of local and regional economic development, GTZ offers a 
comprehensive toolkit to support countries with quite different framework 
conditions.27 LRED strategies are designed in a participatory process involving 
the relevant stakeholders; this entails a joint participatory analysis of the main 
bottlenecks and constraints and coordinated planning of practical initiatives.  
The goal of local and regional economic development is to strengthen 
locational factors and competitive advantages of sub-regions or localities 
within a country as well as to enhance cooperation between different sub-
national entities. To improve the investment environment for both existing 
companies and new investors, it aims to create an appropriate policy 
27LRED approaches are currently pursued in most GTZ programs in Asia, for example, in Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, Laos, and China. 
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and institutional framework and strengthen the availability of demand-
oriented services. The establishment and support of cooperation networks 
and clusters of enterprises, research institutions, and local authorities 
within a region helps to link existing potentials in a bid to increase regional 
competitiveness.
At the same time, there is increasing recognition that sub-national development 
needs to be inserted into a national policy perspective. Territorial (or regional) 
development policies include all the policies undertaken by public authorities 
(central, regional, and local authorities) with the explicit goal of enhancing the 
growth of specific geographical areas. While aiming to strengthen competitiveness, 
the objective is also to achieve a sustainable development pattern as well as balanced 
growth among different regions of a country. This also builds on the German 
approaches of regional policy and the promotion of selected regions with a view to 
enhancing economic growth and facilitating structural change.28
The Regional Development Program (RED) in Indonesia exemplifies 
the systemic LRED concept. The program aims to build the capacity of 
decision makers at the regional but also at the national level to manage an 
integrated regional economic development approach. To improve the business 
environment in the region of Central Java and to simplify administrative 
processes, the provincial government has introduced one-stop services in all 
districts in the province; regulatory impact assessments have been conducted 
in a number of districts with a view to adjusting or abolishing regulations 
that negatively affect economic activities. Forums for economic development 
and employment promotion serve to facilitate the dialogue between relevant 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors as well as members of civil 
society, and are the forum for jointly designing local economic development 
initiatives. Regional marketing activities play an essential role in the project 
approach: Internal marketing activities attempt to reduce disparities between 
districts; they motivate local actors to think and act beyond their district 
boundaries on a regional scale. External marketing activities advertise the 
strengths of the region to potential external investors. By integrating all 
determinants of successful enterprise promotion, RED creates an enabling and 
efficient system for sustainable development of the private sector in Central 
Java. Practical experiences are then transferred to the national level.
In China, the Sino-German Economic and Structural Reform Program 
is currently supporting the drafting of a comprehensive strategy for regional 
28See Hutter in this reader. 
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development. In its recent five-year plan and its vision for a harmonious 
society, the Chinese government has recognized the need for a systematic 
approach to strengthen development in backward regions: While 37% of 
Chinese gross domestic product is created in three provinces (Yangtse, Pearl 
River, Beijing/Tianjin), approximately 750 million Chinese continue to live 
in the less developed regions of western, northeastern, and central China. This 
has led to an increasing income gap (Gini coefficient 0.45). The aim is thus 
to develop a comprehensive policy for coordinated, balanced, and sustainable 
regional development in China. This builds on so-called territorial reviews, 
which are conducted by OECD experts with state-of-the art analytical tools for 
regional development strategies. GTZ, as a long-term partner of high-ranking 
Chinese decision-makers, supports the process and ensures that the findings are 
incorporated in the process of drafting new laws. It will also support capacity 
development and implementation of reform processes to ensure the impact of 
the law on regional development.
In a nutshell, the LRED approach thus translates and operationalizes the 
systemic perspective to the sub-national level:
•  GTZ experience emphasizes the importance of a consultative and 
participatory approach which integrates the perspective of all stakeholders, 
both from the public and the private sectors. Consultation and participation 
are important to mobilize the involvement and active contribution of all 
relevant parties. 
•  Major emphasis is on developing an institutional framework that builds 
on regional and inter-regional cooperation between enterprises, research 
institutions, business membership organizations, and local authorities. 
•  Increasing attention is given to linking local and regional initiatives with 
policy reforms at the national level. This relates, on the one hand, to the 
implementation of national level policy reforms at the sub-national level. 
On the other hand, territorial development approaches aim to provide 
orientation to regional development decision makers from a national 
perspective, with a view to reducing regional disparities and increasing 
regional competitiveness.29
29See Mang and Bonschab in this reader.
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Public-Private Cooperation and Dialogue
An integrated and systemic PSD approach builds on the involvement of 
multiple stakeholders. Of particular importance in this context is the facilitation 
of a structured exchange and dialogue involving representatives of both the public 
and the private sectors. Institutionalizing public-private dialogue processes is 
important both at the national and the sub-natio nal levels.
Many developing and transition countries in Asia have little tradition of 
constructive dialogue between the government and the private sector; many 
believe that consultation on law and policy making is only pro-forma or 
superficial. Often, there is no experience with and no tradition of structured 
consultation mechanisms such as regular forums at the national or local levels, 
expert consultative groups, or focus group discussions. 
The importance of strengthening the dialogue between public and private 
sector stakeholders is thus increasingly high on the agenda of development 
partners. The World Bank, for example, has prepared a comprehensive toolkit, 
including case studies and monitoring mechanisms, for such dialogues.30 
German experience strongly emphasizes the importance of such dialogue 
mechanisms between different stakeholders, including the public and the private 
sectors and trade unions as labor representatives. Within Germany, there is a 
tradition of round tables which play an important role in many federal states and 
constitute a structure for consultation and joint decision making on strategies 
for regional economic development. GTZ has always given high priority to 
enhancing the articulation of entrepreneurs’ interests, also, for example, by 
strengthening the role of business membership organizations. 
In Vietnam, GTZ has supported the drafting of the Enterprise Law and the 
Investment Law by introducing a set of systematic consultation mechanisms and 
has helped to establish structured exchange processes. This has included direct 
support to the organization of policy dialogues between government agencies 
and the private sector, involving both foreign and local business associations. 
GTZ has also helped to carry out regulatory impact assessment exercises that 
engage stakeholders in a systematic analysis of the effects of regulation. Involving 
the press and media helped to bring the issues discussed in policy dialogue forums 
to the public, resulting in wide civil society discussion of many critical issues 
surrounding the laws. As a result, support for reforms and “public ownership” of 
the laws has greatly increased. These two laws have been the most widely debated 
ones to date and have set an example for wide participation of the private sector 
in lawmaking in Vietnam. Based on the success of the consultation processes for 
30see www.publicprivatedialogue.org
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these specific laws, GTZ has worked with key agencies to institutionalize these 
mechanisms. As a result, the government is now intending to introduce regulatory 
impact assessments as a standard tool for consultation on law projects. 
GTZ’s experience thus shows that:
•  Structured dialogue processes require more than occasional meetings 
between the relevant stakeholders; for an effective and efficient organization 
of such dialogues, clear mandates and defined roles of the stakeholders 
involved, a focus on tangible outputs, as well as follow-up and monitoring 
are necessary.
•  Facilitating the dialogue between the public and private sectors plays an 
essential role, not only in policy reforms, but also in order to effectively 
involve the relevant stakeholders in the development of coordinated 
intervention strategies, for example, for specific regions or sub-sectors.
•  Dialogue mechanisms so far have engaged mainly the public and private 
sectors in joint strategy development; worker representatives have not yet 
been systematically involved in these processes. 
Strengthening the Integration of Local Firms in Global Value Chains in 
Cooperation with International Lead Firms
Finding ways to effectively cooperate and join forces with the international 
private sector is gaining increasing attention in the international discussion on 
economic development, in particular in the context of value chain approaches. 
Development partnerships with the private sector or public-private partnerships 
give German development cooperation an effective tool to involve big international 
companies in contributing to sustainable development.31
For GTZ, an integrated view of a sub-sector that addresses the interlinkages 
between enterprises of different sizes is an important element of a systemic 
approach. Earlier approaches which focused exclusively on small companies fell 
short of addressing the challenges of world market orientation and the need 
for structural change. Cooperation with international lead firms is essential for 
enhancing the ability of regions or sub-sectors to comply with requirements of 
the world market.
This is even more important in Asia, with its vigorous private sector development 
and the significant presence of international firms. In many programs in Asia, 
31German development cooperation has always highlighted the significant contribution of private sector 
engagement to development objectives. Earlier approaches of integrated advisory services were converted to 
the Public-Private Partnership Program in the 1990s. 
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particularly in those with value chain components, for example in Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Thailand, and Nepal, international players are 
involved in the development of local value chains.
In Vietnam, GTZ systematically engages international firms in the development 
of different agricultural value chains. In the fruit and vegetable value chain, for 
example, GTZ has cooperated with the Metro Cash and Carry Group to train 
more than 8000 farmers, collectors, and retailers in measures to improve quality 
and hygiene. They jointly invested in upgraded washing, sorting, and packaging 
infrastructure. As a result, the previous losses of about 50% of fruits and vegetables 
between the farmer and the retailer have been significantly reduced, resulting in 
higher income for the farmers and better quality products. Furthermore, Metro 
and GTZ are cooperating in advising Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade in order to 
strengthen local retail and distribution networks.
Such public-private partnerships thus involve international companies in 
building the capacity of small local companies to improve production standards 
and compliance with international standards and may ultimately contribute 
to increased sales and higher income. They also strengthen the impact and 
sustainability of value chain initiatives, as they increase the leverage of the 
interventions. These partnerships not only enhance the competitiveness of local 
enterprises, but also help sensitize both local and international companies to 
issues of ecological sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The 
adoption of social and ecological responsibility is increasingly recognized as the 
foundation for sustainable corporate management; in other words, CSR, not as 
charity, but as a basis for generating a competitive advantage.
In a nutshell, the involvement of international players:
•  introduces the perspective of world market requirements into strategies 
for the development of selected value chains; it induces small producers to 
orient local production to market demand;
•  sensitizes companies to an overall orientation of sustainable development; 
corporate social responsibility is increasingly recognized as an element 
of competitiveness by big international companies as well as by Asian 
governments; and
•  provides additional resources for sustainable economic development, as 
companies see the advantages of engaging in partnerships with development 
cooperation efforts.
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Addressing Social Aspects
The social impacts of global production patterns are gaining increasing 
attention in development cooperation, but also from governments and the 
international private sector. Practical support for the introduction and observance 
of social – as well as environmental – standards leverages the principles of social 
and ecological sustainability among all involved stakeholders, but is also essential 
in order to strengthen the international competitiveness of the local industry.  
Social and ecological concerns are receiving growing attention from 
governments in Asia, and also from the Asian private sector. In particular, 
in the fast developing countries of Asia, societal change and environmental 
risks increasingly place these concerns at the forefront of attention. For the 
private sector, increasing international attention to production standards and 
pressure from consumers has put social and ecological production standards 
on the agenda. 
In Bangladesh, for example, social concerns have seriously called into question 
the competitiveness of the ready-made garment industry – the country’s chief 
source of employment and export revenues. Collapsing or burning garment 
factories with hundreds of victims are only the tip of the iceberg of extremely poor 
labor conditions, which have resulted in uncontrolled labor strikes. Therefore, 
GTZ’s PSD program (PROGRESS) in Bangladesh has been reoriented to 
promote observance of social standards, while at the same time building up 
the competitiveness of the garment sector. The program cooperates with local 
suppliers, international buyers, government, non-govern ment organizations, 
and business associations to strengthen the economic, social, and ecological 
sustainability of the garment sector. Among other things, it has supported the 
revision of labor and environmental legislation, which now constitutes the basis 
for social and ecological standards that are commonly accepted by all national 
and international stakeholders. Round tables involving German and European 
companies contribute to greater coordination among international buyers and 
local producers. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor and Employment and 
employees of the two largest industry associations have been trained to more 
effectively promote the enforcement of standards. The intensive debate on labor 
conditions in the Bangladeshi garment industry has resulted in an increase of 
wage levels and improved working conditions, as social standards are increasingly 
accepted by entrepreneurs.32
32Further examples on how social aspects can be addressed as part of GTZ-supported programs are found  
in this reader; see Roggekamp on KATALYST in Bangladesh and Finkel on Vietnam. 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from this example: 
•  While social aspects are becoming a concern for the private sector for 
different reasons, most often this is a result of pressure from the inside 
(strikes and social unrest, as in the case of Bangladesh) or from the outside 
(international buyers). 
•  Development cooperation can make use of this pressure and support the 
practical development and introduction of social standards. It can sensitize 
and advise the various stakeholders on the relevance of corporate social 
responsibility.33 
Integration of Environmental Issues into PSD Approaches
Environmental aspects are of crucial importance in the context of Asia’s 
development pattern. Strengthening environmental sustainability has high 
priority for German development cooperation in general and specifically in the 
context of its cooperation strategy with Asia. Still, for a number of reasons, there 
is limited integration of environmental aspects into private sector development 
approaches.
 Environmental – as well as social – concerns are moving up the political agenda 
in Asia. To some extent, this is a result of the globalization process, where the 
observance of social and ecological standards is increasingly a precondition for 
competing globally. Environmental sustainability is receiving growing attention 
from governments in Asia, in particular in the fastest growing countries of 
Asia. At the same time, ecologically sustainable development is one of the main 
priorities of German development cooperation in Asia, with a focus, for example, 
on eco-efficiency, reduction of emissions, and natural resource protection. 
Most private sector development projects in Asia have therefore to some extent 
integrated concerns of ecological sustainability into their intervention strategy. 
The section above has highlighted how private sector development approaches are 
addressing social and environmental production standards as an integral part of 
their approach. Private sector development projects in Asia have also supported 
the introduction of related business services based on the concept of profitable 
environmental management (PREMA), a tool which is adapted to the specific 
requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises. It emphasizes in particular 
the reduction of non-product outputs as a means of cost-reduction, on the one 
hand, and the improvement of environmental performance, on the other. 
The Thai-German Program for Enterprise Competitiveness is probably 
the first program in Asia that has integrated eco-efficiency and economic 
33This is outlined in more detail by Finkel in this reader.
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development in a comprehensive and systemic manner. It has reacted to a 
strong demand from the Government of Thailand, which has put priority on 
the introduction of eco-efficient and sustainable production. The program 
addresses environmental issues at different levels and in a number of fields: It 
provides advice to relevant ministries and business associations with regard to the 
development and implementation of SME promotion policies and works with 
a wide range of intermediaries, especially in the fields of management and eco-
efficiency, so that they can improve their capacity to offer more relevant services 
to SMEs. The project aims, for example, to improve the competitiveness of the 
agro-industry through the implementation of cost-effective production process 
technologies and professional management techniques. Estimations indicate 
that the Thai agro-industry could generate an additional annual income of US$1 
billion through waste-to-energy and energy-efficiency improvements. After only 
one year, more than half of all Thai palm oil mills, representing more than 60% 
of production capacity, are participating in these activities. 
However, the efforts of the Thai program to systematically integrate economic 
and environmental concerns constitute an exception among private sector 
development programs supported by German development cooperation in Asia. 
Even though various programs have supported the development of business 
services in relation to social and ecological standards, as shown by the examples 
above, or have contributed to the establishment of eco-industrial zones, ecological 
aspects have not been integrated in a sufficiently systematic way. 
GTZ experience thus underlines the significant demand and potential 
for better integration of environmental and eco-efficiency aspects into PSD 
approaches. However, so far progress is slow; fuller integration of these aspects 
thus constitutes a key requirement for the further development of PSD approaches 
in Asia and also in other regions. 
Requirements for Further Development
The above review has already given some indication of areas where private 
sector development concepts and approaches of GTZ are not yet sufficiently 
addressing major current challenges of Asian development, and where they 
should build more systematically on the principles of the social and ecological 
market economy. It has identified some fields of intervention which need to be 
better integrated into private sector development approaches, in order to face up 
to the requirements of Asia’s rapid industrialization process. 
Asia’s high-growth countries are increasingly faced with the social and ecologi-
cal effects of their fast development. They must rapidly adjust their development 
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patterns and the ways in which they deal with ecological sustainability and social 
equality. At the same time, they must continue to expand their competitive 
advantages in an increasingly knowledge-based development path. While some 
Asian countries have integrated into the international knowledge economy faster 
than countries in other regions of the world, many less developed countries in 
Asia are lagging behind. Surprisingly, however, innovation and technology issues 
and support to the development of national innovation systems have not yet 
played a significant role within GTZ’s private sector development approaches 
in this region. Additionally, the highly industrialized countries – among them 
the strategically important so-called anchor countries – play a particular role in 
bilateral cooperation and are of growing relevance also for other German policy 
fields and ministries.
In the least developed countries of Asia, sustainable patterns of pro-poor 
growth and inclusive development are still a major concern. New answers need 
to be found to deal with the effects of climate change, demographic change, and 
international migration. While Asia is the top destination of remittances (an 
estimated US$114 billion in 2006), the loss of highly qualified labor represents 
a major challenge for many – particularly the poorer – countries in Asia. Other 
regions are affected by escalating conflicts, which, particularly in several South 
Asian countries, limit their development perspectives. In the least developed 
countries, integration into overall government programs and cooperation with 
other donor initiatives (in the context of the Paris Declaration34 and program-
based approaches35) are additional requirements for further development of PSD 
approaches. 
German technical cooperation in the field of private sector development will 
only be able to make a sizeable contribution to Asian development if it constantly 
adjusts and sharpens its concepts in the light of these trends and modernizes its 
technical concepts and approaches. The following will highlight just a few areas 
where GTZ private sector development approaches need to innovate in order to 
be better able to address these key challenges together with partner countries: 
34The Paris Declaration (endorsed in March 2005) is an international agreement to increase efforts to 
harmonize, align, and manage for development results.
35Program-based approaches are a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principle of 
coordinated support for a locally owned development program. The approach includes four key elements: 
(1) leadership by the host country or organization; (2) a single program and budget framework; (3) donor 
coordination and harmonization of procedures; and (4) efforts to increase the use of local procedures 
over time with regard to program design and implementation, financial management, and monitoring and 
evaluation.
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•  Industrial policy elements should be more systematically developed 
and addressed as part of GTZ’s advisory approach: Asian countries have 
been relying more than countries in other regions of the world on selected 
industry-specific public interventions, and have emphasized education and 
skills development, as well as investment in research and technology. German 
development cooperation needs to sharpen its concepts and instruments 
to provide the required specific advice on how to further develop these 
approaches, including furthering ecologically sustainable production 
patterns, strengthening innovation policies, and developing territorial 
development approaches with a view to increasing regional competitiveness. 
At the same time, industrial policies must consider the restrictions on 
subsidies and promotional policies under WTO requirements.36
•  Innovation policy should become a major field of GTZ advisory 
services in Asia: Innovation and support to R&D as a basis for the further 
integration of Asian countries into the knowledge economy is of particular 
relevance in the Asian context. Improved access to knowledge about markets 
and new technologies and processes is as essential for innovation as better 
framework conditions. This calls for the creation of an environment that 
enables innovation. GTZ can build on the approaches and experiences 
it has developed in this field in other regions, which must be adjusted to 
the specific requirements and circumstances of Asia. It should also seek to 
cooperate with the German Ministry of Economics and Technology and 
join up with the ministry’s activities in some Asian countries. The German 
system of promoting innovations is of specific interest in this context. 
•  Ecological aspects must be integrated and linked with PSD approaches: 
The above review has shown that PSD programs are not yet addressing 
ecological aspects properly; environmental impacts of private sector 
development are not sufficiently taken into account. More needs to be 
done, therefore, to systematically incorporate elements of environmental 
sustainability in PSD. Specifically, this requires developing linkages between 
the respective instruments and approaches and better integrating economic 
development and environmental programs. 
•  The partnership between capital and labor should be addressed in advisory 
strategies: This implies more systematically including the perspective of 
workers in policy reform, for example, through tripartite dialogue processes. 
Based on the German experience, approaches that ensure labor involvement 
36See Altenburg et al. in this reader, who elaborate on an approach of “smart industrial policies” with a view  
to addressing these demands and requirements.
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in corporate governance and build a consensus-oriented relationship 
between capital and labor will, in the long run, be the basis for sustainable 
and balanced development. An integrated approach to strengthening labor 
standards and corporate social responsibility should involve government, 
the private sector, and civil society and should become an integral element 
of PSD approaches.
 
Apart from technical concepts and approaches, cooperation with Asia also 
requires review and adjustment of methods and modes of delivery. In the 
developed Asian economies, cooperation will be characterized by exchange and 
mutual learning, even more than now. At the same time, Asia is gaining relevance 
as a partner for Germany and for the European Union in fields outside classical 
development cooperation, as other ministries and institutions (apart from 
BMZ) increasingly engage in cooperation with Asia. For example, the Federal 
Ministries for the Environment and of Economics and Technology attach high 
importance to cooperation with the newly industrializing countries of Asia. 
For GTZ, this presents new demands, but also new opportunities to support 
the implementation of programs of other German ministries as well as of the 
European Union. 
On the other hand, in the less developed countries of Asia, the further 
development of technical cooperation approaches will have to take place in close 
cooperation with other development partners and in the context of program-
based approaches. This implies new challenges and opportunities with a view 
to ensuring a harmonized approach, while at the same time emphasizing key 
principles of German development cooperation.
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Strengthening Regional Competitiveness  
in Vietnam
Angelika Hutter
This article will give a brief overview of German regional policy and its 
historical background and then introduce the local and regional economic 
development approach advocated by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH in Vietnam.
Regional Policy in Germany
The German constitution stipulates that equal living conditions be created 
throughout the national territory. The state thus must balance locational 
disadvantages and further the integration of structurally weak regions into 
overall economic development. Policies for this purpose are regional policy and 
the promotion of selected regions in order to enhance economic growth and ease 
structural change. 
The most important regional policy instrument is the so-called joint task of 
the German federation and the Länder (regions) to “improve regional economic 
structures,” effective since 1969. Cooperation between the federation and the 
regions/states on this joint task is regulated by article 91a of the constitution and 
is elaborated in the law on the joint task.
The joint task is more than just a promotional tool. In the context of national 
German regional policy, it is a strategic as well as a coordinating and a regulatory 
framework, ensuring implementation of German as well as European law, with 
special regard to subsidy entitlement. Each year, the federation and the regions/
Länder draw up a plan defining the provisions for support, the subsidy level, 
areas, and regional support programs. 
However, despite this national framework between the federation and the 
Länder, article 30 of the German constitution stipulates that the Länder are 
responsible for regional economic development. Thus, implementation of the 
joint task is strictly a Länder affair. In the frame set jointly by the federation and the 
Länder, the state government can prioritize spatially or sectorally, it can determine 
support projects and entitlements, and it will also confirm and control support.
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Joint task support is purposefully restricted to structurally weak regions, in 
line with the principle of “help for self-help.” The objective is the creation of 
competitive jobs in the regions through increased regional investment. There is 
no support for structurally strong regions, which are expected to keep up their 
competitiveness and manage structural change by their own means.
The joint task supports investment in private businesses and local economic 
infrastructure. Supporting private business investment creates and ensures 
competitive jobs and employment in structurally weak regions. Investing in local 
infrastructure attracts investors and enhances regional competitiveness.
Support is provided via integrated regional development approaches 
and regional management projects, as these will strengthen ownership and 
responsibility of local governments for regional development and enhance 
bottom-up development approaches. Cooperation network and cluster 
management approaches to promote regional and inter-regional cooperation 
between enterprises, research institutions, and local authorities help to better 
link existing potentials and increase regional competitiveness.
The joint task is an instrument for both equalization and growth. According 
to the principle of subsidiarity, it is an equalizing instrument, as it is restricted to 
structurally weak regions. At the same time, it is also an instrument for growth, 
using an investment, not a consumption approach.1 
Historical Background to Current Regional Policy in 
Germany and the EU
The crisis of industrialized regions (coal, steel, textiles) in Western Europe 
from the 1970s onward led to a search for new competitive advantages and new 
concepts for economic policy. At the same time, the financial crisis of the welfare 
state led observers to question its performance and capacity. New ways to alleviate 
this public sector burden were sought. In Germany, ideas of endogenous, self-
reliant development were combined with ideas of comparative and competitive 
advantages as well as federal traditions to create innovative concepts of local 
and regional cooperation between various stakeholders from the public and the 
private sectors. From the 1980s onward, enormous financial resources channeled 
from the European Union (EU) to European regions via the so-called structural 
funds supported these developments. Nowadays, there is fierce competition for 
investors, visitors, and skilled labor among European cities and regions, as can 
1Further information can be found at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Wirtschaft/
Wirtschaftspolitik/Regionalpolitik/gemeinschaftsaufgabe,did=151120.htm.
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be seen in the intense marketing efforts everywhere. The so-called soft locational 
factors, such as business climate and quality of life, have become much more 
important than in the past, since hard locational factors such as infrastructure do 
not differ much any more throughout Western Europe.
Local and Regional Economic Development –  
The GTZ Approach
Strengthening competitiveness is at the core of GTZ’s approach to local and 
regional economic development (LRED). The approach draws on German as 
well as international experiences with local economic development policies. These 
experiences have shown that competitiveness is an issue that reaches far beyond the 
natural endowments of a location or the strength of certain enterprises or even sectors 
(as the traditional understanding of competitiveness suggests). It has been shown that 
competitiveness depends a lot more on the performance and capacities of stakeholder 
collectives than on individuals: among private sector stakeholders, it is no surprise to 
see that widespread entrepreneurial thinking is a relevant element of private sector 
competitiveness. More than that, it has become clear that the willingness and the 
capability to cooperate and to create networks among firms – the ability to build and 
to use social capital for innovation – is an important element of competitiveness. 
As for the public sector, it is a rather new insight that it needs to be competitive, too. 
The competitiveness of the public sector manifests itself in the customer and service 
orientation of the civil service, readiness for dialogue with the business community, 
the proactivity and management abilities of political leaders, the business friendliness 
of the regulatory framework, and the quality of promotional policies – in short: the 
design of local or regional economic policy. These capacities are essential in shaping 
the soft as well as the hard locational factors that often appear as objective, given 
features (infrastructure, labor, natural conditions). Finally, good cooperation and 
dialogue between the private and the public sector in a certain territory have turned 
out to be critical elements of local or regional competitiveness.
There are a handful of additional principles that characterize the GTZ LRED 
approach:
•  Each locality or region has potential that can be identified and used to 
improve local economic performance, increase competitiveness, and reduce 
poverty. To identify the potential, a mix of participatory as well as expert-
driven methods has proven to be effective.
•  Local enterprises are the drivers of local economic development. Their 
business activities and investments create employment, income, and 
economic growth. 
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•  Local governments have an important role in creating favorable conditions 
for local and regional economic development through appropriate regulation, 
policies, and strategies.
•  Local governments and the local business community are partners in local 
economic development. Local enterprises know local (and wider) markets, and 
they understand the constraints of doing business in a certain locality or region. 
Therefore, they are valuable dialogue partners for local authorities. Local enterprises 
can even become contributing partners in jointly funded public-private initiatives.
•  There is no blueprint solution as to how LRED should be done. Each locality 
or region is unique and needs to develop its own approach.  
Local and Regional Economic Development in Vietnam
In Vietnam, LRED is taking place in the context of Vietnam’s transformation 
from a centrally planned to a market economy that is now, after its accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2006, integrated into the global economy. Vietnam’s 
economy has been growing strongly since 2000; however, the sustainability of that 
growth and the competitiveness of Vietnam’s businesses are still unresolved issues. 
Along with an ongoing process of political, administrative, and fiscal 
decentralization in the country, this situation poses huge challenges. It requires 
new types of political thinking and policy-making, both at the national and the 
sub-national levels, new ways of interaction between the state and the citizens, 
new management styles, and new ways of problem solving in the public and 
the private sector alike. Reforms are needed in terms of content and coherence 
of policies, political processes (coordination between agencies, priority-setting, 
and consensus-building), and institutional and organizational set-up and 
performance. If state reform follows international practice, state functions will 
have to be redefined and condensed, allowing other stakeholders in society to 
participate more in decision making and service provision.
Although decentralization creates favorable conditions for LRED, it is 
difficult to introduce new institutional arrangements that rely on public-private 
cooperation, such as the ones applied in German regional policy described above. 
More so than in a social market economy of the European type, the state is still very 
active in the economy in Vietnam, as an entrepreneur in state-owned enterprises 
and as a planning agency. There is still a strong belief throughout society that the 
government has to manage the economy, in other words, make decisions that in 
a market economy would be left to entrepreneurs and market forces. This means 
that LRED processes are strongly dominated by local governments, while the 
local business community is not encouraged to actively contribute to policies 
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and initiatives on the local level. For many provincial government leaders, local 
economic development is still more about lobbying successfully for centrally 
funded, large-scale infrastructure projects than about developing local economic 
potential and local enterprises (a province is an administrative unit of about one 
million inhabitants). This is in contrast to the situation at the national level, 
where public-private dialogue has developed into forums where representatives 
from the domestic and foreign business communities communicate openly and 
frankly with government representatives. The situation in the provinces still lags 
far behind, and the traditional gap between authorities and citizens is far from 
being closed. 
Competitiveness Issues on the Provincial Level
Currently, the strongest competition between the 64 provinces in Vietnam 
centers on attracting foreign direct investment, for which three factors are decisive: 
the quality of labor, the quality of infrastructure, and the investment climate. 
Attention to the local business and investment climate has been heightened since 
2005, when USAID started to conduct annual rankings of provinces according 
to their business friendliness in the Vietnam Competitiveness Index. The ensuing 
public debate has created a high level of awareness about competitiveness issues 
among political decision makers in the provinces. A positive impact of this 
provincial competition regarding the local business and investment climate is the 
fact that between 2006 and 2007, the number of “bad performers” was halved 
(21 to 10), while the number of “good performers” almost doubled (9 to 17). The 
negative side is that provinces are also competing in terms of large infrastructure 
investments such as harbors, airports, industrial zones, etc. Since there are no 
intermediary administrative levels mandated with regional coordination, the risk 
of uncoordinated duplication of projects and waste of public funds is high.
Conclusion
In Germany, Western Europe, and currently in Eastern Europe, EU 
structural fund resources linked to regional policy instruments such as regional 
management, clusters, or regional marketing have eased structural change. The 
strength of these approaches lies in the fact that they make use of local resources, 
empower local stakeholders, help develop social capital, and enhance innovation 
in local contexts.
In Vietnam, structural change is in full swing now. If regional policy instruments 
that emphasize cross-sector cooperation, dialogue orientation, and networking 
Angelika Hutter  |  385
approaches were adopted, this could certainly greatly facilitate that process 
of structural change and even reveal unforeseen opportunities. However, the 
competitive advantages brought about by effective vertical coordination in the 
political and administrative system as well as by strong horizontal coordination 
between the public sector and other sectors in society still need to be discovered 
in Vietnam. 
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Mind the Gap – Regional Disparities in China
Moritz Mang and Thomas Bonschab
Introduction
Regional policies aim to mitigate regional disparities and contribute to 
the equality of living conditions among citizens. This goal is enshrined in the 
German constitution and is intrinsically tied to the principles of the social 
and ecological market economy. The relevant principles are equal opportunity, 
distributive justice, and the principle of solidarity. China too is striving to provide 
more equal opportunities for its citizens or – to use the Chinese phrase – to 
build up a “harmonious society.” However, the previous attempt of the Chinese 
Government to achieve that goal triggered economic development in the coastal 
region, which led not only to a relative regression of the interior provinces in 
terms of employment, income, resources, and education, but also to massive 
environmental degradation. The current policies embraced by the Chinese 
Government to counterbalance regional disparities between the coastal and 
interior provinces and between urban and rural areas, as well as to promote social 
cohesion and environmental protection, consequently show clear similarities to 
the basic principles of the model of a social and ecological market economy.
Recent Chinese policies in this area demonstrate a fundamental shift in the 
country’s regional development approach, from temporarily counter-balancing 
regional disparities by means of subsidies and the redistribution of income, 
towards policies convergent with the strategies in the European Union (EU) 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
member countries. Based on observations in China and the EU as well as on 
surveys conducted by the OECD, this paper will raise some of the regional policy 
issues discussed on both sides and thereby identify a corridor where the EU, the 
OECD, and China can enter into a policy dialogue and a process of mutual 
learning. It will then draw some conclusions for German technical cooperation 
for regional development in China. 
The European Commission has already been conducting a dialogue with China 
on regional policy for several years. The Sino-German Economic & Structural 
Reform Program, supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development, officially launched a component on 
Sustainable Regional Development in January 2008. Within this project, GTZ is 
also cooperating with the OECD, in particular with the Territorial Development 
Policy Committee.   
Background
From Subsidies to Investments
In recent years, regional policies of the EU as well as of OECD member states 
have increasingly focused on the exploitation of a region’s endogenous assets and 
its under-utilized potentials.1 Rather than providing direct government subsidies 
to particular sectors, these policies facilitate investment that strengthens regional 
competitiveness and mobilizes the region’s latent capacity to provide a sound 
business environment, relying on local potential to attract and maintain firms 
and labor.
The comprehensive character of this approach, however, requires policies 
to respond to the respective region’s characteristics (problems and potentials). 
Regional competitiveness results from a multitude of complementary factors, 
going beyond what is commonly conceived as a factor of production. In this 
context, Kitson et al. identify the factors infrastructural capital, knowledge/
creative capital, productive capital, human capital, social-institutional capital, and 
cultural capital (Kitson et al. 2004). It is suggestive to add geographical capital 
to this list, referring to climate conditions, proximity to natural transportation 
opportunities (rivers, ports), soil fertility, etc. All these factors define a region’s 
development potential and determine the best policy to strengthen regional 
competitiveness. There are many “soft” assets which play a decisive role in “the 
bundle of actions to increase the performance of local firms and to improve the 
attractiveness of a region as a place to work and to invest” (Davies 2004). 
We can leave open the question whether this way of thinking about regional 
development is true rocket science and justifies the talk of a “new” approach 
or even a “paradigm shift.” What it does stand for, however, is a renunciation 
of abstract redistributive and sectoral policies defined at the national level and 
an embrace of a more holistic approach that takes account of local conditions 
and a proactive involvement of the private sector. It expresses a turn away from 
top-down policies – often adopted by states and development organizations – 
which effectively propose the same measures for every country and every region. 
In this recent approach of the EU and OECD member states, sectoral policies 
1Exemplified by the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 2005) and observations of OECD (OECD 2005).
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are still an important element, but they are better integrated into comprehensive 
strategies for regions. 
Challenges in Regional Development in EU and OECD Member States
Based on observations from the OECD, various persistent and newly 
emerging problems can be identified with regard to different types of regions: 
rural, intermediate, and metropolitan.2 
As a result of an increase in productivity in the agricultural sector during 
the last decades, employment in rural areas dramatically decreased. Because 
most industries settle in or near urban regions or industry agglomerations 
in intermediate locations, rural regions are often faced with the problem of 
insufficient employment opportunities. These conditions, amplified by a lack of 
sufficient educational and cultural facilities, induce younger people to migrate 
to other regions – thus leading to an aging society. In turn, rural regions fail to 
provide the required business infrastructure necessary to attract firms.
The link between rural and metropolitan regions is set up in small and medium-
sized towns (SMTs), where economic activities are mainly conducted by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Although these intermediate regions are able 
to provide a more comprehensive business environment than predominantly rural 
regions through the provision of the required physical infrastructure and services, 
there is a noticeable decline in economic development and a fall in the employment 
rate due to industrial restructuring. Intermediate regions often fail to provide the 
training facilities necessary to retrain the highly specialized, yet laid-off workforce 
that is increasingly common in these areas. Shortages of finance often prevent 
SMEs from conducting research in order to increase innovative capacities. Firms 
in existing clusters are often unable to utilize the advantages of agglomerations, 
such as spill- over effects, access to modern infrastructure, and common learning 
by networking as well as through sharing services or outsourcing them to other 
companies. However, these advantages are crucial to dealing with the challenges 
of globalization and increasing competition from new emerging nations that build 
their competitiveness on low labor costs but also on strong innovative capacity. 
Furthermore, a lack of tertiary education facilities in SMTs often results in out-
migration of younger people and thus in the inability to provide skilled labor.
2In order to enable comparisons between regions, the OECD established a standard typology separating 
(predominantly) urban, (predominantly) rural, and intermediate regions. The classification is based on the 
share of the population living in rural communities. For rural regions, the share is higher than 50%; for urban 
regions, less than 15%; and for intermediate regions, the share is between 15 and 50%. See OECD 2006, p. 36. 
There is, of course, an extensive discussion of alternative ways to define a region, but we cannot embark on this 
discussion here.
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As regards metropolitan regions, they face competition from other major 
cities on the regional, national, as well as the international level. Metropolitan 
regions have to make sure that they prevent labor from migrating to proximate 
intermediate regions, and attract further investments and labor to the area. This is 
crucial in order to maintain their roles as economic hot spots, centers of decision 
making, attractive places for headquarters of multinationals, as well as logistic 
gateways for international trade.
In summary, industrialized countries are confronted with specific challenges. 
Their economies face competition from “new emerging countries” such as 
China, India, Brazil, and Russia, which are able to produce at lower costs and 
ever higher quality. In order to maintain economic growth, rural regions must 
overcome a lack of required services for business and the resulting scarcity of 
employment opportunities. Intermediate regions, in turn, have to increase 
support to existing and potential agglomerations, providing an attractive basis 
for the regional economy. Metropolitan regions, on the other hand, have to strive 
for inimitability in national and global competition by distinguishing themselves 
from other metropolitan areas.  
Disparate Regional Development in China
Since China embarked on reforms opening the country to international trade 
and investment in 1978, it has been able to generate unmatched economic growth. 
As a result, China has caught up with other nations and has improved the overall 
situation of its population.3 Nevertheless, the strategies implemented in the past 
also had the result of creating extensive disparities at the sub-national level: The 
economy of the coastal region in eastern China developed at an extremely fast 
pace, due to its advantageous geographic location and the supporting preferential 
policies. The interior provinces, on the other hand, had to support the economic 
rise of the east. In the process of ongoing internationalization, the interior region 
was additionally burdened with an unprofitable industrial structure. Expected 
spill-over effects failed to appear, which resulted in the inland provinces lagging 
even further behind the coastal region (Demurger et al. 2002).
The Chinese Government has long understood the risk that economic growth 
may not be sustainable if regional disparities continue to increase. Since 2000, the 
Chinese Government, therefore, in a first step, implemented a strategy aiming 
to develop China’s west and subsequently introduced an equivalent strategy for 
northeast China. However, because they failed to build up the business environment 
3In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
China improved from 0.525 (1980) to 0.755 (2003), ranking 85th among 177 assessed countries (UNDP 2005).
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necessary to attract domestic and foreign investment, these policies have not been 
sufficient to help the regions catch up with the coastal region thus far. 
One of the reasons that inland provinces failed to become competitive and 
make use of their comparative advantages is the lack of coordination among 
the different bodies and levels of government responsible for drafting and 
implementing the policies. As a result, the regional gaps in terms of income, 
poverty, education, health care, and employment continue to increase (UNDP 
2005). Taking this flip side of the economic boom period into account, China’s 
spectacular growth rates have to be revaluated. Against the background of the 
short-term character of China’s previous approach, the constant transfer of fiscal 
funds necessary to counterbalance disparities is significantly holding back the 
national economy, as the subsidies are merely used to plug and camouflage existing 
holes instead of providing a sustainable solution. Furthermore, compensation 
for environmental pollution is confronting China with enormous economic 
losses.4 One may well argue that the best use for China’s current huge foreign 
exchange surplus would be investment in policies to reduce regional imbalances 
and environmental degradation. After all, it is in the interest of the Chinese and 
the entire international community to ensure sustainable social, economic, and 
ecological development in China. 
The latest strategy papers of the Chinese Government, namely the 11th Five 
Year Plan (FYP) and the findings of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CCPC), consequently represent a shift in the approach of Chinese regional 
development policy away from the previous persistent major focus on overall 
economic development towards support of the different regions’ potentials. By 
including reforms such as improving access to education, promoting environmental 
protection, utilizing cultural amenities, improving social cohesion, restructuring the 
administration, and encouraging public participation as well as more involvement 
of the private sector, the new approach tackles the problem of regional and social 
inequality with a view to more balanced and comprehensive development, resulting 
in the building of a “harmonious society.”5 However, the directives are formulated 
very vaguely and neither a comprehensive overall regional development strategy 
nor the modes of implementing the vision are available to date.
4In 2005, China became the second largest producer of greenhouse gases in the world. Twenty-five percent of 
Chinese territory suffers from acid rain and, consequently, suffers huge economic losses from environmental 
pollution (Beech 2005).
5See Communist Party of China Central Committee 2005 and Hu Jintao 2007.
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Methodology
Observations in Developed Countries
Both the EU and OECD have developed and evaluated concrete strategies 
to cope with the regional problems that member countries are struggling with. 
As strategies have to be developed according to the respective requirements of a 
region, integrated solutions must focus on the nature of the problem as well as on 
the respective region’s characteristics. 
Implications for Rural Regions
As illustrated above, a region’s ability to improve its economic performance is 
dependent on the availability of the factors of regional competitiveness. In the 
case of rural regions, the OECD, in particular, specifies i) (natural/man-made) 
amenities, ii) transport facilities, and iii) cultural identity as the factors crucial to 
an enhancement of competitiveness. Furthermore, the survey identified four main 
modes that have a positive impact on regional development (Pezzini 2003):
•  Amenity-focused development (for example, scenery landscapes, a high 
quality environment or rich cultural heritage) in order to create new 
employment opportunities and increase the quality of life in a region. 
Although employment is constantly declining in rural areas, it plays a very 
important role in maintaining rural amenities.
•  Diffusion of industries is a necessary step towards independence from 
proximity to markets. Enterprises in certain fields (for example, information 
and communication technology) do not rely on being close to markets. The 
regional standard of living consequently plays an increasing role for such 
firms when deciding where to locate their business. It remains very difficult 
to create agglomerations of industries and improve networking, because 
rural regions often cannot offer the necessary proximity to consumers and 
suppliers, as well as the education and training facilities that favor industrial 
diffusion.
•  Exploitation of natural, but unfortunately often non-renewable, resources 
(for example, gasoline, coal, and natural gas).
•  Public expenditures (using the area as a location for superficially unfavorable 
facilities, such as waste dumps, prisons, power plants, etc.).
As the latter two of the given approaches are not sustainable, OECD policy 
recommendations focus on close linkages between amenity-focused development 
and the creation of industrial clusters for most rural regions, together with the 
promotion of agro-tourism and environmental protection.
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Implications for Intermediate Regions6 
In order to respond to the challenges caused by globalization, firms in 
intermediate regions have to move from price competition to competition 
based on quality, creativity, and skills. The creation and design of business 
agglomerations is thus crucial. The benefits of such networks are shared R&D 
facilities and services and therefore the ability to increase innovative capacity 
without increasing costs. To stay flexible and be able to react to changes in 
markets as well as to innovations in technology, intermediate regions have to put 
considerable weight on intangible (non-physical) assets through:
•  deregulation of SME investments;
• business training;
• programs to promote and support start-up companies;
• encouraging cooperation and networking among SMEs; and
•  encouraging inter-city networks to offer common services and skilled labor.
Implications for Metropolitan Regions
Urban regions can enhance local competitiveness by applying policies aimed 
directly at specific “commodities” (such as investment, tourism, labor, national 
funding, etc.) as well as comprehensive actions focusing on improving a region’s 
competitiveness by a system of tangible assets (for example, physical infrastructure) 
and also intangible assets (such as human resources, networking, and innovation 
capacity). Nevertheless, experience shows that marketing strategies, incentives, 
and other policies aimed merely at obtaining such specific commodities will not 
be successful if a region is not able to provide an attractive business environment. 
Against this background, OECD policy recommendations provide four areas 
of activities in urban regions to support private and public investments for the 
creation of regional competitiveness (Dubarle 2003 and Kamal-Chaoui 2003):
•  Promotion of clustering and specialization to exchange knowledge through 
common learning, to reduce costs and to develop new markets and therefore 
overcome challenges caused by a strong economic dependence on traditional 
but declining sectors. 
•  Increase of innovative capacity and mobilization of labor skills by linking 
learning and widening labor markets. The latter is an often applied means 
to prevent brain drain (outflow of skilled workers) and bottlenecks. The 
concept of learning regions also includes the idea of knowledge spillovers 
between public institutes (education and research facilities) and private 
enterprises.
6See Kamal-Chaoui (no date) and Pezzini (2003). 
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•  Strengthening physical infrastructure, including accessibility of assets like 
cultural and recreational facilities, to ensure the accessibility of a region. 
Nevertheless, physical infrastructure cannot drive economic growth on its 
own. 
•  Strengthening the social capital to ensure social harmony. Since globalization 
additionally furthers diversity, policies have to counter these problems (such 
as unemployment, crime, drugs, poverty, and even racism) by integration 
activities to prevent a strong loss of quality of life.  
Implications for Governance
Up to now, development theories have often focused on central government 
policies of investment in specific sectors or geographical areas. With the aim of 
spreading the benefits and thus helping other areas (“trickle-down effect”), these 
policies are often drafted without consulting local governments or stakeholders. 
As a consequence, back-wash effects – resources and capital flowing back from 
the periphery to the core – were generated, contrary to the original intention. 
In contrast to traditional top-down approaches, assessments conducted in EU 
and OECD countries show a transfer of responsibilities to governments on the 
regional or local level (bottom-up approach). Well-organized vertical cooperation 
among the different levels of government consequently plays a crucial role in this 
process. Given the higher complexity, horizontal cooperation is also essential 
in order to utilize local knowledge and improve collaboration with the private 
sector. Furthermore, the provision of public goods and services is a challenging 
task for governments (OECD 2005, 69 ff.).
In addition, many of the tasks and responsibilities of the government are 
transferred to the private sector (for example, the production of certain goods 
and provision of specific services), as this often increases the access of the more 
disadvantaged social groups. Despite this more liberal approach, the state 
still bears the responsibility of providing common goods (such as education, 
water, etc.), and, moreover, is accountable for the final outcome of the policies. 
According to the subsidiarity principle, the state merely fulfills those tasks that 
cannot be performed by the private sector. 
  
China’s Rocky Road to Regional Balance
Since the 1980s, China’s unbalanced economic development policies were 
mainly focused on the promotion of the coastal region’s development, encouraging 
some regions to get rich first. Aware that the interior provinces were lagging 
behind, the Chinese Government began to concentrate on counterbalancing 
these disparities in the second half of the 1990s. The approach was based on the 
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perception that the differences among provinces were not caused by stagnation 
in development, but by a different speed in the regions’ growth. 
The 9th FYP (1996-2000) stressed the importance of coordinated regional 
economic development in order to narrow the gap between the different regions 
(Wang Xinhuai 2006). This should be done by policies focusing on supporting 
the interior provinces through:
• preferential treatment concerning resource allocation;
• improvement of infrastructure;
• price optimization for resource-based products; and
•  increase in financial support by reforming the central fiscal transfer system.
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese Government 
committed itself to a plan to establish a “moderately well-off society” (xiaokang 
shehui) by 2020. This expression refers to a society that is not really wealthy, 
but possesses all the necessities for a decent standard of living (food, clothing, 
education, health, etc.). As the population in the coastal areas is already quite 
prosperous, the task to be fulfilled, therefore, was to improve the standard of 
living in the inland area ( Jiang Zemin 2002).
Earlier strategies divided China into the coastal and interior regions. The 
opening-up process and market-oriented reforms allowed for the separation into 
east, central, and west China. The recent approach of the Chinese Government 
provides for four zones, the coastal, the northeastern, the central, and the western 
regions, in which the Chinese Government began implementing the following 
strategies by 2005: 
The Great Western Development Strategy
Launched in January 2000, this strategy focuses on increasing international 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the area, raising the living standard 
of the population, and counterbalancing interregional disparities through:
• the construction of infrastructure facilities;
• the improvement of the ecological environment;
• the improvement of the investment environment;
•  the promotion of specific industrial sectors (primarily energy, minerals, 
tourism, and human resources; and
• ensuring access to education (China Internet Information Center 2007).
Revitalization of Northeast China
As China’s rust-belt, the region has to cope with the problems of unprofitable 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a poor management structure, and nearly 
depleted resources. Efforts to reform the SOEs have resulted in a large number 
of laid-off workers, raising the unemployment rate above the national average. 
As a consequence, the Strategy for Revitalizing Northeast China and Other Old 
Industrial Bases launched in October 2003, focuses on the following measures:
• transforming and restructuring resident SOEs;
• pushing forward the opening-up (internationalization) of the region;
• developing the private sector;
• expanding the labor market;
• supporting the agricultural sector; and
• improving the social security system (World Bank 2006).
Rise of the Central Region
At the end of 2004, the Chinese authorities started to discuss a strategy aimed 
at the central region of China, which was less and less able to keep up even with 
the western region. The central region is characterized by the predominant role of 
agriculture and heavy industry – primarily SOEs in the field of energy resources 
– and its geographical location in between China’s different regions. The topic 
was put forward throughout 2005 and was finally also strongly represented in the 
11th FYP, focusing on: 
• investments in infrastructure;
•  enhancing the region’s comparative advantages (resources, skilled labor, and 
geographic location);
•  modernizing the agricultural sector with special focus on grain production;
•  strengthening key industries (energy, mineral extraction, production 
materials);
•  promoting the foundation of high-tech industries;
• modernizing the market system;
• creating a circular economy;
•  restructuring the SOEs;
•  increasing the positive effects of urban areas on the development of the 
surroundings; and
•  enhancing inter-regional cooperation (Wu Xinmu 2006).
Although there was a discernible positive impact of the strategies aimed 
at western and northeastern China (mainly in the field of infrastructure), 
assessments of the strategies have shown a number of deficits (Wei Houkai 2006 
and Wang Shengijn 2006):
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•  Lack of coordination
    The strategies lack a conductive major orientation that clarifies goals, indicators, 
modes, and most importantly, the role and responsibilities of the different levels 
of government. Critics thus fear that the lack of coordination and the policies 
deriving from different administrative levels focused on their own respective 
advantages will weaken the strategies’ success.
•  Lack of industrial support and innovative capacity
    The basis for industrial development still has to be improved extensively. In 
this context, policies will have to encourage firms to increase investments in 
R&D, cooperate with other companies and research institutions to produce 
technology-intensive products, increase development potentials, and build 
up supplier networks, while at the same time promoting low-technology and 
labor-intensive industries. 
•  Large state projects fail to integrate the local economy
   Companies from the west and northeast often are not able to compete with 
coastal firms in the process of bidding for implementation of the projects. 
Consequently, the projects’ multiplier effects impact economies of other areas.
•  Insufficient participation of private investors
    The share of FDI in western and northeast China is continuously falling, as 
the regions fail to provide an attractive business environment. Companies 
located in the coastal region tend to invest in neighboring provinces instead 
of shifting towards the western and northeastern regions.
Both, the latest 11th FYP and the findings of the 17th CCPC try to tackle 
the existing problems and the deficits of the prevailing regional development 
strategies by placing a great deal of importance on comprehensive and balanced 
development based on international expertise (scientific view of development), 
sustainability in terms of balanced economic, social, and ecological development 
(development in four aspects, including culture as one factor)) and innovative 
capacity (innovative country) in order to create socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.
However, due to their vague character, the plans of the Chinese Government 
fail to provide answers to questions essential for future (regional) development. 
In this context, the following issues must be resolved (Mang 2006):
•  Lack of an overall regional development strategy
    The 11th FYP as well as the 17th CPCC is more of a rough idea of how 
to proceed during the next years than a strategy in this case. However, a 
comprehensive and coherent national regional development strategy is crucial 
for the coordination of regional development. As the hitherto conducted 
approach is too general to respond to the different needs of the sub-regions 
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(rural, intermediate, and urban), the definition of regions and sub-regions 
has to be reconsidered. Furthermore, comparable and detailed information 
on the respective regions’ characteristics have to be compiled and evaluated 
through an analysis of regional strengths and weaknesses.
• Lack of coordination
   The prevailing lack of coordination not only prevents synergies among 
the different public and private actors, but also causes new problems and 
thus is counterproductive to the development of regional competitiveness. 
As a consequence, obscurities concerning the existing strategies must 
be eliminated, and explicit indicators, goals, and tools necessary for the 
implementation of the strategies must be defined. Also, there is no general 
administrative body responsible for coordination of the respective offices 
and departments. However, such a body is necessary to guarantee the 
implementation of an overall strategy, with the different offices cooperating 
instead of competing. The existing institutional arrangement thus has to be 
improved and optimized. 
Against the given background, it is not possible to prevent duplication in the 
regions, as they seek to achieve competitiveness. The instruments applied by one 
region to make its business environment more attractive to investors, therefore, are 
not guaranteed exclusivity. As a result, the implemented instruments might fail 
to provide a local competitive advantage. Instead of building unique competitive 
regions, such a diluting process causes homogeneity.
Implications for German Technical Cooperation
The recent EU and OECD approach in regional policies and China’s current 
reform agenda for regional integration are, by and large, compatible. To be sure, 
China’s less developed regions are further behind than any region within OECD 
countries has ever been; its rural, intermediate, and metropolitan characteristics 
are unique; and the scale of social and environmental challenges necessitates 
reforms barely feasible in the context of OECD member states. But there 
is a strong drive on both sides to embark on a process of policy dialogue and 
mutual learning. After all, China’s development has a significant effect on the 
opportunities and troubles of rural, intermediate, and metropolitan regions in 
European and other OECD member states. China, in turn, can benefit from 
the good and bad practices of regional integration elsewhere and the policy 
instruments employed in the context of German reunification, as well as from 
the experience of integrating new member states into the EU, which may be even 
more relevant.
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Germany is in the best position to play a major role in this dialogue between 
China, the EU, and other OECD member states. More than any other country, 
Germany is associated with the principles of the social and ecological market 
economy, which fit so well with the reform agenda in China. In line with these 
principles, Germany can both provide abundant experience from its own history 
and build the bridges to expertise from other European countries. Among the 
topics in this dialogue are: 
•  integration of social and ecological aspects into economic development 
strategies;
•  (public) participation of non-government stakeholders in the decision-
making process and implementation of sustainable development strategies 
(for example, social partnership);
•  transparent and accountable governance; and  
•  solidarity-based transfer of financial and human capital.
This dialogue takes place by cooperating with various German government 
bodies at the national, Länder (states), and municipal level. The main modes of 
delivery in this context are fact-finding missions, expert hearings, and workshops. 
The main topics include: 
• regional development and structural planning;
• revitalization of old industrial areas;
• rural-urban development;
• transformation to a knowledge-based economy;
• local governance;
• local economic promotion;
• counterbalancing regional disparities; and
• interregional cooperation.
  
To deal with these topics, partnerships have been established at the national level 
with the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology (BMWi), and the Federal 
Ministry of Transport, Building, and Urban Affairs (BMVBS). At the state level, 
respective partnerships have been built up with the Ministries of Economy as well 
as the Ministries of the Environment in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Saxony. 
In order to convey local experiences and expertise, cooperation with various 
municipal governments and respective bodies (such as agencies for economic 
promotion, start-up services, etc.) in numerous German cities has been established. 
Furthermore, experts from German research institutions and universities frequently 
contribute to program activities, either in Germany or China. 
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What, then, is the particular opportunity for German technical cooperation? 
First of all, GTZ has been present in China for more than 20 years, under 
both easy and difficult conditions for technical cooperation. During this 
time, Germany has proven itself a reliable partner and has gained access to 
high-ranking institutions, often as the only bilateral or multilateral donor 
organization.
For the optimal profile of Sino-German technical cooperation on regional 
policies, this background has a couple of implications:
•  Given the access to high-ranking decision-making institutions, technical 
cooperation is expected to facilitate a policy dialogue between China, 
Germany, and other OECD member states.
•  Cooperation with relevant German federal ministries and other high-
ranking international bodies like the OECD Directorate for Public 
Governance and Territorial Development or the Directorate General for 
Regional Policy of the European Commission is indispensable, because 
this is where policy dialogue takes place and where the required technical 
expertise is available.
•  Technical cooperation is becoming part of a more general dialogue 
between China and Germany. Recognizing that China and Germany have 
mutual interests, for example, in China’s social stability and environmental 
protection, is essential for the cooperation. Once again, collaborating 
with German federal ministries like the Ministry of Economics and 
Technology and the Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
and Nuclear Safety is not a nice “add on,” but indispensible to the success 
of this dialogue.
To sum up, German technical cooperation in the field of regional 
development, in particular based on the principles of the social and ecologic 
market economy, has great potential to facilitate sustainable regional 
development and, consequently, to narrow interregional gaps in China by 
bringing German and European expertise into this field. In return, negative 
global economic and environmental impacts of disparate development in 
China could be massively reduced.
Nevertheless, there is no “one-size-fits-all” way to achieve regional com-
petitiveness. Although China shares the problem of regional disparities with 
numerous other countries, the respective solution has to be in line with China’s 
specific conditions (economic, social, environmental, but also geographical, 
political, and institutional) in order to achieve sustainable development in the 
long run.
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Twenty-Five Years of Sino-German 
Development Cooperation – Qualified Human 
Resources as a Key Factor of Chinese  
Sustainable Development
Michaela Baur and Antje Pfeiffer
Introduction: China – A Vast Country with Endless Human 
Resources?
According to a recently conducted survey among German companies in China, 
88% of the respondents rated human resource issues as the greatest bottleneck in 
their business in China.1 By far the most serious headaches are caused by problems 
in finding qualified workers and keeping them once the contract is signed. A 
majority of the companies saw problems as well in the area of staff qualifications 
in general and their motivation and commitment.
This might seem amazing, but only at first glance. Certainly, China is a vast 
country with a huge work force. And in the last two decades, when China’s 
development and its integration into the world economy were based mainly on 
labor-intensive mass production, the labor force really did seem endless. It was 
easy to find workers without specific qualifications to do monotonous work on 
an assembly line and easy to replace them. Finding suitable staff at the middle and 
higher level has been much more difficult, and companies have had to compete 
intensely to attract “grey collar” or “white collar” talent.
Now China is setting out for new horizons: In addition to mass production 
industries, business leaders and politicians now aim for sound economic 
development based on innovation and high levels of technology. China intends 
to catch up with the rest of the world, not only in terms of quantity, but in terms 
of quality, as well. The human resource factor will be crucial for that objective. 
1See Ulf Borsch, “Mastering the Growth Imperative: Strategic Drivers and Bottlenecks for German 
Multinational Companies,” Business Forum China 6 (2007): 38.
.
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Certainly, the universities and vocational training institutions produce more 
graduates each year. But also here, it is obvious that quantity alone is not the 
solution. More important is whether jobseekers match concrete demand and 
whether they are good enough – compared to their international counterparts.
The following article begins with an overview of the situation in the labor market 
and the vocational training system in China, and also describes the impact of Sino-
German cooperation in these fields. In Chapter 2, we discuss current developments, 
as well as relevant governmental policies, their objectives, and their impact. Chapter 
3 is focused on the 25 years of Sino-German technical cooperation. Whereas the 
joint projects in the field of vocational training look back on a broad and long 
history, the gradual shift to explicitly labor-market-oriented projects started only 
in the 1990s. They were a reaction to the remarkable changes in the labor market 
that accompanied economic reform. To give an overview of the relevant policies 
in Germany that serve as the foundation for cooperation, German labor market 
policy and the German vocational training system will be briefly described. 
Based on that, the gradual shift in Sino-German technical cooperation is further 
analyzed. Chapter 4 gives an outlook on the major challenges for the Chinese labor 
market and vocational training. Success or failure in that policy field will greatly 
influence the entire transformation. China must keep its growth rate high in order 
to absorb at least a large part of the job seekers. According the 11th Five-Year Plan, 
the government is seeking to create 24 million new jobs a year. At the same time, 
there must be a reduction in the significant mismatch between the profiles of 
jobseekers and the skills demanded in the vacancies. According to estimates, there 
is demand, for example, for at least one million additional computer specialists 
and 300,000 car mechatronics. A further challenge is the ongoing urbanization, 
which is expected to reach 57% in 2020, meaning that the greater part of the rural 
population has to catch up with the required qualifications. Today, less than 20% 
of the rural population have more than a junior middle school education. The 
challenges affect not only economic restructuring and sound development, but 
also social cohesion and inclusion of weaker groups. The Gini coefficient grew 
rapidly in recent years to the disconcerting figure of 0.49 and already shows the 
heavy burden of social injustice. Besides the ecological issues, this social aspect may 
be the major obstacle to sustainable development. The social and ecological market 
economy in Germany is therefore a model that is evaluated with great interest by 
Chinese leaders, as it reflects, in many ways, the concept of a harmonious society 
which is the officially defined goal of the Chinese transformation.
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The Labor Market and Vocational Training in China
 
“I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.” This famous 
saying of Confucius shows that action-oriented vocational training looks back 
on a long history in China. Indeed, in the pre-socialist era before the 1940s, it 
was quite common to find a master training his apprentices and, by doing so, 
ensuring the availability of skills actually demanded in the labor market. Today, 
this traditional approach has vanished almost completely. One can find only very 
few people looking for such a master in the countryside; the existing apprentices 
are usually working without pay for a carpenter in order to learn his profession. 
Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) today relies mainly 
on vocational schools. These vocational schools are a comparatively new 
development; they were initiated at the beginning of China’s opening-up policy 
that began in the late 1970s. Until 1980, students entered the workplace after 
having graduated from middle school without any previous work experience. 
Only a small number of middle schools had a special focus on some sort of basic 
technical training.
When the central government first embarked on its economic reforms, it 
realized that in order to develop China’s economy and to succeed in transforming 
a planned economy into a market economy, the country needed a qualified 
workforce and, consequently, a sound vocational education system. Since 
then, China has established a framework of laws, regulations, and standards 
for vocational education. In 1980, the State Council ordered about half of the 
country’s senior middle schools to convert into vocational and technical schools 
teaching crafts, mechanics, animal husbandry, or commercial subjects. However, 
generally these schools were inadequately equipped and focused on rote and 
theoretical learning. In most schools, teachers lectured on how to use certain 
machinery in front of a class consisting of at least 40 to 50 students who were not 
actively involved. These schools did not have the machines and materials to allow 
their students to apply their theoretical knowledge in practice.
Since then, the TVET system has been undergoing reform. The Chinese 
Government has put remarkable effort into this reform process; however, two 
main obstacles are apparent. On one hand, vocational training still suffers from 
its second-rate image. In China, academic ambitions are very high: parents want a 
reputable university degree and a subsequent career as a white collar employee for 
their children. In particular, the one-child policy increased parents’ ambitions for 
their child’s academic career, unfortunately also the pressure on the children. On 
the other hand, the deeply rooted preference for academic education in Chinese 
society has led to constant underfunding of the TVET system by governments 
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at different levels. Thus, it is an undeniable fact that the quality of vocational 
training – buildings, equipment, training material, and teachers – is of lesser 
quality than that of universities. China still faces the challenge of breaking this 
doom loop. But, despite this underlying structural problem, there were certainly 
significant changes and major improvements in the TVET system. The following 
table shows the most important milestones of the reform.
Table 1: Important Milestones in China’s Vocational Education Policy
Year Milestone Result
1978 National Conference on 
Vocational Education
Resolution to create more vocational 
schools and to modernize the 
educational system
1980 Structural reform of the 
vocational education 
system
Half of China’s senior middle schools 
were transformed into vocational 
schools
1985 Resolution of the 
Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of 
China about reform of the 
education system
Vocational education should be given 
priority and no longer be regarded as 
the weakest link in the educational 
system 
1996 Law Regarding Vocational 
Education in China passed 
Opening of the education sector 
for private institutes, integration of 
companies into the learning process in 
order to enhance practical experience, 
general guidelines for curricula
1999 Ministry of Education 
Resolution
Vocational education to be increasingly 
workplace oriented, provinces are 
allowed to design their own curricula
2000 Ministry of Education 
issues catalogue of 
vocational education 
curricula
Categorization of professions and 
standardization of educational 
training, identification of necessary 
qualifications
2005 State Council Resolution 
for Vocational Education
New emphasis on practical 
orientation, modernization of school 
administrations, increase in number 
of students, greater investment in 
programs for vocational education
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Today, there are more than 15,000 secondary vocational schools with more than 
16,000,000 students, and the number is increasing every year. Additionally, there 
are more than 6,000,000 students in more than 1000 tertiary vocational schools. 
All in all, more than 60 million students have graduated from China‘s TVET system 
in the last 20 years, and each year there are more graduates of the TVET system, 
just as there are more university graduates. Despite the fact that growing and newly 
established companies have an enormous demand for qualified staff, many of these 
graduates fail to find suitable jobs. According to official statistics, more than 30% 
of the graduates from the TVET system or universities do not find a proper job in 
the first year after graduation.2 There are a variety of reasons for these placement 
problems and the difficulties in vocational training in general. 
•  The examination system is rigid and the permeability of the professional 
system is low. Once a student fails to pass university entrance exams, his or 
her chances for an academic profession are small.
•  Because of its second-rate image, students in the TVET system often lack 
motivation and enthusiasm. Their dream of a bright career is already over.
•  Despite the fact that vocational training is under constant, gradual reform, 
some changes are slow and cumbersome.
•  Establishing practical training alongside theoretical studies has only just 
started. Trainees mainly study in schools and learn little about the reality of 
the workplace. Schools rarely teach key qualifications such as the ability to 
communicate, team work, or independent decision making. 
•  Classes in many schools are oversized. Teachers are overworked and therefore 
unable to address pupils’ individual needs. The technical equipment available, 
such as machines and appliances, is often inadequate and outdated. 
•  Vocational training is not yet sufficiently linked to the requirements of 
the labor market, so many graduates cannot find any appropriate work. 
Many employers still prefer hiring university graduates, although they then 
complain about their lack of practical skills.
As a result, the Chinese labor market faces serious problems of mismatch. But 
this mismatch relates not only to the graduates; the wider labor supply also fails 
in part to meet labor demand. The impact of the economic reform on the labor 
market in general was of great significance and may be the single most important 
factor today in Chinese people’s lives and their attitude towards life. 
2The picture is probably not much better for the second year, but unfortunately there are no specific figures 
available. It is very likely that more of these graduates found a job in the second year after their exams, 
although many of these jobs did not match their original qualifications.
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After 1980, China’s government started the ongoing process of dismantling 
the so-called iron rice bowl, a system in which work units were responsible for 
supplying their workers with everything from medical care to pensions. Until then 
– as in many socialist countries – people were members of their work unit for their 
whole life and could not lose their job. Workers’ qualifications tended to be low, as 
most industrial work was simple and people did not have to compete for jobs. The 
government’s reform policy forced state-owned companies to face competition 
for market share and to make a profit, so they had to adopt leaner structures 
in order to survive. As a result, many companies were restructured, many went 
bankrupt, and more or less all companies laid off large parts of their workforce. 
To give an example of the dimensions of this situation: In the mid-1990s, some 20 
million employees in China’s cities lost their jobs due to restructuring, closure, or 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. People had to compete against each other 
for the remaining jobs. Pre-job qualifications, long neglected, became an issue. 
The demand became even stronger when private enterprises entered the market 
and started to create new employment opportunities. Although these companies 
offered jobs, they usually searched for a more skilled and enthusiastic workforce 
than the one left behind by crumbling state firms. Gradually, a mismatch between 
the skills of jobseekers and requirement profiles emerged.
The problems in the labor market put a lot of pressure on individual people 
and the society as a whole. Acceptance of the open-door policy with all its 
implications and the legitimacy of a government based on a one-party system 
were put to the test. Therefore, the government tried hard to relieve the pressure 
on the labor market and to make it more inclusive, especially for weaker groups. 
However, at the same time, the government tried to take advantage of the low 
salaries and quite poor labor security conditions in order to attract foreign direct 
investment on the highly competitive international market. This conflict of aims 
led more than once to incoherent and inadequate labor market policies. Before 
we take a closer look at these policies, some important characteristics of the 
Chinese labor market should be noted:
•  The economic and social disparities in China are extraordinary. Whereas the 
coastal regions in the east are now rather prosperous and have experienced 
double-digit growth rates for many consecutive years, the central and western 
parts, like the northeast, face severe development problems.3
3Certainly the weaker regions can be distinguished. The northeast provinces are called the rustbelt of China, 
as they still rely on heavy state-owned industries undergoing a painful transition. In comparison, the  
western and central parts of China are based on agriculture.
Michaela Baur and Antje Pfeiffer  |  409
•  Inner-Chinese mobility is rigidly restricted. Migrant workers (up to 200 
million people, according to estimates) actually do move to more promising 
areas of China, but changing their official residence is almost impossible.4
•  The infrastructure, institutions, and social services in rural areas have been 
underfunded for decades; therefore, disparities continue to grow.
•  As mentioned, the mismatch in the labor market is extreme with respect to 
regions and qualifications.
•  Some groups of people in the labor market were gradually marginalized: 
peasants, migrants, the elderly (a term that is often used for people over 
30), those with poor qualifications, and women. They face deep-rooted 
discrimination.
•  The labor market is under demographic pressure. Today, there is still little 
awareness of the comprehensiveness of the demographic challenge which 
will affect not only the labor market, but also the social security system and 
the society as a whole.
When it comes to the labor market, the life of people in China today could 
not be more different than 20 years ago. Within only one generation, the changes 
have been profound, comprehensive, and complete. Many people seized the 
opportunity; their lives became easier and they became wealthier. Besides the 
few who have become ultra-rich, a relevant middle class is emerging with all 
the typical middle class demands and desires. Nevertheless, there is a very large 
group of people that is being left behind. The social systems are not in place, so 
unemployment generally means poverty, if other family members do not help out. 
Long-term unemployment in China is not as prevalent as in other societies, but 
China now stands at a crucial point, and only a capable and effective labor market 
policy, combined with regionally balanced economic development, can prevent a 
perilous situation. The following table shows how the Chinese Government has 
tried to handle the labor market issues:
4This fact has great impact on the living conditions of the people with respect to schooling, property 
ownership, social insurance, etc.
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Table 2: Milestones for Employment and China’s Labor Market Policy
Year Milestone Result
1978-1984 First relaxation of the state-
run allocation of jobs
Increase in unemployment and 
new ownership structure of 
former state-owned companies
1984-1992 Gradual introduction 
of regular employment 
contracts 
End of the lifelong employment 
guarantee 
1994 First Labor Contract Law 
passed
Introduced flexibility in the labor 
market, official introduction of 
temporary contracts
1995-2002 Waves of dismissals by state-
owned enterprises
About 20 million urban workers 
were made redundant
1995 The Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security assigned 
priority to labor market 
policy and re-employment
According to official statistics, 
about 70% of those laid-off 
during the period mentioned 
above were re-employed
2002 White Paper on 
Employment
The Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security  introduced preferential 
policies that are now diversified 
in relation to specific target 
groups 
2005 Draft of Employment 
Promotion Law introduced
Promotion of job creation and 
anti-discrimination on all levels 
of the government 
2006 Draft of a new version of 
Labor Contract Law 
Employees’ rights strengthened
2007 Revised Labor Contract Law 
and Employment Promotion 
Law passed
Strengthened employee and 
trade union rights, banned 
discrimination of job seekers, 
encouraged local governments to 
create jobs 
Compared to other countries in transition, the Chinese approach is often 
described as incremental and cautious. This is surely correct in terms of political 
reforms, and partly right in terms of economic and social reforms. It is less the case 
for labor market reform. The labor market policy can be described as follows:
•  It is generally a political decision whether a government favors market forces 
or attempts to cushion the blow. In China, the people bore the brunt of the 
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reforms; the government did not attempt to interfere with free market forces 
too much.
•  On the other hand, the government knew that without any cushioning, 
social unease and even upheavals were even more likely. The basic tools of 
labor market policy like benefits, training, placement, and counseling were 
focused on quantitative goals, attempting to reach as many people as possible, 
but there was hardly any real impact in terms of (re-)employment.5
•  Impact monitoring is weak, and labor market statistics do not give a realistic 
picture. The official unemployment rate is 4.5%; the real rate varies from 10 
to 30%, depending on the region.
•  The institutional setup for labor market policy is still not reasonable. Too 
many players (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Personnel, and several other ministries) act with overlapping or 
unclear responsibilities.
•  The government cleared the labor market by excessive early retirement, 
imposing a heavy burden on the already weak social security system,6 which 
must also cope with the demographic challenge.
•  Interregional financial compensation is generally weak in China and basically 
non-existent when it comes to labor market policy. Thus, wealthier provinces 
with less pressure on their labor markets have more funds available than poor 
provinces with heavy labor market problems.
The Labor Contract Law and the Employment Promotion Law, which went 
into effect in January 2008, are strong evidence that the labor market will be 
more regulated and the interests of individual workers and weaker groups will 
be better protected in the future. Companies have already started to complain 
about the Labor Contract Law, which is not necessarily a bad thing. The laws 
makes hiring and firing (in particular the latter) not only more difficult, but also 
more expensive. Fixed-term labor contracts are much more restricted than before 
and have to be changed into unlimited contracts after a certain time period. 
That is perhaps unpleasant for some companies, but in fact it balances power in 
the labor market in a reasonable way. And not only that: it is also an important 
step towards fair competition on global markets, because dumping prices and 
dumping standards will gradually decrease.
5For example, training was rather short and not demand oriented. Job counseling took place at the  
placement counter in five to ten minutes.
6Female civil servants could leave for retirement at the age of 45.
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The Technical Cooperation of China and Germany in the 
Field of TVET and Labor Market Policy
In 2007, the Chinese and German Governments and the related institutions 
celebrated the 25th anniversary of their cooperation. Development 
cooperation between China and Germany began at the beginning of 
the 1980s. On the one hand, the People’s Republic of China needed to 
improve its vocational training system. On the other hand, Germany was 
widely known as a leading country in the field of vocational training. Thus, 
vocational training became the focus of Sino-German cooperation. At that 
time, assisting China in building up a sound vocational education system was 
an implicit contribution to poverty alleviation as well. Educating people is 
also an important tool for empowering them to take their lives into their 
own hands, thereby improving human rights. By training officials or teachers 
who can act as multipliers, GTZ has also helped to educate many individuals 
who took the lead in China’s transformation from a largely rural country 
dominated by state dirigisme into a modern market economy with booming 
industrial and later on service sectors.
Altogether, GTZ China and its partners have implemented 25 related projects 
and programs in different locations across China. A further five are currently 
being implemented. These projects have established educational institutions, 
organized re-employment for laid-off workers, and advised government 
institutions at all levels. Numerous Chinese laws, regulations, and practices have 
benefited from German ideas and experiences, such as the vocational education 
norms and standards promulgated in 1985 or the Law Regarding Vocational 
Education in China passed in 1996. In the early phase, three-quarters of GTZ-
supported projects in China were devoted to vocational training. Over the years, 
this prominence has subsided, because other fields of cooperation, such as energy, 
environmental issues, and legal and economic advisory services, were added to 
the GTZ portfolio in China, reflecting their rising significance for the Chinese 
development process. 
A main objective for Sino-German technical cooperation has always been to ensure 
that the programs’ achievements could be easily multiplied and transferred to other 
regions, ministries, and institutions. Thus, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH cooperates with many different partners, ranging 
from relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MoLSS), 
the Ministry of Education (MoE), and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to 
labor bureaus at all levels, training institutions, the Women’s Federation, tax offices, 
labor service providers, and trade unions in China. 
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Moreover, close cooperation with private companies is a must, as they are 
constantly demanding a qualified workforce. Therefore, projects supported by 
GTZ China cooperate with enterprises such as BMW-Brilliance, MAN Roland, 
Fischer Group, Putzmeister, Festo, Mennekes, Suning House Appliances, 
and Golden Needle. The cooperation with a large number of partners greatly 
enhances the effect of GTZ China’s efforts and ensures that the new concepts not 
only work in theory, but are also adopted in practice.
During the past 25 years, the mode of cooperation has gradually shifted, from 
setting up facilities for training and research, to providing policy advisory services 
at the decision-making level and combining training with stimulation of the 
economy. The cooperation has always been based on mutual trust and interests 
and has benefited both countries. Of course, neither China nor Germany nor 
any other country in the world has solved all the challenges of their labor market; 
there is always a great deal to be learned from each others’ experience. 
The Concept of the Social and Ecological Market Economy
The experience of Germany with the social and ecological market economy 
plays an important role in Sino-German development cooperation. Although it 
was not explicitly brought in at the beginning, one can clearly see that the evolution 
of Sino-German projects has been influenced by this concept. To clarify how this 
concept is related to German development cooperation, the core principles of 
the social and ecological market economy will be presented briefly. However, it is 
not Germany’s aim to hand this concept over to China as a blueprint, but to offer 
valuable experiences which can be adapted to the Chinese situation.
Core principles of the social and ecological market economy:
1)  Ensure the rule of law. Economic development needs legal framework 
conditions that are transparent and effective. This includes binding laws and 
a government which acts accordingly. The judiciary must be independent of 
government influence.
2)  Aim for pro-poor growth. The extent to which economic growth reduces 
poverty depends upon employment and income generation. To ensure 
fair distribution of the benefits of economic growth, policies need to be 
designed in such a way that poor people benefit over-proportionally and get 
the chance to become fully integrated members of a balanced society.
3.) Strengthen the private sector. Generally this means following the subsidiary 
principle which ensures that roles are distributed according to efficiency. The 
production of goods and services should mainly be the responsibility of the 
private sector with the objective that it contributes to pro-poor growth. Therefore, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises must be embedded in a coherent 
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development strategy and combined with regulations that cushion potential 
negative employment effects. In regard to public goods like education, water, and 
health, the government has to ensure the inclusion of vulnerable groups.
4) Improve market-oriented framework conditions. Competition is the most 
effective instrument with which to limit economic power. Therefore the 
government has the responsibility to ensure framework conditions that 
facilitate fair competition. This includes institutions that hinder market 
cartels and ensure that markets are transparent and accessible. 
5)  Ensure economic sustainability. Successful economic growth is increasingly 
based on knowledge, technology, and innovation. The government, therefore, 
has the responsibility to establish a dialogue between economic, scientific, 
and civil partners to identify future challenges and develop strategies for 
dealing with them. Industries with high growth potential in the future but 
low competitiveness at present can be given infant industry protection.
6)  Establish a social partnership. Capital and labor have a complementary 
relationship. This means that not only employers’ associations but also 
employees’ organizations and civil society should participate in an 
economic policy dialogue. The right to free speech and freedom for trade 
unions to organize are necessary for a fair balance of interests and thus 
contribute significantly to social peace. Furthermore, enterprises have the 
responsibility to consider their corporate social responsibility and respect 
core labor standards. 
7)  Aim for ecological sustainability. Economic growth must not be promoted 
at the expense of the environment. Sustainable use of resources contributes 
to ecological and economic sustainability alike. The government’s 
responsibility in this regard is to establish a preventive environmental policy 
in such a way that there are economic incentives for respecting international 
environmental agreements. 
8)  Ensure equal opportunities. Economic development must be pro-poor, 
thus contributing to poverty reduction. The government has to ensure 
that market results are distributed equally and that vulnerable groups (e.g. 
women, youth, the elderly) are empowered to improve their own situation.
In Germany during the last 60 years, the social market economy has proved to be 
an economic model which can achieve a balance between the interests of different 
stakeholders, even in times of deep-rooted change and transition. At the same time, 
it has contributed to pro-poor growth that has enabled all population groups to 
participate in this growth process by way of employment and income. However, 
achieving balanced growth still is and will continue to be a challenging task. 
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In Germany, it was in the 1970s when awareness of environmental damage and 
the need for the ecological use of resources first appeared, but it took until the 
1990s for the concept of an ecological market economy to be formalized, thus 
creating the social and ecological market economy.
Furthermore, in Germany there is also a long tradition of balancing 
responsibilities and rights between employers and employees in the development 
process. This has been institutionalized in the German constitution as the principle 
that “property entails obligations,” which means that companies have the right to 
make a profit but also have social responsibilities, while employees have the right 
to freely choose their work but also the responsibility to perform it properly. In 
this way, Germany tries to create a harmonious society. 
China has incorporated the aim of establishing a harmonious society into the 
present five-year plan. This essentially means that social and regional disparities 
are to be reduced considerably. In regard to the proposed development path, the 
idea is to first achieve a society with modest wealth for all before actually solving 
the problem of disparities. As the five-year plan does not make entirely clear how 
this can be achieved, the Chinese Government has been looking for suitable 
concepts in different countries. However, the German social and ecological 
market economy is a model that not only potentially helps reduce disparities, but 
also combines socialism and a market economy in a favorable way, thus mirroring 
the very different starting points in China. 
Two important elements of the social and ecological market economy that 
have influenced Sino-German development cooperation are German labor 
market policy and the German “dual system.” Both elements will be briefly 
described below. 
German Labor Market Policy – To Assist and Activate
In Germany, labor market policy is implemented on three levels, the political, 
the institutional, and the local levels. On the political level, the German Ministry 
for Labor and Social Security (BMAS) is the responsible entity. The BMAS is 
responsible for implementation of the European employment strategy and labor 
regulation in Germany, for example, labor contract law. On the institutional 
level, the Federal Employment Agency is responsible for implementing active 
and passive labor market policy measures. On the community or city level, where 
local labor market policy is implemented, it is possible to directly engage public 
institutions and private companies in a dialogue with the aim of improving the 
employment situation in the region. One advantage of the multi-level approach 
is that experiences which are made on the local level can be transferred to other 
regions via the institutional or policy level. 
416  |  Part 4  Practitioners‘ Perspectives
Besides public institutions, there are private organizations like trade 
unions and employers’ associations. During collective bargaining processes, 
employers’ associations represent their member companies, while trade unions 
mostly act for their individual members. The autonomy and independence of 
these organizations is protected by the German 
constitution. The government cannot influence the 
process or its results. 
In general, labor market policy can be divided 
into active and passive labor market policies. 
While active measures have the objective of (re-)
integration into the labor market through, for 
example, further training, passive labor market 
policy aims at ensuring a minimum level of income 
for the unemployed person until he or she has found 
a new job, keeping in mind that the unemployment 
period should be as short as possible.
From the beginning of the 1990s until 2005, 
Germany had a quite high overall unemployment 
rate. This situation led to the so-called Hartz 
reforms, which attempted to make German labor 
market policy more efficient in terms of (re-)
employment. The theme of the reform has been an 
activating social state which focuses on the balance 
between assisting and activating. Unemployed people are assisted according to 
their individual needs and the demands of the labor market, at the same time. 
All labor market measures were evaluated and, if they were inefficient, they 
were revoked or reformed. The Federal Employment Agency was restructured, 
and a monitoring and evaluation system which allowed the management to 
continuously monitor the efficiency of the reformed measures was introduced, 
meaning that these measures are not permanent, but can be further developed. 
As a result of the reforms and the present positive economic developments in 
Germany, the employment situation has improved considerably. 
The German Dual System
In Germany, the dual system is far and away the largest educational area within 
the secondary sector: two-thirds of each age group undergo formal training to 
acquire the skills for a recognized occupation. The great majority of graduates of 
dual-system training then work as skilled employees – and many later make use 
of opportunities for further vocational training. Under certain circumstances, 
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graduates of such training can also acquire a university entrance certificate and 
then go on to university studies. 
On the whole, there are many possibilities for transition between school-based 
and dual system vocational training and for transition from vocational training to 
higher education. Some 20% of all first-year students come to higher education 
after having completed training in the dual system. Completing university after 
graduation from the dual system offers students the chance for a successful 
and profitable career, regardless of their background. In this way, vulnerable 
population groups can make use of the opportunities offered by higher education. 
This contributes to greater equality in German society. 
The dual system does not have any formal admission prerequisites: by law, 
all school leavers, regardless of the school-leaving certificate they have, can learn 
any recognized occupation requiring formal training. In actual fact, however, 
opportunities for admission and the actual numbers of people who enter certain 
occupations depend on pre-qualification. 
In the dual system, a combination of learning and working provides the basis 
for acquiring vocational skills. The system seeks to teach theory and practice, 
and to impart structured knowledge and active competence in their proper 
context. The different learning sites involved, the company and the vocational 
school, interact in keeping with their different emphases, but their tasks are not 
rigidly divided: school is not reserved solely for teaching theory, and in-company 
training involves more than practice. 
Under the dual system, vocational schools and companies have a joint 
educational responsibility. Trainees spend one or two days in vocational school 
and three or four days in their company. Vocational schools also establish 
specialized classes oriented to the various relevant occupations – and they do 
so at a supra-regional level for less-popular occupations. The state coordinates 
its framework regulations for training in the companies and vocational schools. 
In final examinations, trainees must show that they have acquired the necessary 
skills – the required practical and theoretical knowledge –from their companies 
and that they have mastered the course material relevant to their occupation as 
taught in the vocational school. 
Vocational training in the dual system is based on the occupational concept: 
formal training for a particular occupation is oriented to the qualifications that 
are typical for the relevant work processes. Specialization is permitted, as a 
complement to the basic qualifications required for each occupation in question, 
but only within an occupation context. Vocational training should prepare 
people for specific occupations, to be pursued immediately after the completion 
of training, but it should also prepare people for further learning. For this reason, 
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promoting willingness to learn and fostering personality development are two of 
its important components. To work in the knowledge society, people must be 
able to plan, carry out, and check their work independently. Vocational training 
within the dual system is oriented to this aim. Additional qualifications, beyond 
regular training, can also support this aim. 
The system’s central aim is to promote employability in a changing workplace – 
a workplace that is shaped both by technical development and by the people who 
work in it. For this reason, state-accredited occupations requiring formal training 
and federal regulations on examinations for further training are designed in 
cooperation with the social partners (employers’ and employees’ representatives). 
This applies to overarching structural issues as well as to individual legal provisions. 
This approach thus fully reflects workplace requirements and the need to foster 
learning and personal development.
Figure 1: Basic Elements of the Dual System7
How can the concept of the social and ecological market economy serve as 
a background for Sino-German development cooperation? In the following 
paragraphs we try to elaborate on the evolution of Sino-German projects and 
programs while showing how the concept of the social and ecological market 
economy has influenced this cooperation.
7See German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Germany’s Vocational Education at a 
Glance (Bonn: BMBF Publik, 2003), 4.
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The projects and programs supported by GTZ China can be divided into 
four modes which reflect this gradual shift from setting up training facilities to 
implementing integrated approaches with greater employment impacts. 
First Mode: Setting up Training Facilities 
During the initial period of cooperation, the typical goal of a project was to 
create and develop new training institutions at the grassroots level. The former 
senior middle schools that were transformed into vocational training schools 
were clearly inadequate as they had no workshops and only taught theory. Thus, 
it was more useful to build new schools from the ground up rather than trying 
to impart new methodologies to existing schools. All schools founded by the 
Sino-German projects – for example, a welding technology school in Harbin 
or an aviation technology training centre in Beijing – offered workshops and 
rooms for practical assignments, using modern machinery for students to acquire 
skills. Thus, combining practical training with theoretical learning was one of the 
first German practices that was implemented in China. Although the training 
in these schools was much more hands on, stimulating, and learner centered, 
there were still some differences between this training and the German dual 
system. In contrast to Germany, Chinese companies have no tradition of taking 
responsibility for the vocational training of their employees. Instead, all formal 
education is organized exclusively by schools. Thus, projects run by GTZ and their 
partners linked up with cooperating companies as a place for practical training. 
Nevertheless, the responsibility still remained with the institutes. As a result, 
the schools started to build up strong links to companies – something entirely 
new for China. These contacts not only increased the schools’ awareness of the 
needs of the labor market, but also contributed to an improved dialogue between 
public training institutions and companies – although on an informal basis. In 
addition to the training facilities, the joint projects set up two regional research 
institutes for vocational education (RIBBs) in Shanghai and Shenyang as well as 
a central institute (ZIBB) in Beijing. These think tanks support the vocational 
training program with research and policy advice. ZIBB, for example, advised 
the Chinese Government on drafting the Law Regarding Vocational Education 
passed in 1996 and successfully advocated for an opening of the educational 
sector to private institutions. In line with the principle of subsidiary – one of the 
core principles of the social and ecological market economy – private training 
institutions can be a good supplement, especially for courses in certain areas like 
IT, thereby enforcing competition, which will – if properly monitored – raise 
quality standards.
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Second Mode: Improving the Quality of Institutions and Human Resources 
The dialogue that developed between companies and training institutions made 
it increasingly obvious that the lack of appropriately qualified teachers and trainers 
was a serious bottleneck for educational development. Trainers and teachers did 
not receive any specific training and often lacked practical knowledge; they were 
thus not able to offer practically oriented education. Only very few of them had 
ever seen private companies from the inside or had sufficient knowledge of the 
daily work and its demands. In order to address this problem, projects supported 
by GTZ and its partners placed greater emphasis on the qualification and practical 
knowledge of teachers through intensive cooperation with companies. This was 
the beginning of a dialogue that included scientific institutions and universities. 
A prominent example of this approach is the Institute of Vocational Training 
(IBB), established at Tongji University in Shanghai as an academic institute for 
vocational teachers and supported by a Sino-German project launched in 1997. 
IBB emphasizes not only theoretical learning, but also diverse opportunities for 
students to acquire practical skills through internships, modern learner-centered 
teaching methods, and so on. There were two multiplier effects: First, trained 
students graduating from the institute became teachers at technical colleges. 
Second, the institute’s methods were transferred to universities and schools in 
three provinces of western China in order to reduce regional and social disparities 
and to promote equal opportunities. 
Third Mode: Orientation towards the Labor Market
Faced with mass layoffs in the 1990s, China had to improve the quality of 
training programs for unemployed workers. The large number of jobseekers 
did not match new job opportunities, because they required special skills and 
qualifications which these jobseekers did not have. At the same time, it became 
obvious that some groups were more at risk than others of losing their jobs 
and having difficulties in finding a new one. These weak groups included the 
unqualified, women, people over 35, the handicapped, and others. The gender 
gap on the labor market grew significantly, because women were among the first 
to be laid off and were often discriminated against when seeking placement in 
new jobs. As there was no coherent labor market policy in place to tackle these 
issues, Germany’s experience in this area proved to be valuable to the Chinese, 
and Sino-German projects started to systematically combine TVET with labor 
market policy measures. Up to that point, labor market policy in China had not 
used the potential of socially oriented market instruments, so the challenge was 
to generate a development strategy that would not just take advantage of low 
salaries and weak regulation of labor security, but would give laid-off people new 
Michaela Baur and Antje Pfeiffer  |  421
opportunities. In 1999, GTZ and the MoLSS began a project that supported 
the reintegration of unemployed women into the labor market. This project 
developed and implemented different labor market policy concepts for women 
in Nanjing and Benxi, for example, training female candidates in different 
professions and enabling them to set up their own businesses. New placement 
concepts were also introduced. On the policy level, the project supported the 
drafting of the Employment Promotion Law which went into effect in January 
2008. Finally, Sino-German programs tried to reduce discrimination in the labor 
market with measures that were targeted especially at vulnerable groups such as 
women, the elderly, and the handicapped, thereby increasing equality.
Fourth Mode: Combining Labor Market Policy with Regional Economic 
Development
Labor market policy measures cannot be fully effective if they are not directly 
linked to business promotion activities, particularly in regions with high 
structural unemployment. Only successfully operating companies can create 
jobs. Therefore, Sino-German projects started to implement an integrated 
approach, which not only matches TVET measures with labor market policy, 
but also integrates business promotion measures. Thus a new GTZ-supported 
project situated in China’s northeastern rustbelt of Liaoning Province addresses 
the issues of companies’ requirements and qualifications of the unemployed, 
while exploring new ways to improve the investment climate in the province. For 
example, the project currently compiles data for labor market statistics and assesses 
the success of various development zones in the province, thereby tackling labor 
supply and demand simultaneously. It is working in a multi-partner structure that 
includes the Provincial Labor Office, the Provincial Reform and Development 
Commission, and the local Department of Commerce in Liaoning, which 
ensures that these agencies will be able to coordinate their strategies later on. 
Other Sino-German projects incorporate not only questions of property rights, 
labor legislation, and decent work requirements, but also product standards and 
ecological considerations.
Moreover, a number of public private partnerships (PPP) were set up as part 
of these projects. As the lack of qualifications in the workforce has surfaced as 
a major problem for German and Chinese companies, both sides profit from 
cooperation. The corporations involved not only contribute financially, but also 
commit themselves to hiring staff which has undergone the respective training. 
GTZ China has taken great care to preserve the knowledge and experience 
gained in the Sino-German programs through various knowledge management tools 
that were developed and emphasized. One important outcome of this process was 
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the Knowledge Management Library of Vocational Training at the Sino-German 
Vocational Training Center (AFZ) in Tianjin, a project which was originally 
established in 1986. The Knowledge Library is open to the public so that interested 
institutions or partners from other projects can learn from each other’s experience or 
exchange ideas. In order to keep the community of old and new partners as well as 
other stakeholders lively and vibrant, GTZ has initiated conferences with Chinese 
and German organizations such as the Hanns Seidel Foundation and InWEnt. These 
biannual conferences on vocational education have turned out to be an ideal setting 
for networking and catching up with new developments. 
Challenges for the Chinese Development Process and 
Potential Fields of Cooperation in the Future
Although very successful thus far, the Chinese development process will remain 
challenging. While in the past the most important objective was double-digit 
growth rates, China now has to address the ecological and social sustainability of 
its development. Regarding the social situation, it needs to be said that China’s 
Gini coefficient – an important measure for inequality –is now higher than that 
in countries like Ivory Coast, Uruguay, and Bolivia. This inequality has led to 
demonstrations and social unrest – an estimated 70,000 such incidents a year. 
Thus, in order to move towards a harmonious society, it is necessary to reduce 
inequality substantially and open up opportunities for a wide range of the labor 
force to participate in the economic growth path. This also includes improving the 
permeability of the technical vocational and education system, so that vulnerable 
population groups have the chance for a successful career.
However, the pressure on the labor market will remain high, not only because people 
are looking for a job, but also because most of these jobs require skills. According to 
estimates, China will need at least one million additional computer specialists, 300,000 
additional car mechatronics, 150,000 additional nurses, and a few hundred thousand 
computer numeric control specialists in the next few years. As China anticipates an 
urbanization rate of 57% by 2020 – compared to about 40% now – the growing cities 
will also need large numbers of construction workers and transport personnel, as well 
as staff for businesses, offices, and modern services such as tourism. 
However, at the moment, China classifies only 4% of its workforce as highly 
qualified, while 36% have a middle school education. The remaining 60% have few 
or no skills and are regarded as “elementary workers.” A large part of this group 
is comprised of approximately 200 million rural migrants currently working in 
cities. More than 80% have only graduated from junior middle school, and only 
2.4% hold certificates that certify a formal vocational education.
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According to the present five-year plan, China’s government plans to create 
around 24 million urban jobs each year, while around the same number of 
people will be seeking a job. This number includes migrants coming in from the 
countryside, people who have been laid off, and new job market entrants such 
as university graduates. Therefore, China needs to keep gross domestic product 
growth high in order to allow job creation to keep pace with demand. Meanwhile, 
the government is in the process of creating a social security system through a 
national social security fund that has taken over the payment of pensions and 
unemployment benefits from work units. Yet, this system is not fully established. 
So far, it exists only in urban areas and, even there, not all urban residents are 
covered. Currently, creating a social security network for rural areas is a huge 
challenge for the Chinese Government.
The main objective for such a social security system is to offset the risks people 
face in their working life, such as unemployment, sickness, work accidents, 
and age. Against the background of the one-child policy, the establishment of 
a pension system will be an especially enormous challenge. The probability of 
having to deal with these risks has increased with the structural transition that 
has been taking place in China in the last 20 years. China has embarked on a 
quite liberal path when it comes to cushioning the negative employment aspects 
of the ongoing structural change. 
In conclusion, it is clear that several topics in the field of TVET and labor 
market policy remain important or are becoming even more so: To further 
address the mismatch on the labor market, improvements in the coordination 
between educational and training institutions and the private sector must 
continue. Growth needs to be more labor intensive; this could be promoted 
by the appropriate framework conditions. A special focus should be laid on the 
development of private small and medium-sized enterprises, which were the job 
motor of the transformation in recent years, but still face discrimination with 
regard to access to credit and other resources as well as administrative procedures. 
Here the cooperation field of TVET and labor market policies has already been 
expanded to include business promotion measures, programs which support the 
improvement of the business and investment climate, and advisory services in the 
field of economic policy and the legal framework. Corporate social responsibility 
and environmental aspects also need to be emphasized further. 
Another field of future cooperation will be passive labor market policy 
measures, such as unemployment assistance and other social security schemes – 
both within the framework of the demographic challenge in China. Here again, 
Germany has valuable experience in establishing and reforming such a social 
security system. 
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Technical and Vocational Training in Thailand
Peter Pozorski
Introduction
The German system of vocational education, known as the dual system, is the 
product of a long development process, which was influenced by changing and 
very different political and economic conditions. The system in its present-day 
form is based on a specific interconnection of the private and the public sectors. 
This particular character is only superficially indicated by the learning sites: the 
private company and the state vocational school. In fact, the system is supported 
by a sophisticated distribution of roles and responsibilities among political, 
economic, and social stakeholders.
The German dual system of vocational education is often mentioned in 
the same breath as the social market economy as an important factor in the 
recovery of the country after World War II. However, the interconnections with 
the newly established and successful post-war economic system were at least 
twofold: On the one hand, the indisputable capability of the dual system to 
produce occupational qualifications demanded by the surging economy indeed 
contributed significantly to the economic success. On the other hand, the social 
market economy provided the basic values for the establishment of a coherent 
legal framework for vocational education, replacing the former fragmented 
legislation. In this regard, the German system of vocational education is part of 
the social market economy. The legal basis enacted in 1969 and the following 
years finally established vocational education as a common good. The state sets 
reliable framework conditions for the cooperation of all stakeholders in order to 
pursue objectives of common interest in three fields:
•  economic: to supply the required quantity and quality of occupational 
qualifications to the employment systems;
•  social: to provide access to occupational qualifications for employment as a 
condition for income and social integration; and
•  educational: to support the personality development of individuals in order 
to strengthen civil society.
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The high level of public appreciation for the dual system might lead observers to lose 
sight of its complex structure, which is determined by and dependent on the political, 
economic, and social environment in Germany. The possibilities of transferring this 
dual system to the different environments of other countries are overestimated, and 
attempts to implement dual structures in vocational education have to take into 
consideration a context broader than vocational education as such.
Vocational Education and Training in Thailand
In Thailand, as in many other countries in the region, the system of vocational 
education and training consists of two different sectors. The first is formal 
vocational education, carried out as a fulltime school scheme. Graduates are 
awarded a certificate, which is on par with that of graduates of general upper 
secondary education. Therefore, only graduates of lower secondary education have 
access to this educational path. The other sector, non-formal vocational training, 
offers many social groups open access to the training programs; graduates are 
awarded internationally recognized certificates of skills development on different 
levels. Since the 1960s, both sectors have been extended continuously and in 
parallel by government funds and with support of international development 
cooperation. Today both sectors have a dense network of institutes that stretch 
across the whole country.
The segmentation is based on regulatory policy. Occupational training is 
regarded as a task of the government and is, consequently, placed under the 
jurisdiction of certain government bodies. Primarily, it is the task of formal 
vocational education, which is under the jurisdiction of the Office of Vocational 
Education Commission (formerly Department of Vocational Education) in 
the Ministry of Education to produce qualified staff for public establishments, 
administration, and state enterprises, where personnel are classified for grade 
and pay scales according to educational qualifications. The vocational training 
of staff for private companies and of workers to be sent abroad under the scheme 
of bilateral labor exchange is the responsibility of the Department of Skills 
Development in the Ministry of Labor.
The great number of private vocational schools, where around 35% of all 
students in formal vocational education on the upper secondary level are enrolled, 
are not in conflict with this system, because they must follow the guidelines given 
by the Ministry of Education pertaining to duration and contents of courses and 
awarded certificates.
Formal vocational education of this kind is closer to the educational system 
than to the labor market. Since the awarded certificate is of the same level as 
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the certificate of general upper secondary education, achieving this certificate 
has greater importance for a successful entry into employment than acquiring 
occupational skills and knowledge. Private sector organizations have no function 
in this government-controlled system, and private companies are only involved as 
providers of internships that form part of study programs driven by educational 
requirements rather than by labor-market demand.
This division of labor began to soften more and more at the end of the 
1980s, when economic growth was gradually accelerating. The demand of the 
public sector for personnel declined significantly, and private companies, which 
were becoming larger in number mainly due to foreign direct investment, 
were increasingly recruiting graduates of formal vocational education. Since 
the growing national economy offered more jobs in their home country, Thai 
workers began to loose interest in being sent abroad for work. As a result, a main 
incentive to undergo skills development was lost. At the same time, the holders 
of certificates of skills development fell behind graduates of formal vocational 
education in competition for well-paid jobs in the surging industry.
Efforts to Reform Vocational Education and Training
At the end of the 1980s, the private sector became the main employer 
of graduates of Thailand’s system of vocational education and training and 
insistently demanded that the government make more efforts to improve 
vocational education, namely to orient it more closely to occupational practice in 
companies. The thrust was directed mainly towards formal vocational education, 
which was far from the reality of the workplace and did not impart occupational 
competence relevant for the companies. Although non-formal vocational training 
was performing much better in practical training, it did not attract much interest. 
Employers did not regard skills development graduates as promising human 
resources because of their generally lower educational qualifications.
During the period of political change in the 1980s, committees for cooperation 
between the public and private sectors were created in different sectors and on 
the regional and national levels. Private-sector representatives in the Committee 
for Public-Private Cooperation in Human Resource Development succeeded 
in convincing the government of the necessity to reform vocational education 
and training and to involve the private sector in its design. However, there 
was dissension between the public and private sectors and also between the 
different participating private-sector organizations about the future structure of 
a system that would be able to produce the qualified workforce required by the 
companies. 
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Approaches of German Development Cooperation
Even before the committee was created, large Thai enterprises expressed their 
interest in the German system of vocational education and subsequently urged 
the Ministry of Education to submit a request to the German Government for a 
development project to implement dual vocational training (DVT). About the 
same time, the Ministry of Industry, in tune with an initiative of private Thai 
enterprises, mainly of the manufacturing sector, also came forward with a request 
for the establishment of a high-tech training institute. Similar German technical 
and financial cooperation projects in Singapore and Malaysia inspired the concept 
and later the name, the Thai-German Institute (TGI). Because of the German 
vocational education system and a number of reference projects, Germany was 
regarded as the most competent partner in the field of vocational training. 
German development cooperation responded positively to both requests, not 
least because the demand initially came from the private sector, but also because 
of the convincing commitment of the relevant government and private sector 
organizations to future cooperation in vocational education and training.
The Thai side, namely the Ministry of Industry, the partner of TGI, was driven by 
the conviction that improvement of vocational education and training is essential for 
the development of existing companies and for continued success in attracting national 
and foreign direct investment and, therefore, for sustainable economic growth. For the 
same reason, the Board of Investment (BOI) began to develop an increasing interest 
in both projects. After a period of observation, the BOI advocated the approaches in 
public discussions and later referred to the projects in its publication for investors as 
examples of advanced human resource development and a location factor.
The DVT project attempted to bring about structural change by training 
organizations and developing occupational skills in order to make the initial 
vocational education practice oriented and relevant to the needs of the companies. 
The TGI project worked to create an exemplary institute that provided further 
training in modern production technologies for qualified staff already working 
in manufacturing companies. The focus was set on production automation 
and key technologies in manufacturing, such as mechatronics and tool and die 
making. As a result, German development cooperation was directly involved in 
the process of reforming vocational education in Thailand with two different 
technical cooperation approaches, in order to increase the availability of qualified 
labor and strengthen the competitiveness of Thai companies by improving their 
human resources in the areas of production and service.
The first years of implementation of the DVT project yielded three general 
insights:
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•  It is feasible to have an initial vocational education system in which state 
vocational schools and private companies share specific tasks in terms of the 
organization of the training process and contents of the courses. A strong 
job orientation in the schools and the companies can produce the type of 
qualifications demanded by the private sector.
•  The nationwide extension of a model of cooperative training depends 
only on a decision of the national authority of vocational education, the 
Department of Vocational Education (now Office of Vocational Education 
Commission). DVT can be implemented without a prior revision of the legal 
framework, because the existing laws on education, labor, and protection of 
young persons provide enough leeway and do not pose impediments. Only 
decisions pertaining to operational procedures in vocational schools and 
companies and an adjustment of existing regulations issued by the national 
authority are necessary.
•  A law on vocational education that provides specific regulations for DVT 
is not a precondition for its introduction. In fact, it became obvious that 
regulations specific to a cooperative model can only be appropriately 
designed after experience has been gained with the cooperation. This 
applies particularly to the allocation of roles and tasks among the acting 
stakeholders.
These findings explain the redirection of the project’s approach towards 
consultancy on the meso level, the national authority for vocational education. 
After a rather short time, the decision for a nationwide introduction of DVT 
was made and underpinned by orders to the state vocational schools. Private 
sector organizations supported this action of the national authority and 
made recommendations to their member companies. Their participation was 
meant to be voluntary, not only because there were no legal means to force 
them, but also because of the intention to make an appeal to corporate social 
responsibility.
During the pilot phase of the project, DVT graduates were only awarded 
a non-formal qualification. The adjustments of regulations, mainly those for 
curricula and examinations, finally put the DVT certificate on par with that of 
formal vocational education on the upper secondary level. DVT became more 
attractive to students and their parents as well as to companies, which likewise 
attached high importance to the fact that their DVT graduates could be awarded 
a certificate with formal and social recognition. Subsequently, the number of 
students enrolled in DVT and the number of cooperating companies started to 
increase year by year. Furthermore, the application of DVT expanded from the 
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manufacturing sector, where it was introduced initially, into the commercial 
and service sectors.
In order to set up the TGI, it was necessary at the beginning to create a suitable 
regulatory basis that provided the institute’s management room to maneuver in 
creating and carrying out programs of further training that keep pace with the 
dynamic development of technology in industrial manufacturing. To this end, the 
Ministry of Industry, under whose authority the TGI was placed, issued bylaws 
on the management of assets, finance, and personnel that clearly went beyond 
the restrictive boundaries set for the management of government institutions. 
This greater freedom of action made it possible to develop and offer a variety 
of demand-driven further training, consultancy, and other industrial services to 
manufacturing companies.
The strong expansion of DVT and the positive reception of the cooperative 
model, which also specifically formed the basis of the concept for further training 
at TGI, did not make a decisive impact on the progress of the public-private 
dialogue on reform of vocational education and training in the Committee 
of Public-Private Cooperation in Human Resource Development. Both sides 
became more and more set on debating different types of qualification systems, 
instead of entering into negotiations on the distribution of roles and tasks in a 
cooperative vocational education system.
After the Asian Crisis, the quickly rebounding economic growth 
ultimately weakened the pursuit of reform. In 2001, the work of all the 
committees was terminated, and all the committees were dissolved. The Thai-
German development cooperation in DVT and demand-driven training in 
manufacturing technology at the TGI remained practically unaffected. In fact, 
both projects attracted increasing attention, while the partners intensified their 
participation and ownership. Enrollment in the DVT reached almost 10% of 
all students in formal initial vocational education and the Bureau of Budget 
established a proper budget item for DVT within the budget of the Ministry 
of Education. During the last two years of the project, the Thai partners, public 
and private, spent DM 2.20 on DVT related activities for each DM 1 spent out 
of the German DVT project budget. The TGI consolidated a prime position 
in technology transfer and training with an expanded program of technology 
services to companies.
Within the objectives and implementation of the two projects, German 
development cooperation also pursued a strategy to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of basic principles of the social market economy and to suggest to the partners 
that these principles could orient regulatory policy for reform. For vocational 
education and training, this means the creation of framework conditions 
430  |  Part 4  Practitioners‘ Perspectives
conducive to decisive participation and responsibility of the private sector for 
the design and organization of recognized processes of occupational training.
In Germany, the existence and effectiveness of the legal framework and 
institutional structure for cooperative vocational education is based on a 
consensus that has been gained through a long process of negotiation on all 
the relevant political, legal, social, and economic issues, which is still ongoing. 
In countries where close public-private cooperation in vocational education is 
in the making and is the subject of a reform process, similar commitments of 
relevant stakeholders need to be obtained and comparable structures need to be 
established from scratch or by changing existing structures. Actually, the Thai 
partners of both projects remained reluctant to create new institutions or to 
make structural changes to existing institutions. In particular, the private sector 
organizations did not show great interest in formally assuming an active role in 
the design and organization of DVT. The main reason might have been that these 
tasks would have required building up more capacity within their organizations 
and there was no readiness to assume the related risks.
Therefore, the formal integration of DVT did not make substantial progress. It 
was de facto introduced and functioning as a model of public-private cooperation 
in vocational education and training, but neither the government nor the private 
side started to make preparations for an appropriate joint organization on the level 
above schools and companies. When work on a new law on vocational education 
began in the year 2000, only regulation of the status quo that had been achieved 
so far by the implementation of the DVT project on the micro level was taken 
into account. Also the organizational development of the TGI in the direction of 
more institutional independence based on public-private partnership remained 
stagnant. The Ministry of Industry, instead, took steps to bring the dynamic TGI 
under closer governmental control again.
Results and Lessons Learnt
The explanation for the lack of progress can be found in unchanged 
mindsets. On the government side, influential decision makers in the partner 
organizations continue to adhere to the position that vocational education 
and training is in principle a task of the government, and vocational institutes 
are instruments of government policies. This seems to be indirectly justified 
by a private sector that prefers to remain in an observing and accompanying 
position instead of contributing to the establishment of an institutionalized 
structure to guide and organize vocational education and training, as a clear 
statement of formative intent.
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A transfer of mandatory tasks from the public sector to a private sector 
body, which may receive appropriate government subsidies in return, is neither 
common in the political and administrative traditions of the country nor 
completely compatible to the mindset of the main stakeholders. To establish 
an institutionalized partnership in vocational education, both sides have to 
overcome their conventional positions and the traditional delineation from 
each other. The final version of the draft Vocational Education Act, which was 
submitted to the parliament in 2007 for approval, may prepare the ground for a 
progressive alignment of both sides in the future by making it obligatory for state 
vocational schools to seek cooperation with private companies.
German development cooperation with Thailand in the area of vocational 
education has demonstrated that the instruments of financial and technical 
cooperation can sustainably improve vocational education in terms of 
modernization, quality, and relevance to company workplaces This impact was 
mainly limited to the operational level of vocational schools and companies, 
where procedures and regulations for effective public-private cooperation could 
be established jointly and successfully. For the TGI project, this applied to the 
level of management, development, and realization of all the different types of 
activities in training, consultancy, and industrial services. On the meso level, in 
the national organization of the partners, only a minimum of structural change 
for steering and control, necessary for maintaining public-private cooperation on 
the micro level, has been achieved.
However, the introduction of basic elements of public-private cooperation 
into the new Vocational Education Act shows that the DVT project ultimately 
left some modest traces on the macro level of national policy and provides 
good preconditions for the further development of public-private cooperation 
in vocational education and training. Straightforward implementation of the 
mandate of the new law by state vocational schools will eventually make it 
necessary to develop an organizational setup for the coordination and support 
of participating companies. Since participation of the private sector is a crucial 
factor for the functioning of such a body, the government-driven approach 
cannot avoid conceding a degree of influence and some responsibilities.
In Thai society and particularly among entrepreneurs, an ethical communitarian 
commitment is quite common. This attitude combines social responsibility and 
economic usefulness. It was, in many cases, the final decisive factor that moved a 
company to join the DVT program, which was understood as a scheme beneficial 
to the personal development and employment of young people. Thus, this social 
commitment constitutes an important starting point for involving the private sector 
in a matter of such high social and economic relevance as vocational education.
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The impacts achieved in Thailand indicate that the existing instruments 
are working well for the micro level, but are not entirely suitable to achieving 
and securing ambitious objectives on the meso level, such as structural change 
in governing bodies, public or private. Therefore, these instruments have to be 
combined with a specific advisory and promotional approach on the meso and 
macro levels that increases the partners’ understanding and support of necessary 
changes. An implementation concept designed in such a manner can take on 
the objective of achieving an essential turn in regulatory policy, namely the 
establishment of a robust agreement on a controlled transfer of a certain range of 
government tasks in vocational education to a public-private body above the level 
of schools and companies. This will lay the foundation for an institutionalized 
and hence sustainable cooperation in vocational education and training.
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Social and Ecological Market Economy  
Principles in German Development Policy 
(Strategy 158)1
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development1
German development policy bases its international role and responsibility on the 
following goals: reducing poverty, securing peace, achieving justice in globalisation 
and protecting the environment. The BMZ is committed to the ideal of sustainable 
development in the pursuit of these goals. Sustainable development entails 
balancing people’s economic, political and social living conditions on the one hand 
with the long-term preservation of vital natural resources on the other. Protecting 
the environment is seen as an inherent element in a development process that allows 
us to satisfy current needs without endangering the development opportunities 
of future generations. Sustainable development demands that ecological, socio-
cultural and political aspects receive the same attention as economic ones.
For the field of fostering economic growth, the model of sustainable 
development assumes a definite shape through the principles of the social and 
ecological market economy. In following this approach, German development 
cooperation is drawing upon a successful German and European tradition of 
economic and social policy design. German development cooperation thus offers 
its partner countries an alternative to the extremes of radical market liberalism on 
the one hand and highly interventionist market regulation on the other. In doing 
so, German development policymakers are establishing their position in the 
international dialogue on shaping globalisation and are assuming responsibility 
within the framework of global structural policy for key issues relating to the 
social and economic future of humanity.
The principles of the social and ecological market economy illustrate the 
most important fundamental economic policy tenets of German development 
cooperation, indicating the special experience and institutions that Germany can 
contribute in its cooperation with partner countries. These tenets provide the 
1Source: BMZ. 2007. Social and ecological market economy principles in German development policy. 
Strategies 158. 
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framework for shaping the content of German development cooperation and 
thus represent the specific German approaches available to Germany’s partner 
countries in development cooperation. This orientation towards a social and 
ecological market economy does not, however, mean that German institutions 
and its market system serve as a blueprint for Germany’s partner countries.
The social and ecological market economy stands for competition, and economic 
and fiscal stability, as well as social balance and sharing. This is not about specifying 
concrete economic policies for achieving these goals. In fact, the strength of the 
social and ecological market economy lies in its ability to react flexibly to the 
conditions in Germany’s partner countries. Certainly, the state and its constitutional 
institutions have an active role to play in shaping economic and social life.
The first and foremost aim of German development cooperation is shaping 
overall conditions so that they support sustainable development in Germany‘s 
partner countries. This also means influencing the social and political views 
of economic players by using appropriate incentives, so that solidarity and 
participation are supported and encouraged. In accordance with the principle 
that ownership entails responsibilities, private wealth does not only serve the 
purpose of individual enrichment; it also implies responsibilities towards the 
community.
German development cooperation is committed to implementing the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration and achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals. The principles of the social and ecological market economy acknowledge 
the special role of economic, social and cultural human rights and gender 
equality.
The guiding principles for the design of German development cooperation 
are as follows:
1. Supporting the rule of law: Economic development requires the creation 
of a legal framework, which includes binding legal standards and state action 
that is guided by the principles of the rule of law. Sustainable economic activity 
presupposes a commitment to law and order. A functioning judicial system 
gives all private sector players an equitable framework in which to engage in 
the economic process. Human rights, equal opportunities and participation are 
integral components of a social and ecological market economy.
2. Striving for broad-based growth: Economic growth is necessary in order to 
reduce poverty. The size of the impact which economic growth has on reducing 
poverty depends quite crucially on its positive effects on employment and income. 
In order to guarantee equitably distributed economic development, the growth 
process must be designed in such a way that the poor benefit from it to a greater 
degree. Policy approaches aimed at broad-based or pro-poor growth therefore seek 
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to increase both economic growth and the participation of poor population groups 
in its fruits. Poverty reduction cannot be achieved by “trickle-down” effects alone; 
it is fostered first and foremost by improved access to employment and income, 
resources, goods and services for poor and disadvantaged population groups.
3. Strengthening the private sector: A social and ecological market economy is 
built on private sector initiative. The provision of goods and services should be left 
to private enterprises wherever they can provide better access to them for poor and 
disadvantaged population groups. Thus, the privatisation of services traditionally 
provided by the state is not an aim in itself. It must be part of a coherent development 
strategy that is tied to the installation of pertinent regulatory competence. In the 
case of public goods in particular – such as education, water and health – the state 
has to ensure that poor people have access to these goods and must, if necessary, 
take responsibility for providing them with these services. The state also continues 
to bear the political responsibility for the outcome of any reform or privatisation 
of public delivery structures. The principle of subsidiarity must be born in mind 
in all cooperation between state, associations and businesses: basically, the state 
should only take on those tasks that the private sector is not able to carry out more 
efficiently.
4. Improving conditions for the market economy: Competition is the 
most effective instrument when it comes to limiting economic power. Creating 
suitable conditions for a market economy to prevail is a vital responsibility for 
governments. In order to counteract the tendency of the market to dissolve into 
a series of cartels and/or monopolies, the state or the international community 
must create an institutional framework that particularly encourages market 
transparency and free and open market access. It is also important to take into 
account the legitimate interests of consumers in product quality. Consumer 
protection is therefore just as much a key task for the state as developing an 
effective administration and effectively fighting corruption.
5. Making an economy viable for the future: The successful growth of national 
economies is increasingly based on knowledge, technology and innovation. Thus, 
the government’s job is to conduct a dialogue with society on the challenges of the 
future. This dialogue has to be realised in cooperation with industry, science and 
civil society. It is important that governments recognise anticipated structural 
change and future patterns of specialisation at an early stage and channel public 
resources into these fields (e.g. research and development, infrastructure and access 
to capital). Sectors with great future potential that are not yet internationally 
competitive or sensitive products may constitute an exception to a government’s 
essentially liberal foreign trade policy, with temporary measures being employed 
to protect them from the pressure of world markets.
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6. Creating a social partnership: Two important aspects of social partnership 
are capital and labour. Therefore the labour force and civil society should also 
have a say in the economic policy dialogue, alongside business associations. The 
right of free speech and freedom to organise trade unions are vitally important 
for balancing conflicting interests and play an important role in preserving 
social harmony. Achieving a balance of interests between providers of capital 
and employees must be taken into account in the management of private 
sector enterprises. This can be done by means of active co-determination by 
the workforce and by allowing collective bargaining. On the other hand, when 
business decisions are taken solely on the basis of the often short-term interests of 
capital investors, this is incompatible with a social and ecological market economy. 
Germany is promoting efforts to increase corporate social responsibility, whereby 
companies are encouraged to act in a socially responsible manner and to ensure 
that international core labour standards are adhered to.
7. Shaping the economy based on ecological concerns: Economic 
development must not be allowed to take place at the expense of the environment; 
it must be directed towards preserving the natural resource base. Governments 
must create economic incentives to preserve the environment through forward-
looking policies and ensure that international standards are observed. Appropriate 
measures have to be taken to ensure the future viability of local and global eco-
systems. This implies protection and sustainable use of vital natural resources by 
means of resource-efficient production methods. Eco-efficient economic activity 
and the use of renewable energies are more than just an increasingly important 
competitive advantage. They are a prerequisite for sustainable value added and 
thus also for an economy that is fit for the future.
8. Ensuring equal opportunities: Economic development must serve 
poverty reduction and should not exclude anyone. The state should ensure equal 
opportunities for all and improve the distributive impact of market processes for 
the benefit of poor and disadvantaged population groups; to achieve this, the 
tax structure should also take into account people’s differing levels of disposable 
income. Equal opportunities also means empowering previously disadvantaged 
groups and particularly capable groups – especially women – groups whose 
potential has so far not been used adequately in the economic process. A well 
developed school and education system is vitally important here. In addition, 
solidarity should also be practised in the case of risks that are too much for the 
individual to cope with (e.g. illness, old age and handicap), following the principle 
of social protection. The cycle of poverty must be broken.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH
Dag-Hammarskjöld - Weg 1 – 5
65760 Eschborn / Deutschland
T   + 49 61 96 79 - 0
F   + 49 61 96 79 - 11 15
E   info@gtz.de
I   www.gtz.de
